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close friends. We reject any suggestion that we are an agent of the Soviet Union in any part of the world. I have explained to you the nature of our position on this issue. We not only have real feelings for the Soviet Union, cemented in a common ideology, but also we have received significant assistance from the Soviet Union for our own economic development. Naturally, with that assistance alone we cannot develop our country as quickly as necessary and as we would like to. However, we do not believe that such assistance is incompatible with the establishment of normalized relations between the United States and Cuba.

Alexander Haig. Mr. Rodriguez, I believe this has been a very fruitful exchange. I am certain that you will forgive me, if I do not agree with all of this logic. Several months ago our intervention prevented a serious clash between your forces located in Angola and the South Africans. But the next time it is possible that we will not have such success in stopping their movement with the assistance of our influence.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But I would say that our forces are located far away from them, and that it was not merely your intervention, but our restraint.

Alexander Haig. I know that. I am aware of that. But they would have advanced further to your bases, and we stopped it. We knew nothing about their operations or about when they would commence. But the fact that they appeared served as a source of information for them concerning the operations of SWAPO [the Southwest African People's Organization]. They even captured a Soviet prisoner, who has not stopped talking to this moment about how he was captured, about the scale of activity and coordination of activities in Angola. He did not exclude anything from his observations.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But that was not a Cuban prisoner. Correct?

Alexander Haig. Correct. We knew where the Cuban armed forces were located,

and we also know, that it would be highly desirable, if Cuba would pull out of Angola. This would help Angola, it would help Cuba, and it would assist in the resolution of the issue over the independence of Namibia and normalization of conditions. This is something that I have discussed with the Soviets, the Angolans, and the governments of the "Front Line," and there is an ever growing opinion, that this is the very thing which you must do.

And moreover, as concerns the events which you described, and the activity of the CIA, I can assure you, that they are in possession of information about military aircraft which has been supplied by you to other

countries. I could furnish you with information about these things which, perhaps, are taking place without the knowledge of some members of the government. That can happen. It has happened at times even in our country, not very often, but in certain instances.

We believe that the presence of Cuba in Nicaragua constitutes a threat to the continent, and in addition, we believe that the activity of Nicaragua in El Salvador likewise constitutes a serious threat. I can assure you categorically that we are in possession of comprehensive proof of such involvement. There isn't the slightest bit of doubt about it. It's a fact. We have photographs, documents, minutes of interrogations and "confirmations" by those interrogated. For this reason, I cannot agree with that which you are telling me. I am not saying that you have no right to say it. You have every right to say what you want to, but we also have a right to draw our own conclusions from the events as we see them. We have proof, and we are telling you about it.

Unfortunately, the time has come, when the rhetorical debate between the United States and Cuba will not solve the problem, and, on the contrary, there is an array of areas in which the sovereignty of Cuba is not in the slightest bit implicated. However, Cuba is exporting revolution and bloodshed on the continent.

We know what you write, we know what you defend, we know what you are talking about, and we believe that it constitutes a threat to peace and stability, and we cannot see it in any other light, inasmuch as we are talking about objective reality.

You complained about the embargo. We have not had an effective embargo, but we can impose one on sugar, on the production of all the products which you use to obtain hard currency. However, we don't want to do that, we don't want to have any other complications. I must inform you of this. You speak of solidarity with the Sandinistas. I believe that you would render to them the greatest form of solidarity, if you would bring the Cubans home, and say to the Sandinistas that they should establish an order that does not violate the rights...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Return doctors? Teachers? Return three thousand Cubans who...

Alexander Haig. We have a very good account of the doctors, teachers, Angolan veterans and military advisers, their titles, names and past activity.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. It would be interesting to take a look at it.

Alexander Haig. I can assure you that the benign picture that you have painted does not conform to reality. I'm not saying that you don't have a significant number of teachers there, but they are teaching your philosophy to Nicaraguan children, just as they tried to do in Chile. However, we do not agree that you have the right to do that. The Nicaraguans have the right to teach their people what they believe in. You are deeply involved in the Sandinista revolutionary movement, and we suggest that this creates a great risk for us all: for the Cubans, for the hemisphere, and for Nicaragua. We believe that Cuba should reexamine this. Nobody is asking Cuba to humiliate itself; we are not talking about that. We are talking about the conditions of ever increasing bloodshed in Central America.

