troops. Prior to this time, create a widespread general opinion with condemnations of the actions of the opposition, which is sentencing the population of Afghan cities. to death from starvation. With the backdrop of such general opinion the escort of convoys by our units would appear to be a naturally humanitarian step. In addition, under this scenario, a number of sections of the road would have to be surmounted with a fight each time.

Fourth scenario. Withdraw almost all Soviet troops by February 15. Officially affirm the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent in a corresponding statement. But, under the pretext of transferring some posts on the Afghan Side of the HairatonKabul highway, leave Soviet units in some of the more important points, including in the Salang pass. Avoid creating much noise, on our part, about this action; note only that this is but a small number of Soviet military personnel who were slightly delayed by the fact that the Afghan side has not yet taken over from them the stated posts. After some time, as in the third scenario, begin escorting convoys to Kabul under our military protection.

Under all these scenarios we can begin with the fact that these operations would be undertaken by our regular units, but they must be formed on a volunteer basis, primarily from among military personnel who are serving out their duties in Afghanistan or those that have served their term and are now in Soviet Union. In conjunction with this, offer a salary of 800-1000 rubles per month, partially in Afghan currency, for the rank-and-file and significantly increase the officers' salaries as well.

Give international observers the right - and announce this widely to verify whether we are actually escorting civilian goods. In the nearest future, talks should be held with the UN Special coordinator of humanitarian and economic assistance programs Aga Khan with the aim of using these programs and the mechanism of the Special coordinator in order to counteract the extremists' plans to stifle Kabul and other large Afghan cities with an economic blockade.

In the talks with Aga Khan it should be suggested that UN convoys of foodstuffs, petroleum products, and medical supplies go not only through Pakistan, but, to a significant extent, through Soviet Union.

In all of the four enumerated scenarios it is intended that at least an insignificant number of Soviet troops is to be left behind after 15 February 1989.

There still remains to be examined yet another, fifth, scenario - Soviet forces are withdrawn completely before 15 February, but we give the Afghan Side additional assistance, including financial, in the organization of the defense of the Hairaton-Kabul highway using their own forces, up to the point of completely providing for these Afghan units for a determined time-period, though, undoubtedly, this would be tied to considerable difficulties, especially in ensuring a dependable convoy escort.

As for the Kabul airport, keeping in mind its importance, it is expedient to have there, with the conclusion of corresponding agreements with the Afghan Side, our own control tower staff, numbering up to 100 people.

2. From the side of the Afghan government a question has been raised concerning the continuation of air assaults and bombardments of the armed opposition forces carried out by Soviet aviation from our territory after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The difficulty of this question is being explained to the Afghan comrades; they are being advised to think about how to make better use of the capabilities of their own aviation under the new circumstances. On the whole, our explanations have been received with understanding, but, at the same time, they say that in some of the more critical situations, the use of Soviet aviation may be simply indispensable. It appears that this question cannot be examined without taking into account all the internal and external factors.

3. The Afghan Side assigns serious significance to having at its disposal such powerful types of weapons as the R-300 rockets and batteries of "Hurricane" multirocket launchers. These questions evidently require a differentiated approach to this or another type of weapon, but the general line should be directed, inasmuch as is possible, towards a more complete satisfaction of Afghan requests. It should be kept in mind that the very fact of possessing such types of weapons would strongly reinforce our friends psychologically and give them confidence in their forces. Taking this into account, batteries of "Hurricane" have already been set up in the Special Guards and the

RA [Republic of Afghanistan] army. The R300 rocket batteries, which are currently with the Soviet military contingent, may also be transferred to the Afghan Side after modifying them to an export model and after the preparation of Afghan personnel for use and maintenance of these units, which should be quickly carried out on our territory.

4. It would be expedient to positively decide the question concerning the use of the USSR border force capacities in the Afghan border zone, keeping in mind, however that the Soviet mobile border groups currently stationed there will not remain.

