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the MPR, Comrade Tschimiddorsh; on the down the border line with these countries. lution of the Chinese-Pakistani border quesChinese side—the deputy Premier of the The border agreement between China tion and the settlement of the Chinese-InState Council and Foreign Minister of the and Mongolia will also contribute to the dia border question could hinder their agPRC, Comrade Tschen Ji (Chen Yi), the resolution of the border question with our gression. deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Tschi other neighboring countries.

Recently the Americans have exerted Peng-fei, the Head of the 2nd Asian Divi- China recently started border negotia- increased pressure on India and Pakistan sion of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, tions with Pakistan. We think that (we) will demanding a solution to the Kashmir quesComrade Zhou Tschu-je, the Chief of Pro- soon reach an agreement as our negotiations tion as soon as possible. It is expected that tocol of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, with Pakistan are taking place in a good at- in the near-future negotiations on the borJui Pei-weng, the Extraordinary and mosphere. The border question with Paki- der question will begin between India and plenipotentary Ambassador of the PRC in stan is also linked to the Kashmir question, Pakistan on the ministerial level. the MPR, Se Fu-schen.

that is, with the question that concerns both The English are trying to influence Erdenebulag served as translator on the Pakistan and India directly. After the con- these matters either in the direction that Chinese side and Adja on the Mongolian clusion of the negotiations between China Kashmir belongs to both countries or that side.

and Pakistan, we will sign a provisional pro- Pakistan connects itself into Indian society After offering tea, fruit, and cigarettes tocol; the signing of an official treaty will (dass sich Pakistan der indischen to the guests, and after a short conversation follow if the Kashmir question between In- Gemeinschaft anschliesst). of a protocol nature, photographs were taken dia and Pakistan has been settled.

We are of the opinion that the border and the guests entered a special room where Anyway, the aforementioned border negotiations between India and Pakistan a three-hour conversation occurred.

treaty will reflect the real situation. We are cannot lead to positive results. Nehru is Hereafter follows a presentation of the not going to define officially the border be- searching for a way to subordinate India and contents of the conversation between the tween China and Pakistan today. That would Pakistan to American domination. Clearly, Premier of the State Council of the PRC, be to lead India into a dead end (Sackgasse). he has no other way out (Ausweg). If this and the Chairman of the Council of Minis- The border between India and Pakistan is occurs, the situation will become even more ters of the MPR, Zedenbal. still officially unresolved.

complicated, and it will become difficult to ZHOU ENLAI: We are very happy, When you visited India in (September] explain this problem to the Indian people. Comrade Chairman Zedenbal, that you have 1959, Comrade Zedenbal, the border con- We have sent a letter to the countries come to our land, in order to sign a treaty flict between China and India had just of Asia and Africa explaining the Chineseconcerning the border between our coun- reached a climax. At that time, I informed Indian border question in detail. You have tries. This is a good thing, the meaning of you regarding the Chinese-India border also received this letter, Comrade Chairman which is to legally define the borders be- question, but during your stay in India you Zedenbal. tween our friendly lands.

tried to avoid this question. We are very Since 1961 India is conducting invaYesterday you said quite correctly, that interested in this matter.

sions into our border districts and has esthe signing of a border agreement would be The major border conflict between In- tablished 43 border posts there. The area in very meaningful for peace and friendship. dia and Pakistan is caused by the Kashmir question is mountainous, has a raw climate, A reasonable settlement of the border ques- question. At the western sector of our bor- and it snows a lot there. tion between China and Mongolia will be der with India, this [area] borders on the After the Chinese-Indian border conan example and an encouragement for bor- Aksai and on the Tibetan district of Ali. This flict broke out and India continued its invader negotiations with other countries. was a historically established traditional sion systematically, we were forced to re

Basically, we have reached an agree- border line. Pakistan's position on the bor- move the aforementioned 43 posts. Several ment concerning the border question with der question is correct. The border agree- of these were overrun and the entire district [North) Korea. But we are waiting still for ment between our countries will undoubt- cleansed. an answer from Korea and therefore have edly be signed, once the status On 21 November (1962) our governnot yet made a public announcement to the [zugehorigkeit) of Kashmir is clarified. In- ment made the decision to cease fire and to press.

dia, however, is trying in every way to pre- withdraw the border units 20 kilometers into Since the Chinese-Mongolian and Chi- vent the conclusion of an agreement. But the hinterlands. We suggested the establishnese-Korean border issues are already these attempts lack any grounds.

