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The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis,

and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962:
New Evidence from the Russian Archives

by M.Y. Prozumenschikov desire to strengthen its influence in the The fact that the USSR did not take a

“third world,” in the process squeezing clear “class” position in a conflict beThe year 1962 was marked by a the Soviet Union out 3

tween a socialist state and a bourgeois further intensification of the discord Unitl the fall of 1962, however, state provoked indignation in China. In between the Communist Party of the both countries succeeded in preserving a 13 September 1959 letter to the CC Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese a semblance of outward unity: the CPSU, the CC CCP accused the Soviet Community Party (CCP) and, corre- "cracks” in the Soviet-Chinese “mono- overnment (although in a veiled form) spondingly, between the Soviet Union lith" were already apparent to the na- of "accomodation and compromise on and the People's Republic of China ked eye, yet it was still not clear whether important matters of principle” and (PRC). Beijing's refusal to stay within they were leading to an outright schism. noted that “the TASS statement showed the boundaries defined by Moscow, The events of October 1962, when new to the whole world the different posiwhich was especially marked after the clashes on the Sino-Indian border and tions of China and the Soviet Union in 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, the Caribbean Crisis (Cuban Missile

the Caribbean Crisis (Cuban Missile regard to the incident on the Indiancaused serious anxiety among Soviet Crisis) broke out practically simulta- Chinese border, which causes a virtual officials who frequently spoke of the neously, constitute a turning point in the glee and jubilation among the Indian CCP leadership's deviation “from the development of Sino-Soviet relations bourgeoisie and the American and Engenerally fraternal countries and par- and signified the beginning of the open glish imperialists, who are in every way ties” and described Beijing's authorities split between the two countries. possible driving a wedge between China as seeking "to more widely bring into This article does not attempt to il- and the Soviet Union."5 the open their disagreements (with us), luminate the causes or recount the The border conflict placed the both in theory and in practice.”1 courses of the border conflict or the USSR in a complicated position for a

In the international arena, these Cuban crisis, but rather, on the basis of number of reasons. First of all, Mao disagreements touched on a wide circle archival documents in the former Cen- Zedong persistently tried to confer on of problems, including questions of war tral Committee (CC) of the CPSU this conflict the character of an imporand peace, peaceful coexistence, evalu- stored in the Storage Center for Con- tant question of the class struggle on an ations of the character of the contem- temporary Documentation (TsKhSD) in international scale and, accordingly, porary period, and others. Soviet leader Moscow, to analyze the influence of sought support for their actions from all Nikita S. Khrushchev, who was trying these dual conflicts in the fall of 1962 “fraternal" parties. This did not at all (albeit inconsistently) to conduct a on Sino-Soviet relations.

correspond to Khrushchev's views, neipolicy of peaceful coexistence with the Armed conflicts on the Sino-Indian ther in principle nor in the specific conWest, could hardly agree with the dec- border first occurred in August 1959 and crete case; while the Soviet leader earlarations coming from Beijing to the already caused at that time a mutual lack nestly desired to preserve good relations effect that the aspiration to achieve of understanding between the PRC and with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal peace without wars is sheer nonsense,” USSR. Moscow, having supported Nehru, for Mao Nehru was “half man, that impirialism “will never fall if it isn't Beijing during the suppression of the half devil" and the task of communists pushed,” and which characterized the uprising in Tibet in early 1959,4 refused was to “wash off his face so that it won't atom bomb as a “paper tiger.”2 Mos- to stand so unequivocally on China's be frightening, like a devil's.”:6 cow reacted especially sensitively to side in the border incident. Soviet lead- Secondly, the Soviet Union could Beijing's efforts to depreciate the role ers believed that in many ways the flare- not act as a peacemaker between socialof the socialist countries and the inter- up was provoked by the Chinese ist China and bourgeois India without national communist movement, having selves, in order to demonstrate in prac- violating the principles of proletarian declared the decisive factor of the de- tice their refusal to accept the McMahon internationalism. Not wishing simply velopment of human society in the con- line (a 1914 boundary agreed on by to embrace the Chinese position in the temporary epoch to be the national lib- British and Tibetan officials which In- border dispute, the USSR remained deaf eration movements of the countries of dian accepted as the correct Sino-Indian to numerous Indian requests to act as a Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the frontier) as the state border between the mediator. In this question, Moscow disUSSR it was feared, not without rea- PRC and India. Moscow clarified its played extreme caution; the CC CPSU, son, that one reason why the “wind from stance in a September 1959 TASS state- for example, categorically rejected a the East had come to prevail over the ment calling on both warring sides to proposal of the director of the Institute wind from the West,” was the PRC's resolve the conflict by peaceful means. of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, P. Gafurov, to orga- conflict. From time to time Moscow Havana established diplomatic relations nize in Moscow a meeting with the par- cautiously attempted to influence in September 1960; now the PRC beticipation of Chinese and Indian schol- Beijing to take a more moderate posi- gan actively to invite envoys from the ars on questions connected with the his- tion and agree to compromise with In- “island of freedom” and recruit from tory and mutual influences of Chinese dia. At that time, Soviet officials be- them advocates of their own course. 13 and Indian cultures. 7

