tions, well knowing that such a demili- Propaganda Department.60

tarization of the conflict-albeit with a MPLA government in place-was what the Soviets had wanted all along. Havana knew how to placate the great power, although, as we will see below, they exacted their price for doing so.57

The second lesson the Soviets believed they had learnt from the Angolan adventure was that the Soviet Union can and must rebuild and reform local anticapitalist groups in crisis areas. The MPLA, local Soviet observers postulated in 1976, was saved from its own follies by advice and assistance from Moscow, which not only helped it win the war, but also laid the foundation for the building of a “vanguard party.” The Angolan movement had earlier been plagued by "careerists and fellow-travellers," but, due to Soviet guidance, the "internationalists" were in ascendance. These new leaders-men like Lopo do Nascimento and Nito Alves-understood that the MPLA was part of an international revolutionary movement led by Moscow and that they therefore both then and in the future depended on Soviet support.58

It was these "internationalists" who Moscow wanted to assist in building a new MPLA, patterned on the experience of the CPSU. Noting the poor state of the MPLA organization in many areas, the Soviet party-building experts suggested that this was the field in which do Nascimento, Alves, and others should concentrate their activities. By taking the lead in constructing the party organization they would also be the future leaders of the Marxist

Leninist party in Angola.59

The Soviets supplied very large amounts of political propaganda to be disseminated among MPLA supporters and used in the training of cadre. The ordinary embassy staff sometimes found the amounts a bit difficult to handle a plane-load of brochures with Brezhnev's speech at the 25th CPSU congress, two plane-loads of antiMaoist literature-but in general the embassy could put the materials to good use (or so they claimed in reports to Moscow). By summer 1976 they had run out of Lenin portraits, and had to request a new supply from the CPSU

The transformation of the MPLA turned out to be an infinitely more difficult task for the Soviets than the dissemination of Lenin busts. Neto's independence of mind and his claim to be a Marxist theoretician in his own right rankled the Russians and made it increasingly difficult for them to control the MPLA as soon as the military situation stabilized. Some of the Angolan leaders whom Moscow disliked, for instance FAPLA veteran commander and defense minister Iko Carreira and MPLA general secretary Lucio Lara, who was strongly influenced by the European left, strengthened their positions after the war was over. According to the embassy, the influence of such people delayed both the necessary changes in the MPLA and the finalization of the development plans on which the Soviets and Cubans were advising.61

Differences between the Soviet and Cuban perceptions of the political situation in the MPLA did not make things easier for Moscow. Part of the price which Castro exacted for his general deference to the Soviets on the Angolan issue was the right to argue for Angolan political solutions which were to his liking. Preeminent in Castro's political equation was the leadership of Agostinho Neto: whom he considered a brilliant man and a great African leader, as well as a personal friend. The Cubans therefore missed no opportunity to impress the Soviets with their view that the MPLA president was the only solution to Angola's leadership problems, well knowing of Moscow's suspicions of him. "We have the highest regard for President Neto," Raúl Castro told Soviet Vice-Minister of Defense I.F. Ponomarenko. "Cuba wants to strengthen Neto's authority," the head of the Cuban party's International Department, Raúl Valdés Vivó, told the Soviet chargé in May.62

The Cubans were, however, always clever at sweetening their tough position in support of Neto by underlining that the Soviet Union of course was Angola's primary international ally. "Relations with the Soviet Union will become a more important aspect of

Angolan foreign policy in the future," Raúl Castro told his Soviet colleagues. He instructed Risquet to “on all questions inform the USSR embassy in Angola and maintain close contact with the Soviet comrades." Castro also castigated some of the Angolan leaders whom the Soviet distrusted; Lucio Lara "displays a certain restraint on questions [of] broadening the collaboration with the socialist countries. He is reserved and not frank . . . . [and] has avoided us," Castro told Ponomarenko. 63

