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the principal issues once again returned and well-known impulsiveness which Leninism.


Sensing that the danger to the USSR's old viewpoint on that marked Khrushchev's actions. Indig- of isolation inside the Communist world conflict, in which China did not at all nant at Beijing's position during the no longer threatened China, Beijing appear to be the victimized side. 49

The Caribbean crisis, Khrushchev, not began to say that "if the international new Pravda article, however, could thinking out very well the consequences Communist movement collapsed, this scarcely seriously change anything, of his actions, decided to activate all the will not cause the sky to fall down.' because by then the border situation had levers of pressure in order to teach the The PRC derived confidence also from largely stabilized and, in the opinion of Chinese a good lesson in the newly the fact that if before only Albania diplomats from the socialist countries, brought to light "classics of Marxism- openly and unconditionally supported both combatants were searching for a

Leninism."52 However, the Soviet China, now a whole group of Asian means to withdraw from the conflict leader still hoped to preserve a certain communist parties, including those in with as much dignity as possible. unity of the Communist world, view- power, shared clearly pro-Chinese po

In its main counterattack, Moscow ing these disagreements with the PRC sitions. Exploiting another of Khrushturned to the congresses of the Com- as an annoying misunderstanding which chev's ill-considered steps, which in the munist parties of a number of countries could be settled. The limits to the So- customs of the time mobilized "progreswhich took place in late 1962 and early viet leadership’s readiness to trumpet its sive people in the West” to criticize 1963, and also to the session of the Su- fall-out with Beijing surfaced in De- China, Beijing began a propaganda preme Soviet of the USSR which took cember 1962 when the Indians decided counterattack against the Communist place in December 1962. Those who to take advantage of the sharpening of parties of France, Italy, and the USA, did not support Khrushchev were de- Sino-Soviet contradictions and began posing a choice to the USSR itself—to clared "babblers," "ultra-revolutionar- to distribute in Moscow, through its take its satellites under its protection ies,” and “reckless adventurists." In his embassy, materials about the events on and in this way intensify the contradicindignation, the Soviet leader went to the Sino-Indian border. This measure tions with China, or to stay silent, crethe point that he named as the main in- was immediately nipped in the bud by ating grounds for disagreement with the stigators of war not U.S. President the Soviet side, prompting a sharp pro

Western communist parties. Kennedy or West German Chancellor test by the Indian representatives.53 The events of the end of 1962 were Konrad Adenauer (which at the time The Kremlin also noted the a borderline, beyond which the diswould have been entirely normal), but strengthening of the “intellectual fer- agreements between Moscow and ... the Albanians! And although at these ment” generated by these disagreements Beijing and the corresponding split in congresses there was still preserved the inside the Communist world itself. the Communist world began to assume ritual, accepted in the last few years in Romania's leaders blatantly tried to an irreversible character. For the first the Communist world, when Moscow, exploit the situation to distance itself time during the whole period of the cursing the Albanians, really had the from the USSR and from China.


One “Cold War" under conditions of the Chinese in mind, and the PRC, cursing alarming tendency, to Soviet officials, fierce confrontation between the USSR the Yugoslavs, meant the USSR, a new was the new willingness of ambassa- and the USA, China not only did not step on the path to a total split had been dors from Romania, Hungary, and support the USSR, but even dared to taken. Khrushchev, in particular, China, in conversations with Soviet condemn Moscow's actions. For the stressed that “someone taught the Al- counterparts, to criticize, albeit vaguely, first time disagreements were widely banians to pronounce vile words,” and certain actions of the USSR, complain- published not on questions of secondWu Xiuquan, CC CPC member and ing that Moscow often failed to consult ary importance, but on the principal former Chinese ambassador to Yugosla- with its allies.55 Under these condi- ideological issues. Finaly, for the first via, speaking in his capacity as the per- tions, Khrushchev was obliged to call time a party which had incited a revolt manent leader of the CPC delegation to for an end to polemics between parties against the hegemony of the Kremlin the Communist party congresses which so that passions could subside.

