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posals for a peaceful and political solution The proposals of the Libyan leadership With respect to the situation in Eritrea, although Comrade Werner Lamberz had on the settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian the Soviet Union has viewed and still views agreed with Mengistu Haile Mariam on conflict have been carefully examined in this in conformity with the UN and OAU working papers in December 1977. Moscow. We have communicated to the resolutions as an internal Ethiopian matter. The attitude of the representatives of Ethiopians the recent Libyan desire to re- We favor a political solution of this ques- the Eritrean Liberation Movement illusceive in Tripoli the chairman of the Provi- tion by negotiations between the central gov- trated, on the other hand that, under the pressional Military Administrative Council ernment and the Eritrean organizations. It sure by the leadership of the Sudan and the (PMAC), based on the fact that only the is our strong conviction that the current at- Arab reaction, there has been a strengthenEthiopian side itself can make a decisions titude of the Eritrean organizations which ing of nationalist, openly separatist forces in this respect. The Ethiopian side had pre- favor the separation of Eritrea from Ethio- within the Eritrean movements, especially viously communicated to us that Mengistu pia contradicts the interests of the Ethiopian by means of the coordination between the could not come to Libya at the end of Feb- Revolution and the progressive forces in this Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the ruary for negotiations with Siad Barre, for area and is only of advantage to the imperi- Eritrean Liberation Front (Revolutionary reasons which the PMAC chairman told you alists and the reaction.
Libya and other progressive Arab states The leader of the Eritrean People's LibThe Libyan side is aware of the Soviet can use their authority and influence to con- eration Front, Aforki, presented the demand position with respect to the procedure for a vince the Eritrean organizations to terminate for a separate Eritrean state in even harsher political settlement in the area of the Horn the fighting and go the way of a peaceful terms. Only after long sharp discussion was of Africa. We have fully explained our point solution of the Eritrean problem in the he willing to agree to this second meeting of view during your recent visit to Moscow. framework of a unified Ethiopian state. and to the further examination of the proThere is only one just basis for the settle
posals made by the SED. Thus it was posment of the conflict - this is the mutual re- (Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.0351 sible to hold the second meeting. In the spect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 127; document obtained and translated by course of the meeting, the representatives non-interference in domestic matters of the Christian F. Ostermann.)
of the Ethiopian leadership and the EPLF other side. All attempts to achieve a politi
reiterated their known positions. They accal settlement on any other basis were bound SED official Hermann Axen to E. cepted the SED proposal - this proposal was, to destabilize such a solution and burden it Honecker, 18 April 1978, enclosing as is well known, agreed to by the CC of with new difficulties.
Draft Letter from Honecker to the CPSU - to put the following four points The withdrawal of Somali troops from Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, before the Provisional Military Administrathe Ogaden is only a step in the right direc
19 April 1978
tive Council and the Central Committee of tion, conditioned by the existing situation.
the EPLF as recommendations for a settleThe conditions for a settlement as officially Enclosure: Honecker to Brezhnev, 19 ment: announced by the Somali leadership, in our April 1978
1. Both sides confirm their resolve to opinion, only served to postpone the start Esteemed Comrade Leonid Ilyich stop the bloodshed immediately and bring of negotiations. These conditions, as is Brezhnev!
about a political solution. known, touch upon the sovereign rights of On 23 March 1978, the second meet- 2. The Provisional Military AdminisEthiopia and upon problems which lie in its ing between the representatives to the Pro- trative Council of Ethiopia will make a pubdomestic realm. The solution of the national visional Military Administrative Council of lic declaration expressing its concrete proquestion in the Ogaden belongs to this. Socialist Ethiopia and the Eritrean Libera- posals for the implementation of regional
One cannot disregard the fact that the tion Front took place. Upon request by the autonomy for Eritrea in the framework of USA and other Western powers, which ver- Politburo of the CC of the SED, Comrade the Ethiopian state and under inclusion of bally favor a settlement of the conflict at Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo all willing positive forces in Eritrea. the Horn of Africa, in fact seek to make such and CC secretary, participated in the talks. The Central Committee of the EPLF a settlement more difficult in order to (Berhanu Bayeh and Aforki declared recognizes the achievements of the Ethiostrengthen their position in this area. again their desire to terminate the bloodshed pian Revolution and declares itself ready for
In our opinion the main task now is to and to do everything to solve the Eritrean cooperation in the interest of implementaput the settlement of the conflict at the Horn problem by peaceful means.)
