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In addition, this section of the “Mao, Stalin, and the Struggle in Man- Revolution in Asia, 1949-58" present Bulletin presents more informa- churia, 1945-46: Nationalism or Intertion on several topics addressed both nationalism?”; Yang Kuisong (Inst. of Panel III: New Evidence on Sinoat Hong Kong and in the previous Bul- Modern History, Chinese Academy of American Relations in the Early Cold letin:
Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing), “On War * Russian and Chinese documents the Causes of the Changes in Mao's on the Mao-Stalin summit in Moscow view of the Soviet Union”; Niu Jun Chair: W. Cohen (Univ. of Maryland/ that help flesh out the conversations (Inst. of American Studies (IAS), Baltimore); Papers: Zhang Bai-Jia (Inst. between the two leaders published in CASS), “The Origins of the Sino-So- of Modern History, CASS), “The Limthe previous Bulletin;
viet Alliance, 1945-50”; Brian Murray its of Confrontation: Looking at the * an analysis by William Taubman (Columbia Univ.), "Stalin, the Division Sino-American Relations during the (first prepared for Hong Kong) of the of China, and Cold War Origins"; Com- Cold War Years from the Chinese Perpersonal conflict between Khrushchev mentators: James Tang (Hong Kong spective”; 0.A. Westad (Norwegian and Mao and its role in the Sino-Soviet Univ.), O.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Nobel Inst.), “The Sino-Soviet Alliance split, as well as contemporaneous Rus- Inst.)
and the United States: Wars, Policies, sian documents (from both Moscow and
and Perceptions, 1950-1961"; Tao East Berlin archives);
Panel II: New Evidence on the Korean Wenzhao (IAS, CASS), "From Relax* another paper prepared for Hong War
ation to Tension in China-US Relations, Kong, by M. Y. Prozumenschikov, on the
1954-58"; Xiao-bing Li (Univ. of Censignificance of the Sino-Indian and Chair: Jim Hershberg (CWIHP): tral Oklahoma), “The Making of Mao's Cuban Missile Crises of October 1962
Cold War: The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crifor the open rupture between Moscow Session 1: The North Korean Dimen- sis Revised"; Yongping Zheng (IAS, and Beijing, along with supplementary sion
CASS), “Formulating China's Policy on Russian and East German archival
the Taiwan Straits Crisis, 1958"; Commaterials;
Papers: Alexandre Mansourov (Colum- ment: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker * and, perhaps most intriguingly, bia Univ.), “Did Conventional Deter- (Georgetown Univ.); Gordon Chang a Chinese response to a controversy rence Work? (Why the Korean War did (Stanford Univ.); He Di (IAS, CASS) opened in the previous Bulletin about not erupt in the Summer of 1949)"; the discrepancy between Russian archi- Hakjoon Kim (Dankook Univ., Seoul), Panel IV: Chinese Policy Beyond the val documents and published Chinese “North Korean Leaders and the Origins Superpowers: Engaging India and the documents regarding communications of the Korean War"; David Tsui (Chi- "Nationalist States." between Mao and Stalin on Beijing's nese Univ. of Hong Kong), “Did the entry into the Korean War in October DPRK and the PRC Sign a Mutual Se- Chair: Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Wilson Cen1950 (along with new evidence on a key curity Pact in 1949?"
ter); Papers: Ren Donglai (Nanjing omission from a Russian document in
Univ.), "From the "Two Camp' Theory the last Bulletin).
