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NEW EAST-BLOC DOCUMENTS ON THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT, 1959 & 1962

Editor's note: The following three selections from Russian and East German documents exemplify the new Eastbloc archival evidence that is becoming available on the triangular Sino-Indian-Soviet relations examined in M.Y. Prozumenschikov's article above. (Unfortunately, Chinese and Indian archives on these issues are currently unavailable.)

The first excerpt is from a muchlonger document from the Russian archives-a draft report "On the [October 1959] trip of the Soviet party-governmental delegation to the PRC [People's Republic of China]," dated 18 December 1959, by Mikhail Suslov to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Presidium for presentation to a forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum. Suslov, a senior member of the CC CPSU leadership, harshly criticized Chinese domestic and foreign policies in the wake of a contentious meeting between the Soviet and Chinese leaderships during USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in early October 1959 for commemorations of the tenth anniversary of the PRC's establishment.

Although at this point the Sino-Soviet split remained publicly concealed, the angry exchanges at that meeting demonstrated that bitterness between the two communist powers was reaching the boiling point. Not only did Moscow and Beijing seem split on basic approaches to issues of foreign policy (the Soviets favored a more moderate rivalry with the West, the Chinese a more militant and confrontational approach), domestic policy (the Soviets found the "Great Leap Forward" an economic disaster), and ideology (both sides clearly sought the mantle of leadership within the communist world), but a bitter personal antagonism had been revealed: Suslov (clearly reflecting Khrushchev's views) decried the "cult of personality” around Mao

Zedong, likening it to that which had surrounded Stalin, while the Chinese did little to conceal their contempt for Khrushchev.

The excerpt reproduced below concentrates on Suslov's criticism of China's handling of Sino-Indian relations, particularly regarding the border clashes which erupted beginning in the summer of 1959. While agreeing with Beijing's suppression of the "counterrevolutionary rebellion" in Tibet of March 1959, which had ended in the Dalai Lama's receiving asylum in India, Suslov condemned as misguided and damaging China's personal invective against Indian Prime Minister tive against Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and its strategy of using the border clashes to exacerbate Sino-Indian relations and push Nehru toward the West in hopes of inciting revolution in India. Rather than furthering the cause of revolution, Suslov stated, China's actions were damaging "progressive forces" (i.e., the Communist Party) in India, weakening China's (and improving Washington's) standing in Asia, and also impeding Sino-Soviet relations for the Chinese Communist Party blamed the CPSU for not openly siding with Beijing against India. Suslov, in fact, depicted China's actions as directed not only against India but against the USSR, for they embarrassed Khrushchev on the eve of his own longsought summit in the United States with President Eisenhower in September 1959, just prior to the trip to Beijing. In sum, Beijing's policy toward India was putting Soviet leaders in an impossible quandary-either to back what they saw as Mao's ill-conceived actions to preserve an increasingly illusory Sino-Soviet alliance (at the price of undercutting Soviet efforts to improve relations with India and the West), or to take a balanced position at the risk of an open split with Mao and the Chi

nese.

the Cold War International History Project by Vladislav M. Zubok of the National Security Archive from the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents (TsKhSD) in Moscow. The document was located in Fond 2, a newly-opened collection of declassified transcripts and related materials of CPSU Plenums. Zubok also translated the excerpt reprinted below from Russian into English. A translation and analysis of the entire Suslov report, as well as of the transcript of the climactic 2 October 1959 Mao-Khrushchev summit meeting in Beijing, is in preparation by Mark Kramer of the Davis Center for Russian Studies (formerly the Russian Research Center) at Harvard University for future publication by the Cold War International History Project.

The second section of excerpts, drawn from Russian documents on Soviet-Indian relations and the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962, is culled from a much larger selection of documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, known officially as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). They were located during research at AVP RF in June 1996 by CWIHP Director James G. Hershberg in the so-called "referentura" (reference) files for Soviet relations with India, in Fond 090 (secret fonds or collection groups begin with a zero; Fond 90 contains “nonsecret" records on Soviet relations with India, though these can also be revealing). The translations from Russian were done for CWIHP by Kathryn Weathersby, who also aided in selecting the materials for translation.