did not end up in total isolation; a numwere taking place during that period, This appeal did not elicit, however, ber of Communist parties unequivocally was subject to well-organized filibus- a positive response in Beijing, for expressed support for her, and inside ters.50 in its turn, the CPC responded China's leaders had no desire to retreat Communist parties of pro-Soviet oriin a series of articles in Renmin Ribao from the positions which had been won, entation there began to appear Maoist showing that the world had by no means believing that the USSR's actions in late fractions. The trumpet call of the revobeen put on the brink of nuclear war by 1962 had conclusively unmasked lution became more muffled and un"babblers" and that "the juggling of Moscow's “revisionist policy."56 If clear, and Communism itself turned out nuclear weapons as the solution to in- previously Mao had likened the diver- to be split not only as an ideological ternational arguments" was in no way gences between the two countries to the credo, but also as a movement which a true Marxist–Leninist position.51 gap between one finger and the remain- carried out practical work in various

Analyzing Soviet policy toward the ing nine on a person's hands, now Chi- countries of the world. PRC during this period, it makes sense nese officials described the differences to take into account the inconsistency "diverse interpretations of Marxism

1 Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1962, Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, 1. 58. 2 Ibid, 1. 64. 3

Ibid, 1. 61. 4 The anti-Chinese position in this conflict of the ruling circles of India, who defended the Dalai Lama and who tried to organize assistance to the rebels in Tibet, constituted a major source of the sharpening tension on the Sino-Indian border. As far as the USSR was concerned, although Moscow also expressed cautious doubts about the lawfulness of some of Beijing's actions, overall the Kremlin unconditionally supported the PRC, proceeding from the main directive: “Support China's just cause, don't aggravate relations with Nehru." Note of the Editor of the Newspaper Pravda V.V. Maevskii to CC CPSU, 12 April 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, 1. 75. At the same time, the USSR was ready to provide assistance to the PRC in the international arena, where events in Tibet prompted an ambiguous reaction. Information Sheet of the Department of the CC CPSU on Relations with Communist and Working Class Parties of the Socialist Countries, "About the Situation in Tibet,” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, 1. 75. 5

Letter of the CC CPC to the CC CPSU Concerning the incident on the Indo-Chinese Border, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 246, 11. 164–165. 6

Record of Conversation of Mao Zedong with Representatives of Socialist Countries, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 238, 11. 77–78. 7

Letter of the Institute of Oriental Studies to the CC CPSU about the Conduct in the USSR of Meetings between Chinese and Indian Scholars, TsKhSD, f.5, op. 50, d. 179, 1. 195. 8

Record of Conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the General Secretary of the CC CPC Deng XiaoPing, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, 1. 132. 9 Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, 1. 97. 10

Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU N.S. Khrushchev at the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, 1. 127. 11 Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambassador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the General Secretary of the CC CPC Deng Xiao-Ping, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, 1. 131. 12

Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on the Relations of the PRC with Cuba, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, 1. 464. 13

Moscow carefully watched these ties, even noting how often in his speeches Dorticos compared the Cuban and Chinese revolutions; ibid., 1. 467. 14

Ibid. 15

Ibid., 1. 475.

sador to the PRCS. Chervonenko with the Deputy Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the PRC Zhang Hanfu, ibid., 1. 366. 22

Ibid., 1 367. 23

Although in 1961 disagreements already existed between the USSR and China, during the Berlin crisis and after the Soviet announcement that autumn of the renewal of nuclear testing, mass pro-Moscow demonstrations were organized in China, and other steps were taken to show PRC solidarity with the USSR and GDR. 24

Pravda, 25 October 1962. 25

Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, 1. 105. 26

Ibid., 1. 107. 27

Ibid., 1. 102. 28

TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50. 29

Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, 1. 106. 30 See, e.g., Record of Conversation of the Staff Members of the USSR Embassy in the PRC V. Mogul'skii and G. Kireev with the Counselor of the Embassy of Hungary J. Kukuchka, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 531, 11. 426-435. 31

