"third world." This desire might account for the thoroughness and satisfaction with which the CC CPSU apparatus collected the enthusiastic reactions from the developing countries to the TASS report of 11 September 1962 vowing that the USSR would protect Cuba against U.S. aggression. In China, despite the fact that this report fit Beijing's propaganda style, only 32 lines were allotted to it in the periodical press.

The CC CCP 10th Plenum, which took place in the fall of 1962, strengthened anti-Soviet moods in Beijing. On October 12, Chinese leaders stated that the conclusion of a nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty (which Khrushchev supported), would further the interests only of the USA, which was trying "to bind China by the hands and feet" in the development of its own nuclear arsenal. 17 An October 20 memorandum from the PRC government to the USSR government on the nonproliferation question, distributed also to representatives of other socialist countries, declared: "However strong the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, it is not able to solve the defense issue of all the socialist nations. For example, on the question of the defense by the Chinese of their borders with India, the Soviet side played just the opposite role."18 A similar announcement explained that the military conflict on the Sino-Indian border, which was again flaring in autumn 1962, had not only failed to move the Soviet Union to change its fundamental position but also, from the Chinese perspective, caused Moscow to become even more pro-Indian, since prior to these events it had given India the military helicopters and transport planes, which took part in the border clashes.

In October 1962, Beijing made a last attempt to compel Moscow to take a "class position" on China's border dispute with India and "to teach certain comrades to separate truth from untruth." "19 On October 15, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) assistant editor Chen Tseiun organized in the newspaper's editorial office a meeting with foreign correspondents, which was intended, according to the opinion of the Soviet journalists who were present, "to dem

onstrate the seriousness of the situation

on the Indian-Chinese border," and to urge "the press organs of the fraternal parties to come forward on the given parties to come forward on the given question with accounts of the Chinese side's positions."20 A week later, So

viet ambassador Chervonenko, as he reported to Moscow, spoke on this very question with PRC Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Hanfu, and "emphatically declared to Zhang Hanfu that it was necessary to understand who was right and who was not right [in the border conflicts]. It would be incorrect not to distinguish between those who were guilty and those who were not guilty. guilty and those who were not guilty. It would likewise not be right to blur the distinction between the guilty and the innocent."21 Such an answer could not be reassuring to Beijing. Chervonenko also mentioned certain problems which were raised by Zhang Hanfu and which evidently were connected "with the aggravation of the situation on the Sino-Indian border, in light of the fact that the Chinese leadership expected different reactions on the part of "22 the Soviet leadership.

One must also note that at first, the Sovie leadership, preoccupied with Sovie leadership, preoccupied with Cuban affairs, did not pay particular attention to the renewed aggravation of tensions on the Sino-Indian frontier. The documents relating to events on the border, which various organs of the CC CPSU issued during this period, did not, as a rule, go further than the International Department of the Central Committee, and they were labeled: “Informational Material. To the archive."

The lack of upper-level Soviet engagement on the border conflict was reflected in Soviet newspaper articles which gave stingy information and, moreover, did not appear in prominent locations. The same lack of top level leadership manifested itself in the conversations of Soviet officials with foreign representatives, in which the Soviets reiterated the old thesis about the need to prevent world conflict.

The situation changed on October 22, when the speech of U.S. President John F. Kennedy effectively put a tough choice before Khrushchev: conflict, with likely use of nuclear weapons, or retreat. The first scenario threatened the

whole world with catastrophe, the second was acutely painful for the USSR and its leader. Searching for a way out, Moscow, in the midst of everything, turned its attention to Beijing. The experience of recent years made it possible for Khrushchev to hope that, at this critical moment in the battle with international imperialism, China would at least momentarily "close its eyes" to the discord and steadfastly support any Soviet action. That had occurred (at least on the surface) in 1956 during the crises in Hungary and Poland, and in 1961 during the Berlin crisis.23 For his part, Khrushchev was ready to compromise with Mao on a whole series of issues, including the Sino-Indian conflict.

