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and its concessional foreign aid pro- viet combat unit, created as a training

grams have ended. The Soviet Union center where Soviet military specialists CUBA AS SUPERPOWER: no longer exists, and the Russian Fed- train officers of the Cuban armed HAVANA AND MOSCOW, 1979

eration is unable and unwilling to pro- forces) to use and maintain new mili

vide Cuba with the funding and other tary equipment, has indeed been located by Jorge I. Dominquez support that permitted the latter to be- in Cuba.” He recalled Cuba's “experi

have as if it were a superpower. ence with previous confrontations with In 1979, Cuba behaved as if it were

The declassified documents from Americans regarding the Soviet military a superpower. Tens of thousands of Cu- the Soviet archives, which this note ac- presence on the island” and emphasized ban troops were stationed in Angola and companies, are drawn mainly from the that “we should not camouflage the real Ethiopia, and hundreds of other Cuban year 1979; even the document that dates state of affairs." Certainly, he emphamilitary advisers, trainers, and addi- from 1981 focuses principally on events sized, there should be no attempt to tional troops were posted to other coun

that had taken place at the end of the negate the presence of a training center tries across the seas. Cuba had interna- 1970s. None of the documents breaks on Cuba" because that would be intertional programs assisting about three major new ground;1 the basic issues preted “as a repudiation by Cuba and dozen countries in Africa, Latin

these documents discuss have been part the USSR of their right to create such a America, the Middle East, and South- of the public record for some time. But center and send the necessary military east Asia; many of these programs re

the documents do shed interesting light personnel” to Cuba. quired the overseas deployment of Cu- on a variety of questions, the most im- In fact, as the subsequent docuban personnel, while others provided portant of which is the nature of the So- ments indicate, the Soviets chose to training in Cuba itself for over 20,000

viet-Cuban relationship at what turned camouflage. Their response to the foreigners. In part for these reasons (and out to be the apex of their joint influ- United States acknowledged the presnotwithstanding Havana's tight alliance ence in world affairs.

ence of a “military training center” but with the Soviet Union), Cuba had been

In the summer of 1979, the United did not acknowledge that it was a “comelected chairman of the Nonaligned

States (re-)discovered the presence of bat unit," contrary to Cuba's preference. Movement at the time a significant or

a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. That In 1979, the Cuban leadership behaved ganization of African, Asian, Latin brigade had been left in Cuba since the

as good believers in democratic centralAmerican, and Caribbean countries- 1962 missile crisis consistent with the ism. Fidel Castro's own reassurances to and it hosted its sixth summit in Ha- same “trip-wire” concept that had led the United States emphasized that it was vana in September 1979.

the United States to keep troops in Eu- a military training center, with no refCuba was also the Soviet Union's rope. In each case, the forward forces erence to a “combat unit"-echoing the only truly reliable military ally in the posted by the respective superpower Soviet position exactly. Only in SepCold War, and the Cuban armed forces were deemed insufficient to stop an all- tember 1991, when the Russian Federaproved to be the only communist army

out invasion by the other superpower, tion government announced its decision capable of fighting effectively in dis- but the presence of those forward forces to withdraw the combat brigade from tant locales for objectives at best remote

had deterrent value: if an invasion were Cuba, did Havana publicly vent its anfrom the “cause" of the defense of the to occur, both superpowers would be ger that the Soviets had rejected Cuba's homeland. From the mid-1970s to the immediately and automatically locked advice in 1979. end of the 1980s, over 300,000 Cuban

in war. As it turned out, some time in Cuba believed that the Soviet potroops served abroad. In any given year,

the late 1960s the U.S. government lost sition in 1979 retreated from the prinrelative to its population, Cuba had track of the Soviet brigade in Cuba; it

track of the Soviet brigade in Cuba; it ciple that both governments had the more troops posted overseas every year

was found only as a result of intensi- right to agree to station a Soviet comthan the United States had posted in

fied intelligence monitoring of Cuba in bat unit in Cuba. Cuba was closer to the Vietnam at the peak of its engagement the late 1970s.

mark. The settlement of the 1979 crisis in that war. In the 1970s and 1980s, the The attached documents for Sep- in fact modified the series of underCuban armed forces were able to ac- tember 1979 discuss the Soviet and Cu- standings begun in 1962 that had complish three times on African soil (in ban response to the new U.S. challenge. evolved over time. For the first time Angola in 1976 and 1988, and in Ethio- The issue for the two governments was those mutual understandings extended pia in 1978) what the United States to decide how honest they should be in to conventional forces. Also for the first could not do in Vietnam and what the their response to the United States. With time, the Soviets accepted a limitation Soviet Union could not do in Afghani- authorization from President Fidel on the presence of their military personstan: Cuban troops won the wars they

Castro, on September 1 Armed Forces nel in Cuba, pledging (27 September went to fight.