We believe that the only solution for El Salvador is to allow the Salvadoran people themselves to decide their own fate, that is, by means of the electoral process, in which all sides should participate. A Legislative Assembly would be created, in which the political process would conform completely with the will of the people. But we cannot consent to Nicaragua's intervening in El Salvador under the mask of solidarity or any other revolutionary ruse, as it has been doing for quite some time. And your presence there, your assistance, facilitates this. Just as day follows night, this is the objective reality.

I have no doubts about the facts which you have marshalled with respect to Shaba or the situation in Ethiopia. However, the question arises, on what basis do Cuban forces continue to be located in Angola, performing various functions, and in Ethiopia[?] Why do the regimes want this? I am addressing a serious question to you, not in respect to Ethiopia, but about the situation in Angola.

You say that you are not involved in South Yemen, but I can tell you, that we have counted large and small aircraft, which have flown from Ethiopia to South Yemen, and we have heard radio broadcasts...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. And did you see Cubans as well?

Alexander Haig. We have intercepted radio broadcasts in the Spanish language. I have read them every day. And if it wasn't you, then it was Ethiopians that speak Spanish remarkably well. And for this reason, I am telling you, that all of this activity, be it within the framework of geopolitics or otherwise, has convinced the Americans that it has a geopolitical connection.

Consequently, we must find a solution, if we are interested in peace and stability in the immediate future, we must find a solu

tion to these problems. Otherwise, we will be required to pursue a different course, which, I believe, after my discussions with you here, would not be desirable for you. I know that the United States also does not want this, but it is prepared, after many years of not being in a position to take any measures, is ready to take them very quickly. Therefore, I am speaking to you of the need to immediately find a solution. I can assure you, that these solutions would not impinge the honor, sovereignty, or integrity of Cuba or the Cuban people. Nobody wants that. That would be foolish. And it is an objective fact, that it would be much easier to achieve this by force, but that is not our intention. However, frankly speaking, we believe that time is slipping away.

We have not disclosed to the American public our data or the information that is available to us. You have seen the "White Book," but we have another fifty of them. We have volumes, records of radio broadcasts, data from technical reconnaissance, we have photographs.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. A good factory for "White Books."

ter.

that is not the case, then we are on a path toward confrontation, and soon. I know that this sounds like rhetoric, but believe me, I have examined and reexamined many documents, detailed reconnaissance data, the content of negotiations conducted in all parts of the word; much of may be inexact, and I am certain that there is inexactness in the "White Book," and it could not be otherwise. It has to do with reconnaissance and intercepted documents which, for the most part, we have examined in Colombia, where the involvement of the Cubans was significant, and we did not raise the question about Colombia...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Let's talk about that as well...

Alexander Haig. Your involvement was significant...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Not as significant as it was said to be.

Alexander Haig. ...but significant enough to raise problems. And this is occurring also in Guatemala...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. If you will permit me, I will address that later.

Alexander Haig. ...fine, what I am say

Alexander Haig. It's just the first chap- ing is, that we must find a solution and

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But I understand that you have a good factory for "White Books."

Alexander Haig. Notwithstanding, the President does not want to do this, although he is prepared to do it and very soon. This would incite great enmity, and would stir up emotions even more. I insist that you take seriously what I have told you, and on an assessment that any sound-minded American will be compelled to make in the face of the events I have described. This does not mean that your involvement has not been exactly as you have described it; however, we regard this as a serious threat to our vital interests and the interests of peace and stability in the hemisphere.

If you share my opinion that stability and peace are desirable in the hemisphere, then you can work out a solution that does not compromise your dignity. How could this be accomplished so that nobody even asked you about that? I have already said that it would be necessary to extol the firmness of Cuba and its spirit of self-sacrifice. However, the basic problem in this matter remains the same, about which we are engaged today in the whole world: peaceful changes in the framework of acceptable legality, and not through bloodshed, arms, and not by the means of instigating terrorism and revolution.

And so, if the Cuban Revolution has matured to this point, then that is fine. If

quickly.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. What solution? Alexander Haig. There must be a solution, because nobody gave Cuba the divine right to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries in this hemisphere, regardless of what arguments may be advanced to justify it. You know that today we have 34 military advisors in El Salvador. And how many does Cuba have in Nicaragua?