But even such measures could not always convince the Soviets of Cuban loyalty. Reporting on Neto's visit to Havana in July 1976, the Soviet embassy noted with disapproval that Fidel Castro had told the Angolans that Cuban troops would remain in Africa "as long as they are needed," and that Neto had asked for Cuba's assistance in building a Marxist-Leninist party. Even worse, Castro had spoken of Angola, Cuba, and Vietnam as "the main antiimperialist core" of the world. That the Cuban president had also mentioned the "central role" of the Soviet Union was not sufficient to please the Soviet observers, particularly since Castro coupled his statement with an endorsement of Neto's own "paramount role" in the MPLA.64

As Philip Windsor has observed about the Brezhnev Doctrine, the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies approximated the roles of a king and his vassals in medieval natural law. The Cubans and the Angolans could set their own agenda, so long as they subordinated themselves to the general purpose of Soviet foreign policy and used the proper code of address when reporting to Moscow's representatives. For Soviet cadre at the local level the real character of the MoscowHavana-Luanda relationship complicated their efforts at reforming the MPLA, as shown in excess by the spectacle of the May 1977 coup attempt against Neto, when Nito Alves—a Soviet favorite-found his bid to oust the president blocked by Cuban tanks.65

The belief of many Soviet leaders that they could control domestic political developments in Third World countries was a misperception with fateful

consequences for Soviet foreign policy in the late Brezhnev era. The Angolan intervention played an important part in upholding this misperception, as the reporting from Luanda shows. In hindsight, one of the main managers of Moscow's African and Asian policies in the late 1970s, Karen Brutents, has claimed that it was Angola which led to Ethiopia which led to Afghanistan, not in terms of the circumstances and structure of the interventions-which certainly varied-but in terms of the inflated pretensions of control over foreign left-wing movements which were stimulated by the Angolan affair. Brutents' point is a good one, although we should still be careful in generalizing about the direction of Soviet foreign policy during that period until we have more documentation on the discussions of the Politburo and General Staff.66

On the other hand, as I have argued elsewhere, what Morton Kaplan terms the "loose bipolar structure" of the Cold War international system often gave Third World revolutionary parties a chance to enter into alliances with one of the great powers, a chance which they may not have been offered in a more complex global constellation of states. As the aspiring, anti-systemic power, the Soviet Union was particularly likely to be the candidate for such alliances from a Third World perspective. The leaders of some African movements, including the MPLA, knew of these possibilities and sometimes knew how to exploit them. In addition to its social and economic message, this potential for a powerful ally was one of the assets of African communism during the 1970s, an asset which increased in importance as their revolutions highlighted the idea of a socialist victory in the Third World in Soviet foreign policy ideology.67

There is enough evidence in the materials on Angola, and elsewhere, to indicate that the Soviet leadership was very much aware of the strategic opportunities which the post-Vietnam anti-interventionist mood in the United States afforded Moscow for activism in regional conflicts. It is likely that the Politburo would have been much less inclined to interventions like the one in

Angola if they had been convinced that Washington would respond in force. The conventional realist approach to interventions provides adequate explanation for this side of Soviet interventionism: the Brezhnev leadership saw an opportunity for unchecked expansion and made use of it.68

On local factors, which were crucial in the case of Angola, some scholars have argued that great power interventions are grounded not so much in misperceptions-the "slippery slope" theory of growing commitment—as in what Charles Kupchan calls the "reputational and intrinsic interest," of the intervening power.69 This is an attempt to rescue the case for an interestdriven decision-making process in cases where there is a significant discrepancy between the prior expectations of an intervening power and the outcome of its action-an argument which of course can only be tested through the evidence.