Minister General Raúl Castro sought an 1979 document) that "We do not have Nearly two decades later, this ac- agreement with the Soviet Union on the

any intention of changing its status as count reads like a fantasy, for Cuba's content and style of the reply. General [a military training) center.” In effect, government today is struggling to sur- Castro's preferred formulation was: this minicrisis was settled through a univive, all its troops have been repatriated, “For the past 17 years a symbolic So

lateral Soviet concession to the United These three statements are quite ban government officials, and has reStates.

consistent with everything that had been peatedly produced nefarious results. Other important areas of disagree- known about the nature of Cuban-So- The 4 July 1979 document cites Fidel ment between the Soviets and the Cu- viet relations in general, and specifically Castro's judgment that Valdés Vivó bans become evident in the minutes of on these issues. The only exception is "failed to discharge the functions enthe 23 November 1981 meeting be- that Rodríguez claims a larger role for trusted to him and was unable correctly tween Cuban Vice-President Carlos Cuban initiative in making the decision and precisely to fulfill his assigned task Rafael Rodríguez and U.S. Secretary of to enter the Ethiopian-Somali war on in a recent trip to a number of African State Alexander Haig. The text makes Ethiopia's side, whereas scholars had countries." Valdés Vivó "raised a host it clear that the talks were not success- believed that the Soviets had had a con- of doubts and false rumors not only ful. Nonetheless, the minutes show a siderably greater impact in making that among our Soviet friends, but among perhaps surprisingly accommodating original decision. The key point that the Africans as well.” In 1996, Valdés opening gambit from Haig, followed by Haig, and others, missed is that the Vivó, then heading the School of Pohis lack of understanding of one key USSR. had a restraining effect on Cuba litical Science at the University of Hapoint that Rodríguez was communicat- in the late 1970s, and that serious dif- vana, took the lead in launching an asing. Haig's principal concern was the ferences occurred between the Soviet sault on the highest-quality semi-auclose connection between Cuba and the Union and Cuba because the latter was tonomous Cuban research think-tanks, Soviet Union in backing Cuban over- much more militant. To be sure, Cuba intolerantly and dogmatically criticizseas operations. Rodríguez kept telling could not have conducted such a far- ing their research on Cuba. Haig, in effect, that it was fine for the ranging foreign policy were it not for The documents conclude with a United States to blame Cuba but, please, the massive Soviet political, economic, timeless statement about Cuba's apdo not blame the USSR.!

and military backing, and on this cen- proach to international affairs. Though Rodríguez first asserts: “I can as- tral issue Haig was right to challenge not always honored, it remains an imsure you unequivocally, inasmuch as I Rodríguez.

portant signpost for governments that played a direct role in this matter, that The attached documents also fea- must still deal with Fidel Castro's govwhen the decision to dispatch Cuban ture other interesting aspects of Soviet- ernment: “There is no obligation that forces into Angola was made [in 1975), Cuban relations. For one, they demon- we have taken upon ourselves with any we communicated nothing about it to strate a thorough and competent knowl- country, group, or government that we the Soviet Union. We were not even edge of Cuban affairs and policies by have failed to honor.” aware of its point of view on that ac- Soviet embassy officials. They show a

1 count." Next, Rodríguez discusses the very close communication between the I have written about these issues in Jorge I. Ethiopian war (1977-78): "I had the

two governments on large and small is- Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revoluprivilege to accompany Fidel Castro at sues that concern them. The minutes of tion: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard the time of his meetings with the lead- the Soviet Politburo meetings under

University Press, 1979).

2 ership of the Soviet Union. ... And it score the importance Soviet leaders ac- Castro's remarks in Granma Weekly Review, 7 was we who insistently urged the need corded to securing Fidel Castro's agree

October 1979, 2. to render military assistance to Ethio- ment on the proposed joint course

3 For Haig's account, see his Caveat: Realism, pia. This was the situation, to be distin- even if Castro's views did not prevail Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: guished from that in Angola, because in the end.