On October 25, with war with the United States potentially imminent, the newspaper Pravda published a frontpage article, which had been approved by the CC CPSU, essentially rejecting the position that Moscow had maintained during the course of the whole Sino-Indian border conflict. The article called the McMahon line, which New Delhi accepted, "notorious," "the result of British imperialism," and consequently legally invalid. Moreover, having made this assertion on the eve of the execution of Chinese plans to settle the conflict, Pravda also accused India of being incited by imperialists and being the main ringleaders of the conflict and charged that the CPI was sliding toward chauvinism to the detriment of proletarian internationalism.24

Moscow's unexpected and abrupt reversal-clearly intended as a gesture to shore up the all but moribund SinoSoviet alliance in the event of war with the West-provoked a sharp reaction, but not exactly the one that the Soviet leadership had expected. From the documents at TsKhSD, it is clear that the article came as a bombshell, especially in India. Nehru declared that he was very pained by the article, which caused significant damage to India's friendship with the USSR.25 Even

more severe embarrassment arose in the CPI; one party leader, Shripad Amrit Dange, sent the CC CPSU a telegram requesting that it take at least some action to repudiate some of the article's statements. Very familiar with the sys

tem, under which the representatives of the other fraternal nations and parties usually followed the Soviet position, unwervingly supporting the Kremlin, Dange begged Moscow "to stop all the fraternal parties so that they would not write in their newspapers about the McMahon line, things which were similar to that which they would otherwise write."26 The telegram went unanswered. Predictably, the pro-Chinese faction of the CPI became noticeably more active, announcing triumphantly that the CPSU was finally "convinced of the folly of its ways and accepted the Chinese perspective."27

In the tangled position in which Soviet diplomats in New Delhi found themselves, they were obliged, in conversations with Indians, to speak of the complicated and confused situation, about the impossibility of defining the reality of any border, even proposing that India wait while Chinese and Indian academicians defined the precise border on the basis of archival documents.2

28 The Indians understood what was happening, inferring that the appearance of "such bad articles” in the Soviet press could only be explained "by the situation of the Cuban crisis and the threat of war.' "29

Soviet officials had expected such reactions, but they hoped to be repaid with active Chinese support in the Caribbean (Cuban Missile) crisis. It was no coincidence that during this period, in conversations with Chinese officials, East German and Hungarian diplomats stressed the need for compromise and cooperation between fraternal socialist parties, rejecting the "clarification of relationships" while there was bitter hostility and potential war with the imperialists.30 Since the records of these conversations were almost immediately sent to the Soviet embassy in Beijing, and from there efficiently dispatched to the CC CPSU, it is not hard to guess that such conversations were, to a large extent, inspired by Moscow.

However, the effort which the USSR expended to obtain China's support proved to be entirely disproportionate to the return it received. All that Moscow got from the PRC leadership was an October 25 declaration on the

Cuban question expressing "complete support for the correct position of the Soviet government," and two large articles in Renmin Ribao with bellicose ticles in Renmin Ribao with bellicose headlines that typified Chinese propaganda of that period, and which approved of the Soviet's actions in the Caribbean.31 This was the last praise that Beijing officially conferred upon Moscow. While the Soviet propagandists tried with limited success to organize massive rallies and demonstrations within other nations for the support of their policy, nothing of the sort was attempted in China in October 1962.

Soviet leaders, it seems, did not grasp the fact that during this period the disagreements between the two governments had become too strong to be surmounted with the stroke of a newspaper writer's pen. Nor did they realize that Khrushchev's actions in Cuba created a dream-like situation for the Chinese-ensuring a positive outcome, from their standpoint, without requiring them to modify their basic position. For if Kennedy retreated and the missiles remained on the island, it would vindicate the CCP's militant thesis that imperialism was a "paper tiger" to which one needed to apply the principle of intensified pressure; conversely, Khrushchev's retreat would strengthen Beijing's slogan denouncing "contemporary revisionists," i.e., the Soviets. Moreover, the future of Sino-Soviet relations and the situation in the Communist world as a whole depended, in large measure, on the result of the Soviet-American stand-off. If events developed according to the first scenario, Khrushchev would probably conduct relations with Washington as if with a relations with Washington as if with a "paper tiger," a development which Beijing could interpret as strengthening the correctness of the Chinese line. The second possibility would lead to a final split, between the USSR and China, and the anti-Soviet mood would intensify.

