retreating to Tibet and to the south have been cut off. They will be destroyed in the very near future. In Yunnan there are also up to another 30 thousand persons scattered to the south-west from Kunming in separate groups of Guomindang followers, but their fate has been decided.

Mao Zedong requested to transmit the following information concerning his health condition and his plans for further stay in Moscow to the leaders of the Soviet gov

ernment:

"My health condition

says Mao

Zedong, has improved after a two-year resting period. For the last four days I have been sleeping 8 hours a day with no problems, without taking special sleeping medication. I feel much more energetic, but when going for a walk, I cannot remain out in the fresh air for more than a quarter of an hour - I get dizzy. With regard to this, I intend to rest one more week in total peace and completely restore a normal sleeping pattern."

Further he pointed out that following the week-long rest period he would like to visit comrades Shvernik, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov, Vasilevskiy, and Vyshinskiy. These visits will have to take the nature of ordinary conversations. He will not talk about any specific topics nor discuss any business matters. There must be one visit per day, they must not be very lengthy, and he thinks that the best time for them would be after 5-6 pm.

During the same time period he would like to meet with I.V. Stalin to discuss business matters.

After completing the discussion concerning business matters, during the remainder of the stay he intends to place a wreath at Lenin's mausoleum, see the subway system, visit a few collective farms, attend theaters, and with that finish his stay in Mos

COW.

Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized that he refrains from visiting factories, meetings with large audiences, and giving public speeches, because it is tiring to his health and may, once again, disturb his sleeping pattern and provoke a relapse of spells of dizziness. Previously he intended to visit different places in the Soviet Union, but presently, due to his health condition, he refrains from traveling around the Soviet Union, because there is a long trip home ahead of him.

Upon leaving Beijing he intended to

stay in the USSR for three months, however, presently the circumstances of [his] work in China are forcing him to reduce the length of his stay to two months. Keeping in mind the eleven-day [train] travel to Beijing, he intends to leave Moscow at the end of January, counting on being in Beijing on February 6.

After listening to all of comrade Mao Zedong's announcements, I stated that I will report all of his wishes to the government the very next day.

Further I asked comrade Mao Zedong if he is aware of the proposal made by the Soviet government in November [1949], to hand over a few hundred Japanese army officers to the Chinese government, in order to bring them to justice for crimes and atrocities which they committed while stationed in China.

Comrade Mao Zedong stated that he was aware of this even prior to his departure from Beijing, but because they were busy with preparations for the trip to Moscow, the Chinese government was not able to look into this matter seriously. His point of view on this matter is as follows: as a matter of principle, the Chinese government will take these criminals and will put them on trial for all their deeds. However, taking into consideration that presently the attention of the Chinese people is concentrated on the events surrounding the elimination of the final remnants of the Guomindang and that the Chinese court system has not yet been ironed out, the Chinese government cannot begin the trial process without preparing the population for it, because it will not have a proper political effect. Besides, the Chinese government must at the same time prepare the trials against the Guomindang military criminals.

Taking into consideration all of this says Mao Zedong, - I suppose that we will be able to take the military criminals from Soviet territory after six months. I ask the Soviet government to keep these criminals for the first six months of 1950 on its territory and, if possible, to collect more information on them for the trial. In the beginning of the second half of the year we will take them and will put them on trial.

On this the business discussion was concluded. Following the discussion comrade Mao Zedong invited me to the table to have dinner together with him. I accepted the invitation.

The conversation was translated by Shi Zhe (Karskiy).

After parting with comrade Mao Zedong, I remained to wait for the car with Karskiy. The latter informed me that comrade Mao Zedong has been feeling much better for three days already. He sleeps fine, without taking medication, jokes, is cheerful and talkative with everyone, but, the same as before, cannot be out in the fresh air for long. He still gets spells of dizziness. Comrade Mao Zedong firmly decided to rest another week and not travel anywhere. On January 2 a conference of doctors will take place.