tion of regional autonomy. of Africa on the tracks of peaceful negotia- Despite this declaration made by both 3. Revolutionary Ethiopia's secure actions. The solution of this problem can not negotiators, the political negotiations cess to the Red Sea must be guaranteed by depend on whether Ethiopia and Somalia showed that the positions on both sides had its uninterrupted access lines and its concan achieve agreement on all other problems become stiffer.
trol over Asmara and the ports of Massawa in their relationship. It is now especially im- The representative of the Provisional and Assab. portant to influence the Somali leadership Military Administrative Council was in- 4. Both sides form a common commisto assume a constructive position and to clined to favor a predominantly military sion for the purpose of implementing the avoid giving the imperialist and other reac- solution of the Eritrean problem. They did above points and all other steps for the setionary forces the opportunity to exploit not make any concrete or constructive pro- curity of the Revolution in Ethiopia and regional autonomy in Eritrea.
regional autonomy of Eritrea in the frame- The CPSU also works in this direction. It was agreed to inform the leadership work of the Ethiopian state in order to com- It agreed to receive an ELF-RC delegation organizations of Ethiopia and of the EPLF municate them at the appropriate time to the led by Ahmed Mohammed Nasser at the and have them communicate their positions Chairman of the Provisional Military Ad- level of the USSR Solidarity Committee on on the results of the second meeting and the ministrative Council, Mengistu Haile a confidential internal basis around 20 May proposals of the SED at a third meeting in Mariam.
1978. We will use these contacts in order to the GDR in mid-May.
induce the representatives of the ELF-RC Thus the second meeting undermined
to have direct contact with the Provisional all attempts by the representatives of the (Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ Military Administrative Council. The objecEPLF to break off all political contacts and 127; document obtained and translated by tive is to find an appropriate solution for negotiations with the Provisional Military Christian F. Ostermann.)
Eritrea within the framework of the EthioAdministrative Council of Ethiopia (as they
pian state. We do not have the intention to had previously intended to do).
Memorandum of Conversation between hide from Ahmed Nasser our policy toward But the situation involves the acute [SED) Comrade Friedel Trappen and a unified Ethiopia. The policy of the CPSU danger that the fighting over Eritrea will Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky in is aimed at the unity of Ethiopia. We will escalate and that the Arab reaction and the the CC of the CPSU, 11 May 1978 try to convince Ahmed Nasser that the fuimperialists will intervene even further and
ture development of the Eritrean people can attempt to internationalize the conflict. This [Other participants)
only evolve in a unified Ethiopian state. In would severely endanger the revolutionary Ulyanovsky:
the discussions we will continue to pursue developments in Ethiopia.
