military wing-the FAPLA (Forças Armadas Popular para Libertação de Angola) took control of most of the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda in the north. In the main Angolan cities, MPLA organizers, now free to act, started setting up strong para-military groups in populous slum areas, drawing on the appeal of their message of social revolution. 22

Moscow in early December 1974 drew up an elaborate plan for supplying the MPLA with heavy weapons and large amounts of ammunition, using Congo (Brazzaville) as the point of transit. Ambassador Afanasenko got the task of convincing the Congolese of their interest in cooperating. This was not an easy task. Congo had never been a close ally of the Soviet Union-in the ruling military junta were many who sympathized with the Chinese-and it had for some time sponsored both Neto's MPLA rivals and a Cabinda separatist group. The latter issue was particularly problematic, and Agostinho Neto had on several occasions criticized the Congolese leader Colonel Marien Nguabi for his support of Cabindan independence. Still, on December 4 Nguabi gave his go-ahead for the Soviet operation.23

Though noting the flexibility of the Congolese government, Afanasenko knew that the job of reinforcing the MPLA would not be easy. In a report to Moscow he underlined the problems the MPLA faced on the military side. Both the FNLA, now joined by Daniel Chipenda's MPLA rebels, and UNITA held strong positions and would be equipped further by the Americans and the Chinese. In the civil war which the ambassador predicted, the "reactionaries" would initially have the initiative, and the MPLA would depend on "material assistance from progressive countries all over the world" just to survive. Politically, however, Neto's group, as the "most progressive national-liberation organization of Angola," would enjoy considerable support. On the organizational side, one should not think. of the MPLA as a vanguard party, or even as a party at all, but rather as a loose coalition of trade unionists, progressive intellectuals, Christian groups,

and large segments of the petty bourgeoisie.24

In spite of the skirmishes which had already begun between MPLA and FNLA forces in late 1974, African heads of state succeded in convincing the three Angolan movements to join in negotiations with Portugal and thereby attempt an orderly transfer of power in Luanda. These negotiations led to the 15 January 1975 Alvor Agreement, in which 11 November 1975 was set as the date for the Portuguese handing over power to an Angolan coalition government. None of the parties took this last attempt at avoiding civil war too seriously, and sporadic fighting continued. The Alvor Agreement was also undermined both by the Soviet Union and the United States, who decided to expand their programs of military support for their Angolan allies.25

The Soviets were prodded in their widening commitment to the MPLA by the Cuban leaders. Cuba had supplied the MPLA with some material support the MPLA with some material support since the mid-1960s, and Havana had increasingly come to regard Agostinho Neto as its favorite African liberation leader. The Cubans told Moscow that Neto would not, and should not, accept sharing power with the other movements. Cuba would itself concentrate more on Africa (i.e., Angola) in its foreign policy, and expected the Soviets to upgrade their support for the MPLA. Moscow would not be bettered by Havana. Afanasenko told the Cuban ambassador to Brazzaville that "the Central Committee of the CPSU is attentively watching the development of tively watching the development of events in Angola and reiterates [its] unity with the progressive forces, in order to smash the cherished adventures of foreign and domestic reaction."

The Soviet Union was also aware of the increase in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's covert support for the FNLA starting in late January 1975. The Soviet embassy in Brazzaville conIcluded that the American assistance would lead Holden Roberto to make an all-out bid for power very soon. The embassy experts realized that there was little the Soviet Union could do to assist the MPLA resist the initial attacks by Roberto's forces. Their hope was

that the further increase in Soviet "technical, military, and civilian assistance" which the Brazzaville ambassador promised José Eduardo dos Santos on January 30 would arrive in time. But in addition to their material assistance, the Soviets also tried to push the MPLA to mend its negotiation strategy. Moscow now hoped that a new alliance between the MPLA and Savimbi's UNITA could get their Angolan allies out of the difficult spot they were in.27