ment of an unpopulated zone 20 kilometers settled, all that remains to be done, is to set The Western press-especially the deep (on each side--ed.). One must say that up joint Commissions on Demarcation of English papers—write, that the Chinese- in the past there were no Chinese troops inBorders according to the agreed-upon prin- Pakistani border question corresponds com- volved in the border conflict. There was ciples.

pletely to the norms of international rela- not a single border guard or (border]-post We are at present conducting negotia- tions. But this question only worries the there, rather, only a patrol (service). But, tions regarding border demarcation with American reactionaries. They think that if administratively, this district was subject to Burma and Nepal. We have the opportu- China, Pakistan, and India delineate their us (our authority). Since 1949, however, nity to resolve this question with the afore- borders, that would be a blow to the India began to threaten and attack this area. mentioned countries on a mutually-agreed agressive Asia policy of America and other Now, after this area is cleansed, we again basis. In this manner we will officially pin imperialist states. They assume that the so- have no border guard there. If India, under these conditions, begins an invasion again, this will be a true challenge and provocation.

If India gives up Kashmir to Pakistan and tries to annex our Aksai district again, this will only be a proof that India is really working for and under the orders of the Americans.

India's attempts to give Pakistan the rich, bounteous Kashmir and, in exchange, to occupy our unpopulated, poor district, only proves (India's] aggressiveness. Under these conditions, we have ceased fire and withdrawn our troops.

The people of Asia and Africa, [and] all the peace-loving people of the Earth, support our policy and our measures. We thank you for the fact that your government welcomed the explanation of the government of the PRC.

Presently, India is in a difficult position. The countries of Asia and Africa are supporting our proposal, and that puts India in an even more exit-less (ausweglosere] situation.

Not long ago, a meeting of leading statesmen from many countries took place in Colombo (Ceylon; now Sri Lanka) concerning the Sino-Indian border question. They decided to send the Ceylonese prime minister (Sirimavo Bandaranaike) to China in order to inform us of the results of the conference. It was confirmed that the Ceylonese Minister-president would arrive [in China) on 31 December. We have already received a special plenipotentary in order to confer on this question. The aforementioned countries are making efforts to reconcile India and China and to initiate negotiations between our countries in order to confirm our cease-fire. We are ready to respond to these efforts. The most important [thing) is that both sides do not allow any renewed clashes. That is our main goal. Many ask, why there is no settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict, because the border question between China and Pakistan is actively discussed[?] We think that Pakistan negotiates with us without submitting itself to America and England, although it belongs to an aggressive bloc. India, however, speaks the language of America, although it maintains that it does not belong to any aggressive blocs.

J. ZEDENBAL: Do you consider India a neutral country?

ZHOU ENLAI: India is diverging from

its so-called neutrality. Furthermore, there perity.
is a less important border question between J. ZEDENBAL: The states and nations
China and Afghanistan. In short, we will will strengthen their independence and de-
start negotiations. Experience shows that we velop their countries, consequently and defi-
can solve the border problems handed down nitely crossing over into a communist or-
to us by history through friendly negotia- der. This is the dialectic of development.
tions both with socialist countries and with ZHOU ENLAI: This is clearly a ques-
the new states of Asia. The treaty regarding tion of the distant future.
the Chinese-Mongolian border demonstrates J. ZEDENBAL: Of course. Our gov-
this. Both of our states are socialist coun- ernment and our people deeply regret that
tries and in a short period we have solved there was a border conflict between China
the border question correctly, according to and India. They are convinced that this prob-
principles of friendship, equality, mutual un- lem must be solved in a peaceful manner.
derstanding and mutual concessions. Our That is our position. This conflict between
countries' governmental delegations have two Asian great-powers and the disturbance
successfully concluded negotiations over the of the friendship between them is disadvan-
border question. This opens the way to the tageous both for the peoples of both coun-
signature of a border agreement. Conse- tries and for the maintenance of peace in
quently, we will have to form a joint com-

general.
mission that will undertake border demar- Our visit to India in 1959 coincided with
cation on the spot.

the heightening (of tensions) on the ChineseJ. ZEDENBAL: Thank you, Premier Indian border. I remember, Comrade PreZhou Enlai both for the information regard- mier, that you informed us at that time reing the course of negotiations you are con- garding the state of affairs. ducting with neighboring countries and for As soon as we were on Indian soil, the the information about your government's correspondents fell upon us with questions position on this question.

