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violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba. The Americans should take into account that such actions affect the national feelings of the Cuban people, which can only complicate the settlement of the difficult issues before us. The Americans would have acted reasonably if they had already ceased this sort of flight, as they should have done given that the condition expressed in the above-mentioned statements stipulating the dismantling of missile installations has been fulfilled, and given that the dismantled materials are being brought together for loading onto ships.

In conclusion, tell McCloy that we expect the Americans to lift the quarantine immediately and completely.

AG

(Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.)

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the CSA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign

Ministry, 1 November 1962

be unleashed.

It is necessary that you and Comrade The second course of action is to get Pavlov (Pliyev] to be guided by this inforfrom the UN some information on the dis- mation. Similar instructions to Comrade mantling of the bases. The government of Pavlov are being given though the Ministry the USA could then be satisfied with this as of Defense. a prerequisite for lifting the quarantine. Confirm reception of this telegram. Robert Kennedy emphasized that he was not yet prepared to talk about the details of this

A.G. whole affair, since the President did not yet have any information on the results of U (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, Thant's trip. Within an hour, said Robert provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Kennedy, a government meeting would take Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; transplace in which this issue would be exam- lation by John Henriksen.) ined. He promised in the event of an emergency to get in touch with me directly, or, if Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister this occurs during my trip to New York to A. A. Gromyko to the Soviet Mission in meet with (CPSU CC Politburo member] New York, 1 November 1962 A.I. Mikoyan, through Stevenson and Kuznetsov.

To the SOVIET MISSION— COMRADES Robert Kennedy emphasized that the KUZNETSOV, ZORIN point was not that they do not trust our information on this account, but rather the First. Judging by your reports (several question of how to present this whole affair words deleted-ed.), the USA and several to the public opinion of the USA in connec- other states belonging to the Security Countion with the earlier statements offered by cil may try to complicate the negotiations the President. It was felt that he had been underway now in New York among the repsomewhat worried by how Fidel Castro resentatives of the USSR, Cuba, and the might hinder the carrying out of the agree- USA, by submitting all the issues being disment that had been reached.

cussed in the course of the negotiations to

the consideration of the Security Council. 1.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN This is visible in the proposal by the Irish

delegate, Boland, that the Security Council (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, hear U Thant's report and pass a resolution provided to CWIHP, and on file at National for delegating to U Thant the task of creatSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- ing a special UN mechanism for monitorlation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- ing the dismantling of the special installasity.)

tions in Cuba. Besides this, his proposal also

stipulates that the other issues of the “CuTelegram from USSR Foreign Minister ban settlement” may also be discussed in A. Gromyko to Soviet Ambassador in the Security Council, although the decision Havana, with a copy sent to Kuznetsov on it may be postponed somewhat. All this in New York, 1 November 1962 means that the USA, along with other coun

tries that support its policy, wants to take 1 November 1962 all these issues into its own hands in order

to drag out the resolution of the issues conThe date for the removal of the dis- cerning the security guarantees for Cuba, as mantled special materials from Cuba has well as the securing, by way of agreements, been set for 7 or 8 November, but not later of the USA duties that have emerged from than 10 November. This has become pos- the exchange of messages between Comrade sible as a result of the fact that the necessity N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. of observing strict secrecy in the transfer of You should firmly object to such an the special materials has fallen away. For attempt to replace the trilateral negotiations, the removal of these materials it is now pos- in which U Thant is participating, with a sible and advisable to use our usual ships submission of all the issues to the considerlocated in Cuban ports or arriving there tion of the Security Council, in which it the coming days, and there is no need to hide would be impossible, given its present comsuch materials in the ship holds.

position, to reach resolutions that are advan

[first page of two-page document is missing from copy obtained by CWIHP—ed.]

[...Dobrynin) expressed the hope, in accordance with the letter sent by N.S. Khrushchev, that the USA would renounce the quarantine without waiting for the introduction of a supplementary procedure for inspecting ships, and so on.

Robert Kennedy has said that this issue does not represent any difficulties. The important thing for us now (he implied that he was talking about public opinion, rather than the thoughts of the President himself), is to have some confirmation, from the UN for example, that the Soviet bases are being dismantled, and that the corresponding missile weaponry is being removed.