Session 2: The Course of the War to the 'Five Principles of Peaceful CoAdditional materials are slated for
existence': A Transition of China's Perpublication in CWIHP Working Papers, Papers: Shen Zhihua (Ctr. for Oriental ception of and Policy Toward the Nafuture Bulletins, and via the Internet on History Research, Beijing), “China Had tionalist States, 1949-1954"; Roderick the CWIHP site on the National Secu- to Send Its Troops to Korea: Policy- MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.), “War in rity Archive's home page on the World Making Processes and Reasons”; the Himalayas, Crisis in the Caribbean: Wide Web: http://www.nsarchive.com Kathryn Weathersby (Florida State the Sino-Indian Conflict and the Cuban
Following is the program of the Univ.), “Stalin and a Negotiated Settle- Missile Crisis, October 1962"; M.Y. Hong Kong Confernce:
ment in Korea, 1950-53”; Chen Jian Prozumenschikov (TsKhSD, Moscow),
(Southern Illinois Univ./Carbondale), “The Influence of the Sino-Indian BorCold War International History Project “China's Strategy to End the Korean der Conflict and the Caribbean Crisis Conference on New Evidence on the War"; Fernando Orlandi (Univ. of on the Development of Sino-Soviet ReCold War in Asia
Trento, Italy), “The Alliance: Beijing, lations" (presented in absentia by J. University of Hong Kong,
Moscow, the Korean War and Its End" Hershberg (CWIHP)]; Comment: 9-12 January 1996
Norman Owen (Hong Kong Univ.) Comment: Allen S. Whiting (Univ. of Panel I: New Evidence on the Origins Arizona), Warren I. Cohen (Univ. of Panel V: From Alliance to Schism: New of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Maryland/Baltimore)
Evidence on The Sino-Soviet Split
Chair: Odd Arne Westad (Norwegian Dinner Talk: John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio Chair: Zi Zhongyun (IAS, CASS); PaNobel Inst.); Papers: Michael M. Sheng Univ./Athens), “The Division of Labor: pers: Dayong Niu (Beijing Univ.), (Southwest Missouri State Univ.), Sino-Soviet Relations and Prospects for “From Cold War to Cultural Revolution: Mao Zedong's Response to “On the Borders of the Sino-Soviet chival documents)"; Vladislav M. Khrushchev's Destalinization and Conflict: New Approaches to the Cold Zubok (National Security Archive), Dulles' Strategy of Peaceful Evolution"; War in Asia"; Christian Ostermann “Stalin's Goals in the Far East: From Deborah Kaple (Princeton Univ.), “So- (Hamburg Univ./National Security
(Hamburg Univ./National Security Yalta to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of viet Assistance and Civilian Coopera- Archive), “The Sino-Soviet Border 1950"; Li Hai Wen (CPC CC), "[Zhou tion in China"; Zhang Shuguang (Univ. Clashes of 1969: New Evidence from en-Lai's Role in) Restoring Peace in of Maryland/College Park), “The Col- the SED Archives”; Commentator: Tho- Indochina at the Geneva Conference"; lapse of Sino-Soviet Economic Coop- mas W. Robinson (American Asian Re- William Taubman (Amherst College), eration, 1950-60: A Cultural Explana- search Enterprises)
“Khrushchev versus Mao: A Prelimition"; Sergei Goncharenko (IMEMO,
nary Sketch of the Role of Personality Moscow), "The Military Dimension of Session 2: The Warsaw Pact and the in the Sino-Soviet Dispute" (presented the Sino-Soviet Split”; Mark Kramer Sino-Soviet Split
in absentia by M. Kramer (Harvard (Harvard Univ.), "The Soviet Foreign
Univ.)); He Di (IAS, CASS), “Paper or Ministry's Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Re- Papers: L.W. Gluchowski (Univ. of Real Tiger? U.S. Nuclear Weapons and lations on the Eve of the Split”; Com- Toronto), “The Struggle Against Great Mao Zedong's Response"; Comment: ment: Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Power Chauvinism': CPSU-PUWP David Shambaugh (Univ. of London); Univ./Carbondale); Zheng Yu (Inst. of Relations and the Roots of the Sino- Vojtech Mastny (independent) East European, Russian, and Central Polish Initiative of September October Asian Studies, CASS)
1956"; Werner Meissner (Hong Kong Panel VIII: New Evidence on the
Baptist Univ.), “The Relations between Indochina/Vietnam Conflicts and the Panel VI: Aspects of the Sino-Soviet the German Democratic Republic and Cold War in Asia Schism
the People's Republic of China, 1956
1963, and the Sino-Soviet Split”; Com- Chair: A.S. Whiting (Univ. of Arizona); Chair: Robert Hutchings (Wilson Cen- mentator: M. Kramer (Harvard Univ.) Papers: Mark Bradley (Univ. of Wisconter):
sin at Milwaukee), "Constructing an Panel VII: New Evidence on Chinese Indigenous Regional Political Order in Session 1: Border Disputes:
and Soviet Leaders and the Cold War Southeast Asia: Vietnam and the Diploin Asia
macy of Revolutionary Nationalism, Papers: Tamara G. Troyakova (Inst. of
1946-49"; Mari Olsen (Univ. of Oslo), History, Far Eastern Branch, Russian Chair: J.L. Gaddis (Ohio Univ./Athens); “Forging a New Relationship: The SoAcademy of Sciences, Vladivostok), Papers: Haruki Wada (Inst. of Social viet Union and Vietnam, 1955"; Ilia “The Soviet Far East and Soviet-Chi- Sciences, Univ. of Tokyo), "Stalin and Gaiduk (Inst. of Universal History, nese Relations in the Khrushchev the Japanese Communist Party, 1945- Moscow) "Soviet Policy Toward U.S. Years”; David Wolff (Princeton Univ.), 1953 (in the light of new Russian ar- Participation in the Vietnam War" (pre
sented in absentia by J. Hershberg CONFERENCE ON REGIONAL CHINESE ARCHIVES HELD
(CWIHP)]; Zhai Qiang (Auburn Univ.), In August 1996, the US-China Archival cently-Declassified U.S. Government Docu- “Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, Exchange Program of the University of ments on American Policy Toward the De- 1964-65"; Robert K. Brigham (Vassar Maryland (College Park) and the Chinese velopment of Atomic Weapons by the College), “Vietnamese-American Peace Central Archives Bureau held a conference People's Republic of China, 1961-1965."