Analyzing the documents available in TsKHSD, one may conclude that the Chinese leaders did not believe that a third, more tragic variant might develop: that the flare-up over Cuba would escalate into World War III. Since Mao loved to issue judgment on themes of global war and was even prepared to

sacrifice hundreds of millions of human lives on the victory altar of Communism, the Beijing leadership evidently firmly believed that such a catastrophe would not happen in October 1962. In the conflict's tensest moments, Chinese officials remained convinced that there was no danger of thermonuclear war, and that if the affair went so far as a military conflict, it would be of a guerilla character, as in Algeria, Laos, or South Vietnam.32 According to Mao,

the main reason that war would not break out was that the American imperialists, who feared for their stolen riches, had no reason to desire it. Similarly, the "Soviet bourgeoisie" that had emerged under Khrushchev and had not forgotten about the Stalinist purges maintained a death grip on their privileges. Consequently, Beijing figured that one side or the other had to yield.

In the end an understanding of the lethal danger of nuclear conflict compelled Khrushchev to retreat.33 Although the Soviet Union understood that their leader lacked the absolute power over his allies in the communist camp to represent the defeat as a "victory in the name of peace," nonetheless, the USSR did not expect the violent reaction to Khruschev's agreement to withdraw the missiles which was to come from Beijing.

As soon as the news of Khrushchev's retreat reached them, the Chinese authorities put their propaganda machine to work at full throttle; newspapers displayed discussions about the situation in the Caribbean, the cities were covered in slogans in support of Cuba, and the speeches that Castro had given on Cuban television explaining the basic disagreements between the Cuban and the Soviet leaderships actually became bestsellers in China at that time. Soviet diplomats in Beijing disconsolately reported that events on the Sino-Indian border, to which Chinese propaganda up until that time had been devoting most of its attention, had been swept aside and lost in this midst of the 34

uproar over Cuba.3 Only now, after

the Soviet concession had ended the crisis, came the rallies the Soviet leaders had desired in its first days, featuring appearances and speeches by the up

per-level Chinese leadership: Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, et al.35 The political campaign culminated with elaborately orchestrated36 mass demonstrations of solidarity at the Cuban Embassy in Beijing, which took place non-stop from the 3rd to the 6th of November and in which, the Chinese media reported, more than five million 37 people participated.

Soviet officials well understood the ulterior motive behind these mass demonstrations. While under the ostensible slogan of solidarity with Cuba, they sharply criticized those "who were frightened in the face of imperial aggression," who "bartered with the freedom and independence of another people," and so on.38 However, at that moment Moscow was not up to a clarification of relations with China; rather, it sought at any price to get out of the conflict with minimal losses. In fact, in November 1962, Moscow switched roles with Beijing; if during the SinoIndian border clashes China unsuccessfully appealed for the support of the Soviet Union, now the USSR faced the analogous response from the PRC. During this period, the Soviet ambassador repeatedly tried to secure a meeting directly with Mao, who cited various reasons for avoiding a personal encounter, instead sending much lowerranking officials. The Soviet Embassy knew full well that during these very days, when Chinese officials asserted that Mao was feeling indisposed and could not receive the Soviet ambassador, the PRC leader was seeing party delegations and representatives of other states.39 All this amounted to a clear demonstration of the poor relations between the PRC and USSR.

Moscow might have put up with Beijing simply taking a neutral position. However, the PRC decided to exploit the Cuban crisis to explain to "certain comrades that under no conditions is it permissible to trade in the liberty and 40 rights" of other states. The PRC Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, speaking on November 7 in the Soviet Embassy on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the October Revolution, as Soviet diplomats later reported, lectured them in a “mentor's tone” about the inadmiss

sors.

ability of any sort of "wishy-washiness" in relations with the imperialist aggres41 Obviously with the approval, of the PRC leadership, Renmin Ribao compared the Cuba situation with the 1938 Munich Pact-e.g., charging Moscow with appeasement of imperialism.42 At that moment, a stronger accusation was difficult to imagine.

The anti-Soviet orientation of statements in China was not limited only to means of mass communication. The CC CPSU received information that in enterprises, offices and even in certain schools across China closed meetings were being held to elucidate the situation around Cuba and the role of the Soviet Union. At these meetings it was essentially stated for the first time openly, and not through hints, that the USSR was conducting a "revisionist" foreign as well as domestic policy. It was true that the responsible party workers who conducted these meetings explained that accusing the Soviet Union of revisionism out loud—like, for example, Yugoslavia-for the time being was not permitted by the tense international situation. But they let it be known that this would be a matter for the coming months. At the same time, it was said in China that the peoples of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe could not sleep at night because of fear of a nuclear conflict.