We and the USA government have essentially two possible courses of actions in this matter: first, to carry out reconnaissance flights over Cuba. But this entails the danger that the Cubans (he emphasized the Cubans, and not the Russians) may shoot down an American plane, sible new and highly undesirable chain reaction of events in the Cuban affair would

thus a pos

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tageous for us. Make a statement about this duration, for example, of a year, is not apin categorical form to U Thant, Stevenson, propriate.

(Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, as well as to the UN delegates of the other 4. On UN posts. In connection with the provided to CWIHP, and on file at National nations that will deal with this issue along issue you proposed of monitoring certain Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; transwith you. Insist on the necessity of prolong- regions of the USA and several Latin Ameri- lation by John Henriksen.) ing the trilateral negoatiations with U can countries with the goal of determining Thant's participation, and on their speedy whether preparations for the invasion of Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister completion by securing the results of the Cuba are underway, follow the instructions Gromyko to Soviet Mission in New negotiations in a corresponding written in which we expressed our positive view of

York, for A. I. Mikoyan, agreement (a protocol statement). U Thant's proposal concerning the “UN

1 November 1962 Second. l. On the monitoring of the presence” in these countries and in Cuba. dismantling and the removal of the special You may approve the proposal that the

1 November 1962 installations. Concerning the issue of moni- composition of the UN posts for carrying toring the performance of work towards dis- out the indicated functions be similar to the Comrade N.S. Khrushchev has enmantling the special installations in Cuba, composition of the groups of agents for trusted me with the task of relaying the folyou should operate on the assumption that monitoring the dismantling and removal of lowing to you: the dismantling process will be completed special missile materials from the territory 1. We have specified here that our inby 2 November, and that the dismantled of Cuba.

stallations now being dismantled can be materials will be removed from Cuba by 7 5. On American bases in Turkey. We shipped out of Cuba by 7 or 8 or at the lator 8 November, or at the very latest 10 No- agree with your opinion. You should not in est 10 November. This must be your point vember, if our ships arrive without hindrance any circumstance touch on this issue in your of departure in your talks with U Thant, in Cuban ports.

negotiations with U Thant and the USA rep- McCloy, and our Cuban friends. Of course 2. On the composition of the group of resentatives in New York, since it is the sub- this is only on the condition that our ships Security Council agents. Proceed on the as- ject of direct negotiations between Moscow will be granted safe passage into Cuban sumption that for us it is acceptable that the and Washington. On this point we are keep

ports. group monitoring the fulfillment of duties ing you informed only for your personal 2. In the talks with Fidel Castro, deto dismantle and remove the special missile edification.

pending on how these talks unfold, you installations from Cuba contain representa- 6. On the concept of “offensive weap- should make use of the following points in tives from the neutral states proposed by U onry." We consider it inexpedient to change your argumentation: Thant (Sweden, Ethiopia, the United Arab the formula that was used in Comrade N.S. Emphasize that it is the necessity of a Republic, Mexico, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Swit- Khrushchev's messages and in the protocol speedy lifting of the so-called quarantine zerland). Also you may not object to the draft communicated by you, namely: "weap- that, in our opinion, our Cuban friends are proposal that this group consist of eight rep- onry which the USA government has called most interested in. They know better than resentatives of the neutral nations belong- offensive."

anyone else whether Cuba needs the shiping to the Disarmament Committee (India, Your proposal to call this weaponry ments of goods presently on Soviet ships Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, “means for launching nuclear arms at an on the open sea. These cargoes cannot reEthiopia, Mexico, Brazil, Sweden), if such operational distance greater than (so many)

the

open sea for long. Among them a proposal is introduced. There are also no kilometers" could allow the discussion of are perishable cargoes. Moreover, it must objections to including in the group the rep- this issue to acquire an undesirable charac- be taken into account that there is also an resentatives of Indonesia, Ceylon, the ter for us, since the Americans will natu- economic aspect to this issue: we are sufUnited Arab Republic, and Ghana, as you rally be trying to broaden the scope of the fering great expenses because the vessels are propose. weaponry prohibited from installations in

being detained on their courses, A further We consider unacceptable the Ameri- Cuba.

detainment will only increase these financans' proposal for the creation of monitor- Third. Concerning all the main issues cial losses. Cuba is not concealing these ing groups composed of the USA, the

relevant to the duties of the parties, the losses from us. Of course it may be that Cuba USSR, and Cuba.