Negotiations: The Failed 1965 Initiaon “Regional Chinese Archives,” with ses- Assembled by then-CWIHP Director Jim
tives”; Igor Bukharkin (Russian Foreign sions and activities in Beijing and other Hershberg with the help of the National
Ministry Archives), "Moscow and Ho northern Chinese cities (Jinan, Qingdao, Security Archive and the Lyndon B. Johnson
Chi Minh, 1945-1969"; Comment: R. Yantai, Tianjin). Participants included both Presidential Library, the documents included Chinese and American scholars and archi- White House, State Department, and CIA MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.) val authorities from regional, urban, na- materials on the events surrounding China's tional, and Communist Party archives. first detonation of an atomic explosion on Closing Roundtable on the New EviOn behalf of the Cold War International 16 October 1964.
dence, Present and Future Prospects and History Project and the National Security The gathering, coming nine months after Research Agenda: Archive (a non-governmental research in- the CWIHP Hong Kong Conference, also stitute and declassified documents reposi- offered an opportunity to continue the
Participants: Niu Jun (IAS, CASS), tory located at George Washington Univer- Project's ongoing contacts with Chinese
0.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.), sity), Prof. David Wolff, now CWIHP's Di- colleagues.
Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Univ./ rector, gave a presentation on declassifica- For further information on the conference tion procedures in the United States and op
Carbondale), W. Cohen (Univ. of Maryand the US-China Archival Exchange Proportunities for using the Freedom of Infor- gram, contact Prof. Shu Guang Zhang, His- land/Baltimore), R. MacFarquhar mation Act to conduct research on issues of tory Dept., 2115 Francis Scott Key Hall, (Harvard Univ.), K. Weathersby interest to China. As an illustration, Wolff College Park, MD 20742-7315, tel.: (301)
College Park, MD 20742-7315, tel.: (301) (Florida State Univ.) presented a compilation of "Selected Re- 405-4265; fax: (301) 314-9399. --J.H.
Fighting for Friendship:
by Odd Arne Westad
Kremlinologists of yore used to Soviet relations since the Moscow sum- Beijing, N.V. Roshchin, to get Stalin's liken analyzing political conflict in the mit.
OK. When Mao's train finally left Politburo to watching a dog-fight tak- Part of the reason why so little has Beijing on December 6, the two sides ing place under a rug. One could hear been regarded as "known" about these had still not agreed on a framework for sounds of fighting, groans from those meetings is the mythology which grew what should be discussed in Moscow. badly bitten, and see the rug moving as up around the physical encounter be- Mao had three matters at the forepositions changed. But it was not until tween the Stalin and Mao figures. Es- front of his mind as his train wound its the rug was removed that it was pos- pecially for Mao, these meetings were way toward the Soviet capital. He sible to determine who had come out an integral part of the story of his rise wanted security against a potential on top and what damage had been done to power, and, no less importantly, the American attack. He wanted Soviet asto those who lost.