5. Lately, we have been doing quite a bit to give the Afghan friends economic assistance in accordance with exactly those difficulties that Afghanistan is in. This assistance, despite all kinds of difficulties with which both we and the Afghans met during its shipment and distribution, has without a doubt averted numerous undesirable turns in the situation's development.

Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty of the Afghan situation, we must once again very carefully re-examine the current economic processes which are of the utmost importance to its internal political situation. We must determine what can be done additionally to improve the Afghan economy which is in a critical state and, in effect, on the brink of ruin; we must give operational assistance to solve the acute problems which are arising, in particular through the shipments if foodstuffs and goods of first necessity to Kabul and various provinces of the country, including Badakhshan.

6. In conjunction with all these measures, it is necessary, as before, to continue giving the Afghan Side assistance in ironing out relations with the opposition in Pakistan, Iran, and Western Europe. We must pay attention to every nuance of the opposition's mood to catch the more suitable moments when we can use the necessary influence to split it, separating the "moderates" from the extremists. In particular, right now it is important to support the mission of the representative of the Secretary-General of the UN B. Sevan who has agreed to work towards the creation of a consulting panel for resolving the future government structure of Afghanistan.

Through our diplomatic channels, it will be necessary to take continuing steps in our work with all countries which are in one way or another connected to the con

flict in Afghanistan.

Special attention should be paid towards supporting contacts with the Pakistani Side, using the upcoming talks involving the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Islamabad.

8. It is essential to carry on even more goal-oriented propaganda work concerning Afghanistan, for which all scenarios of developments in the Afghan situation must be thoroughly analyzed ahead of time. Of particular importance will be the securing of propaganda concerning the decision to introduce martial law in Afghanistan, if such is taken by President Najibullah.

E.Shevardnadze V. Chebrikov A.Yakovlev D.Yazov V. Murakhovskii V. Kryuchkov

23 January 1989 #65/OS

20 copies

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 4; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 13 May 1989, with report by ZaikovShevardnadze-Yazov-Kryuchkov

Proletarians of the World, Unite! Communist Party of the Soviet Union CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No P158/6

To com. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov, Baklanov, Belousov, Kryuchkov, Belyakov, Pavlov A., Falin

Excerpt from the protocol no. 158 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU on 13 May 1989

On additional measures to influence the Afghan situation

1. To agree wtih considerations of com. Zaikov L.N., Shevardnadze Ed. Y., Yazov D.T., Kryuchkov V.A., reported in the memorandum of 12 May 1989 (attached)

2. For the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the Committee on State Security [KGB] of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to take necessary measures for realization of the proposals in

During the almost three months since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the armed forces of the Republic manage to oppose the opposition supported by Pakistan, the USA, and Saudi Arabia. However, the enemy, who realises that its plans to overthrow the government of Najibullah may be in danger, does everything to increase its military pressure. It focuses on the seizure of Jalalabad in order to set up its "transitional government" and to lay seige to Kabul.

In view of preparations for a new massive assault on Jalalabad with a large involvement of the Pakistanis, all the way to the sending of Army formations camouflaged as "Malishi," we published a Declaration of the MFA USSR and undertook other measures of a preventive nature, including ones in covert channels.

Taking into account this development, it would be advisable to carry out a number of measures to bolster the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and to exert a constraining influence on the Afghan opposition and Pakistan.

1. Of special importance in the current situation is a constant display of powerful impact on the enemy by combat fire, its further intensification, the use of the most effective types of weaponry. In this regard, we should search for additional reserves to accelerate delivery of armaments and ammunitions into Afghanistan, particularly the

armament like R-17 missiles, air-defense equipment, and others.

2. The question about conducting bombing raids by Soviet aviation from the territory of the USSR requires additional study.