USSR AMBASSADOR IN CHINA /s/ (Roshchin)

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, f. 0100, op. 43, d. 10, papka 302, ll. 1-4; document provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

Document 5: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 2 January 19503

Central Committee:

(1) Our work here has achieved an important breakthrough in the past two days. Comrade Stalin has finally agreed to invite Comrade Zhou Enlai to Moscow and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and other agreements on credit, trade, and civil aviation. Yesterday, on 1 January, a decision was made to publish my interview with the Tass correspondent, and it is in the newspapers today (2 January), which you might have already received. At 8:00 p.m. today, Comrade Molotov and Comrade Mikoyan came to my quarters to have a talk, asking about my opinions on the Sino-Soviet treaty and other matters. I immediately gave them a detailed description of three options: (a) To sign a new SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. By taking this action, we will gain enormous advantages. Sino-Soviet relations will be solidified on the basis of the new treaty; in China, workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the left wing of the national bourgeoisie will be greatly inspired, while the right wing of the national bourgeoisie will be isolated; and internationally, we may acquire more political capital to deal with the imperialist countries and to examine all the treaties

signed between China and each of the imperialist countries in the past. (b) To publish through the news agencies of the two countries a brief communique stating that the authorities of the two countries have exchanged opinions on the old Sino-Soviet treaty and other issues, and have achieved a consensus, without mentioning any of the details. In fact, by doing so we mean to put off the solution of the problem to the future, until a few years later. Accordingly, China's foreign minister Zhou Enlai does not need to come here. (c) To sign a statement, not a treaty, that will summarize the key points in the two countries' relations. If this is the option, Zhou Enlai will not have to come either. After I have analyzed in detail the advantages and disadvantages of these three options, Comrade Molotov said promptly that option (a) was good and that Zhou should come. I then asked: “Do you mean that the old treaty will be replaced by a new one?" Comrade Molotov replied: "Yes." After that we calculated how long it would take for Zhou to come here and to sign the treaty. I said that my telegram would reach Beijing on 3 January, and that [Zhou] Enlai would need five days for preparations and could depart from Beijing on 9 January. It would take him eleven days by train [to travel to Moscow], so he could arrive in Moscow on 19 January. The negotiation and the signing of the treaty would need about ten days, from 20 January to the end of the month. Zhou and I would return home in early February. Meanwhile we also discussed the plans for my sightseeing outside [my quarters and Moscow], and we decided that I would visit Lenin's tomb, travel to Leningrad, Gorky, and other places, and make tours of such places as an ordnance factory, the subway (Molotov and Mikoyan recommended these two items) and a collective farm. We also discussed the problem of my meeting with various Soviet leaders (so far I have not left my quarters to pay an individual visit to any of them).

(2) Please finish all the preparations [for Zhou's departure] in five days after you receive this telegram. I hope that [Zhou] Enlai, together with the minister of trade4 and other necessary aides, and with the necessary documents and materials, will depart from Beijing for Moscow by train (not by air) on 9 January. Comrade Dong Biwu will assume the post of acting premier of the Government Administration Council. The

news should not be publicized until Zhou has arrived in Moscow.

(3) Are the above-stated arrangements feasible? Will five days be enough for you to finish the preparations? Does [Zhou] need one or two more days for preparation? Is it necessary for Comrade Li Fuchun or other comrades to come to offer assistance? Please consider them and report to me in a return telegram.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:211-2; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 131-2.]

Document 6: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 4 a.m., 3 January 1950

Central Committee:

My telegram of 11:00 p.m. yesterday must have reached you. Comrade [Zhou] Enlai's trip to the Soviet Union must be officially approved at a meeting of the Government Administration Council. The Council should also be informed that the main purposes of Zhou's trip are as follows: to negotiate and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (in comparison to the old treaty, there will be some changes concerning the status of Lushun [Port Arthur] and Dalian, although the details still have to be negotiated; however, the defense against possible aggression of Japan and its allies and the recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence will continue to constitute the basic spirit of the new treaty); to negotiate and sign a credit agreement (we have proposed the sum of $300 million, which will be provided over a few years; the reason why we have not requested more is that [we believe] it better for us to borrow less than to borrow more at present and for several years); and to negotiate and sign a civil aviation agreement (it will benefit the development of our own aviation industry) and a trade agreement (by defining the scope of the barter trade with the Soviet Union, we will be in a more favorable position to determine the orientation of our own production, as well as to conclude trade agreements with other countries). In addition, you should gather all the members of the Government Council now in Beijing for a briefing. At both meetings, you should point out that this move [the signing of an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union] will place the

People's Republic in a more advantageous position in the world. It will press the capitalist countries to come to our terms; it will be favorable for China to be recognized unconditionally by various countries, and for the old treaties to be abolished and new treaties to be signed; and it will deter the capitalist countries from taking reckless actions.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:213; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 132-3.]

