ePub 版

Korea. 18

considerations before and after October sad if we stood idly by.”

»17 Mao finally port, especially air cover for Chinese 2, as well as by comparing the contents convinced his comrades of the need to ground forces, from the Soviet Union. of the Chinese and Russian versions of send troops to Korea at the October 5 By analyzing the two versions of Mao's the telegram.

meeting. Once the decision was made, telegram, a common point was that Mao First of all, it should be emphasized the Chinese leaders acted immediately. believed that if China was to enter the that Mao Zedong felt that he was forced (It is unclear whether this decision was war, it must win the war, and win it to make the decision to send troops to taken before or after Mao received quickly. Only a speedy victory would Korea. He fully understood that China's Stalin's response—which strongly solve all of China's difficulties and involvement in the Korean War would urged Chinese intervention in Korea, worries. In order to achieve a rapid vicentail great difficulties. On this point, even at the risk of World War III—to tory, it was necessary that the Soviet his views basically coincided with those his earlier telegram indicating doubt Union, China's main ally, to provide the of his comrades who opposed or had about entering the war.) After the Oc- PRC with adequate military assistance, strong reservations about sending tober 5 meeting, Mao invited Zhou the air support in particular. However, troops to Korea. In actuality, those rea- Enlai, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai to Stalin, in his October 1 telegram to sons that Mao listed in the Russian ver- dine with him, and they further dis- Mao, as well as in several other comsion, such as America's technological cussed some of the details. Mao also in- munications with the Chinese leadersuperiority, the danger of an open war structed Peng and Gao to travel to ship before and afterward, failed to with the United States, and the possible Shenyang to convey the Politburo's clarify this crucial issue. Without reachnegative domestic reactions, were all decision to division-level commanders ing clearly-defined and concrete agreereflected in the Chinese version, though of the Northeast Border Defense Army, ments with the Soviets, Mao might have from a different angle. When Mao men- preparing to enter operations in Korea felt that it was better not to give Stalin's tioned in the Russian version that "many by October 15. The next day, Zhou request a direct and positive response. comrades in the CC CPC judge that it Enlai chaired a Central Military Com- This could have been the most imporis necessary to show caution,” this does mission meeting, which made concrete tant reason underlying Mao's proposal not mean that he had changed his own arrangements about how the troops to send Zhou Enlai to the USSR to meet determination. A careful comparison of should prepare to enter operations in Stalin. And this also could explain why, the two versions leads to a different con

under the circumstance that the Chinese clusion: Mao did not change his goals It should also be noted that there leadership had already made the decibut rather the tactics he would use to exists no irreconcilable contradiction sion to enter the Korean War, Mao told achieve them. Instead of replying di- between the Chinese leaders' previous Stalin on October 7 that China "would rectly and positively to Stalin's request, agreement to send troops to Korea and not be able to send troops (to Korea) at Mao adopted a more indirect and am- Mao's expression that China would "re- this moment, but would do so after biguous response, so that he would be frain from advancing troops” in the

some time.”

"21 The key question had able to reconcile his own determination Russian version. Scholars who believe now become Soviet air support for Chito enter the war with the disagreements that China had completely changed its nese troops that were to fight in Korea. still existing among other CCP leaders, stand have ignored an important condiwhile at the same time keeping the door tion, that is, every time the Chinese 1 See my paper, “China Was Forced to Enter the for further communication (and bar- leaders mentioned that China would Korean War: Causes and Decision-making Progaining) with Stalin open. This inter- send troops to Korea, they made it clear cess," prepared for “New Evidence on the Cold pretation would explain why the CCP that a crucial precondition for taking War in Asia," international conference sponsored chairman specifically informed Stalin action was that the enemy forces by the Cold War International History Project, in the Russian version that “A final de- crossed the 38th parallel. In Zhou University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996. cision has not been made on this ques- Enlai's meeting with K. M. Pannikar, 2 For Kim's letter to Stalin of 29 September 1950, tion. This is our preliminary telegram.” India's ambassador to China, early in see Cold War International History Project BulIt also explains why he proposed to send the morning of October 3, the Chinese letin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 110-111; the origiZhou Enlai to consult with Stalin. premier particularly emphasized that if nal is kept in the Archives of the President, Rus