regarding the border conflict. Our answer The negotiations between our countries to the correspondents ran: we hope that the to define exactly and mark the borderline border question between these two great have been successfully concluded, and noth- powers can be settled in a peaceful manner. ing more stands in the way of signing an At the meeting with Nehru, I said to him agreement. Comrade Premier, you have cor- that the correspondents had turned to us with rectly stated that our countries' governmen- this question; I assume that the border questal delegations negotiated successfully on tion between the two countries will be the basis of mutual understanding, mutual settled in a friendly manner. At that time the consideration of interests, mutual conces- question was, it seems to me, mainly about sions and mutual regard. I value this as much a border area of 90,000 square kilometers. as you do. Since socialist countries have a Nehru said that if it was a border discommon goal and ideology, we definitely agreement involving a few kilometers, one must solve all questions that come up be- could make mutual concessions, but that in tween us in the spirit of friendship. The bor- this case it was a matter of 90,000 square der question between our countries was kilometers, whose inhabitants are Indian settled on just such a basis. The goal of the citizens, who elect representatives to the peoples who are building socialism and Indian parliament. Therefore, he said, this communism is to eliminate once and for all question is not so simply solved. such problems as border drawing and the It seems to me that, in fact, it is not easy like that divide nations from each other. to reach an agreement involving such a large

But for the time being borders will re- area. A longer time is clearly necessary for main. I only say this, because I am taking this. As it turned out, the outbreak of the our final goal, Communism, as my point of border conflict and the armed clashes have, departure.

in essence, complicated the situation. Now, ZHOU ENLAI: There is a Chinese say- obviously, an even bigger area is involved ing that says that in the end the world will than before. be an unitary whole, that there will be no We think that the Chinese government's exploitation of man by man. But before we unilateral ceasefire is a reasonable step, join in one whole, we must establish the taken after full consideration of the circumborders and provide for our affairs and pros- stances. We hold the view that you are undertaking flexible measures towards settle- occurred, because there are no other woods those from Inner Mongolia (Zedenbal asment of the Indian-Chinese border conflict nearby. But it can be solved on the basis of sured Zhou that these are needed for linin a peaceful manner by negotiations. friendly, mutual understanding.

guistic, not nationalistic reasons); resettleIn general, life confirms daily the need Since the founding of the PRC it has be- ment of Mongolians in China; Sinofor flexible policies to solve international come a good tradition that during tempo- Mongolia trade relationstrans.) problems. We do not doubt that the Chinese- rary difficulties caused by drought and dry ZHOU ENLAI: With regard to China's Indian border conflict can be settled peace- wind, the administrations of individual dis- economic help to Mongolia, we can discuss fully.

tricts of our countries, in friendly contacts, this tomorrow afternoon, since we have too By “speculating" on the Chinese-Indian have permitted the reciprocal use of pasture little time today to negotiate concrete matborder conflict, the reactionary forces in land. We hope that it will also be possible ters, such as workers, construction, trade and India have strengthened their activity and in the future, in case of difficulties, to con- railway freight traffic. their offensive against the country's (India's] tinue this excellent tradition.

I do not understand the word “regretCommunist Party and democratic forces. I suppose that our Comrade “Land

table”, that you used regarding the ChineseWe are convinced that the measures that owner” (“Gutsbesitzer”] Shagwaral, who is Indian border conflict. If this refers to Inyour government has taken towards a responsible for agricultural questions would dia, it is correct. If you said it in reference ceasefire on the Indian-Chinese border, to- be very interested in this.

to China, in order to make us out to be the ward the withdrawal of border troops and We thank you for the help that you have guilty (party), then that is false. On this questowards the future settlement of this prob- provided in difficult times to the cattle- tion there are differences of opinion among lem by negotiation will generate positive breeders in our Aimaks and Somons, espe- the fraternal parties. results. We are of the opinion that this would cially in winter and spring. We also express We have undertaken considerable work be, on the one hand a blow against reaction- further our satisfaction that the border ques- to inform and provide explanations to the ary forces in India itself, and on the other tion between our countries will soon be appropriate states and countries. The Indian hand a blow against the forces of imperial- settled.