3. We should continue demonstrative relocations of our aircraft from Soviet airfields near the border with Afghanistan, having in mind that these relocations should be done without any camouflage so that they could be observed by the Pakistanis and the opposition. [We should] continue further the flights of the Soviet military reconnaissance aircraft over Afghanistan, particularly in the areas of Jalalabad and Khost, possibly at lower altitudes, with the aim of obtaining aero-photografic data about military concentrations of the enemy.

4. With regard to the idea of Najibullah about sending foreign volunteers to Afghanistan to render assistance to the government of the Republic in the repulsing of aggression, there is nothing to object to, if the Afghan friends do this kind of work with a number of countries, particularly Muslim

ones.

5. It is decided that we will continue a constant political-diplomatic campaign with the aim of influencing [public opinion] on the Afghan issue in the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and also insofar as one can use the capabilities of India, the Non-Aligned Movement. In particular, the Afghan theme will continue to be a focus in Soviet-American contacts. It is advisable to accept the proposal of Saudi Arabia to play a mediator's role between us and the Afghan opposition. We have in mind to take into account the anti-Afghan line of Pakistan in developing bilateral ties with this country.

L. Zaikov E. Shevardnadze D. Yazov V. Kryuchkov

12 May 1989 no. 390/os

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 35; trans. by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

Editor's Note: The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union ended years ago, but it thrives in two places: on the Korean peninsula, where communist North confronts capitalist South across the 38th parallel in a tense armed standoff; and between the United States and Cuba, where Fidel Castro remains in charge almost four decades after the revolution he led came to power in 1959-still passionately committed to socialism and still the nemesis of Washington, which refuses to recognize and regularly lambasts his government. Even as such Cold War landmarks as the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis recede into history, relations remain as problematic as ever, and as likely to become entangled in U.S. domestic politics. Presidents from Kennedy to Clinton have maintained an economic embargo on and refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Castro regime, and given at least rhetorical support to a Cuban emigre community in the United States that openly calls for its overthrow. Havana, in turn, has regularly denounced Washington as an imperialist bully seeking to strangle, subvert, and topple the Cuban revolution.

The past year (1996) provided ample evidence that Cold War-era acrimony continues to flourish across the narrow straits separating Cuba and Florida, as exemplified by the enactment in the United States of the "HelmsBurton Amendment" (a controversial law, sharply criticized in Europe, designed to punish firms or individuals doing business with Cuba); the fatal shooting-down by a Cuban air force fighter of a plane piloted by a U.S.based anti-Castro Cuban emigre group; and fervent anti-Castro declarations by both major presidential candidates in their election campaigns.

The translated East-bloc documents below, dealing with U.S.-Cuban relations during the Cold War period

of 1976-1981, thus constitute a source of potentially valuable insights both for historians and for analysts of current and future interactions between Washington and Havana. Although scholars (with few exceptions) still lack access to Cuban archives which might allow a more accurate and perceptive reconstruction of Cuban decisions, policies, and motives, the opening of other archives in the former communist world offer new opportunities to probe what was happening on “the other side" of the U.S.-Cuban impasse, and of Cold War events in which Cuba played a part. Elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, for example, appear translations of Russian on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and Russian and East German documents on the 1977-78 Horn of Africa events (as well as a rare instance of Cuban archival documents that have emerged, in this case relating to Havana's policies in Africa obtained by Prof. Piero Gleijeses).

All but one of the documents that follow were obtained from the Russian archives in connection with the "Carter-Brezhnev Project," a series of oral history conferences on U.S.-Soviet relations and the collapse of detente in the mid-1970s organized by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University in cooperation with the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and other academic and archival partner institutions. These documents, obtained from the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documention (TsKhSD) (the archival repository for records of the former Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1952-1991) and the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), both in Moscow, include:

* a background report on CubanAmerican relations, 1976-1979, prepared by the Soviet Embassy in Havana in the spring of 1979;

*

a record of a June 1979 conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Cuba and Fidel Castro regarding the recently-held Vienna summit between Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev;