Carlos R. Rodriguez. We have there not many more advisors, not many more.

Alexander Haig. We are in possession of intelligence, and you are correct when you say that there are many independent forces in Nicaragua. And they tell us every day what is happening there every day. And what is happening is unacceptable. Regardless of the manner in which you describe it, regardless of what seems to you subjectively as moderation, it cannot be accepted. Anxiety exists in the countries of this hemisphere. There was a time when Cuba held very sound positions in the non-aligned world. However, issues have now arisen concerning its involvement. It is essential that we come to a mutual understanding, otherwise the results may be very serious. And we are not talking about the intervention of American forces against Nicaragua, we are not going to do that. However, we can find no explanation for an army of 50,000 men and a militia of 200,000 men. There is no justification for that.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Why not?

Alexander Haig. Fine, as countries they have the right to do this, but if they choose this course, then they must pay the price for that choice. And this gives rise to anxiety in all of the countries in the region, and they are bound to oppose it. This constitutes a danger. Wherein lies the necessity for this? I have no information to suggest that any country wants to invade Nicaragua. If you have in mind a handful of Somoza supporters, who are engaged in smuggling in Honduras and who do not even have arms, the government of Honduras has announced that it is attempting to relocate them to another place in order to avoid any pretext for an invasion. And that effort has already been underway for a period of several months. I say to you in complete candor, that time is slipping away from us.

For this very reason, as you are aware, the Mexicans proposed this approach. I have studied all of the negotiations that took place during the time of the Carter administration, and they were nothing but a series of delaying tactics, in order to prevent any progress. And nothing was achieved by that, not a thing. We do not want to establish that kind of a dialogue, you don't want that, and we don't want it. If you are prepared to speak seriously, we are also prepared. But we are in need of a prepared context for discussions and some kind of sign from your side that results will be achieved.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Inasmuch as we have little time, I will try to be brief, laconic, and objective.

First, you have insisted upon the need for a solution and have expressed the interest of the United States in a solution in which there would be no humiliation of Cuba or threat to the sovereignty of Cuba. We are prepared to search for a solution, and we must come to an agreement at another time about what steps to take, because this involves not only the United States and Cuba, but also the other countries of the region, and the revolutionary forces with their own criteria and points of view. We believe that Mexico could be a uniting link in this matter. We could conduct an even more direct exchange of opinions.

Alexander Haig. Let's maintain contact directly, without intermediaries, as we have done in the past. We could send our ambassador with special authority, General [Vernon] Walters, to Havana. We can meet, in turn, in Havana and New York, because, in my view, we must commence a dialogue immediately.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. I believe that this is important, and we are ready to do it. In addition to this I would like to introduce several clarifications, because certain misun

derstandings can arise.

I do not want at this time to commence a discussion about the facts, although at some point we can also discuss whether there or not there is falsification. When General Walters comes to Cuba, I think that it is important for him to bring with him as much data as possible in order to examine it for the purpose of interpreting these facts.

I remember that the "Bay of Pigs" was brought about by information from people located in Cuba that led the CIA to a mistaken conclusion. As regards your reference to aircraft, I can tell you, that everybody knows what is taking place in Cuba. We have no factions in the government. We have a division of labor. However, the members of the Politburo know everything that the military is doing. And I can assure you that you are telling me things with which I cannot in the slightest bit agree, frankly speaking, not in the slightest degree. About Angola, about Ethiopia. They ask, why are we still located there[?] Because they want us there, and the same in Angola. If, as a result of what is happening there now (we already know about the results of the meeting of the contact group, about the decision of the foreign ministers of Africa, we see that there is an opportunity to achieve a consensus on Namibia, and that there are visible signs of progress), if as a result of a solution to the Namibia issue the Angolans allow us to withdraw our forces, then we are ready to leave there. There is no doubt about this whatsoever. But I am concerned by the fact that we have in Angola not only several thousand soldiers, several tens of thousands of soldiers, but also several thousand construction workers and civilians.

And the information that you are spreading about Nicaragua is a complete falsification. We can discuss all of this with General Walters in detail in the course of several days. We can discuss this, and we can give you all of the details that are of interest to you, because we do not want a confrontation to arise because of a mistake.