Document 7: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 6 a.m., 5 January 1950

[Your] telegram of 7:30 p.m., 4 January has been received. (1) We have already arranged [with the Soviet leaders] for Zhou to come here with approximately seventeen aides. He can come. There should be no problem. We have also informed the authorities here that the train will leave Beijing on the night of 9 January. (2). It is better if Bao Erhan, Deng Liqun and the head of the trade department of the Yili [Ili] region could arrive in Moscow on 21 or 22 January, two or three days after [Zhou] Enlai's arrival; but it is fine if they come on 19 January, the same day Enlai arrives. Please inform me immediately about your decision [on this matter]. Please also decide and report to me what kind of transportation Bao Erhan and Deng Liqun will need for getting here. Do we need to dispatch a plane from here, or is it possible for the air transportation regiment now stationed in Xinjiang assign a plane for them? Please inform me of your decision immediately by telegraph. (3) Concerning the key points of the negotiation and the preparatory work [for the negotiation], all the points you have put forward should be carefully considered, and preparations should be made accordingly. Since we are going to engage in negotiations, we should present our views extensively, and should make our points clear. After Enlai's departure, the Central Committee may continue to study these issues, and inform us of its opinions by telegraph at any time. As far as the materials on trade are concerned, if you are unable to have them ready in five days, you may continue working on them after Enlai's departure, and report to us by telegraph at any time.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:215; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 133.]

Document 8: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP Central Committee, 5 January 1950

Please pay attention to two matters: (1) When the question of replacing the [old] Sino-Soviet treaty with a new treaty has been reviewed by the Government Administrative Council and the [Central People's] Government Council, please urge all the participants to maintain secrecy. (2) Before Zhou [Enlai] departs with his more than ten [assistants], or on their way [travelling to Moscow], it is necessary for him to assemble all those people to declare discipline to them, telling them that undisciplined words and actions are prohibited, and that they must obey orders on every occasion.

On 6 January of the current year, I visited Mao Zedong. After a brief exchange of greetings and formalities conversation of the following content took place.

1. I informed Mao Zedong that with regard to the request of the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China for assistance with the disastrous condition of the Jilin [Xiaofengman] hydroelectric power station, the Soviet government has made a decision-to send, within a period of five days, four Soviet experts to China for a month, who must write a report on the condition of the hydro-electric gen

erating station and draft the necessary measures for putting an end to the disastrous condition of the Jilin [Xiao-fengman] hydro-electric power station.

Mao Zedong voiced his gratitude to the Soviet Government for rendering the necessary assistance by answering that the help rendered by the Soviet Union in this matter is of great significance to China's entire national economy.

2. I informed Mao Zedong that, with regard to Liu Shaoqi's telegram concerning fuel supplies from the Soviet Union for the use of pilot training, [we] intend to answer that, according to calculations made by our experts, it has been determined that the need for fuel for the aforementioned purpose is determined by the standards of the Soviet Army in the following amounts: 13,400 tons of high-octane gasoline, 5,270 tons of lowoctane gasoline, 1,315 tons of aviation oil, and 26 tons of product P-9.

The Soviet Government will give an order to direct the aforementioned amount of fuel to China in the course of the first half of the year, starting with January. As far as the methods and conditions of payment by China for the delivered fuel are concerned, they can be determined during the negotiations concerning the commodity circulation for the year 1950.

Mao Zedong voiced his agreement with the telegram and asked to express gratitude to the Soviet Government for this assistance. As far as the amount of fuel goes, he said that "our people would like to acquire more" and they have to be under strict control. He is grateful to the Soviet Government for reviewing the calculations in this situation, an action with which he completely agrees. Mao Zedong added that the matter of fuel expenditure has to be dealt with in a strict manner, because it will be in the interests of China itself, which must be more frugal in using the articles of outside assistance. Mao Zedong asked [me] to leave him the text of the telegram.

3. I asked Mao Zedong whether he thinks it would be more expedient for the People's Republic of China to address the Security Council of the United Nations with a declaration that the remaining of the Guomindang representative in the Security Council is unlawful and that he must be expelled from the Council. As for itself, the Soviet Union intends to support this kind of declaration and, in its turn, to demand the

Security Council to expel the representative of the Guomindang group from the Council. In the event that the Guomindang representative remains in the Security Council, the Soviet representative will declare that he will not participate in the work done by the aforementioned Council so long as the Guomindang representative will be participating in it.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this course a hundred percent and thinks that copies of such a declaration from the People's Republic of China to the Security Council can be directed to the members of the Security Council simultaneously.

I noted that after coordinating this matter from the Chinese side, I will have to present the proposal to the Soviet Government for consideration.

4. Mao Zedong said that, in regard to the message of the Soviet Government to the People's Government of China concerning the Japanese military criminals /971 persons/, he would like to report the following:

1. In general, there is no doubt that the Japanese military criminals must be transferred to China to stand trial.

2. However, the Chinese Government intends to put the Japanese military criminals on trial at the same time as the Guomindang military criminals. The organization of such a trial process is planned to take place approximately during the first or second half of 1951. Therefore, it would be desirable for the Soviet Government to agree temporarily to keep the aforementioned Japanese military criminals in the Soviet Union, roughly until the second half of 1950.