The excerpts, mostly from reports from the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, were chosen to illustrate such topics as Soviet ties to the Indian Communist Party, Soviet perceptions of the SinoIndian border dispute, and the impact of the border crisis on Soviet-Indian The Suslov report was obtained for relations, as shown in direct communi

cations between Nehru and Khrushchev. While these excerpts hint at how the Soviet archives can offer a fascinating and rich window into these and many other aspects of the stillmurky Sino-Indian border dispute, much further research in Moscow is still necessary, particularly with key Chinese and Indian archives still closed. In any event, CWIHP would be pleased to assist scholars interested in examining the photocopies of these and other Russian documents obtained during research on Soviet-Indian relations, 1959 and 1962, or in commissioning English translations of more of them. The documents are on file as part of the Russian Archives Documents Database (RADD) at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at the George Washington University on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037, tel. (202) 994-7000; e-mail: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; fax: (202) 994-7000.

The third section below is the transcript, found in the East German archives, of a 26 December 1962 conversation in Beijing between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Premier Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal (J. Zedenbal in German). Although the occasion of the talk was the signing of a Sino-Mongolian boundary treaty, the conversation soon turned to the recent clashes along the Sino-Indian border. According to the transcript-presumably kept by the Mongolians, though it is unclear from the document how it came to be translated into German and rest in the East German archivesZedenbal took the opportunity to criticize Chinese policy in the border dispute with India as detrimental to the interests of the international socialist camp, producing a tense exchange with Zhou. Whether or not the transcript is accurate-no Chinese version is available-the Mongolians clearly wanted to show their Soviet-bloc patrons that they were standing up for Moscow's policy, and Ulan Bator may have circulated the transcript to Moscow and/ or its allies precisely for that reason.

The document itself was located in the archives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in East Berlin by scholars collecting materials for a volume on relations between the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic: Werner Meissner, ed., Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik und China, 1949-1990: Politik-WirtschaftWissenschaft-Kultur. Eine Quellensammlung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). The document was not included in the published volume, but was recently obtained by David Wolff, who. thanks Prof. Meissner (Hong Kong Baptist University) and his colleagues at the Free University in Berlin, Anja Feege, M. Leutner, and Tim Trampedach, for providing access to this and other documnents on China from the former East German archives. The Zhou-Zedenbal record-which made its way into the East German archives and the German language in a manner that remains unclear-was translated into English by Wolff with assistance by Christian Ostermann, Oliver Corff, and James G. Hershberg.

It should be stressed that the materials reprinted below represent only an early sampling of the types of materials that could become available for als that could become available for studying the complicated Sino-IndianSoviet triangle with the opening of new archives. In coming years, CWIHP hopes to work with scholars using American, Russian, and other archives-particularly the Chinese and Indian archives, should they relax their current secrecy-to explore this important subject, involving an issue that has outlasted the Cold War. While in late November 1996, during a visit to New Delhi by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, PRC and Indian leaders signed an agreement not to use force to resolve their border dispute, the sometimes tense recent history of relations between the world's two most populous countries clearly merits further research and study.

-James G. Hershberg

I. Draft report dated 18 December 1959, "On the [October 1959] trip of the Soviet party-governmental delegation to the PRC [People's Republic of China]," by M. Suslov to CC CPSU Presidium for presentation to a forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum (excerpt)

Draft

ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL

DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

[lengthy sections on bilateral questions, including criticism of China's domestic and ideological policies omitted--ed.]

...Now let me move to some issues of foreign policy where certain differences emerged between us and the Chinese comrades.

[here followed criticisms of Beijing's exacerbations of international tensions, Mao's thesis that imperialists were “paper tigers" and seemingly cavalier attitude toward nuclear war, and China's “inconsistent" handling of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 and relations with Japan-ed.]