lieved that such a change in China's Considering that the Chinese revoThird, the border conflict sharply approach could occur only “as a result lutionaries' militant language in many worsened the position of the Commu- of review by the leaders of the PRC of respects echoed the Cubans', Moscow nist Party of India (CPI): subjected to their foreign policy conceptions as a tried by all means to lessen Chinese inattacks from the bourgeois parties of In- whole,” but this “in the near future is fluence. These efforts did not go to dia, the CPI also itself split between extremely problematic."9 In contrast waste. During a visit to China at the those who felt that only India was at to the diplomats, Khrushchev, dis- end of 1960, Cuban revolutionary Che fault in the conflict and those who

sug- pleased by the Mao's refusal to heed Guevara in a joint Chinese-Cuban comgested that responsibility could be di- Moscow's advice, stated in a much munique expressed approval of the PRC vided between both countries. At the sharper way that when he converses policy of “three red banners”; but one 6th CPI Congress in 1961, Soviet rep- with Mao, when he listens to him, he year later, Cuban President Oswaldo resentative M. Suslov exerted consid- gets the impression that he is speaking Dorticos, in a visit to the PRC, did not erable effort so that, on the one hand, with Stalin, is listening to Stalin.


once touch on this question despite conmilitant pro-Beijing party members From their part, the Chinese persistently siderable Chinese efforts. 14 who felt the CPI must always align it- told Soviet representatives that resolv- In Cuba itself, authorities generally self with the CCP would not prevail, and ing the border dispute required influ- tried to minimize the disagreements that on the other hand, to block discussion encing India, not the PRC; that “Nehru had arisen in the communist world. at the Congress of a resolution proposed is the central figure in the anti-Chinese Havana even specially appealed to by a number of prominent Indian com- campaign in India, that he does not in Moscow and Beijing with a request not munists criticizing the PRC and back- any case want to resolve the question to publish anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese ing Nehru. These Soviet actions could of the Sino-Indian border, even in some materials in TASS and Xinhua bulletins hardly pass unnoticed in Beijing; in a fixed period."11 Moscow listened to distributed in Cuba, for this could, the talk with Soviet ambassador S. these statements in silence, leaving Cuban leadership feared, damage the Chervonenko, CC CCP secretary Deng them without commentary.

unity of the Cuban people and create Xiaoping made a point of referring in- Concurrently with the Sino-Indian additional political difficulties within dignantly to “some Indian communists, border conflict, Soviet and Chinese at- the country. 15 The Cuban press carewho are even praising Nehru."


tention was drawn to events in the West- fully “filtered” all statements by ChiFinally, another relevant aspect of ern hemisphere, where in 1959 the Cu- nese leaders critical of Soviet policy in the problem was the fact that Moscow ban revolution triumphed. The chance particular, most newspapers excised clearly grasped that Beijing's bellicose to spread their respective understand- such remarks from the speech of Chimethod of resolving border questions ings of Marxism among the Cuban nese Premier Zhou Enlai at the CPSU with India could also be repeated in revolutionaries sparked a lively compe- 22nd congress); at the same time the other disputed portions of the Chinese tition between the two communist gi- Cubans politely but firmly suppressed border, and not necessarily only with ants for ideological influence in Cuba. Soviet attempts to distribute literature countries liberated from colonial depen- Initially, Moscow seized the lead- in Cuba that enunciated Moscow's point dence. As early as 8 September 1959, ership in this “contest for Cuba,” which of view on the dispute.16 two weeks after fighting broke out on was in many ways determined by So- Both the Soviet Union and China the Sino-Indian border, the CC CPSU viet military and economic aid to Ha- naturally counted on extracting advanreceived from the USSR Ministry of vana. By contrast, although Chinese tages from the "special relations” they Foreign Affairs a detailed report “On leaders welcomed the Cuban revolu- hoped to establish with Cuba. However, the Question of the Soviet-Chinese tion, if they took a wait-and-see ap- if Beijing embarked on a path of proBorder.” The preparation of such a re- proach with regard to its leader Fidel pagandistic expansion through Cuba port at a time when Sino-Soviet rela- Castro, in part to preserve diplomatic onto the Latin American continent, then tions, at least on this question, were communications with Taiwan via Cuba. in the USSR a plan took shape to use ostensibly satisfactory strongly suggests In this regard, noted Soviet representa- the island as an unsinkable nuclear base that at least some Soviet officials al- tives in China, who closely monitored near the shores of the USA. Khrushready foresaw the danger of border the development of Chinese-Cuban re- chev preferred not to let Mao Zedong problems with China.