growth of his unique knowledge and sistance in the construction of socialUntil very recently, analyzing the understanding. Mao loved to talk about ism. And he wanted to remove the events of the Sino-Soviet summit meet- his “humiliation” at Stalin's hands in stigma which, in his view, had been ining in Moscow in late 1949-early 1950 Moscow, and about how the Korean flicted on Chinese-Soviet relations by has been a bit like watching the War had proven him (Mao) correct, and Stalin's signing in 1945 (at the close of Kremlinologists' dogs. We have not how the Soviet leader, once again, had World War II) of a Sino-Soviet Treaty known much, except to register a gen- come to realize his mistakes toward the with Mao's bitter rival, the Nationalist eral sense of unease on both sides when end of his life. Until 1956, Mao told Government headed by Jiang Jieshi they alluded to these meetings over the this story repeatedly to members of his [Chiang Kai-shek). The best way to subsequent decades. Until 1995—when inner circle, and after 1956—when open achieve all of these aims, Mao conthe Cold War International History criticism of Stalin became acceptable cluded, was to sign a new treaty beProject obtained and published records following Khrushchev's secret speech tween the two countries, based on Comof two conversations between Joseph at the 20th Congress of the Communist munist solidarity, discarding the 1945 Stalin and Mao Zedong during the sum- Party of the Soviet Union—the Chinese pact. But the Chinese leader was in no
—no transcripts from the many leader told it to visitors of all sorts who way certain that Stalin would accept conversations held during the summit came to call on him at Zhongnanhai, the such a proposal, and he was prepared were publicly available. The only docu- compound for the Chinese leadership to act with great care, so that his wish ments which Western scholars could use in Beijing. For Mao and for all mem- for a new treaty did not stand in the way were the published treaties, which on bers of the Chinese Communist Party of the two other aims, both of which most issues were as uninformative as (CCP), the Chairman's encounter with could prove more obtainable.
6 all other Soviet friendship, cooperation, Stalin became a central part of revolu- Stalin, on his side, wanted to test and mutual assistance agreements.
Mao, his commitment to proletarian This constituted a strangely limited What do we then “know” almost internationalism,” and his style of beharvest for what undoubtedly was fifty years after the event, as the cover havior in Moscow. With unflinchable among the most important political is slowly sliding away?
faith in his own ability to separate summit meetings of the 20th century. The Moscow summit had a long friends from enemies, Stalin agreed to Not only were these the first and only and unhappy pre-history. Mao had re- a meeting with the new Chinese leader face-to-face meetings between the two quested a meeting with Stalin on at least in order to see how Mao would hold up great Communist dictators. They pro- three occasions since early 1947, but the under scrutiny. Stalin had not yet devided the fundamental shape for the Kremlin boss—the vozhd—had turned cided whether or not to sign a new Sino-Soviet alliance, a compact which him down each time, with excuses rang- treaty, nor had he made up his mind formed the political direction of both ing from the military situation in China, about any major agreements with the states and which Western leaders for to international diplomacy, to the So- new Chinese regime, prior to Mao's many years during the most intense viet grain harvest. Even after Stalin arrival in Moscow. Based on what we phase of the Cold War regarded as a promised senior CCP emissary Liu know of his behavior in other contexts, deadly threat to the capitalist world sys- Shaoqi in July 1949 that Mao would be it is likely that Stalin sought material tem. The meetings also formed impres- invited to Moscow as soon as the for his conclusions primarily from the sions and images among leaders on both People's Republic was set up, 5 the Chi- Chinese attitude to the post-World War sides, shades of which have been vis- nese in October and November had to II territorial arrangements in East Asia ible at all important junctures in Sino- pressure the Soviet ambassador in and from Mao's attitude toward the vozhd personally.
Lewis, and Xue Litai surmise that it was portant it was to the Soviets for him to What happened between the two rumors among the foreign press corps appear willing fully to coordinate his sides in Moscow from December 17 to in Moscow that Mao was being spurned policies toward the United States with January 2 remains shrouded in mystery. or even put under house arrest by his Moscow. The effect of Molotov's and Stalin obviously wanted to impress the Soviet hosts which compelled Stalin Vyshinskii's alerting the Chinese to Chinese, to show them Soviet power by agree to let TASS publish an interview Acheson's speech (and particularly his arranging visits to memorials and sym- with the Chinese leader on January 2. claim that the Soviets were out to subbols of the achievements of Commu- In that interview, Mao referred to the jugate China) was to give Mao a chance nism. It is also obvious that he did not 1945 treaty and trade issues as items to demonstrate his loyalty to the boss. want anyone to engage in any further being under consideration by the two (At the same time in Beijing, Mao's indiscussions of the main political issues sides.