As Comrade B.N. Ponomarev has al- the line of emphasizing the unity between The Politburo of the CC of the SED is ready pointed out in the last conversation the Marxist-Leninist forces and nationalof the opinion that everything has to be done with the comrades of the SED, the CC of democratic forces in Ethiopia and Eritrea. to achieve a political solution of the Eritrean the CPSU considers the talks of the SED We would like to stress that we have question. The safeguarding of the revolu- with the Eritrean movements and the Ethio- to be extremely tactful in our relations with tionary process in Ethiopia and its territo- pian side very useful and positive. We can Mengistu Haile Mariam and the PMAC, in rial as well as political integrity is a neces- still say this today. On this basis one should particular with respect to the Eritrean quessary precondition for this. The Provisional approach the next meeting in June as well tion. Military Administrative Council must as other meetings. We consider the four Mengistu Haile Mariam does not have doubtless have reliable control over its free points agreed on at the last meeting as posi- an easy stand within the PMAC in this reaccess to the Red Sea. This, however, must tive. If both sides really take the four points gard. In connection with the well-known Dr. be safeguarded by political and military as a starting point, this would be positive Negede (Gobeze) affair tensions have means. It is our impression following the for further development. We are of the opin- heightened within the PMAC and this has recent meeting that the Provisional Military ion that the following main points should not made Mengistu's task any easier. Administrative Council is only oriented to- be emphasized:
We would like to emphasize that all wards the military tasks in this matter and, a) The political solution of the prob- concrete initiatives on the Eritrean questions despite repeated verbal assurances, has not lem and an end to the bloodshed.
have to originate from Ethiopia. This does made any concrete political steps in win- b) The granting of regional autonomy not mean that the Eritrean side is free of any ning over the Eritrean population for the for Eritrea, but, however, no separate na- initiatives. If we put the entire weight on implementation of regional autonomy. tional independence.
the Mengistu Haile Mariam's shoulders and We therefore think that the Provisional c) The unconditional use of Ethiopia's free Ahmed Nasser or respectively Aforki Military Administrative Council should communications with the ports on the Red of any responsibility, this would be onewithout further delay address an appeal to Sea.
sided. The Ethiopian side is watching with all willing forces in Eritrea for the peaceful d) The increased unification of the pro- great jealousy the actions of the CPSU and political solution of the Eritrean problem. It gressive forces on both sides.
the SED. Here as well one has to see the would have to render more precisely the This would be a deeply satisfying plat- connection between Mengistu Haile proposals it has made so far by concrete form which could be developed further. Mariam's position and the people around suggestions on the implementation of the The points agreed upon in the March him. Mengistu Haile Mariam deserves to be right for self-determination of the different meeting are contained in these proposals and regarded by us as a man who represents innations within Ethiopia in order to speed up hence could be developed further at the June ternationalist positions. By contrast to him, the process of differentiation within the meeting. This would create a real founda- Berhanu Bayeh and Fikre Selassie as well Eritrean population and to isolate the reac- tion for the rapprochement of both sides. The as Legesse Asfaw and others, for example, tionary, separatist forces in Eritrea. main question is, how honestly, how genu- are marked by nationalism although they are
Based on the results of the last meet- inely, and how deeply both sides will com- faithful to Mengistu Haile Mariam. ing, the Politburo of our Party proposes ply with these points. If one could say to- All steps and initiatives on the part of therefore that the Soviet comrades, in con- day that the four points are fulfilled by both the CPSU, the CP Cuba, and the SED must junction with representatives of our Party, sides or will soon be fulfilled, this would be be put forward extremely tactfully and carework out internally possible solutions to the a great relief for us.
fully not to cause any protests. Frankly, the problem lies to a certain degree in the fact great, and huge task to get the people of the Eritrean people will be achieved within that we all attempt to square the circle. The Eritrea on the side of the Ethiopian Revolu- the framework of a Ethiopian state. We reone side of the problem is - and we are both tion. Preparations have been made but no ceived an information (report) in early May working on this - to solve the problem on concrete steps and measures. The Soviet according to which direct contacts had been an internationalist basis. On the other hand comrades have told Mengistu Haile Mariam established between the PMAC and the there are efforts to solve it on a nationalist and Legesse that it was now important to EPLF. We do not know anything about the basis. This is precisely why, I emphasize show the Eritrean people that the PMAC is substance of these contacts. With respect to again, we have to apply maximum caution, not identical with the regime of Emperor the concrete question whether it makes sense circumspection, and tactfulness towards Haile Selassi and the interests of the Ethio- to continue the negotiations or to await miliMengistu Haile Mariam so that the nation- pian Revolution are in harmony with the tary actions, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated alists will not grasp him by the throat. interests of the progressive forces in Eritrea. that both sides had to be induced to (take
In our contacts and talks with Ahmed Unfortunately, forces in the PMAC and part in) further negotiations and that at the Nasser we intend to make it unmistakably Mengistu Haile Mariam himself have same time a certain limited military presclear to him that it is necessary that all revo- caused a slow-down of this necessary po- sure was quite useful, meaning that even lutionary forces join together and that the litical work towards the people of Eritrea. with the continuation of the negotiation efEritrean problem is not only a national but Mengistu Haile Mariam is passive.