lations, in its propaganda during this know about this plan, not only because For the previous three years a situ- early period the CCP leadership made of the existing disagreements, but also, ation of unstable equilibrium had been no attempt to counterpose their policy perhaps, out of a wish to reap future maintained on the Sino-Indian border, toward Cuba to that of the CPSU.12

laurels himself and at the same time to threatening the outbreak of new armed The situation changed after Beijing and strengthen the Soviet position in the “third world.” This desire might account onstrate the seriousness of the situation whole world with catastrophe, the secfor the thoroughness and satisfaction on the Indian-Chinese border," and to ond was acutely painful for the USSR with which the CC CPSU apparatus urge “the press organs of the fraternal and its leader. Searching for a way out, collected the enthusiastic reactions from parties to come forward on the given Moscow, in the midst of everything, the developing countries to the TASS question with accounts of the Chinese turned its attention to Beijing. The exreport of 11 September 1962 vowing side's positions."20 A week later, So

perience of recent years made it posthat the USSR would protect Cuba viet ambassador Chervonenko, as he sible for Khrushchev to hope that, at this against U.S. aggression. In China, de- reported to Moscow, spoke on this very critical moment in the battle with interspite the fact that this report fit Beijing's question with PRC Vice-Minister of national imperialism, China would at propaganda style, only 32 lines were Foreign Affairs Zhang Hanfu, and “em- least momentarily “close its eyes” to the allotted to it in the periodical press. phatically declared to Zhang Hanfu that discord and steadfastly support any The CC CCP 10th Plenum, which

it was necessary to understand who was Soviet action. That had occurred (at took place in the fall of 1962, strength- right and who was not right in the bor- least on the surface) in 1956 during the ened anti-Soviet moods in Beijing. On der conflicts). It would be incorrect not crises in Hungary and Poland, and in October 12, Chinese leaders stated that to distinguish between those who were 1961 during the Berlin crisis.23 For his the conclusion of a nuclear weapons guilty and those who were not guilty.

guilty and those who were not guilty. part, Khrushchev was ready to comprononproliferation treaty (which It would likewise not be right to blur mise with Mao on a whole series of isKhrushchev supported), would further the distinction between the guilty and sues, including the Sino-Indian conflict. the interests only of the USA, which

the innocent."21 Such an answer could On October 25, with war with the was trying to bind China by the hands not be reassuring to Beijing. Cher- United States potentially imminent, the and feet” in the development of its own vonenko also mentioned certain prob- newspaper Pravda published a frontnuclear arsenal. 17 An October 20 mem- lems which were raised by Zhang Hanfu page article, which had been approved orandum from the PRC government to and which evidently were connected by the CC CPSU, essentially rejecting the USSR government on the nonpro- "with the aggravation of the situation the position that Moscow had mainliferation question, distributed also to on the Sino-Indian border, in light of tained during the course of the whole representatives of other socialist coun- the fact that the Chinese leadership ex- Sino-Indian border conflict. The article tries, declared: “However strong the pected different reactions on the part of called the McMahon line, which New military capabilities of the Soviet the Soviet leadership."22

