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corporation into the Soviet Union.

I want to announce this, and maybe I will sin against my doctrine of repudiating dogmatism. But, in any case, I want to say that the fact that the Soviet Union is taking over four northern regions of China, is the most important and the most significant factor in any great power's relations with Asia.

What does this signify to us? This signifies something very, very important."

I advised Mao Zedong to familiarize himself with Acheson's entire speech and left him a full text of this speech (as reported by TASS).

Mao Zedong said that until now, as is known, these kinds of fabrications were the job of all kinds of scoundrels, represented by American journalists and correspondents. And now this dirty work has been taken up by the Secretary of State of the USA. As they say, the Americans are making progress!

I responded that, with regard to Acheson's speech, we think the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China should respond accordingly. At the same time, I pointed out that according to a TASS announcement from Washington, on 14 uary, the former consul general in Mukden, [Angus] Ward, while responding to questions from the press, stated the very opposite of what Acheson said in his speech on 12 January. In addition, I quoted the appropriate portion of Ward's declaration, which stated that he did not see any signs which would point to the Soviet Union's control over the administration of Manchuria or its attempt to incorporate Manchuria into the USSR, even though the Soviet Union is exercising its treaty rights concerning the joint administration of KChZhD [Chinese Changchun Railroad].

I said that we intend to react to Acheson's aforementioned speech with a declaration from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. However, we would prefer for the Chinese government to be the first to make a statement on this matter, and afterwards, following the publication in our press of the declaration of the People's Government of China and Ward's statement, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs would make an appropriate statement.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this, and there is no place here for any

doubts. At the same time, however, he inquired if it would not be better for Xinhua [Chinese News Agency] to make this kind of declaration.

I answered that since the matter concerns a speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USA on an important matter, the declaration should not be made by the telegraph agency, but rather by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Mao Zedong said that he shares the same opinion and, after familiarizing himself with Acheson's speech, tomorrow he will prepare the text for the declaration [to be made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, submit it to us for suggestions and corrections, and then telegraph it to Beijing, so that the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presently performing the duties of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, can publish this declaration. At the same time Mao Zedong pointed out that in this declaration he will expose Acheson's slanderous fabrications against the Soviet Union.

Mao Zedong asked what, in our opinion, is the actual purpose of Acheson's slanderous declaration and could it, this declaration, be a kind of smokescreen, using which, the American imperialists will attempt to occupy the island of Formosa?

I said that, after going bankrupt with their policy in China, the Americans are trying, with the help of slander and deception, to create misunderstandings in the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. I also said it is impossible to disagree that they are using the dissemination of slander as a kind of a smokescreen, in order to carry out their plans of occupation. In addition, I noted that, in our opinion, the declaration of the People's Government of China regarding Acheson's speech could point out that the fabrications of the USA Secretary of State are an insult to China, that the Chinese people did not lead a struggle, so that someone else could rule or establish control over one or another part of China, and that the Chinese people reject Acheson's declaration.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this and will immediately start drafting the declaration. At the same time he asked for the text of Acheson's speech and Ward's declaration to the press to be transferred to Beijing for the Xinhua agency. I promised

to do so this very evening and immediately made arrangements with comrade Vyshinsky.

Afterwards Mao Zedong said that during the past few days the Americans have mobilized the activities of their [diplomatic, intelligence and information] networks and are testing the ground for negotiations with the People's Government of China. Thus, a few days ago, the head of the American telegraph agency in Paris addressed Mao Zedong with a question on how he would react to the famous American expert on fareastern affairs [State Department official Philip C.] Jessup's trip to Beijing for negotiations. Almost simultaneously, information was received from Shanghai stating that steps are being taken by the American consulate in Shanghai, through representatives of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, to obtain agreement from the People's Government of China to send their representative to Hong Kong for negotiations with Jessup. However, we are paying no attention to this American ground testing, said Mao Zedong.

Furthermore, Mao Zedong said that, as he already informed comrade Vyshinsky earlier, the People's Government of China is taking certain measures toward forcing the American consular representatives out of China. We need to win time, emphasized Mao Zedong, to put the country in order, which is why we are trying to postpone the hour of recognition by the USA. The later the Americans receive legal rights in China, the better it is for the People's Republic of China. On 14 January of this year, the local government in Beijing informed the former American consul of their intention to appropriate for their own use the barracks formerly used by foreign armies, rights for which were acquired by foreigners through inequitable treaties. Occupation of the aforementioned buildings essentially means that the American consul will be deprived of the house he is inhabiting and will force him to leave Beijing. In response, the American consul in Beijing started threatening the Chinese government that USA, as a sign of protest, will be forced to recall all of their consular representatives from Beijing, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Nanking. This way, said Mao Zedong in a half-joking manner, the Americans are threatening us with exactly that which we are trying to accomplish.