During this spring relations between the People's Republic of China and India have seriously deteriorated. This deterioration is linked to the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet in March 1959. Reactionary circles of India to some extent were probably involved in this rebellion. However, the rebellion in Tibet would not have taken place, had one implemented timely democratic reforms and appropriate measures to improve economy and culture with a view on historical specifics of Tibet, and had one been duly vigilant with regard to reactionary elements. Unfortunately, Chinese comrades also did not draw appropriate conclusions from the warnings of the CC CPSU about the activities of reactionaries aimed at the forceful separation [otriv] of Tibet from the People's Republic of China.

Chinese comrades were correct when they put down decisively the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet. They claim with justification that the issue of Tibet is a domestic affair of the PRC. We give them full support on this. We stand against the attempts of Western powers to sever Tibet from China, to exploit the Tibetan issue for aggravation of international situation. At the

last (16th) session of the UN General Assembly the representatives of the USSR and fraternal socialist countries resolutely supported the PRC, protesting against the discussion of the so-called "Tibetan question" and other attempts to blacken the People's China, including the one using the SinoIndian border dispute.

The imperialist tactics aim at making the Tibetan issue a bone of contention first of all between China and India, to pit these two great Asian powers against each other, to aggravate the situation in the South-East Asia, to undermine the influence of the socialist camp, including China, in this region of the world, to weaken the positions of communists in the movement of national liberation. The American press openly admits that one word from India compromises the prestige of the PRC more than one thousand words spoken in the USA.

Regrettably, the Chinese comrades did not take into account this tactic of the imperialists. Responding to the noisy campaign in imperialist mass media about Tibet, they unleashed their own propagandist campaign and concentrated their fire mainly on India and personally on [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru. They accused the Indian government and personally Nehru of an imperialist policy, aimed against China. This was the essence of a large editorial article in "Renmin Ribao" ["People's Daily"] on 6 May 1959, under the title "The revolution in Tibet and the philosophy of Nehru."

Nehru is a well-known politician. One cannot exclude that to some degree he was involved in the intrigues against the PRC. But Nehru is far-sighted enough to recognize the vital importance of India's friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp. Nehru behaved with reserve. In his numerous speeches he admitted that Tibet is a part of China, he spoke against the establishment of a socalled "government of Dalai-Lama in exile," stressing the significance of the SinoIndian friendship. India repeatedly raised the issue of restoration of rights of the People's Republic of China in the UN. Precisely these actions made the rightist bourgeois circles in India, who are linked to Anglo-American capital, to assail Nehru, blaming him for "indecisiveness" and "appeasement" with regard to the People's China. Their goal is to unseat Nehru, to revise the neutralist foreign policy of India, to tilt it in a rightist

direction, to the path of alliance with Western powers. If reactionary circles of India succeed in achieving these goals, it would cause serious damage to the socialist camp and the whole cause of peace, since the present foreign policy line of the Nehru government is a positive factor in the struggle for strengthening peace.

One should ask, what aims did Chinese comrades pursue in attacking Nehru so uncompromisingly? As they explained it themselves, they stood by the principle of "cohesion and struggle." According to com. Mao Zedong, they unmask Nehru as a "double-dealer," "half a man, half a devil," "half a gentlemen, half a hooligan,” and in doing this they allegedly "force" him to strengthen friendship with the PRC.

A question, naturally, was raised how to live side by side with this “devil”? How to build relations with India? The Chinese comrades found a solution in forcing Nehru to repent and in pressuring him into cooperation with China. At the same time the Chinese said that they visualize the possibility of the downfall of the Nehru government and see no great trouble if a reactionary pro-Western government comes to power in India. In their opinion, this would only bring us closer to a revolution in India.

Obviously this course inevitably had to lead to further aggravation of relations with India. And it happened, indeed, when after suppression of the Tibet rebellion the Chinese troops approached the borders with India.

The People's China and India inherited from the past unresolved border issues. It is not possible here to dwell on the history and the essence of these issues that deal with some territories located in the Himalayas. But it is important to notice by what methods the Chinese comrades attempted to resolve this problem, so acute and painful for both sides.