One of the articles, for example, was called, “The Soviet Army is Ready to Strike a Blow to the emy.” Renmin Ribao, 26 October 1962. 32 Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Positions of the Leadership of the CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, 1. 438. 33

Khrushchev seriously worried that Kennedy might embark on a military conflict using nuclear weapons, pushed not only by American "hawks" but also by the majority of the U.S. population. According to an information sheet of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations specially prepared for the top Soviet leadership, Americans, as of early 1962, asked whether they would favor a nuclear war or submitting to Communism, responded: for war81%. Information Sheet of IMEMO to the CC CPSU, “Regarding the issue of correlation of forces in the ruling circles of the USA," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 398, 1. 73. 34

Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Relations of the PRC with Cuba, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, 1. 477. 35

Ibid., 1. 434. 36

Ibid., 1. 435. 37 Demonstrations at the Cuban Embassy were meticulously organized: the schedule of processions was reported to the Cubans in advance with breaks for lunch and rest. The Soviet Embassy reported following the first day of the demonstrations, when the enthusiasm of the participants turned out not to be too great (in the opinion of the organizers of these demonstrations), in the factories and enterprises supplementary explanatory work was conducted. Ibid. 38 Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on the Positions of the Leadership of the CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, 1. 439. 39 Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambassador in China S. Chervonenko with the Deputy Head of the Department for Relations with Fraternal Communist Parties, CC CPC Zhao Yimin, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 534, 11. 206–207. 40

Report of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Position of the Leadership of the CPC in Re

gard to the Cuban Crisis, ibid., 1. 439. 41

Ibid., 1. 440. 42 Renmin Ribao, 5 November 1962. 43

Record of Conversation of the Attache of the USSR Embassy in China V. Zhdanovich with Employees of Various Embassies in China, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 531, 11. 511-513. 44

Political Letter of the USSR Embassy in China on the Situation in China on the Occasion of the 10 Year Celebration of the PRC, TsKhSD, f. 5, op

49, d. 239, 1. 202. 45

Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, 1. 95. 46 Ibid., 1. 94. 47 Under pressure from the USSR the Chinese at the end of 1958 promised that “they would not allow any further adventurism." Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in China for 1958, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 134, 11. 84–85. 48

Information of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on Chinese-Cuban Relations (December 1962– January 1963), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 624, 11. 49-50. 49

Pravda, 5 November 1962. 50 The very naming of Wu Xiuquan, who was only a member of the CC CPC, as the leader of the CPC delegation to the congresses of the “brother parties” should have demonstrated the true relation of Beijing to those parties. 51

Renmin Ribao, 15, 31 December 1962. 52

Khrushchev reacted extremely painfully when Mao was extolled as a great theoretician, evidently feeling his own weakness on that issue. Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU at the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, 11. 127-130. 53

Record of Conversation, Head of Press Departrnent, MFA USSR lu. Cherniakov, with Press Attache of the Indian Embassy in Moscow I. Dzhein, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, II. 85–86. 54

[Ed. note: See Raymond L. Garthoff, “When and Why Romania Distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact,” CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 111.) 55

Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the Bilateral Meeting Between the CPC and the CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, 11. 125–126. 56 Here one may refer also to the visit in autumn 1962 of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev to “revisionist” Yugoslavia, which in the same way prompted a storm of indignation in China. 57 Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the Bilateral Meeting between the CPC and CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, 11. 96–97.