*documents on the September 1979 "Cuban brigade" controversy, in which a political furor erupted in the United States over reports that a Soviet military brigade was stationed in Cuba; although the flap died down after it became evident that the Soviet force was a residual presence dating from the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis rather than a newly-deployed "combat" force (as some alleged), the episode side-tracked Congressional consideration of ratification of the just-signed SALT II treaty and exacerbated Soviet mistrust of the Carter administration;

a December 1979 analysis of current trends in U.S.-Cuban relations privately presented to the Soviet ambassador in Havana by the head of the responsible department of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee;

*the transcript (provided by the Cubans to the Soviet Embassy in Havana) of a secret November 1981 meeting in Mexico City between U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Cuban Vice President Carlos R. Rodriguez.

Of the Russian documents printed here, perhaps the Haig-Rodriguez transcript is the most surprising given the Reagan Administration's combative public stance toward Cuba at the time (when Haig, hinting at military action, said Washington should "go to the source" to stop Cuban support of leftist insurrections in Latin America). In their meeting, kept secret at the time, Haig and Rodriguez discussed current tensions in bilateral relations and also reviewed past disputes, such as the Cuban interventions in the Angola and Ethiopia crises examined elsewhere in this Bulletin. The Haig-Rodriguez encounter constituted a rare discussion

between senior officials of the two countries, and is all the more remarkable in that it occurred precisely at a moment of acute tension between them. Alas, the accuracy of this Russian transcript and other details concerning the meeting are difficult to ascertain at the moment, since records on this meeting apparently remain secret in both the U.S. and Cuban archives.

Presenting commentaries on the Russian documents noted above are two scholars who have authored numerous works on U.S.-Cuban relations: Peter Kornbluh, Senior Analyst and Director of the Cuba Documentation Project at the National Security Archive, a nongovernmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University in Washington, DC; and Jorge 1. Dominguez, Dillon Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and author of To

USSR Embassy in Cuba, “Informational Letter on Contemporary CubanAmerican Relations," 26 April 1979

EMBASSY OF THE USSR
TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

TOP SECRET Copy No. 4 Ser. No. 223

26 April 1979

INFORMATIONAL LETTER

ON CONTEMPORARYCUBAN

AMERICAN RELATIONS

Havana 1979

The process of relaxation in CubanAmerican relations, which was abruptly interrupted in 1976, commenced anew with the election of Jimmy Carter as president of the USA. The new American administration, by all appearances, is counting on the results of normalization in relations and expansion of trade with Cuba to restore certain positions in the economy and turn the country's difficulties to its own advantage. In this regard the question continues to surface regarding the possibilities inhering in a prospective "break" between Cuba and the USSR.

A large influence in the change of Carter's policies has been contributed by an

Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Harvard University Press, 1979).

In addition to the Russian documents, the translated materials include an excerpt from the East German transcript of a May 1980 summit meeting in Havana between Castro and the leader of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Erich Honecker, in which Castro presents his version of the "brigade" controversy of the previous autumn and other aspects of East-West relations. This excerpt, as well as a Castro-Honecker conversation in East Berlin in April 1977 also excerpted in this issue of the Bulletin, are from a larger collection of records of Honecker-Castro conversations between 1972 and 1989 obtained from the SED archives in Berlin by Christian F. Ostermann, a doctoral candidate at Hamburg University currently based at the National Security Archive, who has also joined the Cold War International

influential group of individuals in his close circle ([U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations] A. Young, [Democratic Senator from South Dakota] G. McGovern and others), who believe that the normalization of relations represents greater opportunities for the United States to neutralize the policies of Cuba toward Africa and Latin America.

As part of the new approach, the Americans have come out with official pronouncements about their readiness to commence discussions with Cuba on the problems existing between the two countries "without preliminary conditions." The Carter administration has also taken practical steps to reduce tensions in relations. Flights over Cuban territory by reconnaissance aircraft have been terminated; several measures have been undertaken to bring a halt to terrorist activity of Cuban revolutionaries on USA territory; and the prohibition of travel to Cuba has been relaxed. USA authorities have begun to warn the Cubans about hostile activities being planned by Cuban emigres, and a number of their participants have been arrested and prosecuted in the American courts.