That Mao had not altered his de- the U.S. (not South Korean) troops had sian Federation (APRF), Moscow, fond 45, opis termination to enter the war was most crossed the 38th parallel, China would 1, delo 347, listy 46-49. clearly demonstrated by his attitude at intervene. 19 As of October 2, this pre


Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou the October 4-5 Politburo meeting. Al- condition had not yet materialized. 20

Enlai, 1 October 1950, Cold War International though the majority of CCP leaders at- In addition to the above factors, History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), tending the meeting continued to ex- Mao did not give Stalin a direct and 114. press strong reservations about enterpositive response because he sensed the 4

Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao ing the Korean War, Mao told them that need to put more pressure on Stalin. An Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the "all of what you have said is reason- important condition for China to enter People's Republic) (Beijing: Central Press of able, but once another nation, one that a war with the United States was that it Historical Documents, 1987), 539-540. is our neighbor, is in crisis, we'd feel would receive substantial military sup


Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao makes it


clear that the text of the telegram published is


Basing his discussion of the meeting on the incomplete. In the original of the telegram, ac- Chinese version of Mao's 2 October 1950 tele- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL cording to Chen Jian, who based his description gram, Chen Jian, in China's Road to the Korean ** HISTORY PROJECT on "interviews with Shi Zhe and Beijing's mili- War (p. 175), asserted that top CCP leaders had

WORKING PAPERS tary researchers with access to Mao's manu- reached general consensus on sending troops to scripts,” Mao also asked Stalin to deliver to the Korea at the October 2 meeting, and that Mao #1: Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance Chinese large amounts of military equipment, proposed before the end of the meeting that he and China's Entry into the Korean War” including tanks, heavy artillery, other heavy and would personally send a telegram to Stalin to in

#2: P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on light weapons, and thousands of trucks, as well form the Soviet leader of the decision. This points

the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, as to confirm that the Soviet Union would pro- appears to be in error if the Russian version is

Prague and Warsaw”

#3: James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet vide the Chinese with air support when Chinese

Policy Towards Germany during the Beria troops entered operations in Korea. See Chen Jian, 16 Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu (Nie

Interregnum" China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of Rongzhen's Memoirs] (Beijing: People's Libera

#4: Vladislav M. Zubok, "Soviet Intellithe Sino-American Confrontation (New York: tion Army Press, 1984), 735.

gence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’Com17 Columbia University Press, 1994), 177.

Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai zishu (The Auto- mittee of Information, 1952-53" 6 For examples of such citations, see the editor's biographical Note of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: #5: Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the note in footnote 30 of Alexandre Y. Mansourov, People's Press, 1981), 472-74.

Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to En- 18 Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang (The First Test of on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Re

lations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961" ter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, Strength] (Beijing: Chinese Television and Broad

#6: Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” casting Press, 1990), 24; Chen Jian, China's Road

the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)" Cold War International History Project Bulletin to the Korean War, 185. For Stalin's reply (n.d.,

#7: Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), at 107. probably October 5 or 6) to Mao's earlier tele

“Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on 7 Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin), 3 Oc- gram, see Stalin to Kim Il-Sung, 8 (7) October the Cold War Period: Two Reports” tober 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message 1950, Cold War International History Project #8: Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in from Mao Zedong, Cold War International His- Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116-17. Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, tory Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp.

Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplo-

1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian 114-115. matic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: The Cen

Archives" 8

#9: Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. For the article and accompanying documents, tral Press of Historical Documents, 1990), 25-27. see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim,

Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet Re20 According to the intelligence reports the Chi

jection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reand China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, nese leaders had received by October 2, only

ports" September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence South Korean troops had crossed the parallel. As

#10: Norman M. Naimark, “To Know from the Russian Archives,Cold War Interna- late as October 14, when U.S.-South Korean

Everything and To Report Everything Worth tional History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/ troops had broken up the North Korean defense

Knowing': Building the East German Po1996), 94-119.

line for Pyongyang, Mao, in accordance with the lice State, 1945-1949" 9

Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's intelligence reports from the Chinese military, still #11: Christian F. Ostermann, "The United Decision to Enter the Korean War," 107, fn. 30. believed that “it seems that the Americans are yet

States, the East German Uprising of 1953,

and the Limits of Rollback" to decide whether or not and when they would 11

#12: Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, By comparison, early on the morning of 2 attack Pyongyang ... The American troops are now

and the Division of China: A Multi-ArchiOctober 1950, Mao sent another telegram to Gao still stationed at the (38th) parallel." Jianguo yilai

val Mystery" Gang and Deng Hua which carries the record of Mao Zedong wengao, 1: 559-61.