USA, the USSR, and Cuba-- and the se- is ready to bear the burden of these doubled 3. On the monitoring of vessels bound curing of their corresponding pledges, fol- expenses, in which case it is a different story. for Cuba, after the lifting of the blockade. low the text of the protocol statement and We see that you and we have different apYou should proceed from the fact that we the instructions contained in our memo- proaches to how this issue must be resolved. have given our consent to the monitoring of randa. Bear in mind, however, that as we If our Cuban friends are for some reaSoviet vessels bound for Cuba by the Inter- have already informed you, you will be car- son not willing to facilitate the resolution national Red Cross. It is envisaged that this rying out these instructions, as well as the of this issue, we will be placed in a situamonitoring will be carried out until the end instructions contained in the “second” point tion in which we will have to recall the ships. of the so-called “quarantine.” From this it of the present telegram, only on receiving For at present we are suffering unjustified follows that the monitoring will be short- reports from us that our Cuban friends have

expenses. term. Your proposal that the system for agreed to these proposals.

It is impossible not to take into account monitoring the vessels be operative for the

A.G. the damages being inflicted on our prestige

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because of the present situation in which our U Thant took a good initiative with the aim the exchange of letters between him and vessels remain immobilized on the open sea. of resolving the Cuban crisis and that in this Fidel Castro. In his first appeal to Castro, U This cannot continue endlessly.

regard we are ackowledging his large con- Thant called on him to cooperate with the We believe that the missiles have tribution. This raises the authority of U UN in the name of securing peace. In his achieved their effect, and achieved it well. Thant himself as well as of the United Na- reply, Castro invited U Thant to visit Cuba You say that you do not believe the Ameri- tions that could express itself in such a dan- personally in his capacity of acting UN Seccans. We too do not believe them. But we gerous situation.

retary General and to discuss with him the are operating on the assumption that the He remarked then that although the issues concerning the attitude of the govsocialist states should take the necessary immediate danger of war has ebbed, never- ernment of Cuba on the question under consteps to ensure their security, and to coexist theless there are political and diplomatic sideration of the Security Council. with the USA. It is possible that I am sim- difficulties and they should be resolved ac- U Thant accepted this invitation and ply repeating here what I was saying to you cording to the ideas and proposals advanced visited Cuba, staying there on 30 and 31 before your trip, but I think that these con- in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev (and] October. He held two meetings with Prime cerns should be borne in mind when you Kennedy and in the declaration of Castro. Minister Castro, when the Cuban issue was are presenting our case to Castro. This does He stressed that for its part the Soviet Union discussed. In Havana he met some diplonot mean, of course, that they should be was ready to continue its efforts to achieve mats accredited by the government of expressed literally and explicitly. But you final resolution of the Cuban issue. He re- Castro. The most useful conversations were must make him clearly understand that we marked that the acting Secretary General ones with the Ambassadors of Brazil, Yuare worried by the unreasonable position that could exercise a certain influence, using his goslavia, the UAR (United Arab Republic), our Cuban comrades have been forced to authority, in the process of ultimate settle- and the USSR. take. ment of the conflict.

One of the issues on U Thant's agenda He informed that he was heading for during the trip was to clarify the reaction of 1.XI.62 A. GROMYKO Cuba to meet with the Cuban friends, and the Cuban government concerning the

decided to stop in New York in order to see agreement of the Soviet Union to allow U.N. (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, U Thant and hear his considerations with observers to check on the fulfillment of the provided to CWIHP, and on file at National regard to his recent trip to Cuba.

commitment to dismantle Soviet missile Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- U Thant welcomed com. Mikoyan. He launchers in Cuba and to return them to the lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer- reminded him of their meetings in Yalta in USSR. sity)

November 1955 when U Thant accompa- Castro said in categorical form that

nied [Burmese leader] U Nu, and then in Cuba is a sovereign and independent state Cable of V.V. Kuznetsov on 1 November Burma. U Thant recalled with warmth his and it would not allow any external organi1962 Conversation between CPSU CC meetings with N.S. Khrushchev in 1955 in zation - be it the UN or anything else - to

Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and Yalta as well as during the trip of N.S. interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba. ImActing UN Secretary General U Thant, Khrushchev to Burma, and also in the position of inspection on the part of the UN 2 November 1962