We are also prepared for a confrontation. We know that such a confrontation will be traumatic for our people. We have no doubt about this. But neither are we afraid of a confrontation. What we fear is an unnecessary confrontation, in which, as a result of errors by both sides, as a result of an absence of contacts, thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Cubans will perish. This worries us. And I am worried by other elements of interpretation which, I believe, we must discuss. If necessary, I can on any day leave for New York and organize a different, more detailed meeting. But several of your personal interpretations

which, as you say, are also consistent with

the interpretations of the President of the United States, cause me great anxiety. For example, I do not believe that the United States has any right to interfere in matters related to the presence of Cuban teachers in Nicaragua. This, and what they are teaching, is a question for the Nicaraguan government to decide. I can assure you, that these are elementary school teachers who can hardly teach Marxist-Leninism. I don't know whether you have ever attempted to read any books about Marxist-Leninism, but it would be very difficult for our 2,700 teachers to teach Marxist-Leninism to little Indians. However, we believe that only the government of Nicaragua, and no other, must decide whether or not they need our teachers. I am convinced of this, because I have had enough discussions with the Nicaraguan leadership and I have also spoken with Fidel, and I know from other discussions, at which I have been present, that the Nicaraguans do not have the slightest desire or interest to intrude in Honduras. They understand perfectly well that this would lead them into a confrontation with the United States, and there would be nothing worse for Nicaragua, than to be pulled into a confrontation with the United States.

We can and must continue our discussion about all these things. You say that time is slipping away from us. Let us use it to the maximum extent. I want to say one thing: Cuba never lies, and Fidel never lies. That which we say, we can prove. I have stated to you what we are prepared to do, where we can achieve a consensus, and where we cannot achieve a consensus. When we say "We are obligated to do it," we are obligated.

You spoke of Colombia. You do not know how these members of M-19 ended up in Cuba. [Colombian] President [JulioCesar] Turbay [Ayala] had a telephone conversation with me in which he requested me - requested me! - that we accept in Cuba members of M-19, inasmuch as they had seized a group of ambassadors in the embassy of the Dominican Republic. As a result, they came to Cuba. They were in Cuba, they underwent preparation, just as thousands of others who come to Cuba. Any Latin American who comes to Cuba - member of the intelligentsia, poet, military person - wants us to teach him to use firearms. And we have taught thousands. That is true. And we never conceal the truth, but we have had nothing in common with the training of

the group that infiltrated Colombia, and had

nothing to do with its arming. The countries who have spoken about this are fully aware of who trained them, who gave them

weapons, and who organized them. I can assure you that Fidel Castro exerted efforts to prevent this adventurism, not for the sake of the government of Turbay, but for the sake of the fate of those young people that we knew would be killed. This was an ill-conceived adventure.

However, as to why Cuba trained the men of M-19. At our initiative, an agreement was reached with [Colombian] President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, when he came to power, when he again recognized Cuba: we agreed not to help, in any way, any one partisan group, and we fulfilled that agreement. You can ask Alfonso Lopez about this. And we adhered to this under the government of Turbay. And only after the government of Turbay assumed a hostile position in the United Nations, which we, in a geopolitical sense, interpreted as a provocation directed by the United States, only then did we consider ourselves discharged from that agreement.

There is no obligation that we have taken upon ourselves with any country, group or government, that we have failed to honor. This should be clear to the United States.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 84, d. 584, ll. 127; translation by Bruce McDonald; document obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Project and on file at National Security Archive.]

RESEARCH IN MOSCOW

Scholars needing research performed in the Russian archives may contract with scholars at the Russian Center "Archival Conversation at the Historical Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow. For further information please direct inquiries to:

Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov; Historical Archives Institute (HAI); Russian State University for the Humanities; Moscow, Russian Federation; fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 9643534; tel.: (7-095) 921-4169 or (7-095) 925-5019

Scholars may also address inquiries regarding possible collaboration for research in Russian archives to:

Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian; Director, Institute of Universal History; Leninsky prospekt 32a; 117334 Moscow, Russian Federation; fax: (7-095) 938-2288; tel: (7-095) 938-1009

COMMENTARIES

CUBA AS SUPERPOWER: HAVANA AND MOSCOW, 1979

by Jorge I. Dominquez

In 1979, Cuba behaved as if it were a superpower. Tens of thousands of Cuban troops were stationed in Angola and Ethiopia, and hundreds of other Cuban military advisers, trainers, and additional troops were posted to other countries across the seas. Cuba had international programs assisting about three dozen countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; many of these programs required the overseas deployment of Cuban personnel, while others provided training in Cuba itself for over 20,000 foreigners. In part for these reasons (and notwithstanding Havana's tight alliance with the Soviet Union), Cuba had been elected chairman of the Nonaligned Movement at the time a significant organization of African, Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean countriesand it hosted its sixth summit in Havana in September 1979.