forts certain military actions could not be above all a class problem which has to be We completely agree with the estimate precluded. solved by the common fight against the im- that military actions for the solution of the Concerning the question on the conperialists and the Arab reaction.
Eritrean question alone are pointless and, crete coordination between the CPSU, the Efforts to split up Ethiopia and create moreover, dangerous. They would widen the SED, and the Cuban CP, Comrade a separate Eritrean state, to refuse to give gap between the Eritrean people and the Ulyanovsky emphasized that all bilateral Ethiopia access to the ports on the Red Sea, Ethiopian Revolution and create new inten- contacts with the Cuban CP are excellent to drive the Soviet Union and the other So- sified hatred. This does not mean that the and that the same applied to the SED. There cialist countries out of this region, are not PMAC should completely abandon military has been no exchange of opinion with the simply a national problem but a problem of activities. We think that it is necessary to People's Democratic Republic of Yemen on international class warfare, not to speak of exert military pressure on the Eritrean sepa- the part of the CPSU. They have, as is well the fact that such a separate state would be ratists forces. This especially since in regard known, pulled their troops out of Ethiopia. manipulated by the Sudan and Saudi Arabia to military matters the current situation in One has to take into consideration that the and their petrol dollars.
Eritrea is not favorable for the PMAC. It is situation in the PDR Yemen is difficult. The We will therefore point out to Ahmed therefore necessary to talk but at the same PDR Yemen has to be protected. Nasser, who claims to be a Marxist, the na- time to act militarily on the part of the Comrade Ulyanovsky agreed to put the tional and international dimension of the PMAC. This applies in particular to the safe- proposal for the creation of a mechanism Eritrean problem.
guarding of important military strategic po- for consultation and coordination before the Concerning the questions put forward sitions and especially of the communica- leadership of the CPSU. Concerning the by Comrade Trappen I would like to add tions with the ports of Massawa and Assab question of a possible later public announcethe following consideration:
well as the capital Asmara, the cities ment of our parties on the Eritrean question The basic difficulty is the fact that sepa- Akordat, Keren, and Barentu. These mili- (in some form), it is expedient to examine ratist ideas have been rooted in Eritrea for a tary actions have to serve political measures. this in the light of the Moscow talks with long time. These ideas are very popular It was emphasized in the talk between Ahmed Nasser and the planned third meetamong the population, especially among the Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and Mengistu Haile ing of the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides with workers. This factor, the factor of the erring Mariam that it is necessary for the PMAC the SED. of the masses based on nationalism, is a to address itself to the Eritrean people. This With respect to the question of expert given one. The main difficulty therefore is political initiative is extremely acute today consultations on variants of a solution, it is that the mass of the Eritrean population does as never before. We deem it necessary that possible at any time for GDR scientists (spenot understand the difference between the both the CPSU and the SED together exert cialists] to consult with Soviet comrades imperial regime of Haile Selassi and the influence on Mengistu Haile Mariam in this about concrete questions. Comrade policy of the PMAC.