United Nations in 1960 and again this year would be considered by the Cuban people

in the Soviet Union. U Thant expressed his as an infringement on its sovereign rights Ciphered telegram

sincere gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev for his and would be considered as a humiliation Top Secret encouraging words passed to him in his let- of the people of Cuba. Such a step cannot No copying is allowed ters to U Thant and also through our repre- be accepted by the Cuban government. If Copy no. 1 sentatives in the UN. He values highly and the USSR wants to meet the announced

rejoices at the assessment that the Soviet goals of sending the groups of inspectors, 2 November 1962 Union gives to his efforts in the resolution then Castro believes that such inspections of the Cuban issue.

might be carried out outside of the territoCC CPSU

U Thant stressed that the position of rial waters of Cuba.

the Soviet government and its head N.S. Castro informed U Thant that on ThursTransmitting the record of conversa- Khrushchev in the Cuban crisis was grate- day, 1 November, he was going to speak on tion of com. A.I. Mikoyan

fully received by the vast majority of the radio and television with a speech where he The conversation took place with U peoples of all the world and met with grati- intends to mention this issue. U Thant reThant on 1 November 1962 in the U.N. mis- tude by the whole mankind. He remarked portedly advised Castro to postpone this sion (of the USSR - trans.).

that the people now see much more clearly speech, since it is very delicate and would At the start com. Mikoyan passed to U the sincere desire of the Soviet Union to be assessed as a declaration of policy with Thant regard from com. N.S. Khrushchev have the UN as an efficacious instrument all consequences that flow out of it. Castro as well as on his own behalf. He told U Thant for maintaining peace and for preventing responded to U Thant that he had already that N.S. Khrushchev recalls with warmth war.

put off making of this speech with regard to the conversations that he had with the act- After that U Thant turned to his trip to (U Thant's) visit in Cuba. If the speech were ing Secretary General. Personally N.S. Cuba and said the following.

delayed one more time, then people would Khrushchev and his colleagues believe that The trip was taken in connection with not understand it. Therefore Castro could not

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once again postpone his speech.

although he received with understanding the voluntary suspension of the quarantine on The U Thant asked Castro not to men- viewpoint of the Prime Minister of Cuba. the part of the USA. tion in his speech the position of the gov- Then in the conversations U Thant and U Thant informed Castro about the ernment of Cuba regarding the [issue of] UN Castro touched on the issue about “the UN acceptance on the part of the Soviet Union inspection, to which he gladly agreed, say- presence” in the region of the Caribbean sea of such a voluntary commitment, and also ing that he would remove this paragraph during the period of the crisis.

that the USA would have also agreed to susfrom the text he had already prepared.

U Thant told Castro that in the inter- pend the quarantine for 2-3 weeks, on the U Thant asked com. Mikoyan, having ests of the government of Cuba and the Cu- condition that there would be a mechanism in mind the confidential character of his ban people themselves it would be useful to for checking if Soviet ships heading for conversations with Castro, not to raise this have in Havana UN representatives, and, if Cuba were not carrying arms. issue on his own initiative.

Castro agrees, he was ready to leave 2 to 3 U Thant informed Castro also that the As Castro pointed out, in his speech of his officials to establish contacts and to Soviet Union had agreed that the Red Cross he planned to lay out the entire foreign follow-up on their dialogue.

should deal with inspection of vessels outpolicy of Cuba and in particularly to em- Castro responded that had the govern- side of the boundaries of the territorial waphasize the five points on the settlement of ment of Cuba agreed at the present moment ters of Cuba. He said that for the Red Cross the Cuban crisis he had advanced on 28 to the presence of UN representatives in it would have been more convenient to inOctober. To this U Thant responded that in Cuba, it could have been interpreted by spect ships in the ports of arrival, and not in view of the deliberations on the Cuban is- people as consent to the presence of inspect- the open sea, if, of course, the government sue in the Security Council and his own ing groups of the United Nations. While of Cuba agreed to that. speech he could not do it. The Security saying so, he referred to American radio Castro said to this, that his government Council did not authorize him to discuss broadcasts which affirm on an hourly basis would not allow groups of the Red Cross to with the sides issues of permanent or long- that the U Thant mission had exactly the inspect Soviet ships on Cuban territory, but term character of settlement of the conflict inspection goals in mind. Under such terms if the USSR agreed to the inspection, then in the Caribbean sea.

people might have misperceived such a step. the UN should start organizing this business To this Castro responded that a tempo- Castro asked U Thant not to insist on this on the open sea. rary resolution of immediate problems did proposal.