I noted that this policy of the Central People's Government of China is designed,

first and foremost, to reinforce the country's internal situation, which is sufficiently clear and understandable to us.

2. Furthermore, I said that the declaration by the People's Republic of China, which states that maintaining the Guomindang representative in the Security Council is unlawful and that Jiang Tingfu must be removed from it, as well as simultaneous actions by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, caused a commotion and, to a certain extent, confused our enemies' camp. However, in order to bring the struggle begun in the UN to a conclusion, we would consider it expedient for the People's Republic of China to appoint its own representative to the Security Council. And it would be preferable for this appointment to take place as soon as possible.

Mao Zedong responded that he had a conversation with comrade Vyshinsky concerning this matter and completely agrees with such a proposal. However, for us, emphasized Mao Zedong, this matter presents a technical problem - selection of the candidate. The only suitable candidate is the present deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs comrade Zhang Hanfu, even though he is somewhat weak for the purpose. I would like to coordinate the question of appointing Zhang Hanfu with comrade Zhou Enlai upon his arrival in Moscow.

I said that if that is the only problem, he can talk to Zhou Enlai over the phone (VCh [a high frequency link]), while he is

en route.

Mao Zedong willingly agreed to communicate with Zhou Enlai over VCh and to coordinate this question immediately.

3. After this I said that according to our information the head of the Guomindang delegation in the Union Council for Japan, General Zhu Shi-Min, wants to break with the Guomindang and switch to the side of the People's Republic of China. However, we have no confidence that this information is sufficiently reliable and, in addition, we do not know Zhu Shi-Min well and it is difficult for us to arrive at any definite conclusion about him. For this reason we would like to discuss the matter with Mao Zedong and find out whether we should wait until Zhu Shi-Min announces his switch or, without waiting for it, demand the removal of the Guomindang representative from the Union Council for Japan.

of view it would be more expedient to act through the Secretary of the Guomindang delegation in the Union Council for Japan Chen Tin-Cho, who not long ago sent a letter through General Derevyanko concerning the work he is performing with regard to the switch of the aforementioned delegation in Tokyo to the side of the People's Republic of China. We, noted Mao Zedong, need to exert influence on Zhu Shi-Min and convince him to switch to our side. This would allow us to reach a smoother solution to the question of our representative's appointment to the Union Council for Ja

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Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) In response to the Vietnamese Government's request to establish diplomatic relations [with us], we should consent to it and give it our reply immediately. I have drafted a reply. Please broadcast it tomorrow (the 18th), while at the same time telegraphing it to Ho Chi Minh by internal radio transmitter. 10 (2) Our foreign ministry should pass the Vietnamese Government's statement requesting establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries to the Soviet Union and the other new democratic countries. 11

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:238; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, Mao Zedong said that from his point eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy

and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

Document 19: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

The telegram of 17 January has been received. (1) That the United States is evacuating all its official personnel from China is extremely favorable for us. However, those democratic figures who have suffered from the fear of the United States may have some disagreement with such actions as the requisition of foreign military barracks. Please pay attention to making explanations to them. (2) When the British charge d'affairs [John C.] Hutchinson arrives in Beijing, what questions should we raise in discussions with him? The Central Committee should draft a written document on the basis of a discussion with members of the foreign ministry, which should define the guidelines, approach that we are to adopt and the concrete issues that we are to address. The document should be reported to me in advance.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:241; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

Document 20: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5:30 p.m., 18 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) This afternoon, at 4:30, I had a telephone conversation with [Zhou] Enlai (he has arrived in Sverdlovsk and will, probably, arrive in Moscow on 20 January, at 5:00 p.m.), and we felt that as Zhang Hanfu does not have the necessary prestige and qualification, he should be assigned as a deputy. It is more appropriate to let Luo Fu become China's chief representative to the United Nations. A telegram to the United Nations has been drafted, and if the Central Committee agrees, please dispatch it and publish it tomorrow, on the 19th. (2) According to [Zhou] Enlai, both Gao Gang and [Li] Fuchun agree that Luo Fu is qualified to be [China's] diplomatic representative. But Luo Fu himself is yet to be informed. When you publish the telegram [to the United Nations], please send a telegram to Luo Fu at the same time, explaining that as we did not have