The Cuban government has adopted a wait-and-see attitude, although in general it has reacted positively to these USA gestures. In a series of public statements, and also in the course of meetings with American senators and congressmen arriving in Havana during this period, Fidel Castro has indicated

History Project as Associate Director. Ostermann plans to analyze and present additional translated selections from the Honecker-Castro conversations in a future CWIHP publication.

Both the Russian and East German documents were obtained and translated via the collective efforts of the CFPD, the National Security Archive, and CWIHP. They and other declassified U.S. and East-bloc documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project are available for research at the National Security Archive, Gelman Library, 7th floor, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20037; e-mail: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; tel. (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005. The collection is part of the Russian and East-bloc Archival Documents Database (READD), maintained by the Archive and CWIHP. READD hopes to include Cuban documents if and when the archives in Havana become accessible to scholars.-James G. Hershberg

the readiness of Cuba in principle to improve relations with the United States, and as a mandatory condition has put forward the demand for an end to the economic blockade.

In early 1977, both countries undertook practical steps toward the goal of improving relations. In March, at the initiative of the Americans, the first direct negotiations at the level of deputy foreign ministers since the interruption of diplomatic relations took place in New York. In April, in Havana, agreements were signed concerning fishing rights within the 200-mile zone along with preliminary agreements on delimitation of the maritime economic zone. At the initiative of the Americans, interest sections have been opened in the embassy of Switzerland in Havana and the Republic of Czechoslovakia in Washington. American citizens with families living in Cuba have been granted the right for their families to visit the United States.

In late 1977, the policy of Cuba in Africa, in particular its international assistance to Ethiopia, put the brakes on the process of normalizing relations with the USA. However, in spite of threatening pronouncements in the press and from an array of congressmen concerning the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia, the USA administration refrained from exerting serious pressure on Havana and attempted to preserve the conditions for dialogue. In December 1977, at

the behest of Carter, Representatives F. Richmond and R. Nolan visited Cuba and expressed to Castro the president's concern in connection with the "growing Cuban intervention" in Ethiopia. In February 1978, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs S[antiago]. Roel Garcia, secretly visited here at the instructions of President L[opez]. Portillo and conveyed to Castro an oral message from [U.S.] Vice President [Walter] Mondale expressing the concern of the American government about the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. Through the intercession of Portillo, the position of principle held by Cuba on this question was communicated to Carter. It was represented that, in the case of necessity, the Cuban military specialists located in Ethiopia would take part in military operations only on the territory of that country.

In May 1978, during the course of the well-known events in the Zairian province of Shaba, which the Americans attributed to the Cuban presence in Africa, Fidel Castro met with the head of the American Interests Section in Havana, L[yle]. Lane, and through him transmitted to Carter an oral message in which he emphasized that Cuba "has no ties whatsoever" to the events in Shaba.

The USA government attempted to diminish the tensions arising in relations between the two countries during late 1978 in connection with the propaganda campaign in the USA centering around the issue over the supply of Soviet MiG-23 fighters to Cuba. In Havana, during a closed meeting between Fidel Castro and representatives of the Carter administration, the latter attempted to justify the resumption of flights over Cuba by USA reconnaissance aircraft on the grounds that the appearance of the MiG-23's had provoked significant anxiety in the United States and that the president had been forced to adopt a "position which would permit him to assure the American people that everything was being done to ensure the security of the country." The Americans also declared that the training of naval forces taking place off the Cuban coast was being carried out in the traditional region and was not being directed against Cuba. The Cuban side took this explanation under advisement.