Moscow was joined in its wish for an anti-FNLA alliance by many of the independent states in southern Africa. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere attempted to get the Soviets to increase the pressure on the MPLA leadership to make the necessary concessions to forge such an alliance. Nyerere,—sympathetic to the MPLA's political aims,was exasperated by Neto's unbending demands in the negotiations. The Angolan leader was “a good poet and doctor," Nyerere told the East German ambassador, but "a bad politician." Nyerere also warned the Soviets against direct involvement in the Angolan conflict. African countries would react sharply against any form of foreign intervention, Nyerere said.28

By early summer, 1975, the FNLA troops had mounted limited offensives against the MPLA both along the coast and in the northern part of Angola. Then, in July, as another Africanbrokered attempt at negotiations broke down, the MPLA counterattacked. By the middle of the month, local FAPLA forces were in control of Luanda, and MPLA troops began attacking the FNLA strongholds in the north. The Soviets had not foreseen the MPLA military success, although the Brazzaville embassy already in April foresaw an improvement of FAPLA fighting capabilities because of the Soviet aid. However, it did not expect a full scale civil war to break out before Angola achieved its independence in November 29

Moscow now seemed to have the recipe for success in Angola. By a limited supply of military equipment, it had secured the MPLA the upper hand in the fighting. As the date for independence approached, Moscow expected

that the rival movements, or at least UNITA, would return to the negotiating table and become part of an MPLAled coalition government. The Soviet experts did not believe that the United States would stage a massive intervention, nor did they give much credence to MPLA reports of direct South African or Zairean involvement. Their main worry was the Chinese, who had stepped up their FNLA assistance program from bases in Zaire. Moscow found particularly disturbing the fact that the Chinese were joined as instructors in these camps by military personnel from Romania and North Korea. 30

The Ford Administration was, however, not willing to let Neto's MPLA force a solution to the nascent civil war in Angola. In mid-July 1975, the U.S. president authorized a largescale covert operation in support of the FNLA and the UNITA. Over three months, the CIA was allocated almost $50 million dollars to train, equip, and transport anti-MPLA troops. In early August, South African forces, at first in limited numbers, crossed the border into southern Angola, while regular Zairean troops joined FNLA forces fighting in the north. By mid-August the MPLA offensives in the north had been turned back, and Neto's forces were retreating toward Luanda, 31

In addition to its flagging fortunes on the battlefield, the MPLA ran up against increasing problems in securing their Soviet lifeline through the Congo. The flamboyant and independentminded Congolese leader, Colonel Nguabi, had been angered by Neto's persistent criticizm of Brazzaville for sheltering Cabindan separatist groups. In an irate message to the Soviet ambassador, Nguabi informed Moscow that he would no longer accept that Neto, "on the one hand, demands assistance from Congo, [and] on the other makes accusations against us." By early August the Congolese had informed Afanasenko that they would not accept Soviet plans for large-scale support of the MPLA through Congolese territory, 32

It was the threat to the "Congo connection" which, in early August, prompted Moscow to ask Fidel

Castro-who had close connections with the Congolese leaders-to act as a facilitator for assistance to the MPLA. The Soviet leaders got more than they bargained for. The Cubans had since early spring tried to get Moscow to support an armed strategy on behalf of the MPLA. Already in February, the Cuban ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam had told his Soviet colleague that “The choice of the socialist road in Angola must be made now. . . . In October it will be too late." In late summer, Castro used the new Soviet request as a stimulus for launching his own plan for the intervention of Cuban forces in Angola,33

Cuba had sent military instructors to work with the MPLA in its camps in Congo for several years before the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. By early summer 1975 these advisers numbered about 250, and—in spite of not participating in combat-they played an increasingly important role in planning MPLA operations. The Cuban officers functioned as a kind of general staff for Neto and the MPLA leaders. Through their operational training, Castro's instructors supplied the necessary know-how which the Angolan forces lacked, especially regarding communications, supply-lines, and coordinated operations.34

On August 15, Castro sent a message to Leonid Brezhnev arguing the need for increased support for the MPLA, including the introduction of MPLA, including the introduction of Cuban special troops. The Cubans had already developed a fairly detailed plan already developed a fairly detailed plan for transporting their troops to Luanda (or Congo), for supplies, and for how the Cuban soldiers would be used on the ground in Angola. Castro wanted Soviet transport assistance, as well as the use of Soviet staff officers, both in Havana and Luanda, to help in planning the military operations. The Cubans underlined to the Soviets the political strength of the MPLA, and the threat which foreign assistance to the FNLA/ UNITA alliance posed to socialism and independence in Angola.