side put us in an intolerable position. We ism, with the USA at its head. We assume I would like to make use of this meeting, were forced to take measures. India began a that such measures will strengthen India's Comrade Premier, to broach two aspects (of new invasion and set off a conflict. We reneutral stance and will prevent India from Sino-Mongolian relations).

buffed them, since it was such a serious situabandoning this position. This will advance We were and are grateful that for the con- ation. We have taken measures to defuse the the battle for peace in the whole world. The struction of our country the PRC has pro- situation. We have ceased fire and pulled American imperialists are making efforts to vided us with financial and economic help out troops back. These are unilateral steps. derive advantages from this conflict. The as well as qualified workers. The appropri- There is no guarantee that this problem is peaceful settlement would undoubtedly be ate authorities in our countries are already definitively solved. The cause is the aggresa serious [line illegible—trans.) for imperi- negotiating regarding the building of objects sive policies of the ruling circles of the Inalism.

agreed upon earlier by our governments. I dian government. The Nehru government is After the signing of the border agreement suppose that these negotiations will con- wavering and turning away from neutrality. between our countries, we will begin the tinue.

India did indeed declare non-alignment to demarcation of the borderline. As is well I would like to pose the following two aggressive blocs, but became ever more known, during the negotiations our delega- questions to you: First, has railway freight dependent on American dollars. India retion raised the question of the village of traffic gone down considerably in the last ceived 640 million dollars from America for Hurimt in the Balgan-Ulgiisk district in years? Maybe that is also an effect of your military purposes. Nehru's government is western Mongolia. Our inhabitants have drought. We hope that railway freight traf- turning away from the policy of peace. We erected several buildings there and begun fic will go up in the future. The full use of must understand imperialism's threat and lumbering. Your delegation, however, re- the railway that will be built as a conse- danger. In India itself, the domestic forces plied that this place cannot be recognized quence of a three-sided agreement between of reaction are becoming ever more active. as Mongolia, because this would meet with us and the Soviet comrades is economically India is turning away from the policy of difficulties. At the same time, your delega- advantageous for our country, Comrade Pre- peace. Our country, however, ceased fire and tion answered that the inhabitants on both mier. We are convinced that you will take took the initiative towards negotiations. The sides have come to an agreement and can this factor into consideration.

Indian government has not yet expressed find a reasonable solution [to the problem Secondly, one of the forms of help that itself regarding our proposals and the meaof) the use of the forest's riches. Therefore, you provide to us is the provision of work- sures we took. Under these circumstances, I do not want to insist that Hurimt should ers from appropriate professions. This la- I ask you to understand Indian-Chinese renecessarily belong inside Mongolian bor- bor is a great help in the building up of our lations correctly. ders. Of course, I think that this question country. Recently, it has nevertheless hap- The MPR, as is known, has entered the must be decided by taking both sides inter- pened that a few less conscientious and in- United Nations. Therefore, the circumests into consideration. We are grateful that experienced people put down their work. I stances must be understandable for you. you have declared yourselves ready to make think you know about this.

India's representative in the UN is followpossible our use of our buildings as well as (segment of conversation not printed re- ing the policy of the Western countries. Inthe forests in this district. This problem garding Chinese guest workers, particularly dia supports the Western powers’ policy on the Hungarian, Korean, and Chinese ques- the conflict and its connections to interna- the head of a Communist. tions as well as on disarmament. In this way, tional problems and in consideration of all The kindling of conflict and noise over India is getting ever further onto the side of the complicated factors, correspond to the some 5-10 kilometers of land will, in the the reactionary imperialists.

interests of the peoples of the socialist camp end, result in the strengthening of the doYou, Comrade Zedenbal, will probably and all progressive mankind.

mestic reactionary forces in India and the agree with some of what I'm saying and dis- ZHOU ENLAI: The hitch is that the fanning of nationalistic passions. This would agree with part. I am not forcing my opin- Nehru government represents the effect the Communists negatively and be ion on you. Further development will show Grossbourgeoisie and is two-faced. It is cor- disadvantageous for Socialism. who is right. Our policy is a peace-loving rect that in the fight for peace one must also You Chinese Communists are much more foreign policy that is guided by the prin- exploit the bourgeoisie. Nehru is however a experienced than us, and tempered in revociples of Marxism-Leninism.

representative of the Grossbourgeoisie. The lutionary battle. I am only saying what I J. ZEDENBAL: Our main task is the reactionary tendency has the upper hand in think about this question and how I undersigning of the Mongolian-Chinese border the Nehru government's policies. We must stand it. agreement. This work is on the verge of a lead a decisive struggle against him, we must ZHOU ENLAI: (Becoming nervous, successful conclusion.