58 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


Renmin Ribao, 12 October 1962. 18

Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, I. 72. 19 Ibid., 11 72–73. 20

Information Sheet of the Pravda Correspondents to the CC CPSU about the Meetings of the Correspondents from Newspapers of the Socialist Countries in the Editorial Offices of the Newspaper Renmin Ribao, ibid., 1. 355. 21

Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambas

M.Y. Prozumenschikov works at the Center

for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow. This paper was presented at CWIHP's conference on "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia,held at Hong Kong University in January 1996, and translated by K. Weathersby, S. Kirchhoff, and M. Doctoroff


Editor's note: The following three Zedong, likening it to that which had the Cold War International History selections from Russian and East Ger- surrounded Stalin, while the Chinese Project by Vladislav M. Zubok of the man documents exemplify the new East- did little to conceal their contempt for National Security Archive from the Cenbloc archival evidence that is becom- Khrushchev.

ter for the Storage of Contemporary ing available on the triangular Sino-In- The excerpt reproduced below con- Documents (TsKhSD) in Moscow. The dian-Soviet relations examined in M.Y. centrates on Suslov's criticism of document was located in Fond 2, a Prozumenschikov's article above. (Un- China's handling of Sino-Indian rela- newly-opened collection of declassified fortunately, Chinese and Indian ar- tions, particularly regarding the border transcripts and related materials of chives on these issues are currently un- clashes which erupted beginning in the CPSU Plenums. Zubok also translated available.)

summer of 1959. While agreeing with the excerpt reprinted below from RusThe first excerpt is from a much- Beijing's suppression of the counter- sian into English. A translation and longer document from the Russian ar- revolutionary rebellion" in Tibet of analysis of the entire Suslov report, as chivesa draft report "On the (Octo- March 1959, which had ended in the well as of the transcript of the climacber 1959) trip of the Soviet party-gov- Dalai Lama's receiving asylum in In- tic 2 October 1959 Mao-Khrushchev ernmental delegation to the PRC dia, Suslov condemned as misguided summit meeting in Beijing, is in prepa(People's Republic of China),dated and damaging China's personal invec- ration by Mark Kramer of the Davis 18 December 1959, by Mikhail Suslov tive against Indian Prime Minister Center for Russian Studies (formerly the to Central Committee of the Commu- Jawaharlal Nehru and its strategy of Russian Research Center) at Harvard nist Party of the Soviet Union (CC using the border clashes to exacerbate University for future publication by the CPSU) Presidium for presentation to a Sino-Indian relations and push Nehru Cold War International History Project. forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum. Suslov, toward the West in hopes of inciting The second section of excerpts, a senior member of the CC CPSU lead- revolution in India. Rather than fur- drawn from Russian documents on Soership, harshly criticized Chinese do- thering the cause of revolution, Suslov viet-Indian relations and the Sino-Inmestic and foreign policies in the wake stated, China's actions were damaging dian border dispute in 1962, is culled of a contentious meeting between the "progressive forces" (i.e., the Commu- from a much larger selection of docuSoviet and Chinese leaderships during nist Party) in India, weakening China's ments from the Russian Foreign MinisUSSR leader Nikita Khrushchev's visit (and improving Washington's) standing try archives in Moscow, known officially to Beijing in early October 1959 for in Asia, and also impeding Sino-Soviet as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the commemorations of the tenth anniver- relations-for the Chinese Communist Russian Federation (AVP RF). They sary of the PRC's establishment. Party blamed the CPSU for not openly were located during research at AVP RF