Judging by the information which flowed into the CC CPSU, one reason behind Beijing's extreme negative reaction to Moscow's actions was the fact that the Soviet Union had deployed missiles to Cuba without saying a word to China. Reproaches that Khrushchev had hidden important international information from his allies were heard frequently in China in those days along with unfavorable comparisons to SinoSoviet consultations during the events in Poland, Hungary, and Laos, when the sides informed each other in a timely manner and therefore made correct de

cisions.43 More to the point, on this issue it was as if Moscow and Beijing had traded places: now it fell to Khrushchev to listen to the reproaches which he had only recently addressed to Mao. In autumn 1958, during the Taiwan Straits crisis, and in 1959, at the

outset of military actions on the SinoIndian border, the Soviets had sought basic operational data from Chinese au

thorities about the situation, but for a long time was unable to get any. In fact, the USSR didn't even know from the beginning that military operations already were going full steam: A secret report of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing noted that in 1958 the "Chinese friends" had informed Moscow "about the political goals which are being pursued by this action [in the Taiwan straits] only after two weeks,"44 while in 1959 Moscow received China's report about the events on the border only after "a great delay."45 Insofar as "the recognition and stressing by the Chinese comrades of the formula about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the Socialist [bloc] might create in world public opinion the impression that the harsh course and the foreign policy actions of the PRC were taken upon agreement with the Soviet Union,"46 Soviet officials viewed Beijing's behavior very negatively, and demanded that China. coordinate positions in situations where the collective security of the two countries-which under the 1950 treaty creating the Sino-Soviet alliance were linked together by, inter alia, the obligation to provide military assistance to one another—was involved.47

There was great amazement in Moscow when in November 1962 the Chinese virtually repeated the old Soviet theses, declaring that the Kremlin's poorly thought out actions in the Caribbean might have involved the Chinese people in a nuclear war against its will, since although the PRC didn't know anything about the Soviet preparations, by the terms of the 1950 alliance treaty in the event of the outbreak of war, it would have had to enter the conflict on the USSR's side.48

All this taken together could not but attract the attention of Moscow, which decided, as soon as the clouds over Cuba bagan to disperse a little, "to bring affairs to order" in the socialist house. On November 5, Pravda published a new lead article on the situation on the Sino-Indian border, which in its content sharply contrasted with its predecessor of ten days before and on

the principal issues once again returned to the USSR's old viewpoint on that conflict, in which China did not at all appear to be the victimized side.49 The new Pravda article, however, could scarcely seriously change anything, because by then the border situation had largely stabilized and, in the opinion of diplomats from the socialist countries, both combatants were searching for a means to withdraw from the conflict with as much dignity as possible.

In its main counterattack, Moscow turned to the congresses of the Communist parties of a number of countries which took place in late 1962 and early 1963, and also to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which took place in December 1962. Those who did not support Khrushchev were declared "babblers," "ultra-revolutionaries," and "reckless adventurists." In his indignation, the Soviet leader went to the point that he named as the main instigators of war not U.S. President Kennedy or West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (which at the time would have been entirely normal), but ... the Albanians! And although at these congresses there was still preserved the ritual, accepted in the last few years in the Communist world, when Moscow, cursing the Albanians, really had the Chinese in mind, and the PRC, cursing the Yugoslavs, meant the USSR, a new step on the path to a total split had been taken. Khrushchev, in particular, stressed that "someone taught the Albanians to pronounce vile words,” and Wu Xiuquan, CC CPC member and former Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia, speaking in his capacity as the permanent leader of the CPC delegation to the Communist party congresses which were taking place during that period, was subject to well-organized filibusters.50 In its turn, the CPC responded

in a series of articles in Renmin Ribao showing that the world had by no means been put on the brink of nuclear war by "babblers" and that "the juggling of nuclear weapons as the solution to international arguments" was in no way a true Marxist-Leninist position.51