The Cuban initiative was coordinated with the MPLA leaders, who now in turn tried to put pressure on the Soviets to get involved with the Cuban

plan for a direct military intervention. Lucio Lara, the senior MPLA underground leader in Luanda, on August 17 appealed to Ambassador Afanasenko for the dispatch of Soviet staff officers to the MPLA General Command, which had just moved from Brazzaville to Luanda. "The MPLA Command needs qualified advice on military questions at the strategic level," Lara said. Afanasenko, however, could only promise technical experts, but agreed to invite MPLA's defense minister designate, Iko Carreira, to Moscow in late August for talks with the CPSU CC International Department, the Defense Ministry, and the Armed Forces General Staff. 36

In spite of their policy to support Neto's MPLA, the Soviet leaders were not pleased with the content of the Cuban plan. First of all, they objected to the use of Soviet officers and even Soviet transport planes in Angola prior to independence. The Soviet leaders worried that such a move would damage the policy of detente with regard to the United States. They also knew that most African countries, including some close to the Soviet Union, would react against a direct Soviet involvement, as would some of their political friends in Portugal. Second, the Cubans were, in the Soviet view, not sufficiently aware of how even a Cuban intervention could upset great power relations, since the Ford Administration would see Cuban forces as proxies for Soviet interests. Third, Moscow was still not sure that the military situation in Angola warranted a troop intervention in support of the MPLA 37

In spite of their displeasure, the Soviet leaders found it difficult to make their objections known to Castro. Moscow knew that the Cuban leader was wary of the Soviet policy of detente, and their experience with Havana told them to tread carefully so as to avoid episodes like the 1968 near-break between the two allies. Still, Brezhnev flatly refused to transport the Cuban troops or to send Soviet officers to serve with the Cubans in Angola. The Soviet General Staff opposed any participation in the Cuban operation, and even the KGB, with whom the policy of paying increased

attention to Africa originated, in August 1975 warned against the effects of a direct Soviet intervention on US-Soviet relations.38

Havana would not be deterred by Soviet hesitation. The first Cuban combat troops arrived in Luanda in late September and early October onboard several Soviet aircraft and rebuilt pre-revolutionary Cuban cruise-ships. They immediately fanned out into FAPLA units in the Angolan countryside, and took charge of much of the fighting against the MPLA's enemies. But the infusion of Cuban troops was not enough to sustain the MPLA conquests from early summer against the new onslaught of its combined enemies.39

In September the MPLA continued its retreat, hard pressed by Zairean and mercenary-led FNLA troops in the north and UNITA forces, supported by advisors and material from South Africa, in the south. Savimbi's incongruous alliance with Pretoria had given his military units the equipment they badly needed, and they could now exploit their substantial ethnically-based support in central and eastern Angola. The MPLA, meanwhile, was by mid-October entirely dependent on its support in the western Luanda-Mbundu regions and in the cities. It controlled less than one-fourth of the country, and was losing ground, in spite of Cuban reinforce40 ments."

The foreign alliance policies of the MPLA, and thereby its possibilities for winning the struggle for power in Angola, were saved by Pretoria's October decision to launch an invasion. Moscow knew of the South African plans in advance of their implementation in mid-October, and the Kremlin leadership discussed how to respond. The CPSU CC International Department considered the new stage of the anti-MPLA operations in Angola a joint U.S.-South African effort, and believed the Soviet Union had to come to the aid of its ally. In the third week of October, Moscow decided to start assisting the Cuban operation in Angola immediately after the MPLA had made its declaration of independence on November 11. The Soviet aim was to infuse enough Cuban troops and Soviet advis

ers into Angola by mid-December to defeat the South Africans and assist the MPLA leaders in building a socialist party and state. 41