Although at this point the Sino-So- siding with Beijing against India. in June 1996 by CWIHP Director James viet split remained publicly concealed, Suslov, in fact, depicted China's actions G. Hershberg in the so-called the angry exchanges at that meeting as directed not only against India but "referentura" (reference) files for Sodemonstrated that bitterness between against the USSR, for they embarrassed viet relations with India, in Fond 090 the two communist powers was reach- Khrushchev on the eve of his own long- (secret fonds or collection groups being the boiling point. Not only did sought summit in the United States with gin with a zero; Fond 90 contains nonMoscow and Beijing seem split on ba- President Eisenhower in September secretrecords on Soviet relations with sic approaches to issues of foreign 1959, just prior to the trip to Beijing. India, though these can also be revealpolicy (the Soviets favored a more mod- In sum, Beijing's policy toward India ing). The translations from Russian erate rivalry with the West, the Chinese was putting Soviet leaders in an impos- were done for CWIHP by Kathryn a more militant and confrontational sible quandaryeither to back what Weathersby, who also aided in selectapproach), domestic policy (the Sovi- they saw as Mao's ill-conceived actions ing the materials for translation. ets found the Great Leap Forward" to preserve an increasingly illusory The excerpts, mostly from reports an economic disaster), and ideology Sino-Soviet alliance (at the price of from the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, (both sides clearly sought the mantle of undercutting Soviet efforts to improve were chosen to illustrate such topics as leadership within the communist relations with India and the West), or Soviet ties to the Indian Communist world), but a bitter personal antago- to take a balanced position at the risk Party, Soviet perceptions of the Sinonism had been revealed: Suslov (clearly of an open split with Mao and the Chi- Indian border dispute, and the impact reflecting Khrushchev's views) decried

of the border crisis on Soviet-Indian the "cult of personality" around Mao The Suslov report was obtained for relations, as shown in direct communi


cations between Nehru and

The document itself was located in I. Draft report dated 18 December 1959, Khrushchev. While these excerpts hint the archives of the Socialist Unity Party “On the [October 1959] trip of the Soviet at how the Soviet archives can offer a of Germany (SED) in East Berlin by party-governmental delegation to the fascinating and rich window into these scholars collecting materials for a vol- PRC (People's Republic of China]," by and many other aspects of the still- ume on relations between the People's M. Suslov to CC CPSU Presidium for premurky Sino-Indian border dispute, Republic of China and the German sentation to a forthcoming CC CPSU Plemuch further research in Moscow is still Democratic Republic: Werner num (excerpt) necessary, particularly with key Chi- Meissner, ed. Die Deutsche nese and Indian archives still closed. Demokratische Republik und China, Draft In any event, CWIHP would be pleased 1949-1990: Politik-Wirtschaftto assist scholars interested in examin- Wissenschaft-Kultur. Eine Quellen- ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET ing the photocopies of these and other sammlung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL Russian documents obtained during 1995). The document was not included

DELEGATION TO THE research on Soviet-Indian relations, in the published volume, but was re- PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1959 and 1962, or in commissioning cently obtained by David Wolff, who. English translations of more of them. thanks Prof. Meissner (Hong Kong (lengthy sections on bilateral questions, inThe documents are on file as part of the Baptist University) and his colleagues cluding criticism of China's domestic and Russian Archives Documents Database at the Free University in Berlin, Anja ideological policies omitted--ed.] (RADD) at the National Security Feege, M. Leutner, and Tim ...Now let me move to some issues of Archive, a non-governmental research Trampedach, for providing access to foreign policy where certain differences institute and declassified documents re- this and other documnents on China emerged between us and the Chinese compository located at the George Wash- from the former East German archives. rades. ington University on the 7th floor of the The Zhou-Zedenbal recordwhich [here followed criticisms of Beijing's Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Wash- made its way into the East German ar- exacerbations of international tensions, ington, DC 20037, tel. (202) 994-7000; chives and the German language in a Mao's thesis that imperialists were paper e-mail: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; manner that remains unclear-was tigers" and seemingly cavalier attitude tofax: (202) 994-7000.