In the case presented here, would a clearer perception of the conditions. inside the MPLA—and of Soviet inability to change these conditions-have prevented an intervention? Possibly, not least since much of Moscow's historical experience pointed away from such an adventure. Soviet diplomacy was at most times very cautious outside its own core area, preferring mutually advantageous links with established regimes rather than with revolutionary movements. Up to the Angolan intervention, the Soviet Union never gave decisive support to a revolutionary movement outside its neighboring countries. One can indeed argue that the United States has supported more successful revolutionary movements, even since the mid1970s, for instance in Nicaragua and in Afghanistan. 70

What prevented a "clear view" of the obstacles to long-term successful intervention was primarily Soviet foreign policy ideology. Its mix of Russian exceptionalism, Marxist-Leninist theory, and the Soviet experience of economic and political development, created a fertile ground for believing that difficulties associated with the character of the movements and societies targeted for intervention could be over

come, in spite of much contrary information. In the case of Angola, this belief contributed significantly to the intervention and sustained the decision to commit additional men, money, and material to the country in subsequent years. It even led Moscow's local representatives to sum up Angola as a success, thereby over time encouraging further Soviet "limited interventions" in Africa and Asia, culminating in the Afghanistan disaster.71

We need much more evidence from Russian and foreign sources in order to generalize about the nature of Soviet Cold War involvement in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. From what we see so far, the two faces of Soviet association with Third World radicals—revolutionary patronage and distrustful caution-correspond closely with two faces of Russian culture and history. One is the elite tradition which has sought to bring Russia into a Europeanized society of states. The other is the tradition of defiance of the West, a radical and, in European terms, sectarian approach to Russia's international role. Both are visible during the last phase of the Soviet experiment: CPSU officials seem to have felt as uncomfortable at meetings in the White House as when visiting PLO training camps in Syria. Both for historians and political scientists, the opening of Russian archives offers opportunities to revisit these motives of Soviet foreign policy and to expand our understanding of their role in the international history of the Cold War.

1

I am grateful to Ilya Gaiduk and Maxim Korobochkin for their assistance in locating materials in Moscow. My thanks also to the former head of the State Archives Service of the Russian Federation, Dr. Rudolf G. Pikhoia, and to the staff of the Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi dokumentatsii (Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation; hereafter TsKhSD) in Moscow for their help during my archival research. Piero Gleijeses, Geir Lundestad, and Iver B. Neumann offered helpful comments on a draft version.

See Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991); Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993); Francis Fukuyama, Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World. RAND report no. 3337-USDP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1986); Andrei Kolosov, "Pereosmysleniie politiki v 'tretiem

mire"" [Rethinking Policy in the Third World], Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' 4 (April 1990).

3

A classic summary is Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs 45 (April 1967). George W. Breslauer has an excellent survey of recent literature on Soviet interventions in "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," World Politics 44: 3 (July 1987), 429-448.

4 Karen N. Brutents, former first deputy head of

the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 (hereafter "Brutents interview"). For a discussion, see Steven R. David, "Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups,” International Security 11 (Summer 1986), 3-36.

5 Celeste A. Wallander, "Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought," World Politics 42:1 (October 1989), 31-37; Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36-59. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Intervention: Americans and Soviets in the Third World," The National Interest (Spring 1987), 39-47.

6 Huntington, "Patterns of Intervention,” 43; on Soviet interest groups, see Jan S. Adams, "Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee," Slavic Review 48: 4 (Winter 1989), 614-30 and, for an insider's view of one of the institutions, former head of the KGB First Chief Directorate Leonid V. Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy: Zapiski nachalnika sovetskoi razvedki (Moscow: Tsentr-100, 1992). This article is in part based on the archives of the International Department, now kept in TsKhSD. The International Department archives contain a large collection of materials important to understanding Soviet foreign policy history-among them embassy reports, documents created for the Politburo or the party Secretariat, intelligence summaries, and records of conversations with foreign leaders. A small portion of this material-documents which the Politburo or the heads of the MO wanted to have available for reference purposes— is held in so-called osobye papki or "special files," most of which are still unavailable to scholars. 7 See the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

8 KGB to MO [International Department of the CPSU CC], 13 April 1970, TsKhSD, fond (f.) 5, opis' (op.) 62 delo (d.) 535, listy (11.) 7-9. This report, primarily an analysis of the preparations for the third summit conference of non-aligned nations in Lusaka, also notes that this conference will mean a step forward for Soviet diplomacy, that China's influence within the group is receding, and that the United States is increasingly isolated in the Third World. See also KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 32-35. On the KGB's influence on Brezhnev's thinking: author's interview with Oleg Troianovskii, former Soviet UN ambassador, Moscow, 14 September 1992.