Cuba was also the Soviet Union's only truly reliable military ally in the Cold War, and the Cuban armed forces proved to be the only communist army capable of fighting effectively in distant locales for objectives at best remote from the "cause" of the defense of the homeland. From the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, over 300,000 Cuban troops served abroad. In any given year, relative to its population, Cuba had more troops posted overseas every year than the United States had posted in Vietnam at the peak of its engagement in that war. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Cuban armed forces were able to accomplish three times on African soil (in Angola in 1976 and 1988, and in Ethiopia in 1978) what the United States could not do in Vietnam and what the

Soviet Union could not do in Afghanistan: Cuban troops won the wars they went to fight.

Nearly two decades later, this account reads like a fantasy, for Cuba's government today is struggling to survive, all its troops have been repatriated,

and its concessional foreign aid programs have ended. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and the Russian Federation is unable and unwilling to provide Cuba with the funding and other support that permitted the latter to behave as if it were a superpower.

The declassified documents from the Soviet archives, which this note accompanies, are drawn mainly from the year 1979; even the document that dates from 1981 focuses principally on events that had taken place at the end of the 1970s. None of the documents breaks major new ground; the basic issues major new ground; the basic issues these documents discuss have been part of the public record for some time. But the documents do shed interesting light on a variety of questions, the most important of which is the nature of the Soviet-Cuban relationship at what turned out to be the apex of their joint influence in world affairs.

In the summer of 1979, the United States (re-)discovered the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. That brigade had been left in Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis consistent with the same "trip-wire" concept that had led the United States to keep troops in Europe. In each case, the forward forces posted by the respective superpower were deemed insufficient to stop an allout invasion by the other superpower, but the presence of those forward forces had deterrent value: if an invasion were to occur, both superpowers would be immediately and automatically locked in war. As it turned out, some time in the late 1960s the U.S. government lost track of the Soviet brigade in Cuba; it was found only as a result of intensified intelligence monitoring of Cuba in the late 1970s.

The attached documents for September 1979 discuss the Soviet and Cuban response to the new U.S. challenge. The issue for the two governments was to decide how honest they should be in their response to the United States. With authorization from President Fidel Castro, on September 1 Armed Forces Minister General Raúl Castro sought an agreement with the Soviet Union on the content and style of the reply. General Castro's preferred formulation was: "For the past 17 years a symbolic So

viet combat unit, created as a training center where Soviet military specialists train officers of the [Cuban armed forces] to use and maintain new military equipment, has indeed been located in Cuba." He recalled Cuba's "experience with previous confrontations with Americans regarding the Soviet military presence on the island" and emphasized that "we should not camouflage the real state of affairs." Certainly, he emphasized, there should be no attempt "to negate the presence of a training center on Cuba" because that would be interpreted "as a repudiation by Cuba and the USSR of their right to create such a center and send the necessary military personnel" to Cuba.

In fact, as the subsequent documents indicate, the Soviets chose to camouflage. Their response to the United States acknowledged the presence of a "military training center" but did not acknowledge that it was a "combat unit," contrary to Cuba's preference. In 1979, the Cuban leadership behaved as good believers in democratic centralism. Fidel Castro's own reassurances to the United States emphasized that it was a military training center, with no reference to a "combat unit"-echoing the 2 Soviet position exactly. Only in September 1991, when the Russian Federation government announced its decision to withdraw the combat brigade from Cuba, did Havana publicly vent its anger that the Soviets had rejected Cuba's advice in 1979.

Cuba believed that the Soviet position in 1979 retreated from the principle that both governments had the right to agree to station a Soviet combat unit in Cuba. Cuba was closer to the mark. The settlement of the 1979 crisis in fact modified the series of understandings begun in 1962 that had evolved over time. For the first time those mutual understandings extended to conventional forces. Also for the first time, the Soviets accepted a limitation on the presence of their military personnel in Cuba, pledging (27 September 1979 document) that "We do not have any intention of changing its status as [a military training] center." In effect, this minicrisis was settled through a uni

lateral Soviet concession to the United States.