For a long time the Chinese comrades postponed a solution of this question. They stressed that in the interests of maintaining good relations with India they would not press with demarcation of the borders and would reckon with the existing realties. However, in the heated atmosphere of the Sino-Indian disputes with regard to the rebellion of Tibet the issue of the border territories became extremely acute. On 25 August [1959] an armed clash took place between the Chinese and Indian border-guards,

and as a result the Hindus lost several people as killed and wounded. Exploiting this conflict, imperialist propaganda raised the uproar about "the aggression of red China." Reactionary nationalists inside India unleashed a fierce anti-Chinese campaign that was accompanied by attacks against Nehru, as well as [against] the Indian communist party.

One should mention that these events took place only a few days before the visit of comrade Khrushchev to the United States. The enemy propaganda did everything to exploit the Sino-Indian conflict for the purpose of disruption of the Soviet peace initiative, to lay blame for China's actions on the Soviet Union and thereby to cause a quarrel between us and India.

With all this in mind, the CC CPSU decided to send a letter to Beijing, expressing our concern about the situation that emerged as a result of the Sino-Indian conflict. It also took a decision to publish a TASS announcement in order to encourage peaceful settlement of the conflict and to give the world public opinion the correct idea about our position. The declaration of the Soviet Union at that time halted escalation of the conflict and thwarted the dangerous game of the imperialists. The governments of the PRC and India announced that further intensification of the dispute would not be in the interests of peace nor in their own interests, and that they would resolve border issues according to "five principles" [pancha sila] of peaceful coexist

ence.

The course of events, however, demonstrated that the question of the Sino-Indian border is rife with new complications. It is known that on 21 October [1959] there was another armed clash on the Sino-Indian border that caused the loss of lives. After it the anti-Chinese campaign in India flared up with new vigor.

One should keep in mind that there are very influential forces in India that seek to aggravate relations with China. Regrettably, the position of the Chinese comrades on this question is such that it facilitates for the Indian reactionaries mobilization of public opinion in the country against the People's China and puts the progressive forces of India in a quandary.

The Chinese comrades insist that they are guided by the considerations of self-defense and prestige of their country, that the

truth and justice is on China's side. In this regard one must inform the Plenum that the letter we addressed to the CC of the Communist Party of China and the TASS announcement about the Indo-Chinese border conflict did not evoke a proper understanding among the Chinese leaders. In their answer to our letter the Chinese comrades claimed that the incident on the Sino-Indian border had been provoked by the Nehru government, which, as the letter of the Chinese friends reads, "has long been marching in its domestic and foreign policies in the reactionary direction." It follows: "We believe that if one carries out only the policy of unprincipled adjustment and concessions to Nehru and the Indian government, not only would it not make them change their position for the better, but, on the contrary, in the situation of the growing offensive on their side, if China still does not rebuff them and denounce them, such a policy would only encourage their atrocity. It would not be advantageous for the friendship between China and India, and also not be advantageous to make Nehru and the Indian government improve, instead of moving toward further rapprochement with the West."

The letter contains a reproach that "the TASS announcement displayed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union toward the incident on the Sino-Indian border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, who use this to drive a wedge into the relations between China and the Soviet Union. This cannot help evoking regrets."

The analysis of this letter of the CC of the Communist Party of China leads us to two conclusions of fundamental importance. They are the following: the Chinese comrades could neither correctly assess their own mistakes committed in their relations with India, nor the measures taken by the CC CPSU for regulation of the Sino-Indian conflict. The Chinese leadership's assessments of the situation in India and the behavior of Nehru with regard to the conflict are undoubtedly erroneous and arbitrary.

Let me refer to the opinion of our Indian friends expressed in their letters to the CC CPSU and the CC of the Communist Party of China. While registering the aggravation of the situation in India as a result of the conflict, the Indian comrades stated that "if the disputes continue, it would benefit

reactionary forces in India and would cause

a negative influence on the masses of the Indian population." Indian comrades justifiably believe that further exacerbation of the Indo-Chinese relations could weaken the democratic movement in India, gravely undercut the position of the Indian communist party and threaten it with a ban. In the words of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India comr. [Ajoy Kumar] Ghosh, Indian communists do not know how to explain the position of the PRC, the reason why it raised the border issue if China at this time and what hides behind it. All leading officials of the Communist Party of India wonder why the government of the PRC let itself be pulled by Indian reaction into this border conflict.