#13: Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three when it was dispatched (2:00 am) and the signa


See Cold War International History Project After World War II: New Documents on ture of Yang Shangkun, director of CCP Central Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116.

Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations Administrative Office, to witness its dispatch. For

with the United States and Great Britain” the text of the telegram, see Jianguo yilai Mao Shen Zhihua is director of Center for #14: Ruud van Dijk, “The 1952 Stalin Note Zedong wengao, 1:538. Oriental History Studies in Beijing and

Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunity for 12 See Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean the author of Chaoxian zhanzheng jiemi

German Unification?”

#15: Natalia I. Yegorova, “The Iran Crisis' War, 173. My own interviews, as well as those of [Unmasking the Secrets of the Korean

of 1945-1946: A View from the Russian ArXu Yan (a leading Chinese scholar on the history War] (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu, 1995).

chives" of the Korean War), also confirmed that the 1 Chen Jian is an associate professor of #16: Csaba Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian October 1950 Central Secretariat meeting did not history at Southern Illinois University Revolution and World Politics” reach a consensus on sending troops to Korea. and a senior

fellow at the United States 13 Telegram, Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Deng Institute of Peace in Washington, DC CWIHP Working Papers are available free Hua, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol.1, for the 1996-97 academic year. Among on request to: CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson p.538.

his publications is China's Road to the International Center for Scholars, 1000 14 Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan (A Biog- Korean War: The Making of the Sino

Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560; raphy of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Contemporary American Confrontation (New York:

fax: (202) 357-4439. China Press, 1993), 400.

Columbia University Press, 1994).

10 Ibid.

KHRUSHCHEV VS. MAO: good candidates for psychological ponents). 4 Not only was this combinaA PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF study. Those who cry out for such scru- tion of characteristics unusual; in the THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY tiny (as Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev end, all three traits were viewed as liIN THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT all do) are distinguished by three traits. abilities by Khrushchev's Kremlin col

First, they have great power; to use leagues. by William Taubman

Sidney Hook's well-known phrase, they Khrushchev's rise from the hum

are "event-making" rather than "event- blest of origins makes his a success Traditional and historical differ- ful” men or women, the difference be- story. Yet almost as soon as he reached ences, ideological arguments, economic ing that the former truly transform situ- the top, his self-defeating behavior beand geo-political issues, even racial ten- ations, whereas the latter merely attempt gan—far from all his troubles were of sions—these and other sources of the to cope with or respond to great changes his own making, of course, but many Sino-Soviet conflict have been analyzed already in progress.3 As paramount were brought on by his own actions. The along with the main episodes in the de- leaders of totalitarian (or in Khrush- Secret Speech itself triggered turmoil cades-long dispute. It has also been said chev's case, perhaps, “post-totalitar- in Poland and then revolution in Hunthat personalities of Chinese and Soviet ian”) systems, all three men surely fit gary in 1956. The Cuban missile crisis leaders played a large role—how could this description.

of 1962 was the beginning of the end they not given the likes of Stalin, Mao, Second, all three were unique; al- of Khrushchev's decade in power. And and Khrushchev?-but that side of though leaders, like ordinary citizens,

though leaders, like ordinary citizens, there were many other such instances events has been less studied.

are influenced by values and other ideas in which Khrushchev's behavior ended Chinese sources indicate that Mao widely shared in their societies, Stalin, up undermining his own position. took the Sino-Soviet conflict quite per- Mao, and Khrushchev nevertheless took One of the them was the Sino-Sosonally, that he did not have a high re- actions and made decisions that no one viet conflict itself. This article will look gard (to say the least) for Khrushchev, else in the Soviet or Chinese leaderships closely at several key episodes, focusand that he even tried deliberately to would have. It is that fact that invites sing on Mao's behavior and demean the Soviet leader. As for us to examine their personalities as a Khrushchev's response, before trying to Khrushchev, his own memoirs indicate prime source of their actions.