respect. We have to take into consideration Ulyanovsky thinks that at this point these The fight continues as in earlier times that the position of the Eritrean movements contacts should be limited to the level of under the imperial regime. This creates the has not become any less obstinate, because the International Relations Departments of great necessity for intensified political work they still demand the separation of Eritrea. the Central Committees. With respect to the by the PMAC and above all by Mengistu This shows that there are no honest efforts involvement of CPSU experts in the conHaile Mariam towards the Eritrean popula- for a political solution on the part of the sultation and negotiations at the third meettion. It was particularly this point that Com- Eritrean representatives. Therefore it is cor- ing, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated that he rade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev discussed with rect to work for a change in the current po- would put this question before the party Mengistu Haile Mariam during his trip to sition of the Eritrean movements. It is espe- leadership for decision. Concerning the Moscow.
cially necessary to receive from them a dec- guarantees called for by the Eritrean side, The PMAC is confronting a decisive, laration pledging that self-determination for one can only get more precise on this point after concrete results have been achieved on character of the Ethiopian Revolution. 1978, Memorandum of a Conversation the question of what, who, and to whom in 2. It acknowledges the importance of between [SED] Comrade Grabowski some matter guarantees might be given. the Soviet-Cuban support.
and the Head of the Third African Finally, Comrade Ulyanovsky pointed 3. It does not demand preconditions. Department of the Soviet] MFA, out that the attempt to keep the Ethiopian 4. It is willing to negotiate.
[CPSU] Comrade Sinitsin leadership from its military advance through 5. It favors the unification on a comus was a very delicate matter. The PMAC mon democratic basis.
On Mengistu's speech of 14 June was predominantly of the opinion that even The Soviet comrades estimate that the The speech contains statements which a political solution of the Eritrean question attitude of the ELF appears to be slightly can hardly be read without concern. One still was not possible without a strengthening of more flexible as those of the other Eritrean has to assume that the military actions of Ethiopia's military positions in Eritrea and movements but this is, however, only an ap- the separatists have to be energetically opthat the liberation of above-mentioned ports pearance.
posed, that full and effective control by the and cities can only be achieved by military
PMAC and the Ethiopian armed forces over means. The PMAC assumed that only then (Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ the cities in the north of the country and their (would) actual and basic conditions exist for 127; obtained and translated by Christian access lines has to be assured. But obviously negotiations with the separatists. [...] F. Ostermann.]
this was not everything that the speech
meant to convey. Intentions for a complete (Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ Winkelmann, SED CC Department of military solution of the Eritrean problem 127; document obtained and translated by
shine through. One cannot recognize any Christian F. Ostermann.)
to Hermann Axen, 9 June 1978 new constructive or concrete suggestions on
how to proceed politically. But this is exSED Department of International
actly what would be necessary in the curRelations, Information on talks of
Comrade Ponomarev is sending cordial rent situation and in the context of correAhmed Nasser (ELF-RC) in the USSR greetings to you. In his opinion, Mengistu's sponding necessary military actions. Solidarity Committee, 7- 8 June 1978 recent speech does not allow for any [new] Obviously those forces within the
conclusions with respect to the (Ethiopian- Ethiopian leadership which have always We received the following information Eritrean) talks in Berlin. Everything should favored a one-sided military solution have from the CC of the CPSU:
be done as agreed upon. Even after this gained ground. It also seems important that The representatives of the Soviet Com- speech there is no reason for any nervous- there is heightened concern about the posmittee for Solidarity explained the USSR
sibility of a new delay of a solution of the position which is based on the assumption Comrade Ponomarev had a long talk problem contributing to a renewed destabithat the solution of the Eritrean question has with Comrade Valdez Vivo on 9 June in lization of the revolutionary regime. to be achieved within the framework of a which he also had an exchange of views On Ethiopia's international situation unified Ethiopian state by means of nego- about Mengistu's recent speech. The speech The predominant majority of Arab tiations.