9 KGB to MO, 4 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 73-76; KGB (Chebrikov) to MO, 26 November 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 115-118. The latter report is based on an evaluation of European policies toward Portugal, originating with an analysis of materials from the Brit

ish Conservative Party. The GRU, in a major report on U.S. strategies in Africa, noted that the continent had become more important for the Americans both strategically and in terms of its natural resources. "Capitalist states," said the GRU, "are putting pressure on African countries to enter into base agreements and military assistance plans." TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 7190, 80.

10 General'nyi shtab voorushennykh sil SSSR [General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR] (Glavnoe razvedivatelnoe upravlenie [Main intelligence directorate]; hereafter GRU) to MO, 15 September 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 63-68; GRU to MO, "Po meropriiatiiam, napravlennym na oslablenie pozitsii KNR v Afrike [On Measures (and) Directions to Weaken the Positions of the PRC in Africa],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 96-101.

11

KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, 11. 32-35, 35. 12 V.N. Bezukladnikov (counsellor, Lusaka) to MO and attached letter from Neto to CPSU CC concerning request for receiving MPLA members for military training, 24 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, II. 99-102; D.Z. Belokolos to MO, 14 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, 11. 195-200.

13 Belokolos to MO, 25 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, 11. 215-218; Embassy, Lusaka to MO, political letter: "Perspektivy razvitiia borby naroda Angoly protiv portugalskikh kolonizatorov [Perspectives on the Development of the Angolan People's Struggle Against the Portuguese Colonizers," n.d. (October 1970), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, II. 219-228, 224. The Soviet intelligence services still suspected that Neto kept the China option in reserve. See KGB to MO, 8 October 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, 1. 212.

14

Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January 1973, "K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA i MPLA [On the question of reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, Il. 4-9; Belokolos to MO, 10 October 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, II. 121-123. The CPSU CC archives hold large amounts of documents on Soviet relations with all liberation movements in Southern Africa, especially the ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union in addition to the MPLA (see footnote 6). 15

John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution. Volume 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 19621976 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 199. 16 MPLA (Pedro Van Dunem) to CC CPSU, 11 December 1972, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, 1. 22; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January 1973, "K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA i MPLA [On the question of reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, ll. 4-9; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 12 April 1973, “K voprosu ob otnosheniiakh mezhdu MPLA i FNLA [On the question of relations between the MPLA and the FNLA]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, II. 54-57; Neto to CC CPSU, 23 June 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, ll. 91; Belokolos to MO, 7 February 1974 (Conversation with Daniel Chipenda), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, 11. 5-8.

17

Belokolos to MO, 25 October 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, II. 118-120; E.I. Afanasenko

(ambassador, Brazzaville) to MO, 30 March 1974, political letter: "O polozhenii v ‘Narodnom dvizhenii za osvobozhdenie Angoli' (MPLA) [On the situation in 'The People's Movement for the Liberaton of Angola' (MPLA)],” TsKhSD, f. 5, p. 67, d. 758, 11. 37-45, 40.

Iu.A. Iukalov (chargé d'affaires, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 22 May 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, II. 70-71; E.I. Afanasenko to MO, 8 June 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 7881.

19 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 245

48.

20

Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 24950; George Wright, U.S. Policy Towards Angola: The Kissinger Years, 1974-1976 (Leeds: University of Leeds, 1990), 18-23.

21 Afanasenko to MO, 10 October 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 121-122; see also Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 251-253. 22 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 253; Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline (London: Zed, 1983), 109-122, presents the MPLA view of events.

23

Afanasenko to MO, 4 December 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 11-12. Raymond Garthoff correctly concludes that the Soviet decision "preceded the American funding in January 1975, although it probably followed the military efforts of the FNLA in November." Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 507.

24 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 25 December 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, II. 10-21, 21, 17.