I noted that, since the Soviet Union is bound by corresponding obligations - to repatriate all Japanese military prisoners by January of 1950, perhaps it would be more expedient to agree on formally considering the Japanese military criminals as having been transferred to China, but in fact to temporarily leave them on the Soviet territory. Mao said that this is the exact formula he considers to be the most expedient.

5. Mao stated that he is increasingly coming to the conclusion that the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union need to draft a new treaty of friendship and alliance between the two nations. The drafting of a new treaty between us, he said, stems from the completely new relations, which have evolved between the People's

Republic of China and the Soviet Union following the victory of the People's Revolution. A review of the existing treaty is especially necessary, since two important components of the treaty, Japan and the Guomindang, have suffered major changes: Japan has ceased to exist as an armed force and the Guomindang has been broken up. Besides, as is well known, a certain group of the Chinese people is expressing dissatisfaction with the existing treaty between China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the drafting of a new treaty of friendship and alliance between China and the USSR would be in the best interests of both sides.

While answering Mao Zedong, I said that the question of a new treaty, in my eyes, seems to be a complicated matter, since the signing of a new treaty or reviewing of the existing treaty and introduction of any kind of corrections may be used as an excuse by the Americans and the English for reviewing and altering parts of the treaty, changing which may cause damage to Soviet and Chinese interests. This is not desirable and must not be allowed to occur.

Mao noted that, without a doubt, this circumstance must be taken into consideration when creating a formula for solving the given problem.

Persons present during the conversation: comrades Kovalev I.V., Fedorenko N.T., and also Wang Jiaxiang and Shi Zhe/ Karskiy/.

The conversation lasted approximately 45 minutes.

ies and volume of exports to and imports from such countries as the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Hungary, as well as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, India, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, Japan, Canada, and the United States, for the whole of 1950. Otherwise, we may find ourselves in a disadvantageous position. It is hoped that, after [Zhou] Enlai's departure from Beijing, [Liu] Shaoqi, Chen Yun, and [Bo] Yibo will pay attention to this matter.

At 1:00 a.m. today (the 7th), Vyshinskii came to my quarters to talk about three matters: (1) [The Soviet Union] is in a position to satisfy our request of purchasing airplane fuel. (2) [The Soviet Union] is in a position to satisfy our request of offering assistance in repairing the dam of the Xiaofengman waterpower station. A letter with formal response to these two issues will be passed to me tomorrow (the 8th). (3) [He] proposed that our foreign ministry should issue a statement to the United Nations Security Council, denying that Jiang Tingfu, the representative of the former Guomindang government, had the legitimate right to hold China's seat at the Security Council. Vyshinskii made it clear that if China issued such a statement, the Soviet Union was ready to do one thing: if Jiang Tingfu remained at the Security Council as China's representative (and it was said that he would even become the president of the Security Council this year), the Soviet Union would refuse to attend the Security Council's meetings. Vyshinskii asked my opinion. I immediately stated that China's foreign ministry could issue a statement like this. I also said that my telegram would reach Beijing on 7 January, and that a statement signed by China's foreign minister Zhou Enlai could be issued on 8 January or 9 January. I asked him that, in addition to sending the statement to the United Nations Security Coun

cil and the United Nations' general secretary, if it was necessary, at the same time, to send the telegram to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France as permanent members of the Security Council. He said yes. He said that the Soviet Union would take due action in accordance with China's telegram. He made it clear that he asked my opinion in the capacity of [Soviet] foreign minister, and I made it clear that my agreement was official. After receiving this telegram, please move forward immediately, so that the telegram with this statement could be sent out before [Zhou] Enlai's departure [for Moscow] on 9 January. In addition to sending the telegram to the United Nations' secretary general and the Security Council, the foreign ministries of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France should also be notified by telegram, with the text of the telegram to the United Nations attached. Please let me know of the arrangement on this matter, as well as if you would be able to send out the telegram on 9 January.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:219-20; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 134-5.]

Document 12: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 12 p.m., 7 January 1950

[Liu] Shaoqi, [Zhou] Enlai:

Here is a draft of the statement5 that Zhou is to telegraph to the president of the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations secretary general, and the governments of the ten member states of the United Nations Security Council (do not send it to Yugoslavia). Please dispatch the telegram per this draft.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:221; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 135.]

