294

1960s because he believed weapons were being wasted. (Reported in Xinwen ziyou daobao [Press Freedom Guardian], 29 September 1995, 3.)

Publications: Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, scheduled for publication Spring 1996); Commission for Research on Party History, ed., Ho Chi Minh, 4th ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1995); Ho Chi Minh, Prison Diary, 9th ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994); Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Dien Bien Phu, 5th ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994); Gen. Giap, Unforgettable Days, 3rd ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994); Vien Su Hoc et al., Lich Su' Viet Nam, 1954-1965 (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Học Xa Hoi, 1995); William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); Xiangen Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing: Yuang yue hang Mei shilu [China secretly dispatched many troops: The real record of supporting Vietnam to resist America] (Jinan: Jinan, 1992); Yinhong Shi, Meiguo zai Yuenan de ganshe he zhanzheng, 19541968 [American intervention and war in Vietnam, 1954-1968] (Beijing: World Knowledge, 1993).

Cuba/Cuban Missile Crisis

Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs," Journal of Latin American Studies 27:1 (February 1995), 1-42.

Publications: Fabian Escalante, The Secret War: CIA covert operations against Cuba, 1959-1962 (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1995); Claudia Furati, trans. Maxine Shaw, ZR Rifle: The Plot to Kill Kennedy and Castro: Cuba Opens Secret Files (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1994); Carlos Lechuga, In the Eye of the Storm: Castro, Khrushchev, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The inside story by Cuba's former UN ambassador (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1995); Mark White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Macmillan, and New York: New York University Press, January 1996).

POLISH CRISIS

continued from page 277

collapse of Communism. Although he added some observations about events through the end of 1991, he decided to proceed with the publication of his book before he had consulted any newly opened archives. This decision was unfortunate, but it was not inexcusable for a scholar who had already completed a manuscript and who would have had to travel many thousands of miles to work in the former East-bloc archives, perhaps delaying the appearance of his book for a considerable time. The delay would have been worthwhile, but it was a judgment call for Zuzowski in 1992, and he obviously believed he should press ahead. press ahead.

In Grishin's case, the decision to forgo archival research is far less explicable. His overview of the Polish crisis covers very familiar ground, and thus he should have done his best to adduce new documentary evidence. Grishin did not complete his monograph until early 1993, well after secret ma

terials in both Warsaw and Moscow had been released and at the very time when sensitive files on the 1980-81 events were still freely available at the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow. (Severe restrictions were reimposed at the former Central Committee archive in April 1983, but that was after Grishin's book was finished.) Although Grishin is based at Kazan University in Tatarstan, rather than in Moscow, he could have traveled to the Russian capital (and ideally to Warsaw, too) at relatively little expense to consult the archives. His decision to rely exclusively on contemporaneous newspaper articles and on a few recent firsthand accounts largely negates whatever contribution his book might have made.

Perhaps if Grishin had pursued archival research, he would have been able to come

up with a more sophisticated presentation. To be sure, his book is a vast improvement over the lurid Soviet-era publications on the Polish crisis (e.g., Georgii Korchadnze's Zagovor protiv Pol'shi), and Grishin's discussion of Soviet policy toward Poland in 1980-81 is often insightful. But his book is a far cry from the scholarly standards that most Western (and, increasingly, many Russian) analysts would accept. Grishin is primarily interested in showing why the Polish leader, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, was justified in crushing Solidarity in December 1981. Grishin draws extensively and uncritically

on Jaruzelski's own account, Stan wojenny: dlaczego (published in Poland in 1992), and his book often seems little more than a reprise of the memoir. Aside from reiterating Jaruzelski's arguments, Grishin's other main goal (as he declares without any subtlety in his introduction) is to depict Solidarity in as negative a light as possible. For polemical purposes his book may have some value, but from a scholarly standpoint it is sorely deficient.

It is a pity that neither of the books under review takes advantages of opportunities afforded by the post-Communist era. Zuzowski's analysis has much to recommend it, and even Grishin occasionally has interesting things to say, but an authoritative reassessment of the Polish crisis will require detailed and critical archival research.

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on "the other side" the former Communist blocthrough publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Amb. Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP's endorsement of authors' views. Copies are available free upon request.

Cold War International History Project Bulletin
Issues 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996)
Woodrow Wilson International Ctr. for Scholars
1000 Jefferson Drive, SW
Washington, D.C. 20560

Tel.: (202) 357-2967; fax: (202) 357-4439
e-mail: wwcem 123@sivm.si.edu

Editor: James G. Hershberg
Managing Editor: P.J. Simmons
Associate Editor: Bonnie Southwick
Researchers: Andrew Grauer, Mark Torok,
Michelle King, Sara Kirchhoff, Anne Chiorazzi,
Helen Christakos

CONTINUED FROM FRONT COVER

In this issue, the Bulletin presents evidence from communist world archivesRussian, East German, Cuban-on many of the same issues that so bedeviled U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1970s: Angola, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Cuba, et al.

In large measure, the evidence presented here stems from the labors of the "CarterBrezhnev Project": a multi-year, multi-archival, international academic effort to explore the causes, consequences, and legacies of the collapse of superpower detente in the 1970s. The project was spearheaded by Drs. James G. Blight and janet Lang of the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University (organizer of similar conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis), with the active participation of an informal consortium of scholarly partners, including the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University; CWIHP; the Norwegian Nobel Institute; the Institute for Universal History, the Foreign Ministry archives, and the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow. (A report on some of the Project's early findings, on U.S.-Soviet relations at the outset of the Carter Administration, appeared in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 140-154.)