unmask his treacherous machinations. In his with altered facial expression) Clearly, the Soviet Union, the PRC and pro-American policy, there is no difference If you are interested in the Indian-Chithe other countries of the socialist camp play between Nehru and Desai. Resumption of nese border question, please examine again a major role in keeping peace in the whole negotiations to strengthen peace will be use- the literature that we have provided for the world. The socialist countries have taken ful. But the Communists see this question Asian and African countries. Our governon the goal to contribute to the fight for differently from other men. The Commu- ment is not fighting with India because of a peace, each according to his strength. Natu- nist Party of England has differences of few dozen kilometers of area. We have made rally the socialist countries are interested in opinion with us on other matters, but on the absolutely no territorial claims, only the Inthe peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chi- Indian-Chinese border question, we are of dian side has. One must understand this cornese border conflict. It is my understanding the same opinion. It would be good, if in rectly. The essence of the matter is that the that our discussion takes this standpoint, as the future you kept this in mind.

Indian side is trying to annex an even larger a point of departure. We and you both know J. ZEDENBAL: I understand that the area on the Western sector of the border. that Nehru is not a Communist, but a bour- Chinese side does not unconditionally in- How quickly India treads the path of socialgeois politician. But we and you both un- sist on immediately incorporating a 90,000 ism depends, above all, on the revolutionderstand how important it is, in the inter- square kilometer area on the eastern border, ary struggle of the Indian Communist Party ests of the whole socialist camp, to exploit that this question will be decided in the fu- and the Indian people. It is important to exthe positive sides of individual bourgeois ture. Is that true or not?

pose to the world public the evil machinapoliticians. We know that your party in its ZHOU ENLAI: I already went to In- tions and dangers, that the reactionary forces long history has garnered much experience dia with Comrade (Foreign Minister] Chen of India represent. If we do not expose their in the exploitation of the deeds of individu- Yi in 1960 in order to settle the Chinese- reactionary activity, they will go over to the als, who are on the enemy's side.

Indian border question, but we returned with American side, and that is even more disadThe exploitation of India's policy of neuempty hands.

vantageous. trality is very important for the socialist J. ZEDENBAL: The Chinese-Indian J. ZEDENBAL: The main thing is not camp. We assume that this is what the five border question must not be solved only in to play into the hands of American imperiprinciples of co-existence that you, Com- the interests of China, but also in accordance alism. rade Premier Zhou Enlai, together with with the interests of the whole international Nehru, proclaimed. It will be very disadvan- communist movement. Given this, I person- It was agreed to continue the conversation tageous for our camp, if in place of Nehru, ally think that it would be somewhat better, the next day. a man such as [Moraji] Desai comes to if you didn't bring up the matter of the 29 December 1962 power. Then there will be a danger that In- 90,000 square kilometers on the eastern secdia will join an aggressive bloc. In general, tor of the border, but, on the contrary, sup- (Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und we attach the greatest meaning to the pres- port the development of class struggle Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen ervation and exploitation of India's neutral- within India in favor of socialism and com- DDR im Bundesarchiv," Berlin, JIV 2/202ity. I think you will probably agree with this. munism, so that it can contribute to the 283, B1.0; obtained by D. Wolff; translaThe Chinese-Indian border conflict is now strengthening of the Communist Party and tion by Wolff, 0. Corff, and C. Ostermann, on all lips, since in contemporary interna- the democratic forces whereby you would with the assistance of J. Hershberg. ) tional relations every event, even if of local help to accelerate India's transition to comcharacter, becomes widely known.

munism. There can be no doubt that the We think that the ceasefire, the pulling border question will be resolved in the fu

VISIT CWIHP'S SITE back of troops and the readiness for a nego- ture. I repudiate the thought of your intend- ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB AT: tiated settlement of the border conflict ing to weaken or undermine in any way the through negotiations, a readiness that you forces of the Communist Party of India. It http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/cwihp decided on after appropriate evaluation of would be absurd, if such an idea came into