And as to the statement of the Chinese comrades about the glee and jubilation of Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, with regard to dissimilar positions of China and the Soviet Union on the incident on the Sino-Indian border, it is erroneous in its basic premises. The imperialists rejoiced indeed, but they did so at the moment when the Indo-Chinese conflict flared up. One can imagine them exulting and rejoicing even more, if the Soviet Union had become enmeshed in this conflict and the impression had been created that there was a united front of all socialist countries against Nehru. Facts demonstrate that the uproar among imperialists seriously abated after the Soviet Union came forth in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict.

What did aggravation of relations between China and India and other foreign policy gaffes of the Chinese comrades lead to? They led to a diminution of the international prestige of the PRC, to the weakening of her positions in Asia, to an increased tendency, in a number of countries of Asia, to ally oneself with Western powers, with the USA, despite strong hatred among the peoples of Asian countries towards their perennial enemies - the colonizers.

[after discussion of Soviet-Chinese differences over Indonesia and other foreign policy issues, Suslov recounted the summit meeting in Beijing on 2 October 1959 between Khrushchev and Mao; his description of the exchange dealing with the Sino-Indian border conflict is printed below—ed.]

From our side in the discussion of foreign policy issues took part comrades

Khrushchev, Suslov and Gromyko. From the Chinese side participated comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Wang Jiaxiang.

The discussion took place on 2 October in the residence of the Politburo of the CC Communist Party of China. Comrade Khrushchev informed the Chinese friends about his trip to the USA and his talks with President D. Eisenhower. He stressed that among American political figures there is growing sentiment in favor of peaceful settlement of unresolved, disputed questions and that at the present time there is a very real possibility for further resolute steps toward a more durable peace. In this regard he brought the attention of the Chinese friends to the necessity for the socialist camp to avoid anything that could be exploited by the reactionaries to push the world back to the tracks of the cold war.

Comrade Khrushchev told the Chinese comrades that we do not completely understand their foreign policy, particularly with regard to India, and on the issue of Taiwan.

Comrade Khrushchev pointed out at the necessity to improve mutual information between the leadership of our parties on the issues of foreign policy. One cannot regard as normal the situation, when we, China's ally, do not know what the Chinese comrades may undertake tomorrow in the area of foreign policy. Indeed, all countries of the socialist camp are linked not only by the common ideas and goals, but also by the alliance commitments. Incorrect actions of one country may hurt international situation of the whole socialist camp. One should keep in mind that imperialist propaganda directly link activity of Chinese comrades to the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries. Indeed, communist parties always emphasize that the socialist camp has one line in foreign policy.

As far as the CC CPSU is concerned, we systematically inform the leadership of fraternal parties of socialist countries about most important foreign policy steps of the USSR and, in special cases, we seek their advice.

One must admit that the Chinese comrades reacted to the remarks of comrade Khrushchev painfully. They claimed that their policy with regard to Taiwan and the off-shore straits has been fully justified and is conducted with skill, that their line toward

the Nehru government is correct. At times the tone of our discussion became quite sharp. It came to the point when a member of the Politburo CC Communist Party of China, minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi, claimed that our line on Nehru is allegedly opportunistic [prisposoblencheskaia], and the policy of China is more firm and correct. Naturally, we gave a resolute rebuff to these pronouncements.

In connection with the remarks of the Chinese leaders one cannot help wondering how they understand the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, whether they see it as a general line of foreign policy of the socialist camp, whether they think it is necessary to struggle for relaxation of international tension and for securing general peace.

We are getting an impression that, while recognizing formally the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two global systems, the Chinese comrades tend to regard this principle just as a temporary tactical maneuver.

[ed. note: after additional critical remarks and recounting of discussion of other matters at the meeting, Suslov noted:]

One should say that at the end of the conversation on 2 October Mao Zedong and other Chinese comrades declared that they did not want war; that they would resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means and would settle the conflict with India through negotiations. They confirmed again that the Communist party of China has a common line and common goals with us. We expressed our satisfaction in this regard.