Other important areas of disagreement between the Soviets and the Cubans become evident in the minutes of the 23 November 1981 meeting between Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig.3 The text makes it clear that the talks were not successful. Nonetheless, the minutes show a perhaps surprisingly accommodating opening gambit from Haig, followed by his lack of understanding of one key point that Rodríguez was communicating. Haig's principal concern was the close connection between Cuba and the Soviet Union in backing Cuban overseas operations. Rodríguez kept telling Haig, in effect, that it was fine for the United States to blame Cuba but, please, do not blame the USSR.!

Rodríguez first asserts: "I can assure you unequivocally, inasmuch as I played a direct role in this matter, that when the decision to dispatch Cuban forces into Angola was made [in 1975], we communicated nothing about it to the Soviet Union. We were not even aware of its point of view on that account." Next, Rodríguez discusses the Ethiopian war (1977-78): "I had the privilege to accompany Fidel Castro at the time of his meetings with the leadership of the Soviet Union. . . . And it was we who insistently urged the need to render military assistance to Ethiopia. This was the situation, to be distinguished from that in Angola, because in this case preliminary negotiations were taking place. But in these negotiations it was Fidel Castro himself who first advocated military assistance." Finally, Rodríguez turned to the troubles in Central America: "Certain American leaders are always expressing the opinion that the Soviet Union acted as a hostile influence between the United States and Cuba, that it fermented in Cuba hostile feelings toward the United States. I could tell you that the opposite is true. Many of the conflicts that we have had with the Soviet Union were occasioned by the acts, words, and positions of Cuba, which did not correspond with the intentions of the Soviet Union in this portion of the world."

These three statements are quite consistent with everything that had been known about the nature of Cuban-Soviet relations in general, and specifically on these issues. The only exception is that Rodríguez claims a larger role for Cuban initiative in making the decision to enter the Ethiopian-Somali war on Ethiopia's side, whereas scholars had

believed that the Soviets had had a considerably greater impact in making that original decision. The key point that Haig, and others, missed is that the USSR. had a restraining effect on Cuba in the late 1970s, and that serious differences occurred between the Soviet Union and Cuba because the latter was much more militant. To be sure, Cuba could not have conducted such a farranging foreign policy were it not for the massive Soviet political, economic, and military backing, and on this central issue Haig was right to challenge Rodríguez.

The attached documents also feature other interesting aspects of SovietCuban relations. For one, they demonstrate a thorough and competent knowledge of Cuban affairs and policies by Soviet embassy officials. They show a very close communication between the two governments on large and small issues that concern them. The minutes of the Soviet Politburo meetings underscore the importance Soviet leaders accorded to securing Fidel Castro's agreement on the proposed joint course— even if Castro's views did not prevail in the end.

The documents also shed light on the role of several key Cuban officials, some of whom remain important players in contemporary Cuba. Rodríguez was long a thoughtful and cosmopolitan influence at the peak of the Cuban government, and his encounter with Haig-though ultimately unsuccessful confirms his reputation for statesmanship. José Antonio Arbesú has been for many years a senior Cuban government and communist party decision maker and analyst with broad responsibilities for U.S.-Cuban relations; the 27 December 1979 document illustrates his broad competence in analyzing U.S. affairs. Raúl Valdés Vivó has repeatedly been given high responsibility by Cu

ban government officials, and has repeatedly produced nefarious results. The 4 July 1979 document cites Fidel Castro's judgment that Valdés Vivó "failed to discharge the functions entrusted to him and was unable correctly and precisely to fulfill his assigned task in a recent trip to a number of African countries." Valdés Vivó “raised a host of doubts and false rumors not only among our Soviet friends, but among the Africans as well." In 1996, Valdés Vivo, then heading the School of Political Science at the University of Havana, took the lead in launching an assault on the highest-quality semi-autonomous Cuban research think-tanks, intolerantly and dogmatically criticizing their research on Cuba.4

The documents conclude with a timeless statement about Cuba's approach to international affairs. Though not always honored, it remains an important signpost for governments that must still deal with Fidel Castro's government: "There is no obligation that we have taken upon ourselves with any country, group, or government that we have failed to honor."

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