explain the pattern in terms of quite clearly that Mao got under his The third criterion is a pattern of Khrushchev's personality. skin. Khrushchev prefaces his account behavior that seems contradictory, irra- At first, Khrushchev's relations of the conflict by condemning those tional, and ultimately self-defeating. with Mao went quite well. The Chinese who imply that the split stemmed from The importance of this is that it sug- need for assistance, even greater after a mere "clash of personalities." Yet he gests a leader is not simply doing what the Korean War than before it, guaranhimself keeps coming back to that same a situation dictates, or what a culture teed Khrushchev would get a warm recause. The trouble with Mao was his encourages or allows, but rather is ception in Beijing in 1954, especially "unwillingness to consider anyone else driven by some internal compulsion that since he arrived bearing substantial his equal." When it came to the ques- influences his or her behavior.

gifts. Khrushchev claims in his memtion of who would lead the world com- Although all three traits character- oirs that he returned from China warnmunist movement, "everything depends ize all three leaders, the focus here is ing his colleagues that "conflict beon personal characteristics, on how one Khrushchev. Not only was he extremely tween us and China is inevitable.” But or another leader feels about himself, powerful, he was also distinctive among the fact that those same memoirs and in which direction he directs his Stalin's potential sucessors. No one else misattribute to his 1954 visit the famous

in the Soviet leadership, I'd contend, Khrushchev-Mao swimming pool enAs the Communist saying goes, would have (1) unmasked Stalin as counter that actually occurred in the these and other similar references aren't Khrushchev did in his secret speech at summer of 1958 suggests that he misaccidental. Almost against his will, they the 20th Party Congress, (2) placed takenly read back into 1954 the alarm register Khrushchev's conviction that nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba, and he clearly felt four years later. the personal dimension, and in particu- (3) taken those same missiles out again Even in 1954, however, lar the clash between himself and Mao, as soon as he was caught in the act. In Khrushchev probably first felt experiwas central.

addition, he stood apart from his peers enced sort of irritation with Mao that But what was it about Mao that so in three key elements of “political would grow steadily over the ensuing irritated Khrushchev? Was Mao's abil- style": in his rhetoric (Khrushchev was years. It was then, for example, that he ity to provoke him exceptional, or was as voluble, earthy, and informal as offered to return the Port Arthur naval Khrushchev in general easily provoked? Stalin and his other colleagues were base without even being asked to by the What light does his conduct of Sino- not); in his approach to work (he was Chinese-only to have Mao demand Soviet relations shed on Khrushchev as hyperactive far beyond the Bolshevik that the Soviets also hand over free of a leader? And how did Khrushchev's norm); and in inter-personal relations charge the Soviet weaponry located leadership affect Sino-Soviet relations? (in which he counted on face-to-face there.

Not all political leaders are equally encounters to gauge and to best his op- Until 1956, recalls Mao's doctor,


Li Zhisui, the Chinese leader welcomed guest. Yet, from the moment he arrived, cooperate with us when we asked for a Khrushchev's assumption of leadership “Mao was reserved and even a bit cool radio station on their territory," in the Kremlin. But the latter's speech with Khrushchev," while in private con

Khrushchev recalls.8 When Mao denouncing Stalin soured Mao on versations with his Chinese colleagues abruptly refused to deal with Soviet Khrushchev for good. Despite his own (which the KGB probably overheard Ambassador Pavel Yudin on the issue personal and other grievances against and reported to Khrushchev), Mao over- and instead rudely demanded that Stalin, Mao now decided the new So- flowed with “private barbs against the Khrushchev himself come to China, the viet leader was “unreliable,” and after Russian leader.”7

Soviet leader dropped everything and that "never forgave Khrushchev for at- During the first half of 1958, Mao's hurried off to Beijing, only to find himtacking Stalin.”6 Moreover, Mao attitude toward the Soviets darkened self the target of a new round of Maoist hardly bothered to conceal how he felt even more drastically as he launched the condescension and humiliation. about Khrushchev, and later practically “Great Leap Forward," and resolved to Talks on the radio stations and flaunted his contempt in Khrushchev's reduce Chinese dependence on Mos- other military matters began politely. face.

cow. Ironically, it was just then that But when Khrushchev took too long For example, during his November Khrushchev decided to propose still repeating points Yudin had made, Mao 1957 visit to Moscow, Mao hardly hid more military dependence to the Chi- openly displayed his contempt. Mao his disdain for his Russian hosts, their nese in the form of a radio station on smoked throughout despite hospitality, their food, and their culture. their territory to be used by Moscow for Khrushchev's well-known aversion to Khrushchev was "friendly and respect- communicating with its new nuclear- cigarettes. He also mocked his guest's ful,” Dr. Li recalls, and went out of his powered, missile-toting submarines. equally familiar penchant for rambling way to treat Mao as a highly honored "We fully expected the Chinese to on in disorganized fashion. Mao waved