is considered as mostly positive. It corre- states is increasingly moving against EthioIn effect, the three talks which were sponds for the most part with the recom- pia. One should under no circumstances held with Ahmed Nasser proved that the mendations of the Soviet and Cuban com- underestimate the danger involved in the Eritrean friends are not yet willing to ap- rades with respect to the current situation clash between the positions of the reactionproach the question by giving up the slogan and the necessary measures. It is in harmony ary and progressive Arab regimes in the of independence for Eritrea. Their argumen- with the agreements which have been made Eritrean question which is heightened by the tation is that neither side should coerce the with Mengistu.
present policy of the Ethiopian leadership. other one into negotiations and a solution Mengistu's speech, which contains the Basically, only the People's Democratic could only be a result of unconditional ne- necessary elements for a peaceful solution Republic of Yemen is granting real support gotiations.
of the problem, is the basis for the further for the Ethiopian Revolution. Algeria is actIn the first conversation on 7 June, A. work. Mengistu will travel in the next days ing in a very reserved way: while acknowlNasser indicated that the ELF-RC would to Asmara. It is planned to hold a meeting edging the achievements of the Ethiopian possibly consent to a federation. In the fol- with the population in which Mengistu will Revolution, it does hardly anything concrete lowing talks it was not mentioned again, and explain his program for a peaceful solu- in support. Syria and Iraq have clearly exby the time the third talk took place on 8 tion. His recent speech is the prelude to this pressed once more in recent days that they June, the position of the Eritrean friends had action.
intend to give support to the [Eritrean] sepaeven hardened.
ratists, including military supplies. The Iraqi Generally they were at pains to prove
leadership is also interested in strengthenthat the ELF was the best, the (most] Marx- (Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/ ing in every way the pro-Baathistic elements ist-Leninist of the Eritrean movements. 127; document obtained and translated by in Eritrea. The Libyan position is quite unThey pointed out their advantages as fol- Christian F. Ostermann.)
clear. Even though they rhetorically recoglows:
nize the achievements of the Ethiopian 1. The ELF recognizes the progressive GDR Embassy in Moscow, 19 June Revolution, they, however, less and less ex
plicitly oppose the separation of Eritrea. The gression was not condemned.
constructive solutions.” It is remarkable that impression that the Libyan leadership basi- Nevertheless, an intervention by the Ahmed Nasser has pointed to this question cally favors the Arabization of Eritrea is not Arab countries in Eritrea should run into during his talks with the Soviet comrades far off. In no case does it want to see rela- considerable opposition within the OAU. in Moscow. The Soviet comrades, however, tions among the Arab states, especially This is in part the effect of the still deeply have no indication that these advances are among the countries of the rejection front, rooted traditional fear and resistance of the actually effective. One has to assume that be burdened by the Eritrean question. The African states against Arab expansionism. the USA would prefer a unified, reactionpressure exerted by Saudi Arabia and Egypt At the same time, none of the African coun- ary Ethiopia to a divided Ethiopia. By uscan definitely be felt. It is difficult to say tries seriously wants to endanger its rela- ing the unity slogan, they are trying to actiwhether Arab countries will be willing to tions with the Arab states. This altogether vate those reactionary and nationalist forces, deploy troop contingents in Eritrea against very passive and inconsistent attitude of which no doubt still exist, against the revoEthiopia. They will undoubtedly take into many African countries and of the OAU was lutionary regime. consideration that the predominant major- not an unimportant factor which led the Considering all these aspects it is not ity of African countries would oppose such Ethiopian leadership to recognize that in surprising that the USA, Italy, and France a move. In their view, Eritrea is a part of practice only the Socialist countries are have officially opposed Eritrean separatism. Ethiopia. A separation of Eritrea would run Ethiopia's real and principal allies.