Macmillan, 1984), 130–137. in this case preliminary negotiations The documents also shed light on For an example of his writings on general Cuwere taking place. But in these nego- the role of several key Cuban officials,

ban affairs in recent times, see Raúl Valdés Vivó, tiations it was Fidel Castro himself who some of whom remain important play- “¿Sociedad civil o gato por liebre,” Granma, 4 first advocated military assistance." Fi- ers in contemporary Cuba. Rodríguez January 1996, 2. nally, Rodríguez turned to the troubles was long a thoughtful and cosmopoliin Central America: “Certain American tan influence at the peak of the Cuban leaders are always expressing the opin- government, and his encounter with ion that the Soviet Union acted as a Haig—though ultimately unsuccess

A “Moment of Rapprochement": hostile influence between the United ful-confirms his reputation for states

The Haig-Rodriguez Secret Talks States and Cuba, that it fermented in manship. José Antonio Arbesú has been Cuba hostile feelings toward the United for many years a senior Cuban govern

by Peter Kornbluh States. I could tell you that the opposite ment and communist party decision is true. Many of the conflicts that we maker and analyst with broad respon

The United States “will go to the have had with the Soviet Union were sibilities for U.S.-Cuban relations; the source" to stop Havana's alleged export occasioned by the acts, words, and po- 27 December 1979 document illustrates

of revolution in Central America, Secsitions of Cuba, which did not corre- his broad competence in analyzing U.S. retary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. spond with the intentions of the Soviet affairs. Raúl Valdés Vivó has repeatedly dramatically warned Fidel Castro's Union in this portion of the world.” been given high responsibility by Cu- Cuba shortly after Ronald Reagan took


office. On 23 November 1981, Haig insights into the style and personalities maneuvers in the Caribbean. “There did just that, sitting down for a secret of the two diplomats involved.

could be no talk about normalization, meeting with Cuban Vice-President The Mexican government was si- no relief of the pressure, no conversaCarlos Rafael Rodriguez in Mexico multaneously intermediary, mediator, tions on any subject except the return City to discuss the issues that divided and catalyst for the Haig-Rodriguez to Havana of the Cuban criminals (from the United States and Cuba.

meeting. Alarmed by the Cold War the Mariel boatlift) and the termination Of all the American presidential ad- rhetoric emating from the Reagan Ad- of Cuba's interventionism," Haig wrote ministrations that have dealt with Fidel ministration—much of it from Haig in his memoirs.6 Castro since 1959, Reagan's seemed the himself-in 1981 the government of During the limousine ride to the airleast likely to engage in a dialogue with President Jose Lopez-Portillo sought to port with Reagan after the Cancun sumCuba's communist government; and of mitigate the growing potential for U.S. mit, however, Lopez-Portillo and all the hardline officials in the Reagan intervention in Central America and the Castaneda put their appeal directly to Administration, Alexander Haig Caribbean by urging dialogue instead the president of the United States. Acseemed the most unlikely choice for of what the Cubans described as "ver- cording to one Mexican official, Lopezsuch a mission. “I want to go after bal terrorism.” In an effort to preempt Portillo essentially called in his chips: Cuba," Haig told his then deputy Rob- future hostilities, Mexican Foreign Min- he asked Reagan to return Mexico's faert McFarlane in early 1981 as he de- ister Jorge Castaneda called for "a vor of disinviting Castro to Cancun by manded a plan for U.S. military pres- ceasefire of silence.” “Mexico," he of- authorizing a U.S. emissary to meet sesure against Castro. As McFarlane re- fered, “is prepared to serve as a bridge, cretly with Cuba's vice president later ported in his memoirs, “it was as though as a communicator, between its friends in the year. Reagan readily agreed, and Haig had come into office thinking, and neighbors. "4

subsequently directed Haig to undertake 'Where can we make a quick win?' and Lopez-Portillo's major opportunity this mission when the opportunity arose judged that place to be Cuba.” |

to promote an agenda of negotiations in November. For that reason, the Haig- came at the North-South Summit held The meeting took place in the spaRodriguez talks stand as an extraordi- at the Mexican resort of Cancun in Oc- cious home of foreign minister nary episode of U.S.-Cuban diplomacy tober 1981. Cuba had been involved in Castaneda, located in a suburb of at the height of the Cold War in the the preparatory meetings for the sum- Mexico City. According to a member Western Hemisphere.