New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives

by James G. Hershberg The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 continues to exert an intense fascination on historians, political scientists, journalists, and the general public, and—as apparently the world's closest brush to thermonuclear war—is likely to continue to do so. Over the past decade, the study of this crisis has expanded to encompass a major influx of new sources and perspectives, primarily stemming from the declassification of new U.S. (and British) documents, but also the addition of Soviet and then Cuban archival materials and perspectives—a process expedited by international scholarly projects as well as the anti-communist upheavals that led to the (partial) opening of Russian archives. 1

The Cold War International History Project Bulletin has previously reported on various new findings regarding the crisis—known to Russians as the “Caribbean Crisis” and Cubans as the “October Crisis”——particularly in issue no. 5 (Spring 1995), which featured an extensive compilation of translated documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow.2

In this issue, the Bulletin presents more translated materials from that repository—the Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF)—documenting various aspects of Soviet policy during the events of the fall of 1962. Most were declassified by Soviet Russian authorities in 1991-1992 and provided to NHK Japanese television in connection with a documentary on the Cuban Missile Crisis aired to mark the 30th anniversary of the event in October 1992; Prof. Philip Brenner (American University), one of the consultants to the show, in turn, subsequently gave copies of the documents to CWIHP and the National Security Archive—a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University—where they are now deposited and available for research. That collection also contains photocopies of some of the same documents that were separately obtained from AVPRF by Raymond L. Garthoff (Brookings Institution) with the Archive's assistance.

The translations into English came primarily from two sources. Many of the AVPRF documents obtained by NHK were translated by Vladimir Zaemsky of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who granted permission for their use here. For most of the rest of the documents, the Bulletin is grateful to Philip Zelikow, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, and Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs, for commissioning translations from John Henriksen of Harvard. (Prof. Zelikow, the co-author, with Condoleezza Rice, of Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Harvard University Press, 1995), is currently involved with two Cuban Missile Crisis-related publication projects, a revision of Graham Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, originally published in 1970, and, with Prof. Ernest R. May of Harvard, an edited compilation of transcripts of declassified tape recordings of “Excomm” meetings involving President John F. Kennedy and senior advisors during the crisis, which were recently released by the Kennedy Library in Boston.) In addition, Vladislav M. Zubok, a Russian scholar based at the National Security Archive, translated the records of the two conversations of Soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan (with U Thant and John McCloy) in New York on 1 November 1962, and CWIHP Director David Wolff translated a conversation between Mikoyan and Robert Kennedy.

The translations themselves are broken into three sections: 1) before the crisis, 14 September-21 October 1962 (although for Kennedy and his advisors the crisis began on October 16, when the president was informed that a U.S. U-2 spy plane had photographed evidence of Soviet missile sites under construction in Cuba, for the Soviets the crisis only started on October 22, when Kennedy announced the discovery and the American blockade of Cuba in a televised address); 2) the crisis itself, 22-28 October 1962 (from Kennedy's speech to Moscow's announcement of its agreement to withdraw the missiles under United Nations supervision in exchange for Washington's lifting of the blockade, its pledge not to attack Cuba, and its private assurance that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would shortly also be removed); and 3) the aftermath, 28 October-10 December 1962 (which included a period of wrangling between Washington and Moscow—and between Moscow and Havana-over the crisis' settlement, especially over the terms of U.N. inspection of the missile removal and the inclusion of Soviet IL-28 bombers in the weapons to be pulled out, which was not finally nailed down, permitting the blockade to be lifted, until November 20).

For the most part, unfortunately, these materials shed little light on the actual process of decision-making at the highest levels of the Kremlin, and minutes or notes of the discussions among Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and his associates during the crisis have still not emerged. 3 The Russian Foreign Ministry documents did include top-level correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy, and between Khrushchev and Castro, but these have already been published elsewhere4 and are omitted from the selection below, as are other documents containing material already available to researchers, such as translations of press reports, correspondence between Khrushchev and U.N. Secretary U Thant (and between Khrushchev and British philosopher Bertrand Russell), and cables to Soviet diplomats circulating or reiterating public Soviet positions.

Nevertheless, the Russian archival materials presented here make fascinating reading for anyone interested in the missile crisis, in Soviet or Cuban foreign policy, in crisis politics or diplomacy generally, in some of the leading characters involved in the drama (such as Robert Kennedy, Fidel Castro, Mikoyan, and U Thant), or in reassessing the accuracy and efficacy of American policy and perceptions during perhaps the Cold War's most perilous passages. For the most part, they consist of Soviet cables from three diplomatic venues (with occasional instructions from the center,” or Moscow):

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