[noting that Khrushchev had pointed out the Chinese leadership's “nervousness and touchiness" at being criticised, Suslov harshly criticized the "atmosphere of the cult of personality" surrounding Mao, which he likened to that of Stalin; recalling that during a 1958 conversation with Khrushchev, Mao had compared SovietChinese relations to two hands in which nine fingers were fully unified “and only in one, little finger we have disagreements," Suslov ended his report on an optimistic note, vowing that the Soviet leadership would do its utmost to promote strong ties and friendship between Moscow and Beijing—ed.]

[Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, ll. 56-91; transla

tion for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

II. Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on Soviet-Indian Relations and the SinoIndian Border Conflict, 1962 (excerpts)

[The first excerpt is from a 17 January 1962 entry from the journal of Soviet ambassador to India I.A. Benediktov describing a conversation with the Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India (CPI), Bhupesh Gupta. During the conversation, Gupta urgently requests Soviet financial aid for the Indian party for use in an upcoming election campaign; the answer conveyed by Benediktov ten days later suggests that the Soviets responded positively to the request, although the amount is not indicated:]

Today I received Gupta at his request. Gupta communicated that on 16-17 January a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPI took place in Delhi, at which was discussed the future work of the party apparatus in connection with the death of A[joy]. [Kumar] Ghosh....Gupta said that he desires that the ties of the CPI and CPSU do not become weakened in any way after the death of Ghosh. The assistance in various forms and the comradely advice of the CC CPSU have always been enormously useful to us, he underscored....Gupta said that no other party, not even the communist party of China, can occupy in the hearts of Indian communists the place which belongs to the CPSU...

Gupta reported that after the death of Ghosh at the present time in the party there is an acute insufficiency of means for the preelection campaign. He expressed the fear that with the death of Ghosh the source for receiving means for the communist party from the CPSU might be closed. These questions were handled by Ghosh alone, Gupta underscored. He never consulted with him /Gupta/, and even less with [Elamulam M.S.] Nambudiripad and G. Nair/ with the latter two only about using the assistance/. All these matters were held in strictest secrecy from other leaders of the party and members of the National Council. This explains the fact that not a single report on this question has appeared in the press. Gupta said that he cannot singlehandedly take on responsibility in

questions of assistance, therefore he considers it necessary to consult with Nambudiripad, whom he characterized as a person of crystalline honesty and whom Ghosh trusted. Gupta confidentially reported that A. Ghosh had not consulted on this problem with Akhmed or with [Shripad Amrit] Dange, who once proposed that he entrust to him alone all matters connected with the receipt of aid from abroad.

Gupta categorically denied that the Chinese friends are giving the CC CPI [Central Committee of the Communist Party of India] financial assistance. The National Council has not received, is not receiving, and will not receive assistance from the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], Gupta declared, and we never will appeal to them with such a request. Moreover, the interlocutor underscored, the Chinese do not know anything about Soviet aid. Gupta noted that he knows this precisely, since he enjoys the trust of both groups in the party. The interlocutor further underscored that the only other channels of aid from abroad are the aid received by the Punjab organization from Sikhs living in England and also the aid at the trade union level through Dange.

Gupta repeated several times that the aid is needed precisely now, since the preelection struggle must be concluded in the first week of February. After the elections we would like to receive your suppport in the matter of the theoretical preparation of party cadres, he said. Gupta expressed the conviction that the CPI not only will preserve its seats in parliament, but also will be able to increase their number.

Gupta said that in the election struggle the reactionary forces within the country are now directing their main blow at the authority of the USSR, which has increased in connection with its position on Goa, Kashmir and other questions. The main task of the CPI in the pre-election struggle, Gupta said, is to make clear to the population that the Soviet Union is giving selfless aid to India, is its true friend...

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), Fond 090, Opis 24, Delo 5, Papka 80, Listy 14-19; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[Benediktov met with Gupta again on 27 January 1962 (as the Soviet envoy recorded

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