mit, and Mexican officials hoped the of Castaneda's family, the Mexican forExtreme secrecy surrounded prepa- gathering of world leaders might pro- eign minister introduced the two prorations for the talks: Reagan and Haig vide an opportunity for a "discreet" tagonists to each other in his library, and kept most of the U.S. government out meeting between Castro and Reagan. then left them to talk privately, aided of the loop; an unmarked car was used But, according to one of the conference only by a Cuban translator. to ferry Haig from the U.S. Embassy to organizers, Andres Rozental (now The house, according to family the private home of Mexican Foreign Mexican ambassador to Great Britain), members, had no secret taping system. Minister Jorge Castaneda; and Haig and U.S. officials balked when they learned Yet, the Top Secret 38-page transcript Rodriguez agreed this would be an "un- Castro was scheduled to attend. “If Fi- of the discussion, which Vice President official, secret meeting." Yet it quickly del came, Reagan wouldn't,” Rozental Rodriguez provided in Spanish to the leaked to the Spanish magazine El Pais, recalls being told. Although Mexico Soviet ambassador to Havana in Deand then to the Mexican and U.S. press. had long resisted U.S. pressure to iso- cember 1981, suggests that the meetIn a televised interview with CBS News late Cuba, Lopez-Portillo was forced to ing may in fact have been recorded in January 1982, Reagan admitted that call Castro and essentially disinvite him. perhaps by the Cuban interpreter. In any such a meeting had, in fact, occurred.


"Castro understood immediately," event, the existence of an apparently Moreover, since the 1984 publica- Rozental remembers, “and graciously

Rozental remembers, "and graciously verbatim record allows historians to tion of Haig's memoirs, 3 historians agreed not to make it an issue."5 chart the issues, diplomatic positions, have had a U.S. version of the Mexico Instead of the summit, Lopez- and tenor of the discussion. meeting. Haig's rendition of events, and Portillo invited the Cuban leader to a The central issue on Haig's agenda his summary of the substance of the private meeting on the island of was Cuba's alleged role in supporting talks, generally comports to the Cuban Cozumel in July. The two talked about the Sandinista government in Nicaraversion printed in this issue of the Bul- a potential U.S.-Cuban dialogue. gua and funneling aid to the El Salvaletin (although it omits discussion of Through Mexico, Castro passed the doran guerrillas. Drawing on what he how the secret meeting came to occur message that he was willing to discuss called "volumes, records of radio broadin the first place). This Cuban tran- all outstanding issues with Washington. casts, data from technical reconnaisscript-originally in Spanish, translated Haig and other administration sance photographs," Haig charged into Russian, obtained by scholars from hardliners, however, forcefully opposed that Cuba, in “tacit agreement" with the the Russian archives and now translated talks with Cuba as anathema to a strat- Soviets, was fueling revolution in Ceninto English-provides new details, as egy of raising Castro's level of anxiety tral America. “We regard this as a seriwell as the flavor of the discussion and through verbal threats and U.S. military ous threat to our vital interests and the


of continuing talks, and that conduct- the Central America conflict escalated interests of peace and stability in the

ing “an even more direct exchange of dramatically in the months and years hemisphere," he stated.

opinions" would be desirable. Haig, at that followed, and for most of the deIn response, Rodriguez spent con

his own initiative, suggested that spe- cade, Nicaragua and El Salvador were siderable time and detail attempting to

cial U.S. envoy General Vernon Walters wracked with the violence and bloodrefute the U.S. "evidence" of Cuban in

visit Havana for additional talks. “We shed that Mexico had hoped could be volvement in revolutionary movements

can meet, in turn, in Havana and New avoided if the Reagan Administration from Central America to Africa. “I am

York, because, in my view, we must and Castro's government could achieve aware that the Secretary of State is a

commence a dialogue immediately," a modus vivendi. great lover of philosophy," he said to

Haig is recorded as saying at the close Yet, the fact that the HaigHaig, noting that

of the meeting. “I believe that this is Rodriguez talks occurred at all may well Since the time of Hume, it has been

important, and we are ready to do it," have mitigated against the further deconsidered proven that the factual replied Rodriguez.

velopment of the even more overtly belappearance of 'B' following the ap

In the immediate aftermath of this licose U.S. policy toward Cuba that pearance of 'A' does not signify

meeting, both the Mexican interlocutors Haig, among others, initially sought. that 'A' necessarily is the cause of

and the Cubans believed that a positive The talks also set the stage for negotiathe appearance of 'B'.