Responding to the question of U Thant not resolve the Cuban issue as a whole. The He then declared that, if the Security about a possible time of convocation of a resolution of these immediate questions, in Council accepted some kind of formula to next session of the Security Council on the the opinion of the government of Cuba, had resolve the Cuban issue on a permanent ba- Cuban issue, Castro said that he would have to be linked to resolution of the longer-term sis, then he, Castro, would be glad to have preferred that the Council convene no problems. The Security Council had to dis- some kind of UN presence on the recipro- sooner than next Wednesday, i.e. after the cuss also and resolve the issue about a last- cal basis. However, this cannot be done in elections in the United States. ing peace in the area of the Caribbean sea. the present phase.

Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant for If the Security Council were preoccupied In conversations with Castro, U Thant interesting and useful information, stresswith resolution of only immediate problems, raised the question about the return to the ing that this would facilitate his talks with then similar problems would emerge in the USA on humanitarian grounds of an Ameri- Prime Minister Fidel Castro. foreseeable future again, and they could cre- can pilot who, according to press publica- He observed that the Americans were ate a situation similar to the current one. tions, had vanished without a trace in the now trying to focus all attention on the disTherefore the government of Cuba is con- area of Cuba. Castro told him that the USA mantling and withdrawal of missile equipvinced that to ensure lasting and secure aircraft of the type U-2 had indeed violated ment, doing nothing on their part concernpeace in the whole world it is necessary that the aerial space over Cuba in violation of ing the guarantees of Cuba's security. the Security Council should preoccupy it- international legislation and the UN Char- Therefore Castro is right when he self with the issue of ensuring lasting peace ter. It was shot down by the Cubans, the pi- speaks about the need to solve the Cuban in the Caribbean region. In case the Secu- lot died, since he could not bail out. Castro issue on a permanent basis. Now it is imrity Council would be convened, Castro in- would have been ready to return the pilot, portant to move from general declarations tends to send to the UN Minister of Foreign and alive, but he is dead, therefore he is to concrete steps for cardinal solution of the Affairs Raul Roa so that he would present ready to return the body under auspices of entire issue on the basis of the letters of the viewpoint of his government on the en- the UN. (This information U Thant passed N.S. Khrushchev (and) Kennedy, and also tire Cuban issue. The delegation of Cuba to the Americans).

the just and constructive proposals of Fidel would address the Security Council with a Castro also said that any further viola- Castro. Naturally, the Americans will object request to find a lasting and final solution tion of the aerial borders of Cuba would be to some proposals of Castro, but his proto this issue. The government of Cuba is dealt with in a similar way.

posals face in the right direction. firmly convinced that such a solution can The next question that was discussed On the time of convening the Security be found only on the basis of 5 points ad- between U Thant and Castro was about a Council, com. Mikoyan remarked that we vanced on 28 October by Premier Castro. voluntary suspension by the Soviet Union understand the considerations of Fidel on

U Thant told Castro that at that point of its supplies of weapons for Cuba for a this score. We also would like to say that he was not competent to discuss this issue, period of 2 to 3 weeks and the simultaneous since general principles of complete liquidation of the conflict has been adopted and in the UN even before his trip to Cuba and perhaps 10-15 days will be required. He declared by the interested sides, and also by they seemed interested. Some Latin Ameri- promised to raise this issue in the forthcomthe UN, since the acting Secretary General can delegates not only were interested in this ing conversation with McCloy. is taking active part in this, then, in our opin- idea but also let U Thant understand that U Thant said that he addresses the ion, the Security Council should be con- such a measure would be desirable.

Americans every day with appeals to susvened at the moment when the current ne- The USA so far does not want to openly pend the blockade. And yesterday, having gotiations would approach the phase of an express its attitude towards this proposal of returned from Cuba, he did the same, makagreed-upon document finalizing this crisis. U Thant. Its reaction was reduced to the ar- ing the Americans aware that he was conUntil then convening of the Security Coun- gument that, well, since this arrangement vinced that the dismantling had begun and cil would hardly assist in this matter. concerns all the countries of Western hemi- was under way as it had been promised, and

Com. Mikoyan voiced the idea that sphere, this issue should be discussed in the that it would be finished by the announced after the end of talks of the sides, some kind Organization of American States.

date. of document might be passed for approval Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant about Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant for his to the Security Council and on its basis and his opinion regarding a possible form of the useful and exhaustive information. They in following up on it the Council might take document stating the reached agreement. agreed that for the press they will announce a decision on subsequent practical steps.