Analyzing Soviet policy toward the PRC during this period, it makes sense to take into account the inconsistency

and well-known impulsiveness which marked Khrushchev's actions. Indignant at Beijing's position during the Caribbean crisis, Khrushchev, not thinking out very well the consequences of his actions, decided to activate all the levers of pressure in order to teach the Chinese a good lesson in the newly brought to light "classics of MarxismLeninism."52 However, the Soviet However, the Soviet

leader still hoped to preserve a certain unity of the Communist world, viewing these disagreements with the PRC as an annoying misunderstanding which could be settled. The limits to the Soviet leadership's readiness to trumpet its fall-out with Beijing surfaced in December 1962 when the Indians decided to take advantage of the sharpening of Sino-Soviet contradictions and began to distribute in Moscow, through its embassy, materials about the events on the Sino-Indian border. This measure was immediately nipped in the bud by the Soviet side, prompting a sharp protest by the Indian representatives.53

The Kremlin also noted the strengthening of the "intellectual ferment" generated by these disagreements inside the Communist world itself. Romania's leaders blatantly tried to exploit the situation to distance itself from the USSR and from China.54 One alarming tendency, to Soviet officials, was the new willingness of ambassadors from Romania, Hungary, and China, in conversations with Soviet counterparts, to criticize, albeit vaguely, certain actions of the USSR, complaining that Moscow often failed to consult with its allies.S 55 Under these conditions, Khrushchev was obliged to call for an end to polemics between parties so that passions could subside.

This appeal did not elicit, however, a positive response in Beijing, for China's leaders had no desire to retreat from the positions which had been won, believing that the USSR's actions in late 1962 had conclusively unmasked Moscow's "revisionist policy."56 If 56 If previously Mao had likened the divergences between the two countries to the gap between one finger and the remaining nine on a person's hands, now Chinese officials described the differences as "diverse interpretations of Marxism

Leninism."57 Sensing that the danger

of isolation inside the Communist world no longer threatened China, Beijing began to say that "if the international Communist movement collapsed, this "58 will not cause the sky to fall down." The PRC derived confidence also from the fact that if before only Albania openly and unconditionally supported China, now a whole group of Asian communist parties, including those in power, shared clearly pro-Chinese positions. Exploiting another of Khrushchev's ill-considered steps, which in the customs of the time mobilized “progressive people in the West" to criticize China, Beijing began a propaganda counterattack against the Communist parties of France, Italy, and the USA, posing a choice to the USSR itself-to take its satellites under its protection and in this way intensify the contradictions with China, or to stay silent, creating grounds for disagreement with the Western communist parties.

The events of the end of 1962 were a borderline, beyond which the disagreements between Moscow and Beijing and the corresponding split in the Communist world began to assume an irreversible character. For the first time during the whole period of the "Cold War" under conditions of the fierce confrontation between the USSR and the USA, China not only did not support the USSR, but even dared to condemn Moscow's actions. For the first time disagreements were widely published not on questions of secondary importance, but on the principal ideological issues. Finaly, for the first time a party which had incited a revolt against the hegemony of the Kremlin did not end up in total isolation; a number of Communist parties unequivocally expressed support for her, and inside Communist parties of pro-Soviet orientation there began to appear Maoist fractions. The trumpet call of the revolution became more muffled and unclear, and Communism itself turned out to be split not only as an ideological credo, but also as a movement which carried out practical work in various countries of the world.

4 The anti-Chinese position in this conflict of the ruling circles of India, who defended the Dalai Lama and who tried to organize assistance to the rebels in Tibet, constituted a major source of the sharpening tension on the Sino-Indian border. As far as the USSR was concerned, although Moscow also expressed cautious doubts about the lawfulness of some of Beijing's actions, overall the Kremlin unconditionally supported the PRC, proceeding from the main directive: "Support China's just cause, don't aggravate relations with Nehru." Note of the Editor of the Newspaper Pravda V.V. Maevskii to CC CPSU, 12 April 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, 1. 75. At the same time, the USSR was ready to provide assistance to the PRC in the international arena, where events in Tibet prompted an ambiguous reaction. Information Sheet of the Department of the CC CPSU on Relations with Communist and Working Class Parties of the Socialist Countries, "About the Situation in Tibet," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, 1. 75. 5 Letter of the CC CPC to the CC CPSU Concerning the incident on the Indo-Chinese Border, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 246, II. 164–165. Record of Conversation of Mao Zedong with Representatives of Socialist Countries, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 238, 11. 77–78.