step had been taken toward dialogue tions between Washington and Havana The U.S. had a “mistaken interpre- between Washington and Havana. “We over immigration that took place in tation” of Cuba's role in Nicaragua and

had accomplished what we wanted- 1984. At the very least, the U.S.-Cuba El Salvador, Rodriguez asserted, which

to get them together,” recalled Andres meeting in Mexico demonstrated that a he blamed on CIA distortion of intelli

Rozental. Face-to-face, the Cubans "moment of rapprochement”-a civil, gence. In response, Haig reasserted that

found Haig to be far more level-headed, rational high-level dialogue—was posthe U.S. possessed “proof' that Cuba respectful, and reasonable than his vit- sible, even at a peak of acrimony in biwas "exporting revolution and blood

riolic Cold War rhetoric had led them lateral relations. shed on the continent." Dismissing

to expect. In Rodriguez's opinion, Rodriguez's lengthy version of world

shared later with Mexican officials, McFarlane recalled that Haig wanted to "close events since 1975, Haig declared: “I can Haig was “neither crazy nor stupid, but

Castro down,” and directed McFarlane to “get evassure you that the benign picture that

eryone together and give me a plan for doing it." a reasonably intelligent, experienced you have painted does not conform to

McFarlane writes that when he came up with an person with whom conversation was

options paper that pointed out the practical drawreality.”

possible.” Rodriguez was said to be im- backs of blockading Cuba or other types of unNotwithstanding the acrimonious pressed that Haig was willing to send

provoked hostility, Secretary Haig harshly repridisagreement on the nature of Cuba's

manded him. “Six weeks ago I asked you to get Walters-an official of "great authorrole abroad, the Haig-Rodriguez discus

busy and find a way to go to the source in Cuba. ity, close to President Reagan"—as an What you've given me is bureaucratic pap. ... sions did produce a surprising commit

envoy to continue the talks, and that the Give me something I can take to the President so ment toward coexistence. Unlike the Secretary of State had emphasized the

that he can show a substantial gain during his first Democratic Clinton Administration

year in office. I want something solid, not some need to make a supreme effort to settle which a decade later would demand that

cookie-pushing piece of junk.” Eventually, issues through “la via pacifica"—the McFarlane reports, calmer heads prevailed and Cuba democratize as a prerequisite for peaceful road.

the Reagan Administration decided to stick to the normalizing relations—Haig made it

Haig, on the other hand, appears to

agreements on Cuba worked out with the Soviets clear that Washington took a realpolitik have interpreted the meeting as evi

during the Cuban missile crisis. See Robert position on Cuba's internal political set

McFarlane, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & dence that U.S. pressure on Castro was Davies, 1991), 177-181. up. “I do not believe that President working. “Clearly the Cubans were

2 See “Reagan Says Haig Met Key Cuban,” New Reagan has some kind of preconceived very anxious. They had read the signs

York Times, 28 January 1982. State Department notion regarding the social system in

officials, according to the story, "described themof a new American policy.”7 Haig reCuba," Haig stated. “This must be de

selves as quite surprised that the President had turned to Washington to push, again, for said what he did. They still insisted they knew of termined by the people of Cuba." Later

a blockade. Walters did make a secret no such meeting." in the conversation Haig noted that trip to Havana in March 1982—Mexi

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, “President Reagan considers trade with

Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: can officials contributed once again to Cuba a possibility.” While dismissing the arrangements—and spent five hours

Macmillan, 1984), 133-136.

Quoted in Morris J. Blachman, William M. past “moments of rapprochement” as “a conferring with Castro and Rodriguez Leogrande

, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, eds, Conseries of delaying tactics" on the part on Central America. But nothing con

fronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy of the Cubans, Haig stated that “if you

in Central America (New York: Pantheon, 1986), crete came of the talks.

276. are prepared to talk seriously, we are

In the end, as Ambassador Rozental


Author's telephone interview with Rozental, also prepared."

puts it, the Mexican initiative was a October 1996. According to the transcript, "failure in getting anything going” be

133. Rodriguez and Haig agreed that Mexico

Haig, Caveat, 136. tween the United States and Cuba. "could be a uniting link in this matter"