Notwithstanding the developments outlined above, a certain amount of progress continued in connection with several specific questions regarding bilateral relations. In late 1977, in connection with the expiration of the temporary agreement on the delimitation of the maritime economic zone, the Americans proposed to conduct new negotiations. In December an agreement

was struck that conclusively strengthened the maritime boundaries between the two countries. In January 1978, an agreement was reached between the coast guards of the two countries calling for the rendering of assistance to vessels in distress in the Straits of Florida, common efforts against the trafficking of narcotics, and a halt to terrorist activity by Cuban counterrevolutionaries on USA territory.

The Cubans were permitted to open accounts in American banks, which was necessary, in part, for normal operation of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, which was also granted the right to transmit consular payments to Havana. Cuban emigres, living on USA territory, were permitted to send their relatives in Cuba up to 500 dollars every three months. American tourists visiting Cuba received the right to bring back into the United States goods having a value of up to $100 per person.

In response to these "gestures" from the Carter administration, the Cuban government freed three Americans who were serving sentences for espionage activity (out of eight). Readiness was declared to favorably examine the question concerning the remaining Americans being detained under the condition that the USA, for its part, would release the Puerto Rican freedom fighters Lolita Lebron and her three comrades [imprisoned for involvement in a November 1950 assassination attempt against President Harry Truman]. American citizens with families located here were returning to the United States (in all about 250 individuals); and persons having dual citizenship were permitted to leave.

A policy of dialogue continued between the parties. Exchanges of opinions on a wide variety of issues concerning bilateral relations took place among contacts at various levels, including those during closed meetings in Atlanta (USA) in August and in Cuernavaca (Mexico) in October 1978. In this connection the Americans emphasized that the principal impediment to full normalization of relations was the Cuban military presence in Africa. From their part they undertook efforts to exert pressure on Cuba in this regard, and to obtain at least a partial withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and Ethiopia. In this connection, official representatives of the American administration declared in closed meetings that if Cuba sincerely desired an improvement in relations, then it must make "positive steps” in the areas of “vital interest” to the USA located in Africa and Puerto Rico. For example, to begin with, the withdrawal of forces from Angola and Ethiopia would lead to a readiness by the USA to examine the

question of lifting the ban on the sale of medicine and certain types of equipment for the nickel industry. They pointed out that the presence of Cuban forces in Africa and the possibility of their intervention in Zimbabwe and Namibia was causing anxiety in the USA and preventing the president from reaching a decision in respect to the economic blockade. The Americans attempted to attain assurances that Cuba would not intervene militarily in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and exhorted Cuba to support Western plans for a "peaceful settlement" of those problems.

In response to the Americans it was firmly declared that Cuba would not impose any preliminary conditions on the normalization of relations with the USA but would not back down on questions of principle relating to its foreign policy. It was further emphasized that the solidarity of Cuba with African and other countries, and the internationalist assistance rendered by it to Angola and Ethiopia, could not be the subject for negotiations with the USA. "We will withdraw our forces from there," Castro stated in discussions with the Americans, "when conditions of peace and security are achieved there. And this will be done on the basis of agreement with the governments of those countries, and not as the result of pressure exerted by the USA."

It was indicated further that Cuba did not oppose a peaceful political settlement to the problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia, but that it refused to bind itself in connection with its future policy in that region, considering that the racist regimes might undertake such provocations and aggressive actions against Angola as would "demand a response." At the same time it was emphasized that Cuba adhered to a constructive position and consistently therewith was in favor of a peaceful settlement to conflicts, including those arising among African countries. As an example, they pointed to the efforts previously undertaken by the Cubans to attain a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, and the assistance rendered by them in support of an improvement in relations between Angola and Zaire.

In the course of meetings with official representatives of the Carter administration, Castro emphasized that the principal impediment to the normalization of relations was the economic blockade and the presence of the American base at Guantanamo. He stressed that Cuba regarded as highly immoral the policy of utilizing a blockade as an "instrument of pressure and imposition of demands." It was stated to the Americans that the problems of Africa and Puerto Rico