Many of the documents in this Bulletin were obtained and translated by the CarterBrezhnev Project in preparation for a series of conferences on the breakdown in U.S.Soviet relations in the late 1970s, held in Georgia in May 1994 (on the SALT II process), in Ft. Lauderdale in March 1995 (on superpower rivalry in the Third World), and in Lysebu, Norway in September 1995 (on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan); other translations, as well as accompanying articles and commentaries, were solicited by the Bulletin. (All documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project are available for research at the National Security Archive.)

Readers interested in these topics will also wish to obtain the first book to emerge from the Carter-Brezhnev Project: Odd Arne Westad, ed., The Fall of Detente: SovietAmerican Relations in the Carter Years (see box), which contains interpretive essays by noted scholars as well as recently declassified U.S. and East-bloc materials; other volumes are planned.

This Bulletin double issue also contains several other major chunks of important new evidence from communist archives:

* More New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia, following up on the previous Bulletin (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294

pp.) and a major conference organized by CWIHP and hosted by Hong Kong University in January 1996;

* More Russian Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis, providing another selection of declassified documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives and other materials to supplement those printed in Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995);

* New Evidence on Soviet DecisionMaking on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises, featuring an authoritive translation and annotation of the so-called "Malin Notes" of key Kremlin meetings during the crises, along with an introductory essay, by Mark Kramer of Harvard University—a remarkable window into how the Soviet leadership responded to a challenge to the communist empire that in many ways foreshadowed the terminal crisis of 1989; and finally

* Research Reports on Soviet Nuclear History: documents on the origins of the USSR's atomic project and on Nikita Khrushchev's 1960 troop cut.

*****

This Bulletin marks my final issue as Editor and as Director of the Cold War International History Project; beginning in January 1997 I took up a position as Assistant Professor of Diplomatic History and International Affairs at George Washington University. I am pleased to report that the Project is passing into able, enthusiastic, more linguistically-gifted, and perhaps more organized hands: David Wolff, formerly of Princeton University, the author of a major forthcoming study of Northeast Asian history, and fluent in Russian, Chinese, Japanese, German, and French, becomes CWIHP's new Director; and Christian F. Ostermann, research fellow at the National Security Archive, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin of reports on new evidence from the East German archives, and the author of a forthcoming study on relations between the German Democratic Republic and the United States, becomes Associate Director. I am also glad to say that I plan to remain closely associated with CWIHP, collaborating with my successors on transitional activities, contributing to future endeavors, editing CWIHP's Book Series, and perhaps even finding time after five years of administration to do more of my own research and writing on Cold War history. So this is not good-bye.

Nevertheless, I would like to express my gratitude to CWIHP's creators, supporters, friends, and collaborators for the chance to participate in the thrilling experience of peering behind (and trying to rip down entirely) the curtain of the last half-century of world history, and to work with an extraor

dinary group of people from around the world. Even more than the historical information it has gathered and disseminated, CWIHP's greatest achievement, I think, has been the creation of an international community of Cold War scholars, especially those who, on a daily and sometimes hourly basis, 24/7, constitute the CWIHP "network": Tom Blanton, Malcolm Byrne, Vlad Zubok, Mark Kramer, Jim Blight/janet Lang, Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, David Wolff, Christian Ostermann, Kathryn Weathersby, Hope Harrison, John Gaddis, Bill Taubman, Warren Cohen, Aleksandr Chubarian, Mikhail Narinsky, and the "group" in Moscow, Bill Burr, Ilya Gaiduk, Leo Gluchowski, Csaba Bekes, Norman Naimark, Priscilla Roberts, Sven Holtsmark, Bob Brigham, Ray Garthoff, Vojtech Mastny, Kostia Pleshakov, Allen Greb, Maxim Korobochkin, Mark Doctoroff, Piero Gleijeses, Daniel Rozas, Peter Kornbluh, and many others who have made the last five-and-a-half years such fun that the exasperation paled by comparison. And above all, thanks to Annie for putting up with everything and coming along for the ride. -Jim Hershberg

THE FALL OF DETENTE: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CARTER YEARS

Readers interested in the materials on the Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Detente in the 1970s should also consult a newly published volume which also emerges from the work of the Carter-Brezhnev Project: Odd Arne Westad, ed., The Fall of Detente: Soviet-American Relations in the Carter Years (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997).

The volume includes interpretive essays as well as key U.S., Russian, East German and other documents on SALT and Bilateral Relations, Regional Conflicts, and Afghanistan and After. For ordering information within North America, contact the Scandinavian University Press North America, 875 Mass. Ave., Ste. 84, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA; tel: 617/497-6515; toll-free: 800/498-2877; fax: 617/354-6875; e-mail: 75201.571@compuserve.com; e-mail orders outside North America: books@scup.no

Essays in the book include: Odd Arne Westad, "The Fall of Detente and the Turning Tides of History"; Olav Njolstad, "Keys of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of Detente"; Carol R. Saivetz, "Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of Detente"; Dan Caldwell, "The Demise of Detente and US Domestic Politics"; Odd Arne Westad, "The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 1978-1979"; John Lewis Gaddis, "Why Did the Cold War Last as Long as It Did?”

For additional information, contact Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute, Drammensveien 19, 0255 Oslo, Norway; fax: 47-22 43 01 68.