Moreover, U.S. military involvement in


6 Haig,


More New Evidence On

Editor's Note: New Evidence on History Department (particularly Prof. Zhang Shuguang (University of Marythe Cold War in Asiawas not only the Priscilla Roberts and Prof. Thomas land/College Park) played a vital liaitheme of the previous issue of the Cold Stanley) during a visit by CWIHP's di- son role between CWIHP and the ChiWar International History Project Bul- rector to Hong Kong and to Beijing, nese scholars. The grueling regime of letin (Issue 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294 where the Institute of American Studies panel discussions and debates (see propages), but of a major international (IAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social gram below) was eased by an evening conference organized by CWIHP and Sciences (CASS) agreed to help coor- boat trip to the island of Lantau for a hosted by the History Department of dinate the participation of Chinese seafood dinner; and a reception hosted Hong Kong University (HKU) on 9-12 scholars (also joining the CWIHP del- by HKU at which CWIHP donated to January 1996. Both the Bulletin and egation were Prof. David Wolff, then of the University a complete set of the the conference presented and analyzed Princeton University, and Dr. Odd Arne roughly 1500 pages of documents on the newly available archival materials and Westad, Director of Research, Norwe- Korean War it had obtained (with the other primary sources from Russia, gian Nobel Institute). Materials for the help of the Center for Korean Research China, Eastern Europe and other loca- Bulletin and papers for the conference at Columbia University) from the Rustions in the former communist bloc on were concurrently sought and gathered sian Presidential Archives. such topics as the Korean and Vietnam/ over the subsequent year-and-a-half, Following the Hong Kong conferIndochina Wars; the Sino-Soviet Alli- climaxing at the very end of December ence, CWIHP brought a delegation of ance and Split; Sino-American Rela- 1995 and beginning of January 1996 (in U.S., Russian, Chinese, and European tions and Crises; the Role of Key Fig- the midst of U.S. shutdown of the fed- scholars to Hanoi to meet with Vietnamures such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, eral government and the worst blizzard ese colleagues and to discuss possible Joseph Stalin, and Nikita Khrushchev; to strike Washington, D.C. and the East future activities to research and reasthe Sino-Indian Conflict; and more. The Coast of the United States in many sess the international history of the new information presented via both ac- years) with the production of the Indochina and Vietnam conflicts with tivities attracted considerable media double-issue and the holding of the con- the aid of archival and other primary attention, including articles or citations ference, after some final fusillades of e- sources on all sides, the visit was hosted in the New York Times, Washington mails and faxes between the Wilson by the Institute for International RelaPost, Time Magazine, Pravda, The Center in Washington (CWIHP's direc- tions (IIR) of the Vietnamese Foreign Guardian, and Newsweek, as well as a tor as well as Michele Carus-Christian Ministry. Contacts between CWIHP report on the Cable News Network of the Division of International Studies and IIR and other Vietnamese scholars (CNN); garnering particular notice in and Li Zhao of the Asia Program) and continue on how best to organize acboth popular and scholarly circles were Priscilla Roberts at HKU.

tivities to exchange and open new histhe first publication of conversations Despite last-minute obstacles torical sources, these are likely to inbetween Stalin and Mao during the posed by weather and bureaucrats (i.e., clude the publication of a special Bullatter's trip to Moscow in Dec. 1949- visa troubles), more than 50 Chinese, letin devoted to new evidence on the Feb. 1950, Russian versions of corre- American, Russian, European, and conflicts in Southeast Asia, and, in cospondence between Stalin and Mao sur- other scholars gathered in Hong Kong ordination with other partners (such as rounding China's decision to enter the for four days of discussions and de- the National Security Archive, Brown Korean War in the fall of 1950; and bates. CWIHP provided primary orga- University, and the Norwegian Nobel translations and analyses of Chinese- nizational support for putting the pro- Institute), the holding of a series of conlanguage sources on the 1958 Taiwan gram together and financial backing to ferences at which new evidence would Straits Crisis, particularly in light of the bring the participants to Hong Kong be disseminated and debated. resurgence of tension in that region (in- (with the aid of the National Security To follow up these activities, cluding Chinese military exercises) in Archive and the University of Toronto), CWIHP plans to publish a volume of the period leading up to the March 1996 while HKU provided the venue and cov- papers from the Hong Kong Conference Taiwanese elections.

ered on-site expenses, with the help of (and related materials); this volume, in The Hong Kong Conference, as generous support from the Louis Cha turn, will complement another book well as the double-issue of the Bulle- Foundation. In addition, as noted containing several papers presented at tin, culminated many months of prepa- above, the IAS, CASS in Beijing helped Hong Kong: Odd Arne Westad, ed., rations. The basic agreement to orga

coordinate Chinese scholars 'participa- Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of nize the conference was reached in May tion; and Profs. Chen Jian (Southern the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1953, 1994 between CWIHP and the HKU Illinois University/Carbondale) and scheduled for publication in 1997.

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