Document 13: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC and CCP Northwest Bureau, 10 January 1950 (Excerpt)

The Central Committee, and pass on to Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], He [Long] and the Northwest Bureau:

(1) I fully agree to the plan to dispatch troops into Xizang [Tibet] contained in Liu [Bocheng]'s and Deng [Xiaoping]'s telegram of 7 January. Now Britain, India, and Pakistan have all recognized us, which is favorable to [our] dispatching troops into Xizang.

(2) According to Comrade Peng Dehuai, the four months needed for dispatching troops [to Xizang] will start in midMay (in the previous telegram I mistakenly wrote "three months").7

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:226-7; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136.]

Document 14: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) I will depart for Leningrad today (the 13th) in the evening and will be back to Moscow in two days. (2) I have arranged for Liu Yalou, Soviet advisor Kotov and two other men to come here. Please inform Nie Rongzhen of this matter. (3) Xiao Jinguang can now be appointed as commander of the navy; please also inform Nie Rongzhen about this appointment.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:234; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136.]

Document 15: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950

(1) I agree with your telegram dated 13 January about implementing the order to requisition foreign military barracks and preparing to force the United States to evacuate all the former U.S. consulates from

China.8 (2) I agree that the Shanghai Military Control Commission should confiscate or requisition immediately all the property left by the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration there. (3) As far as the problem of taking over the property left by the puppet regime in Hong Kong is concerned, please make a decision after the Foreign Ministry and the Central Finance and Economics Commission have provided their suggestions. I have no specific opinion on this matter. (4) Vyshinskii came to my quar

ters and talked with me this evening. He proposed that our government should send a telegram to the United Nations, addressing the question of sending our representative to the United Nations to replace the Guomindang's representative, since a very serious struggle is now under way in the Security Council over the legitimacy of the GMD's representative. While the Soviet Union supports our government's statement about expelling the GMD's representative, the United States, Great Britain, and the majority of the member states oppose the expulsion. Therefore, it is necessary for China to make a further statement. The telegram can be sent out a week from now. I have agreed to his proposal. The Central Committee may need to consider a nominee for our head representative and report to me by telegraph, and the final decision will be made after [Zhou] Enlai gets here. (5) I will leave for Leningrad tomorrow (the 14th), at 10:00 p.m., not today. I will stay in Leningrad for one day, the 15th, and will return on the 16th. [Wang] Jiaxiang, [Chen] Boda, Shi Zhe, Wang Dongxing will accompany me. Ye Zilong and the technical staff will stay to work in my quarters here. The Central Committee may send its telegrams to me as usual.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:235-6; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136-7.]

Document 16: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950

Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu:

I shall leave for Leningrad today at 9:00 p.m. and will not be back for three days. I have not yet received the draft of the Renmin ribao ["People's Daily"] editorial and the resolution of the Japanese Communist Party's Politburo. If you prefer to let me read them, I will not be able to give you my response until the 17th. You may prefer to publish the editorial after Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi has read them. Out Party should express its opinion by supporting the Cominform bulletin's criticism of Nosaka and addressing our disappointment over the Japanese Communist Party Politburo's failure to accept the criticism. It is hoped that the Japanese Communist Party will take appropriate steps to correct Nosaka's mis

takes.9

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:237; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 137.]

Document 17: Conversation, V.M. Molotov and A.Y Vyshinsky with Mao Zedong, Moscow, 17 January 1950

FROM THE DIARY OF TOP SECRET V.M. MOLOTOV

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF V.M. MOLOTOV AND A.Y. VYSHINSKY WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MAO ZEDONG, 17 JANUARY 1950

After an exchange of greetings and a brief dialogue on general topics, a conversation ofthe following content took place.

1. I told Mao Zedong, that on 12 January [1950] the USA Secretary of State Acheson gave a speech at the National Press Club, which touched on certain international matters, in particular, matters concerning China, USSR and their mutual relations. Acheson's statements concerning these matters are a clear slander against the Soviet Union and were designed to deceive directly public opinion. The United States went bankrupt with its policy in China, and now Acheson is trying to justify himself, without shying away from deceitful means in the process. An example of the extent of Acheson's fabrications can be seen in the following segment of his speech:

"The following is taking place in China: the Soviet Union, armed with these new means, is partitioning northern regions of China from China and incorporating them into the Soviet Union. This process has been completed in Outer Mongolia. It has been almost completed in Manchuria, and I am sure that Soviet agents are sending very favorable reports from Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang [Xinjiang]. This is what is happening. This is a partition of entire regions, vast regions, inhabited by Chinese, a partition of these regions from China, and their in