translated into English by Wolff with ward nuclear war, and China's inconsisThe third section below is the tran- assistance by Christian Ostermann, tenthandling of the Taiwan Straits crisis script, found in the East German ar- Oliver Corff, and James G. Hershberg. of 1958 and relations with Japan-ed.] chives, of a 26 December 1962 conver- It should be stressed that the mate- During this spring relations between sation in Beijing between Chinese Pre- rials reprinted below represent only an the People's Republic of China and India mier Zhou Enlai and the Chairman of early sampling of the types of materi- have seriously deteriorated. This deteriorathe Council of Ministers of Mongolia, als that could become available for tion is linked to the counterrevolutionary Premier Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal (I. studying the complicated Sino-Indian- rebellion in Tibet in March 1959. ReactionZedenbal in German). Although the oc- Soviet triangle with the opening of new ary circles of India to some extent were casion of the talk was the signing of a archives. In coming years, CWIHP probably involved in this rebellion. HowSino-Mongolian boundary treaty, the hopes to work with scholars using ever, the rebellion in Tibet would not have conversation soon turned to the recent American, Russian, and other ar- taken place, had one implemented timely clashes along the Sino-Indian border. chives-particularly the Chinese and democratic reforms and appropriate meaAccording to the transcript-presum- Indian archives, should they relax their sures to improve economy and culture with ably kept by the Mongolians, though it current secrecyto explore this impor- a view on historical specifics of Tibet, and is unclear from the document how it tant subject, involving an issue that has had one been duly vigilant with regard to came to be translated into German and outlasted the Cold War. While in late reactionary elements. Unfortunately, Chirest in the East German archives- November 1996, during a visit to New nese comrades also did not draw appropriZedenbal took the opportunity to criti- Delhi by Chinese President Jiang ate conclusions from the warnings of the CC cize Chinese policy in the border dis- Zemin, PRC and Indian leaders signed CPSU about the activities of reactionaries pute with India as detrimental to the

an agreement not to use force to resolve aimed at the forceful separation (otriv) of interests of the international socialist their border dispute, the sometimes Tibet from the People's Republic of China. camp, producing a tense exchange with tense recent history of relations between Chinese comrades were correct when Zhou. Whether or not the transcript is the world's two most populous countries they put down decisively the counterrevoaccurateno Chinese version is avail- clearly merits further research and lutionary rebellion in Tibet. They claim with ablethe Mongolians clearly wanted study.

justification that the issue of Tibet is a doto show their Soviet-bloc patrons that

- James G. Hershberg mestic affair of the PRC. We give them full they were standing up for Moscow's

support on this. We stand against the atpolicy, and Ulan Bator may have cir

tempts of Western powers to sever Tibet culated the transcript to Moscow and/

from China, to exploit the Tibetan issue for or its allies precisely for that reason.

aggravation of international situation. At the last (16th) session of the UN General Assembly the representatives of the USSR and fraternal socialist countries resolutely supported the PRC, protesting against the discussion of the so-called “Tibetan question” and other attempts to blacken the People's China, including the one using the SinoIndian border dispute.

The imperialist tactics aim at making the Tibetan issue a bone of contention first of all between China and India, to pit these two great Asian powers against each other, to aggravate the situation in the South-East Asia, to undermine the influence of the socialist camp, including China, in this region of the world, to weaken the positions of communists in the movement of national liberation. The American press openly admits that one word from India compromises the prestige of the PRC more than one thousand words spoken in the USA.

Regrettably, the Chinese comrades did not take into account this tactic of the imperialists. Responding to the noisy campaign in imperialist mass media about Tibet, they unleashed their own propagandist campaign and concentrated their fire mainly on India and personally on (Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru. They accused the Indian government and personally Nehru of an imperialist policy, aimed against China. This was the essence of a large editorial article in “Renmin Ribao” (“People's Daily”) on 6 May 1959, under the title “The revolution in Tibet and the philosophy of Nehru."