Delhi accepted, “notorious,” “the reUnion, it is not able to solve the defense One must also note that at first, the sult of British imperialism," and conissue of all the socialist nations. For Sovie leadership, preoccupied with sequently legally invalid. Moreover, example, on the question of the defense Cuban affairs, did not pay particular having made this assertion on the eve by the Chinese of their borders with In- attention to the renewed aggravation of of the execution of Chinese plans to dia, the Soviet side played just the op- tensions on the Sino-Indian frontier. settle the conflict, Pravda also accused posite role.”:18 A similar announcement The documents relating to events on the India of being incited by imperialists explained that the military conflict on border, which various organs of the CC and being the main ringleaders of the the Sino-Indian border, which was again CPSU issued during this period, did not, conflict and charged that the CPI was flaring in autumn 1962, had not only as a rule, go further than the Interna- sliding toward chauvinism to the detrifailed to move the Soviet Union to tional Department of the Central Com- ment of proletarian internationalism.24 change its fundamental position but mittee, and they were labeled: “Infor- Moscow's unexpected and abrupt also, from the Chinese perspective, mational Material. To the archive.” reversal—

clearly intended as a gesture caused Moscow to become even more The lack of upper-level Soviet en- to shore up the all but moribund Sinopro-Indian, since prior to these events gagement on the border conflict was re- Soviet alliance in the event of war with it had given India the military helicop- flected in Soviet newspaper articles the West-provoked a sharp reaction, ters and transport planes, which took which gave stingy information and, but not exactly the one that the Soviet part in the border clashes.

moreover, did not appear in prominent leadership had expected. From the In October 1962, Beijing made a locations. The same lack of top level documents at TsKhSD, it is clear that last attempt to compel Moscow to take leadership manifested itself in the con- the article came as a bombshell, espea “class position” on China's border versations of Soviet officials with for- cially in India. Nehru declared that he dispute with India and to teach certain eign representatives, in which the So- was very pained by the article, which comrades to separate truth from un- viets reiterated the old thesis about the caused significant damage to India's

On October 15, Renmin Ribao need to prevent world conflict. friendship with the USSR.25 Even (People's Daily) assistant editor Chen The situation changed on October more severe embarrassment arose in the Tseiun organized in the newspaper's 22, when the speech of U.S. President CPI; one party leader, Shripad Amrit editorial office a meeting with foreign John F. Kennedy effectively put a tough Dange, sent the CC CPSU a telegram correspondents, which was intended, choice before Khrushchev: conflict,

choice before Khrushchev: conflict, requesting that it take at least some acaccording to the opinion of the Soviet with likely use of nuclear weapons, or tion to repudiate some of the article's journalists who were present, “to dem- retreat. The first scenario threatened the statements. Very familiar with the sys


tem, under which the representatives of Cuban question expressing "complete sacrifice hundreds of millions of human the other fraternal nations and parties support for the correct position of the lives on the victory altar of Commuusually followed the Soviet position, Soviet government," and two large ar- nism, the Beijing leadership evidently unwervingly supporting the Kremlin, ticles in Renmin Ribao with bellicose firmly believed that such a catastrophe Dange begged Moscow "to stop all the headlines that typified Chinese propa- would not happen in October 1962. In fraternal parties so that they would not ganda of that period, and which ap- the conflict's tensest moments, Chinese write in their newspapers about the proved of the Soviet's actions in the officials remained convinced that there McMahon line, things which were simi

Caribbean.31 This was the last praise was no danger of thermonuclear war, lar to that which they would otherwise that Beijing officially conferred upon and that if the affair went so far as a write."26 The telegram went unan- Moscow. While the Soviet propagan- military conflict, it would be of a gueswered. Predictably, the pro-Chinese dists tried with limited success to orga- rilla character, as in Algeria, Laos, or faction of the CPI became noticeably nize massive rallies and demonstrations

South Vietnam.32 According to Mao, more active, announcing triumphantly within other nations for the support of the main reason that war would not that the CPSU was finally "convinced their policy, nothing of the sort was at- break out was that the American impeof the folly of its ways and accepted the tempted in China in October 1962. rialists, who feared for their stolen Chinese perspective.”27