telligence chief, Li Kenong, told the beyond what had been said at the meet- Just what happened in the Kremlin Soviets that a peaceful liberation of ing between Mao and himself on De- during the day of January 2 we do not Taiwan might be possible after all.8) cember 16.
know. Oral history sources indicate that Zhou Enlai had prepared well on Beyond that, everything is still con- Molotov and Mikoyan together ap- his long train trip across Siberia. From jecture. Mao may have feigned illness proached the boss and suggested hold- his arrival in Moscow on January 20, to avoid accepting the Soviet agenda for ing talks with the Chinese at some point the Chinese Prime Minister was the "sightseeing" and to insist on an imme- over the coming two weeks. Stalin dynamic force in the negotiations, diate continuation of the political talks. agreed, and entrusted the two with seek- which soon took the form of Chinese The Soviets then used Mao’s “illness” ing out Mao and informing him. After proposals and Soviet counter-proposto explain why substantive meetings seeing Molotov and Mikoyan, Mao als. On almost all issues concerning with Stalin, or any Soviet leader, were fired off a jubilant telegram to Beijing, the alliance treaty, bilateral assistance, impossible, thereby trying to force Mao telling of an important breakthrough” trade, and credits and loans, the Chito come up with suggestions for a spe- in his work: The Soviets had agreed to nese drove their agenda forward, while cific agenda. Mao may indeed have signing a new treaty and would receive the Soviets argued over details. The been ill. We know that he was not in Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in Moscow Chinese got less, and some times much good health in October, and the strenu- to negotiate it.
less, than what they bargained for, but ous journey to Moscow could hardly Based on what we now know, Mao they got some form of agreement on all have helped.
was almost certainly overstating his areas which were important to them. 10 Even more important is why Stalin case. As the Chairman's conversation While the economic negotiations decided to let his guest kill time over with Molotov on January 6 shows, showed the Chinese that Stalin's lieuthe New Year holidays holed up in a Stalin had in no way green-lighted a tenants could drive a hard bargain, what government dacha near Moscow. The new treaty, and was still holding open really hurt the CCP leaders in a way that most likely explanation is that the So- the possibility of merely amending the none of them ever forgot was the Soviet leader just could not make up his 1945 text. In spite of the several meet- viet propensity for introducing territomind on what the outcome of the Chi- ings between Mao and Soviet officials rial issues into their negotiating tactics. nese visit would be, and as long as the over the following weeks, to which The Soviet negotiators made Mao feel boss did not act, his subordinates could Goncharev, Lewis, and Xue allude, like he was forced to part with pieces not take any initiatives on their own. there is no evidence from archival of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, The exertions of his own 70th birthday sources of when the Soviet leader gave Xinjiang, and Mongolia to get the Socelebrations (on 21 December 1949) his go-ahead for a new treaty to be ne- viet assistance which he needed. Espeand the ensuing New Year functions gotiated. It was not until meeting with cially when the Soviets introduced the may also have taken their toll on the Mao and Zhou on January 22 and de- issues of excluding all non-Soviet forvozhd and made it inopportune for him claring “to hell with” the Yalta accords eigners from Manchuria and Xinjiang to seek out difficult negotiations just at that Stalin made clear to the Chinese and establishing joint Sino-Soviet comthat time.
that he was ready to scrap the 1945 text. panies in Xinjiang, Mao must have felt We know that Stalin did meet with A contributing factor to Stalin's that he paid a heavy price. Mao on at least three occasions during change of mind may have been the con- As we see clearly from the Chinese this period, but existing sources indi- versations on U.S. foreign policy which record, Stalin's tactics, driven by suscate that those meetings were brief and were held in Moscow and Beijing in the picion and rancor, were unnecessary for dealt exclusively with specific practi- interim. As shown by the record of the preventing Sino-American rapprochecal issues, such as sending Soviet teach- January 17 meeting—where the topic ment and most unhelpful for establishers to China and Soviet assistance in for discussion was Secretary of State ing a lasting Sino-Soviet relationship. repairing the Xiaofengman hydroelec- Dean G. Acheson's speech on develop- Stalin kept his railway and naval contric station. In their book Uncertain ments in Asia before the National Press cessions in Manchuria (although the Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean Club in Washington on January 12— leasing period was shortened), and seWar, Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Mao was very much aware of how im- cured phrasing in the secret additional