Nehru is a well-known politician. One cannot exclude that to some degree he was involved in the intrigues against the PRC. But Nehru is far-sighted enough to recognize the vital importance of India's friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp. Nehru behaved with reserve. In his numerous speeches he admitted that Tibet is a part of China, he spoke against the establishment of a socalled “government of Dalai-Lama in exile," stressing the significance of the SinoIndian friendship. India repeatedly raised the issue of restoration of rights of the People's Republic of China in the UN. Precisely these actions made the rightist bourgeois circles in India, who are linked to Anglo-American capital, to assail Nehru, blaming him for "indecisiveness" and "appeasement" with regard to the People's China. Their goal is to unseat Nehru, to revise the neutralist foreign policy of India, to tilt it in a rightist

direction, to the path of alliance with West- and as a result the Hindus lost several people ern powers. If reactionary circles of India as killed and wounded. Exploiting this consucceed in achieving these goals, it would flict, imperialist propaganda raised the upcause serious damage to the socialist camp roar about “the aggression of red China." and the whole cause of peace, since the Reactionary nationalists inside India unpresent foreign policy line of the Nehru gov- leashed a fierce anti-Chinese campaign that ernment is a positive factor in the struggle was accompanied by attacks against Nehru, for strengthening peace.

as well as (against] the Indian communist One should ask, what aims did Chinese

party. comrades pursue in attacking Nehru so un- One should mention that these events compromisingly? As they explained it them- took place only a few days before the visit selves, they stood by the principle of “co- of comrade Khrushchev to the United States. hesion and struggle.” According to com. The enemy propaganda did everything to Mao Zedong, they unmask Nehru as a exploit the Sino-Indian conflict for the pur"double-dealer," "half a man, half a devil,” pose of disruption of the Soviet peace ini“half a gentlemen, half a hooligan,” and in tiative, to lay blame for China's actions on doing this they allegedly “force” him to the Soviet Union and thereby to cause a strengthen friendship with the PRC. quarrel between us and India.

A question, naturally, was raised how With all this in mind, the CC CPSU to live side by side with this "devil”? How decided to send a letter to Beijing, expressto build relations with India? The Chinese ing our concern about the situation that comrades found a solution in forcing Nehru emerged as a result of the Sino-Indian conto repent and in pressuring him into coop- flict. It also took a decision to publish a eration with China. At the same time the TASS announcement in order to encourage Chinese said that they visualize the possi- peaceful settlement of the conflict and to bility of the downfall of the Nehru govern- give the world public opinion the correct ment and see no great trouble if a reaction- idea about our position. The declaration of ary pro-Western government comes to the Soviet Union at that time halted escalapower in India. In their opinion, this would tion of the conflict and thwarted the danonly bring us closer to a revolution in India. gerous game of the imperialists. The gov

Obviously this course inevitably had ernments of the PRC and India announced to lead to further aggravation of relations that further intensification of the dispute with India. And it happened, indeed, when would not be in the interests of peace nor in after suppression of the Tibet rebellion the their own interests, and that they would reChinese troops approached the borders with solve border issues according to “five prinIndia.

ciples” (pancha sila) of peaceful coexistThe People's China and India inherited from the past unresolved border issues. It is The course of events, however, demnot possible here to dwell on the history and onstrated that the question of the Sino-Inthe essence of these issues that deal with dian border is rife with new complications. some territories located in the Himalayas. It is known that on 21 October (1959) there But it is important to notice by what meth- was another armed clash on the Sino-Indian ods the Chinese comrades attempted to re- border that caused the loss of lives. After it solve this problem, so acute and painful for the anti-Chinese campaign in India flared both sides.

up with new vigor. For a long time the Chinese comrades One should keep in mind that there are postponed a solution of this question. They very influential forces in India that seek to stressed that in the interests of maintaining aggravate relations with China. Regrettably, good relations with India they would not the position of the Chinese comrades on this press with demarcation of the borders and question is such that it facilitates for the Inwould reckon with the existing realties. dian reactionaries mobilization of public However, in the heated atmosphere of the opinion in the country against the People's Sino-Indian disputes with regard to the re- China and puts the progressive forces of bellion of Tibet the issue of the border terri- India in a quandary. tories became extremely acute. On 25 Au- The Chinese comrades insist that they gust (1959) an armed clash took place be- are guided by the considerations of self-detween the Chinese and Indian border-guards, fense and prestige of their country, that the


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