Soviet leaders, it seems, did not riches, had no reason to desire it. SimiIn the tangled position in which grasp the fact that during this period the larly, the “Soviet bourgeoisie" that had Soviet diplomats in New Delhi found disagreements between the two govern- emerged under Khrushchev and had not themselves, they were obliged, in con- ments had become too strong to be sur- forgotten about the Stalinist purges versations with Indians, to speak of the

mounted with the stroke of a newspa- maintained a death grip on their privicomplicated and confused situation, per writer's pen. Nor did they realize leges. Consequently, Beijing figured about the impossibility of defining the that Khrushchev's actions in Cuba cre- that one side or the other had to yield. reality of any border, even proposing ated a dream-like situation for the Chi- In the end an understanding of the that India wait while Chinese and In- nese-ensuring a positive outcome, lethal danger of nuclear conflict comdian academicians defined the precise from their standpoint, without requir- pelled Khrushchev to retreat. 33 Alborder on the basis of archival docu- ing them to modify their basic position. though the Soviet Union understood ments.28 The Indians understood what For if Kennedy retreated and the mis- that their leader lacked the absolute was happening, inferring that the ap- siles remained on the island, it would power over his allies in the communist pearance of “such bad articles” in the vindicate the CCP's militant thesis that

camp to represent the defeat as a “vicSoviet press could only be explained imperialism was a “paper tiger" to tory in the name of peace," nonetheless, “by the situation of the Cuban crisis and which one needed to apply the principle the USSR did not expect the violent rethe threat of war.' -29

of intensified pressure; conversely, action to Khruschev's agreement to Soviet officials had expected such Khrushchev’s retreat would strengthen withdraw the missiles which was to reactions, but they hoped to be repaid Beijing's slogan denouncing "contem- come from Beijing. with active Chinese support in the Car- porary revisionists,” i.e., the Soviets. As soon as the news of Khrushibbean (Cuban Missile) crisis. It was Moreover, the future of Sino-Soviet chev’s retreat reached them, the Chinese no coincidence that during this period, relations and the situation in the Com

relations and the situation in the Com- authorities put their propaganda main conversations with Chinese officials, munist world as a whole depended, in chine to work at full throttle; newspaEast German and Hungarian diplomats large measure, on the result of the So- pers displayed discussions about the stressed the need for compromise and viet-American stand-off. If events de- situation in the Caribbean, the cities cooperation between fraternal socialist veloped according to the first scenario, were covered in slogans in support of parties, rejecting the “clarification of Khrushchev would probably conduct Cuba, and the speeches that Castro had relationships" while there was bitter relations with Washington as if with a given on Cuban television explaining hostility and potential war with the im- "paper tiger," a development which the basic disagreements between the perialists. 30 Since the records of these Beijing could interpret as strengthening

Beijing could interpret as strengthening Cuban and the Soviet leaderships actuconversations were almost immediately the correctness of the Chinese line. The ally became bestsellers in China at that sent to the Soviet embassy in Beijing, second possibility would lead to a final time. Soviet diplomats in Beijing disand from there efficiently dispatched to split, between the USSR and China, and consolately reported that events on the the CC CPSU, it is not hard to guess the anti-Soviet mood would intensify. Sino-Indian border, to which Chinese that such conversations were, to a large Analyzing the documents available propaganda up until that time had been extent, inspired by Moscow.

in TsKhSD, one may conclude that the devoting most of its attention, had been However, the effort which the Chinese leaders did not believe that a swept aside and lost in this midst of the USSR expended to obtain China's sup- third, more tragic variant might de- uproar over Cuba. 34 Only now, after port proved to be entirely disproportion- velop: that the flare-up over Cuba would the Soviet concession had ended the ate to the return it received. All that escalate into World War III. Since Mao crisis, came the rallies the Soviet leadMoscow got from the PRC leadership loved to issue judgment on themes of ers had desired in its first days, featurwas an October 25 declaration on the global war and was even prepared to ing appearances and speeches by the up


per-level Chinese leadership: Deng ability of any sort of "wishy-washiness" outset of military actions on the SinoXiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, et in relations with the imperialist aggres- Indian border, the Soviets had sought al.35 The political campaign culmi- sors.41 Obviously with the approval, basic operational data from Chinese aunated with elaborately orchestrated36 of the PRC leadership, Renmin Ribao thorities about the situation, but for a mass demonstrations of solidarity at the compared the Cuba situation with the long time was unable to get any. In fact, Cuban Embassy in Beijing, which took 1938 Munich Pact-e.g., charging the USSR didn't even know from the place non-stop from the 3rd to the 6th Moscow with appeasement of imperi- beginning that military operations alof November and in which, the Chinese alism.42 At that moment, a stronger ready were going full steam: A secret media reported, more than five million accusation was difficult to imagine. report of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing people participated. 37