7

Letter of the Institute of Oriental Studies to the CC CPSU about the Conduct in the USSR of Meetings between Chinese and Indian Scholars, TsKhSD, f.5, op. 50, d. 179, 1. 195.

9

Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, l. 97. 10

Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU N.S. Khrushchev at the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, 1. 127. 11 Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambas

sador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the General Secretary of the CC CPC Deng Xiao-Ping, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 131.

12

Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on the Relations of the PRC with Cuba, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, 1. 464.

13 Moscow carefully watched these ties, even noting how often in his speeches Dorticos compared the Cuban and Chinese revolutions; ibid., 1. 467.

14 Ibid.

15

17

Ibid., 1. 475.

16 Ibid.
Renmin Ribao, 12 October 1962.

18 Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, l. 72.

19

Ibid., 11 72-73.

20 Information Sheet of the Pravda Correspondents to the CC CPSU about the Meetings of the Correspondents from Newspapers of the Socialist Countries in the Editorial Offices of the Newspaper Renmin Ribao, ibid., 1. 355.

21

Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambas

sador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the Deputy Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the PRC Zhang Hanfu, ibid., 1. 366.

22

23

Ibid., 1 367.

Although in 1961 disagreements already existed between the USSR and China, during the Berlin crisis and after the Soviet announcement that autumn of the renewal of nuclear testing, mass pro-Moscow demonstrations were organized in China, and other steps were taken to show PRC solidarity with the USSR and GDR. Pravda, 25 October 1962.

24

25

Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, l. 105. 26 Ibid., 1. 107.

Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, 1. 106. 30 See, e.g., Record of Conversation of the Staff Members of the USSR Embassy in the PRC V. Mogul'skii and G. Kireev with the Counselor of the Embassy of Hungary J. Kukuchka, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 531, ll. 426-435.

31 One of the articles, for example, was called, "The Soviet Army is Ready to Strike a Blow to the Enemy." Renmin Ribao, 26 October 1962. 32 Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Positions of the Leadership of the CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 438.

33 Khrushchev seriously worried that Kennedy might embark on a military conflict using nuclear weapons, pushed not only by American "hawks" but also by the majority of the U.S. population. According to an information sheet of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations specially prepared for the top Soviet leadership, Americans, as of early 1962, asked whether they would favor a nuclear war or submitting to Communism, responded: for war— 81%. Information Sheet of IMEMO to the CC CPSU, "Regarding the issue of correlation of forces in the ruling circles of the USA," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 398, l. 73.

Renmin Ribao, 5 November 1962. 43 Record of Conversation of the Attache of the USSR Embassy in China V. Zhdanovich with Employees of Various Embassies in China, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 531, ll. 511–513. 44 Political Letter of the USSR Embassy in China

on the Situation in China on the Occasion of the 10 Year Celebration of the PRC, TsKhSD, f. 5, 49, d. 239, 1. 202.

Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, 1. 95.

Pravda, 5 November 1962.

50 The very naming of Wu Xiuquan, who was only a member of the CC CPC, as the leader of the CPC delegation to the congresses of the "brother parties" should have demonstrated the true relation of Beijing to those parties. 51 Renmin Ribao, 15, 31 December 1962. 52 Khrushchev reacted extremely painfully when Mao was extolled as a great theoretician, evidently feeling his own weakness on that issue. Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU at the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, II. 127–130. 53

Record of Conversation, Head of Press Departrnent, MFA USSR Iu. Cherniakov, with Press Attache of the Indian Embassy in Moscow I. Dzhein, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, 11. 85–86. 54 [Ed. note: See Raymond L. Garthoff, "When and Why Romania Distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 111.] 55 Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the Bilateral Meeting Between the CPC and the CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, II. 125–126. 56 Here one may refer also to the visit in autumn 1962 of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev to "revisionist" Yugoslavia, which in the same way prompted a storm of indignation in China.

57 Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC,

On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the
Bilateral Meeting between the CPC and CPSU,
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, II. 96–97.
58 Ibid.

M.Y. Prozumenschikov works at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow. This paper was presented at CWIHP's conference on "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia," held at Hong Kong University in January 1996, and translated by K. Weathersby, S. Kirchhoff, and M. Doctoroff.