A New “Cult of Personality": University). The excerpts below come

Draft Suslov's Secret Report on Mao, from another recently-discovered docu- ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet ment, a secret report on Khrushchev's SOVIET PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL Tensions, December 1959 trip to Beijing and meeting with Mao

DELEGATION TO THE delivered two months later by a senior PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

member of the Politburo of the Central (Ed. note: Though still masked Committee of the Communist Party of [Suslov:...) The crux of the matter is from public view, the simmering ten- the Soviet Union, Mikhail Suslov, to a that the leadership of the Chinese Commusions in the Khrushchev-Mao relation- December 1959 Plenum of CC CPSU. nist party has recently developed tendencies ship burst into the open between them The excerpts suggest how the fast de- to embellish its successes and capabilities, when the Soviet and Chinese veloping Sino-Soviet split had moved to exaggerate the degree of maturity of soleaderships met in Beijing on 2 Octo- beyond political and ideological dis

beyond political and ideological dis- cialist relations in China. Their heads have ber 1959. Khrushchev, who had led a putes into a highly-personal conflict. gotten somewhat dizzy because China is delegation to attend celebrations mark- The document, part of a large col- back on her feet and became visibly stroning the tenth anniversary of the estab- lection of Plenum transcripts and sup- ger. There are elements of conceit and lishment of the People's Republic of porting materials recently declassified haughtiness, that became particularly visChina, was shocked when his criticisms by Russian authorities, was discovered ible after the second session of the Eighth of recent Chinese policies provoked a in the Center for the Storage of Con- Congress of the Communist Party of China furious responseand the resulting ar- temporary Documentation (TsKhSD, that took place in May of 1958 (which set gument turned so angry that officials the former CC archives) in Moscow and China on the path toward the so-called on both sides sought to suppress the translated for CWIHP by Vladislav M. "great leap forward” which Suslov harshly transcript. (A secret Chinese compila- Zubok, a scholar based at the National criticized—ed.). tion of Mao's meetings with foreign Security Archive, a non-governmental (Suslov described a series of policy dis communist leaders omits this encoun- research institute and declassified docu- agreements-in foreign, domestic, military, ter, and scholars have reported finding ments repository located at George economic, ideologicalbetween Moscow Soviet documents indicating that the Washington University in Washington, and Beijing, and how these disputes flared record should be destroyed.)

D.C. (Another excerpt, on the Sino-In- up during Khrushchev's meeting with Mao Nevertheless, the Soviet transcript dian conflict, is printed after M.Y. and other Chinese leaders on 2 October of the meeting has survived-it was Prozumenschikov's article elsewhere 1959, noting that Khrushchev had remarked cited in Dmitrii Volkogonov's biogra- in this section of the Bulletin.) A full that the nervousness and touchiness" of phy of Leninand the Cold War Inter- translation of the Suslov report is slated

translation of the Suslov report is slated the "Chinese friends"does not mesh well national History Project plans to pub- for publication by CWIHP along with with the principle of equality and comradely lish it in full when it becomes available, the Mao-Khrushchev transcript noted relations that has become customary in the with translation, commentary, and an- above.)

fraternal family of communist parties...we notation by Mark Kramer (Harvard

continued on page 248

point. 9

his hand and said, “You've talked a long further lecture as if to a particularly which he had just visited, was bad time but have still not gotten to the dense student: “The British, Japanese, enough in Chinese eyes. His request that

and other foreigners who stayed in our the Chinese release two American piShocked and embarrassed, country for a long time have already lots who had parachuted into Northern Khrushchev is said by a Chinese wit- been driven away by us, Comrade China during and after the Korea War, ness to have mumbled, "Yes, don't Khrushchev. I'll repeat it again. We do and that they accommodate the Indian worry, I will continue," and then blamed not want anyone to use our land to leader Jawaharlal Nehru, whose strong Yudin for not making things clear. Later, achieve their own purposes anymore." "neutralist" and "anti-imperialist" powhen Khrushchev explained his hope During the next day's discussions sitions were all-important to the socialto build “a common fleet” to contend beside the pool Mao invited ist camp, enraged the Chinese. with America's 7th fleet, Mao is said to Khrushchev for a swim. Since the So- At one point in the talks, have “banged his large hands against viet leader couldn't swim very well, he Khrushchev charged that the Chinese the sofa, and stood up angrily. His face at first spluttered about in the shallow hadn't consulted Moscow before shellturned red and his breath turned heavy. area, then clambered out with the helping Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. When He used his finger to point impolitely of attendants, and finally re-entered the Chen Yi counter-attacked, he provoked at Khrushchev's nose: 'I asked you what pool with an inner tube. As for Mao, he Khrushchev to a fury. His face turning a common fleet is. You still didn't an- watched Khrushchev's clumsy efforts bright red, Khrushchev shouted at Chen, swer me.""