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enough time, we were unable to get his consent in advance, and that we thus ask for his understanding. He will be notified in a separate telegram for the time of his departure for the United Nations. (3) The completion of the procedure on his nomination can be waited until the convening of the sixth session of the Government Council. If you feel necessary, you may summon the vice-chairpersons of the government and the leading members of the major parties for a discussion tomorrow, the 19th. (4) Since [Zhou] Enlai will soon come to Moscow, the statement can be issued in Li Kenong's name. (5) As what you did the last time, after the telegram is dispatched, copies of it should. be sent to the diplomats of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other countries in Beijing. (6) When the Xinhua News Agency publishes the news, it must be introduced that Zhang Wentian is a member of the CCP Central Committee, that he participated in the 25,000-li Long March, and that he has been responsible for various kinds of revolutionary work. (7) Please let me know of the progress of your arrangement on this matter.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:242; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138-9.]

Document 21: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 19 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and convey to [Hu] Qiaomu:

(1) I have written an article in the name of [Hu] Qiaomu. Please carefully scrutinize it and then publish it. 12 (2) The article, "Japanese People's Road (toward Liberation),” is very good. 13 It is now being translated into Russian, and we are preparing to submit it to Stalin to read.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:245; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 139.]

Document 22: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 25 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi]:

(1) [Zhou] Enlai, Li [Fuchun], and oth

ers arrived here on 20 [January]. On 21 [January], the twelve of us participated in a meeting in commemoration of Lenin. On 22 [January], six of us, including Shi Zhe, had a discussion with Comrade Stalin and others, in order to settle the questions concerning principles and the working procedures. On 23 [January], Zhou [Enlai], Wang [Jiaxiang] and Li [Fuchun] had a discussion with Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, and Roshchin about several concrete issues. On 24 [January], we handed to Vyshinskii a draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, 14 and Mutual Assistance worked out by us. We are now drafting a second document, that is, the agreement on Lushun, Dalian, and the Chinese Chanchun Railway, and, probably, the drafting can be finished today. We have also decided that we will make a third document, the Sino-Soviet barter agreement, ready in three days. All in all, our work is proceeding quite smoothly. (2) Attached here is the draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Please ask the Central Committee to discuss it and report its opinions to me by telegraph. Please pay attention to keeping it from the outsiders.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:251-2; English translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 140-1.]

Document 23: Remark, Mao Zedong, "About the Negotiations on Establishing Diplomatic Relations with Britain," 29 January 1950

Zhou [Enlai]: Please make the following response [to Beijing]: When [John C.] Hutchinson comes, only the problems concerning the relations between Britain and Jiang Jieshi and other problems related to establishing diplomatic relations [between Britain and the PRC] should be discussed. The question of the requisitioning of the military barracks should not be touched upon. While meeting the Dutch charge d'affairs, if he mentions the recognition of Indonesia in exchange for [Dutch recognition of the PRC], the matter should be reported to the superiors for consideration.

and the Cold War in Asia, 141.]

Document 24: Telegram, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Liu Shaoqi, 1 February 1950

Comrade Liu Shaoqi:

Please convey our greetings to Comrade Ho Chi Minh. 15 He has played the role as the leader and organizer in the heroic struggle for Vietnam's national independence and the establishment of a people's democratic government in Vietnam. China and Vietnam have recognized each other, and will soon establish diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union has already recognized Vietnam, and it is hoped that the other new people's democratic countries will all give their recognition (our embassy in the Soviet Union has delivered Vietnam's memorandum asking for foreign recognition and establishing diplomatic relations to the embassies of all new democratic countries in the Soviet Union). We sincerely congratulate Vietnam's joining the anti-imperialist and democratic family headed by the Soviet Union. We wish that the unification of the entire Vietnam would be soon realized. We also wish Comrade Ho Chi Minh and his comrades-in-arms good health.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:254; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 141-2.]

Document 25: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 10 February 1950

Comrade Liu Shaoqi:

(1) It is approved that Su Yu may deploy four divisions in naval operation maneuver. 16 (2) The first several phrases 17 in the preface of the credit agreement, which mention China's compensation to the Soviet Union, should not be omitted. (3) The treaty and the agreements should be published by both sides on the same day, and you will be specially informed about the date. (4) [Chen] Boda has written an editorial for the Xinhua News Agency, which we will look over and send to you tomorrow. Please ask [Hu] Qiaomu to scrutinize it, and then publish it at the same time the treaty is 18 published.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:253; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy [Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:257-8; transla

tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 142.]