U Thant said that if the sides agree in about useful exchange of opinions and the Such a document might have the character general, then the goal will be reached friendly atmosphere of the conversation. of a protocol which would describe talks that through any such document in the form of At the end of the conversation U Thant would have taken place between the sides protocol, joint declaration, separate decla- said that if A.I. Mikoyan would come back with participation of U Thant on the basis ration of the sides, agreement and even in via New York, he (U Thant) would be glad of the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and the form of summing-up declaration of the to meet again and learn about the results of Kennedy, and also the declarations of Fidel chairman of the Security Council.

the trip. He would like that time to be a more Castro, and that would inform about the Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant also to generous host than now and to invite A.I. achieved agreement that, thereby, would express his personal considerations on the Mikoyan for lunch and breakfast. have been sealed by the Security Council. time of convocation of the Security Coun- The conversation was recorded by [Mikoyan) said to U Thant that we cil.

com. Zherebtsov V.N. learned with great interest about his initia- U Thant said that it should be done aftive concerning the practicality of having ter the elections in the USA, but everything 2.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV observers in Cuba, in the USA, and in other depends on the sides' agreement. If the sides countries neighboring Cuba for a duration come to agreement, the Council can be con- (Source: AVPRF; obtained by NHK, proof some period. He informed (U Thant) that vened at any time.

vided to CWIHP, copy on file at National N.S. Khrushchev was delighted to see this Then U Thant passed his wish to thank Security Archive; translation by Vladislav initiative of U Thant and considered it to be the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba for his genu- M. Zubok (National Security Archive). ] interesting and useful. It is good that Fidel ine and wholehearted cooperation during the Castro took it in a positive way. This pro- trip of U Thant. In particular, U Thant noted Telegram from Soviet envoy G. Zhukov posal contains in itself the principle of reci- that our Ambassador in Havana and the So- to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962 procity, and the USSR is ready to support viet officer informed him without delay such a proposal. It could be included into a about the time when dismantling of the mis

2 November 1962 draft protocol.

sile units began, about the time when work He asked U Thant if he had spoken to will be finished, and about the fact that ships Yesterday, on 1 November (before dinthe Americans on this subject and if so what are commissioned for withdrawal of these ner with A.I. Mikoyan), McCloy invited me was their attitude toward this idea.

units. In this regard U Thant asked as a mat- to his residence and said the following: U Thant said that in conversation with ter of personal interest about the time of ar- 1. The Americans express their gratiSoviet representatives he advanced several rival of ships to Cuba to pick up the men- tude for the fact that the American plane formulas for solution of the issue in its en- tioned materiel.

making aerial photos of Cuba today was not tirety, and the problem of guarantees in par- Com. Mikoyan confirmed what our subjected to gunfire. The photos are still ticular. At one of these meetings with com. Ambassador in Havana had told U Thant being developed, but the Americans hope Zorin he indeed proposed that, provided the about the time-frame of dismantling. Con- that they will confirm the correctness of the agreement of the sides, the presence of the cerning the time-frame of withdrawal he statement made by the Soviet general in UN in the Western hemisphere, in the said that those ships that are now in Cuba Cuba, to the effect that the missile dismanflashpoints, would be useful. Were it to will not suffice. However, with regard to the tling process has already been started. prove acceptable, then, in the opinion of U continuing quarantine Soviet ships cannot 2. McCloy offered a detailed account Thant, such a measure would have facili- sail to Cuba. Therefore it is necessary to lift of how U Thant had informed him of his tated a settlement of the situation in the Car- the quarantine, so that Soviet ships could talks with Castro (the account coincides with ibbean region on the permanent basis. enter Cuban ports, unload their cargoes and what U Thant told our delegation). He said

U Thant discussed this idea with heads load on them the dismantled units that he understood the difficulties arising of missions of Latin American [countries] (ustanovki). If one does it in speedily, then from Castro's refusal of ground-based in

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