It is also symptomatic that the United States counter to their national interest as strong Among the imperialist countries, one is making obtrusive efforts to prove that it separatist movements exert de-stabilizing has to pay particular attention to the efforts was they who recommended to Siad Barre influence in many African countries. and activities of the USA, Italy, and France. to withdraw his troops from Ethiopia. The
It is remarkable that similar consider- Their situation in Ethiopia and also with cautious handling of aid to Somalia also ations make even (Sudanese President Jafaar respect to the Eritrean question is quite deli- shows that the USA on no account intend to Al-) Numeiri waver. His attitude toward cate. All imperialist countries, of course, are keep their relations with Ethiopia - in the Ethiopia has become more careful, despite interested in the elimination of the Revolu- long run - strained. The USA and China are pressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Be- tionary achievements in Ethiopia and in the using Somalia and the provocative actions sides the Southern problem, several other establishment of a pro-Western regime. by Somalia against Ethiopia - which are questions (refugees from Eritrea, interest in They are putting all their efforts toward this above all intended to have a de-stabilizing the use of the Nile) impel him to keep up goal. The NATO countries, led by the USA, effect—more for anti-Soviet than antisomewhat normal relations with Ethiopia. base their efforts on the sober assumption Ethiopian purposes. They understand that
The African countries are in principle that a frontal attack would hardly help to support of the Eritrean separatists would also opposed to a change of borders. In this ques- achieve their goals, would only foster the be directed against the rea nary forces in tion the progressive (countries) and those basic anti-imperialist mood of the Ethiopian Ethiopia. countries which are largely dependent on the people and its leadership and drive Ethio- With respect to Somalis, the USA are West coincide in their views, though the lat- pia even closer into the hands of the Social- intent on establishing a foothold and bringter fear the revolutionary changes in Ethio- ist community of states. The USA in no case ing the leadership of the country under their pia. The common danger has even led to a wants to burn all its bridges to Ethiopia. To firm control. In this regard attention has to rapprochement between Ethiopia and the best of their abilities, they want to de- be paid to the fact that they also do not conKenya. Kenya appears more aggressive and stabilize the situation in Ethiopia and the sider Barre a solid partner. They assume that positive [in this question) than some pro- revolutionary regime, and undermine and he would deceive even the West. Neverthegressive African states. Tanzania's attitude subvert the revolutionary development in less, it is to be expected that Barre will soon has a very positive effect as it consistently Ethiopia. The imperialists aspire to take ad- make a trip to the USA. He wants to gain and convincingly opposes the separation of vantage of ethnic conflicts, exploit the so- military support in the amount of $1 billion. Eritrea. Nigeria, which is under strong pres- cial instability of the leadership, and encour- There are indications that the USA is willsure by the USA and in which the OAU has, age nationalist feelings in an effort to fur- ing to give $50 million. as is well known, much influence, already ther stiffen the Ethiopian attitude in the With respect to similar "military abshowed itself to be wavering during the ag- Eritrean question and thereby aggravate the stention" by China, without doubt other gression by Somalia. Guinea, which has re- situation of the revolutionary regime. One motives play a role: the Chinese leadership cently repeatedly pointed out the war of na- also has to take quite seriously the skillful does obviously not consider it opportune to tional liberation by the Eritrean people, attempts, in particular by the USA, to launch display its military weakness in public - and gives Ethiopia more headaches than support. such arguments as “why should the solu- especially in such a burning spot of interna
In sum it can be said that the OAU does tion of the Eritrean problem be done only tional politics. Light arms are less revealnot want to allow for a confrontation and is by way of cooperation with the Soviet Union ing, yet they will not allow Somalia to wage looking for ways to confirm the inviolabil- and the Socialist countries,” “a certain co- a large war against Ethiopia. In addition, ity of borders and the territorial integrity. operation with the USA and the West could China does not want to strain its relations How little consistent and passive the OAU certainly be useful,” “the USA after all have with Africa any further. is, is proved by the fact that Ethiopia has considerable possibilities in effectively in- With respect to the domestic situation received little support and that - due to the fluencing Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other in Somalia, one has to first emphasize that fear of a possible split - even Somalia's ag- Arab countries,” “the West has to offer quite Barre is continuing to exploit nationalist slo