Document 26: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 12 February 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

Here is an internal party telegram I have just drafted. Please give it some consideration as soon as you receive it and dispatch it quickly[:]

All central bureaus, bureau branches, and front-line committee:

A new Sino-Soviet treaty and a series of agreements will be signed and published in days. Then, when different regions hold mass rallies, conduct discussions, and offer opinions, it is essential to adhere to the position adopted by the Xinhua News Agency's editorial. No inappropriate opinions should be allowed.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:260-1; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 142-3.]

1 After leaving Beijing by train on 6 December 1949, Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on 16 December and stayed in the Soviet Union until 17 February 1950. Liu Shaoqi was put in charge during Mao's absence. When Mao was in Moscow, he maintained daily telegraphic communications with his colleagues in Beijing, and all important affairs were reported to and decided by him.

2 After the Burmese government had cut off all formal relations with the GMD government in Taiwan, the PRC and Burma established diplomatic relations on 8 June 1950.

3

cil-the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, Ecuador, India, Cuba, Egypt, and Norway: The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is of the opinion that it is illegal for the representatives of the remnants of the reactionary gang of the Chinese Nationalist Party to remain in the Security Council. It therefore holds that these representatives must be expelled from the Security Council immediately. I am specially calling your attention to this matter by this telegram, and I hope that you will act accordingly."

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9

On 6 January 1950, the Cominform Bulletin published an article criticizing Nosaka Sanzo, a member of the Japanese Communist Party's Politburo, for his alleged "mistake" of putting too much emphasis on the peaceful path to power in Japan and his "wrong understandings" of the existence of U.S. influence in Japan. Although Nosaka had long been known as a faithful support of the CCP (he spent the war years in Yanan and attended the CCP's Seventh Congress), the CCP leadership still decided to maintain as identical stand with the Cominform in criticizing Nosaka. For a more detailed description of the "Nosaka affair," see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 160-162.

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During the first two to three weeks of Mao Zedong's visit in Moscow, little progress had been achieved in working out a new Sino-Soviet treaty that would replace the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. This telegram recorded the first major breakthrough during Mao's visit to the Soviet Union. 11 China's minister of trade at that time was Ye Jizhuang.

4

5 The full text of Zhou Enlai's telegram to the United Nations, which was dispatched on 8 January 1950, was as follows: "Lake Success, to Mr. Carlos Romulo, President of the United Nations General Assembly; to Mr. Trygve Li, Secretary General of the United Nations; also to the member states of the United Nations Security Coun

The Soviet Union and other East European countries quickly established diplomatic relations with the DRV.

12 As a response to Acheson's speech made at the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, this article particularly criticized Acheson's comments on Sino-American relations. For the text of the article, see Renmin ribao, 21 January 1950. 13 This article was the CCP leadership's response

to the Nosaka affair (see above, Mao Zedong telegram to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950, and corresponding footnote).

14 This draft was worked out by Zhou Enlai un

der Mao's direction.

15 Ho Chi Minh, after walking for seventeen days, arrived on the Chinese-Vietnamese border in late January 1950, and then he was taken to Beijing to meeting Liu Shaoqi and other CCP leaders. He made it clear that his purpose to visit China was to pursue substantial Chinese military and other assistance to the Vietminh's struggles against the French. He also expressed the desire to visit the Soviet Union. By the arrangement of the CCP, Ho Chi Minh then travelled to the Soviet Union and met Stalin and Mao and Zhou there. He would come back to China together with Mao and Zhou and to continue discussions with Chinese leaders. These discussions resulted in Beijing's (but not Stalin's) commitment to support Ho. For a more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 19501954," The China Quarterly 132 (March 1993), 85-110.

16

This refers to Su Yu's plan to attack the GMDcontrolled Zhoushan islands.

17 The phrases to which Mao refers here are as

follows: "The Government of the Soviet Union agrees to satisfy the request of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China for a loan that is to be used in payment for the machines, facilities, and other material that the Soviet Union has agreed to provide China." 18 This editorial, entitled "The New Era of SinoSoviet Friendship and Cooperation," was published by the Xinhua News Agency on 14 February 1950.

FUTURE BULLETIN ISSUES

Future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin are already being compiled, and you are invited to contribute! Among the themes currently projected for upcoming issues are: New Evidence on the End of the Cold War (in both East-Central Europe and the USSR); New Evidence on the Indochina/Vietnam Wars; New Evidence the Cold War in the Balkans; Stalin and the Cold War; and the Intelligence Services and the Cold War.

On these and other topics relevant to Cold War history, the Bulletin welcomes submission of important new East-bloc evidence (particularly archival documents), as well as reports on research conditions in former (or present) communist countries and on research projects and activites.

THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE

VERSIONS OF MAO'S

2 OCTOBER 1950 MESSAGE TO
STALIN ON CHINESE ENTRY
INTO THE KOREAN WAR:
A CHINESE SCHOLAR'S REPLY

by SHEN Zhihua translated by CHEN Jian*

[Translator's Note: The Chinese Communist Party leadership made the decision to enter the Korean War in October 1950. For several years, scholars have relied upon Chinese documents available since the late 1980s to discuss the process by which Beijing made that decision. Among these documents, one of the most crucial was a telegram Mao Zedong purportedly sent to Stalin on 2 October 1950, in which the CCP chairman informed the Soviet leader that Beijing had decided "to send a portion of our troops, under the name of Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee.'

With the opening of Russian archives in recent years, however, a sharply different version of Mao's 2 October 1950 message to Stalin has emerged, according to which Mao related that because dispatching Chinese troops to Korea "may entail extremely serious consequences," many CCP leaders believed China should "show caution" about entering the conflict, and consequently Beijing had tentatively decided against entering the war.

How did such a sharp discrepancy between the Chinese and Soviet versions of this communication occur? Which (if either) is correct? What really happened in Beijing and between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950? In the previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter 1995/1996), which first published the Russian version of the disputed telegram, Russian scholar Alexandre Mansourov questioned the accuracy and even authenticity of the Chinese version. Debate continued in January 1996 at a conference on "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia" organized by CWIHP and hosted by Hong

Kong University. In this article, specially prepared for the Bulletin, a participant in that conference, Chinese historian Shen Zhihua, presents the results of his investigation in Beijing concerning the Chinese version of Mao's telegram and addresses Mansourov's question. An earlier version appeared in spring 1996 in the Beijing publication Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Party History Research Materials. --C.J.]

As I have argued elsewhere,1

China's decision to enter the Korean War was based primarily on crucial national security (as opposed to ideological) considerations. After conflict on the peninsula broke out into large-scale war in June 1950, and especially when the military situation turned from North Korea's favor to disfavor that autumn, the attitudes of China and the Soviet Union toward the Korean situation experienced profound changes, leading to divergent directions in policy. While the Soviet Union became increasingly cautious about engaging itself in Korea (at tious about engaging itself in Korea (at one point, Moscow even considered abandoning the North Korean communist regime to defeat), China began to adopt a strategy of positive defense, a strategy which would eventually lead to its entry into the War. The Chinese leaders' primary concern was how to guarantee stable development-for the People's Republic of China, which had only come into existence the previous fall after an exhausting civil war. However, if necessary, the Chinese leaders did not fear entering a direct military confrontation with the United States, the number one power in the world, under the banner of "resisting America and assisting Korea, defending our home and our nation."

As it is by now well known, China's final decision to enter the war was reached in the first three weeks of October 1950, after the successful U.S.U.N. landing at Inchon put the North Korean regime in danger of imminent collapse. On 28 September 1950, the (North) Korean Labor Party politburo (North) Korean Labor Party politburo decided to solicit direct Soviet and Chinese military support. On September 29 and 30, Kim Il-song and Pak Hon-yong sent two urgent letters to, respectively,

Stalin and Mao Zedong, requesting direct Soviet and Chinese military support.2 Stalin immediately kicked the ball to the Chinese. In a telegram to Mao Zedong on October 1, Stalin urged the Chinese to "move at least five to six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once," without mentioning what Moscow would do to support the North Koreans.3 At the most crucial moment of the Korean War, Mao and his comrades in Beijing had to decide if they would take on the main responsibility and burden for rescuing North Korea.

How did the Chinese leaders respond to Stalin's and Kim Il-song's requests to dispatch Chinese troops to Korea? Because of the recent emergence of two sharply different versions of Mao Zedong's telegram to Stalin dated 2 October 1950, this has become an issue under serious debate among Chinese and foreign scholars.

In 1987, the first volume of Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic] was published under the neibu category (meaning "for internally circulation only"). It included the main part of what was identified as a telegram by Mao Zedong to Stalin on 2 October 1950, reading as follows:

(1) We have decided to send a portion of our troops, under the name of [Chinese People's] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades in fighting the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regarded the mission as necessary. If Korea were completely occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary forces were substantially destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East.

(2) We realize that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight the Americans, we must first be able to solve the problem, that is, that we are prepared to annihilate the invaders from the United States and from other countries, and to drive them out [of Korea]; second, since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name the Chinese Volunteers), we must be prepared for an American declaration of war

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