with obvious enjoyment, and then dove "You may be a marshal in the army, and By this time, Khrushchev's lips into the deep end and swam back and I a lieutenant general. But I am the First were pursed and white with strain, while forth using several different strokes. For Secretary of the CPSU, and you are ofhis small, bright eyes flared with anger. his next trick, Mao demonstrated his fending me.” But he swallowed hard, and as if in an- skill at floating and treading water, and “You are the General Secretary, all swer to Mao's pointing finger, spread then, highly satisfied with himself, he right," Chen responded. “But when you out his arms. “I don't understand why swam over to Khrushchev and struck are right I listen to you, and when you you are acting like this," he said. "We up a conversation in what a Chinese are wrong I will certainly refute you." came here just to discuss things to- onlooker called “a relaxed, friendly and At this, Khrushchev looked at Mao, gether."

open atmosphere." 11 After all, Dr. Li spread his arms widely, and complained “What does it mean to discuss continues, “the Chairman was deliber- that he and his delegation were badly things together?”” Mao demanded. “Do ately playing the role of emperor, treat- outnumbered in a meeting with the Chiwe still have our sovereignty or don't ing Khrushchev like the barbarian come nese political bureau. “How many we? Do you want to take away all our to pay tribute. It was a way, Mao told people do you have and how many do I coastal areas?” Tracing the shape of the me on the way back to Beidaihe, of have? The negotiation is unfair and unChinese coastline in the air with his fin- "sticking a needle up his ass.


equal." ger, Mao added sarcastically, “Why To make matters worse, the sub- Mao smiled, recalls his interpreter, don't you take the whole Chinese sea- stantive talks went badly. Moreover, paused, and then began speaking slowly

Khrushchev's trip was followed by and in a low voice: “I have listened to Struggling to stay calm, Beijing's shelling of the offshore islands you for a long time. You have accused Khrushchev shifted to the subject of of Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu us of quite a lot. You say we...did not refueling stops and shore leaves for [Mazu), undertaken without warning unite with Nehru, that we shouldn't Soviet submarines at Chinese ports. But Moscow, and in order, says Dr. Li, “to have shelled Jinmen, that the Great Mao rejected the idea out of hand and demonstrate to both Khrushchev and Leap was wrong, that we brag about continued to do so

even after Eisenhower that [Mao) could not be ourselves as orthodox Marxists. ThereKhrushchev noted how NATO coun- controlled, and to undermine fore I have an accusation for you, too tries mounted just such cooperation, and Khrushchev in his new quest for peace.” that you are guilty of 'right opportunsweetened the pie by offering access the Or as Mao himself put it, “The islands Chinese access to Soviet arctic ports in are two batons that keep Khrushchev The talks ended abruptly and unreturn.

and Eisenhower dancing, scurrying this happily. In Vladivostok, where “We aren't interested,” replied way and that. Don't you see how won- Khrushchev stopped on the way home, Mao, looking at Khrushchev as if (re- derful they are?”:13

he looked depressed and withdrawn. calls the Chinese witness) the Soviet In the late summer of 1959, with Part of the problem was sheer exhausleader “were a kid trying to do a trick an explosion building in Sino-Soviet tion after trips to both the United States in front of an adult.” Moreover, when relations, Khrushchev made his third and China. But what was also showing Khrushchev's face turned red with an- and last trip to Beijing. Behind a facade in Khrushchev's face was his frustrager, Mao seemed positively pleased. of politeness, a series of heated clashes tion and rage with Chairman Mao. “We don't want to use your Murmansk, made even the tense 1958 talks appear The next summer, Khrushchev atand we don't want you to come to our warm and friendly in comparison. tacked Mao by name and was attacked country either.” After that he offered a Khrushchev's infatuation with America, in turn by Peng Chen in a fiery clash at



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