The anti-Soviet orientation of noted that in 1958 the “Chinese friends" Soviet officials well understood the statements in China was not limited had informed Moscow “about the poulterior motive behind these mass dem- only to means of mass communication. litical goals which are being pursued by onstrations. While under the ostensible The CC CPSU received information this action [in the Taiwan straits] only slogan of solidarity with Cuba, they that in enterprises, offices and even in after two weeks,”:44 while in 1959 sharply criticized those "who were certain schools across China closed Moscow received China's report about frightened in the face of imperial ag- meetings were being held to elucidate the events on the border only after “a gression," who "bartered with the free- the situation around Cuba and the role great delay.”45 Insofar as “the recogdom and independence of another of the Soviet Union. At these meetings nition and stressing by the Chinese com

38 people," and so on. However, at that it was essentially stated for the first time rades of the formula about the leading moment Moscow was not up to a clari- openly, and not through hints, that the role of the Soviet Union in the Socialfication of relations with China; rather, USSR was conducting a “revisionist" ist [bloc) might create in world public it sought at any price to get out of the foreign as well as domestic policy. It opinion the impression that the harsh conflict with minimal losses. In fact, was true that the responsible party course and the foreign policy actions of in November 1962, Moscow switched workers who conducted these meetings the PRC were taken upon agreement roles with Beijing; if during the Sino- explained that accusing the Soviet with the Soviet Union,"


Soviet offiIndian border clashes China unsuccess- Union of revisionism out loud-like, cials viewed Beijing's behavior very fully appealed for the support of the for example, Yugoslavia—for the time negatively, and demanded that China Soviet Union, now the USSR faced the being was not permitted by the tense coordinate positions in situations where analogous response from the PRC. international situation. But they let it be the collective security of the two counDuring this period, the Soviet ambas- known that this would be a matter for tries—which under the 1950 treaty cresador repeatedly tried to secure a meet- the coming months. At the same time, ating the Sino-Soviet alliance were ing directly with Mao, who cited vari- it was said in China that the peoples of linked together by, inter alia, the oblious reasons for avoiding a personal en- the socialist countries of Eastern Europe gation to provide military assistance to counter, instead sending much lower- could not sleep at night because of fear one another—was involved. 47 ranking officials. The Soviet Embassy of a nuclear conflict.

There was great amazement in knew full well that during these very Judging by the information which Moscow when in November 1962 the days, when Chinese officials asserted flowed into the CC CPSU, one reason Chinese virtually repeated the old Sothat Mao was feeling indisposed and behind Beijing's extreme negative re- viet theses, declaring that the Kremlin's could not receive the Soviet ambassa- action to Moscow's actions was the fact poorly thought out actions in the Cardor, the PRC leader was seeing party that the Soviet Union had deployed ibbean might have involved the Chinese delegations and representatives of other missiles to Cuba without saying a word

missiles to Cuba without saying a word people in a nuclear war against its will, states. 39 All this amounted to a clear to China. Reproaches that Khrushchev since although the PRC didn't know demonstration of the poor relations be- had hidden important international in- anything about the Soviet preparations, tween the PRC and USSR.

formation from his allies were heard by the terms of the 1950 alliance treaty Moscow might have put up with frequently in China in those days along in the event of the outbreak of war, it Beijing simply taking a neutral position. with unfavorable comparisons to Sino- would have had to enter the conflict on However, the PRC decided to exploit Soviet consultations during the events the USSR's side. 48 the Cuban crisis to explain to “certain in Poland, Hungary, and Laos, when the All this taken together could not comrades that under no conditions is it sides informed each other in a timely but attract the attention of Moscow, permissible to trade in the liberty and manner and therefore made correct de- which decided, as soon as the clouds rights" of other states. 40 The PRC For- cisions.4

43 More to the point, on this over Cuba bagan to disperse a little, "to eign Minister, Chen Yi, speaking on issue it was as if Moscow and Beijing bring affairs to order" in the socialist November 7 in the Soviet Embassy on had traded places: now it fell to house. On November 5, Pravda pubthe occasion of the 45th anniversary of Khrushchev to listen to the reproaches lished a new lead article on the situathe October Revolution, as Soviet dip- which he had only recently addressed tion on the Sino-Indian border, which lomats later reported, lectured them in to Mao. In autumn 1958, during the in its content sharply contrasted with its a "mentor's tone" about the inadmiss- Taiwan Straits crisis, and in 1959, at the predecessor of ten days before and on

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