The Soviet perception of the widening role of the CIA in assisting FNLA forces from bases in Zaire also played a role in Moscow's reevaluation of its Angolan policy. The KGB station in Brazzaville supplied vital information on the dramatic increase in U.S. assistance, and Andropov believed that the Americans had a long-term strategy of Americans had a long-term strategy of equipping large groups of Angolan, Zairean, and Western mercenary troops to be sent into Angola. It was also likely, the KGB said, that U.S. "experts" would increase their own cross-border activities. 42

The reaction of most African countries to the South African invasion led the Soviets to believe that it would be less dangerous than before to intervene in the Angolan conflict. Julius Nyerere, an African leader who Moscow respected in spite of his often blunt criticism of its Africa policies, told the Soviet ambassador on November 3 that in spite of deploring the war in Angola, Pretoria's intervention had made outside support for the MPLA necessary. He hoped that many African countries now would aid Neto's movement. Still, he warned against a too open Soviet support for the MPLA, and hoped that Moscow would channel the bulk of its aid through African governments. The Soviet ambassador, untruthfully, re43 sponded that such would be the case.

The Soviet military preparations for the airlift of Cuban troops to Angola intensified in early November. The CPSU secretariat met on November 5 and decided to send Soviet naval units to areas off the Angolan coast. In Brazzaville, in a striking reversal of roles within less than two months, the Soviet ambassador now exhorted his Cuban colleague to "intensify" Havana's preparations for combat in Angola. “But a Cuban artillery regiment is already fighting in Luanda," the Cuban ambassador responded, somewhat incredulously.44

Agostinho Neto declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola on November 11, just as the

MPLA was fighting for its very existence only a few miles north of Luanda. In the battle of Quifangondo valley the Cuban artillerymen proved to give FAPLA the crucial advantage over its FNLA-Zairean opponents. Soviet-supplied BM-21 122 millimeter rocket launchers devastated the attacking forces and sent them on a disorderly retreat toward the northern border, giving the MPLA and the Cubans a free hand to turn on the South African and UNITA forces approaching from the 45 south.

During the week before independence, large groups of Cuban soldiers had started arriving in Luanda onboard Soviet aircraft. The Soviets had organized and equipped these transports, although the operation was technically directed by the Cubans themselves. Moscow had made it clear that the primary objective of these forces was to contain the South Africans along the southern border and that they should not be used for general purposes in the civil war. For the same reason the Soviet General Staff ordered about 60 of their own officers to join the Cuban forces from Congo. These men started arriving in Luanda in the evening of November 12.46

The ensuing two weeks saw the rapid advance toward Luanda of the UNITA army led by about 6.000 regular South African troops. By late November, these forces had reconquered all the territory which Savimbi had lost to the MPLA over the preceding months. They had occupied every major port south of the capital except Porto Amboim, taken control of the Benguela railway, and were attempting to set up their own civilian administration in Huambo. Both the Soviets and the Cubans concluded that if the MPLA regime was to survive, the Cuban forces would have to attack in the south as

soon as possible.47

After the creation of the MPLA regime the Politburo authorized the Soviet General Staff to take direct control of the trans-Atlantic deployment of additional Cuban troops, as well as the supplying of these troops with advanced military hardware. The massive operation-the first Soviet effort of its kind—

transported more than 12,000 soldiers

by sea and air from Cuba to Africa between late October 1975 and mid-January 1976. In the same period it also provided FAPLA and the Cubans with hundreds of tons of heavy arms, as well as T-34 and T-54 tanks, SAM-7s, antitank missiles, and a number of MiG-21 fighter planes.48

It is still not possible to chart in any detail the logistics of the Soviet operation. What we do know is that the governments of several African countries agreed to assist with the enterprise. Congo was the main staging ground for personnel and arms arriving from Cuba. and the Soviet Union (although in some cases An-22 transport planes flew directly from the southern USSR or from Cuba). Algeria, Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania cooperated with the efforts in different ways, even if the Soviets on some occasions had to push hard to get their cooperation. Moscow also had to push some of its East European allies to rush to the defense of "African liberation and global anti-imperialism" by supporting the MPLA.49

By the end of November the Cubans had stopped the South African-led advance on Luanda, and in two battles south of the Cuanza river in December the southern invaders suffered major setbacks. Pretoria then decided to withdraw towards the border, partly because of its military problems and partly because the U.S. Senate voted on December 19 to block all funding for covert operations in Angola. Pretoria would not accept being left in the lurch by Washington, with its own men held hostage to a conflict they no longer believed they could win 50

Just as it had opened the gates for African acceptance of Soviet-Cuban aid to the MPLA, the by now defunct South African intervention also paved the way for African diplomatic recognition of the new Angolan regime. By mid-February 1976, most African states had of ficially recognized Neto's government, as had the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in spite of attempts by its chairman, Ugandan President Idi Amin, to have the decision postponed. Soviet diplomatic efforts contributed significantly to this development, for

instance in the case of Zambia, where President Kenneth Kaunda switched over to the MPLA's side after substan

tial Soviet pressure. 51

In terms of control of the central regions, the Angolan war was over by early March 1976. The capital of the early March 1976. The capital of the anti-MPLA forces, Huambo, fell to FAPLA forces on February 11. Holden Roberto had already in January returned to exile in Zaire and the FNLA had given up its military activities. Jonas Savimbi had returned to the bush areas of southeastern Angola with about 2.000 guerillas and their U.S. and South African advisers, and although he was to fight his way back to international prominence by the early 1980s, in 1976 Savimbi himself realized that he could not effectively challenge FAPLA and the Cubans.52

In the spring of 1976 the Soviet leaders felt-with a high degree of certainty and self-congratulation—that they had won the Angolan war. The Kremlin was impressed that the logistics of the operation had worked so well: over 7,000 kilometers from Moscow the Soviet Union had conducted a campaign in support of its allies against the power of the United States and its strong regional supporters, and come out on top. For Brezhnev himself Angola became a benchmark for "active solidarity with the peoples of Africa and Asia" and evidence that the Soviet Union could advance socialism in the Third World during a period of detente with the United States.53

What did the Soviets believe they learned from the Angolan conflict? From the reports coming in to the CPSU CC International Department, the most important lesson at the time seems to have been that the United States could be defeated in local conflicts under certain circumstances. First, the Soviet armed forces must be capable of and ready to provide, at short notice, the logistics for the operation needed. These tasks were primarily assigned to the navy and the air-force, both of which were commended for their efforts in Angola. Second, the Soviet Union must be able to organize and control the antiimperialist forces involved (unlike in Vietnam, where the Soviet leaders felt

that disaster had struck again and again because of the Vietnamese leaders' in

ability to follow Moscow's advice).54

The Soviet cadres in Angola were, by 1976, very satisfied with the way both Angolans and Cubans had respected Moscow's political primacy during the war. According to the embassy, Neto realized his dependence on Soviet assistance and, equally important, that it was Moscow, not Havana, who made the final decisions. Even though the embassy still did not trust. Neto fully, they admitted that he had performed to their liking during these battles. In the spring of 1976 he continued to press for more Soviet military instructors, an attitude which the charge d'affaires in Luanda, G.A. Zverev, held up as a sign of the Angolan president's dedication to the new alliance, even if Neto had not yet consented to request 55 permanent Soviet military bases.

As to the Cubans, the Soviet representatives often expressed a certain. degree of surprise to Moscow at how harmonious were relations with the small Caribbean ally. The Soviet-Cuban "close coordination in Angola during the war has had very positive results," Zverev told his superiors in March 1976. Soviet diplomats and officers lauded the Cubans for their bravery and for their ability to function as a link between Moscow and Luanda while at the same time "respecting" the paramount role of the CPSU leadership. The overall Cuban-Soviet relationship improved significantly in the wake of the Angolan operation, up to a point which had not been reached since the 1962 missile crisis.56

Moscow and Havana also agreed on strategy in Angola after the main battles had ended in the spring of 1976. Both countries wanted to wind down their military involvement as soon as possible, "avoid broad military clashes with South Africa, and attain their goal by means of political and diplomatic struggle." In May, Raul Castro told the Soviet General Staff that he wanted to start withdrawing Cuban troops right away, and that he expected almost 15,000 Cubans to have left by late October. The Cuban leaders asked Moscow to inform Pretoria of their inten