25 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 25758; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 533-34. 26 S.A. Slipchenko (Soviet ambassador, Dar-esSalaam) to MO, 30 December 1974 (Conversation with Oscar Oramas, Cuban Foreign Ministry; later ambassador to Luanda), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, 11. 3-7; Afanasenko to MO, 10 January 1975 (Conversation with Cuban ambassador A. Columbio Alvarez), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 17-18, 18. See also Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 130-137; William M. LeoGrande, “Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," Cuban Studies 10:1 (January 1980), 1-48.

27

B. Putilin (first secretary, embassy Brazzaville) to MO, n.d. (late January, 1975), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, II. 10-21; Afanasenko to MO, 30 January 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, 11. 26. U.S. support for Holden Roberto-with whom the CIA for several years had had “an intelligence gathering relationship"-was limited to "non-lethal equipment" up to July 1975; see "Talking points for secretary Kissinger. NSC meeting on Angola, Friday, June 27, 1975." National Security Archive (NSArchive Angola collection of documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (hereafter "National Security Archive Angola FOIA collection"). The Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository, is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library at George Washington University in Washington, D.C.); Robert E. Gates,

Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Neil Matheson, The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower Military Intervention in the Third World, 1975-1980 (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982).

55 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" [On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, II. 13-23, 15-16.

56 Ibid., 23; Castro discussions, ll. 42-48. For the history of the Cuban-Soviet relationship, see Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, 78-84.

57 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" [On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, 11. 13-14; G.A. Zverev to MO, report on conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó (Head, General Department for International Relations, Cuban Communist Party) - Zverev, 28 May 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 53-54; Castro discussion, 1. 45.

58 B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 March 1976, report: “O polozhenii v MPLA [On the Situation in the MPLA]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, II. 29-34.

59 Ibid.

60 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 21 June 1976, Report: "Ob informatsionno-propagandistskoi rabote za II kvartal 1976 g." [On Information and Propaganda Work in the Second Quarter of 1976], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 60-62. The embassy did, however, find it difficult to dispose of "several" sets of Lenin's collected works in French-not surprisingly, since more than 90 percent of all Angolans were illiterate and those who were able to read mostly did so in Portuguese. 61

Castro discussions; F.D. Kudashkin (councellor, Luanda) to MO, 30 July 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 82-83. By the end of 1976 Soviet authorities were hard-pressed to find the Marxist-Leninist avant-garde in Angola. See N.P. Tolubeev (Soviet ambassador, Havana) to MO, 10 December 1976, memorandum of conversation Jorge Risquet - Tolubeev, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 121-123.

62 On Fidel Castro: Marquez, “Operation Carlota," 1-2; Castro discussions, 1. 46; G.A. Zverev to MO, 28 May 1976, memorandum of conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó - Zverev, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, 11. 49-54. 63 Castro discussions, ll. 43, 47.

64

Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 August 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513.

65 Philip Windsor, “Superpower Intervention," in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 54. Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line (London: Zed, 1983), 85-99, is a generally reliable account of the Alves coup.

66

George W. Breslauer, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," World Politics 39 (April 1987), 429-48; Richard F. Herrmann, "Soviet Behavior In Regional Conflicts: Old Questions, New Strategies, and Important Lessons," World Politics 44: 3 (April 1992), 432-65;

Brutents in Lysebu transcript, p. 77.

67

Morton Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal War," in James N. Rosenau, ed. International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 110-11; Odd Arne Westad, "Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the Third World," Journal of Peace Research 29:4 (1992), 455-64. See also Edward Kick and David Kiefer, "The Influence of the World System on War in the Third World," International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 7 (1987), 34-48; and Kick, "World System Properties and Military Intervention-Internal War Linkages," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 11 (1983), 185-208; Oran R. Young, "Intervention and International Systems," Journal of International Affairs 22:2 (1968).

68

For other examples, see Alexei Vassiliev, Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism (Reading: Ithaca, 1993), and Margot Light, ed., Troubled Friendships: Moscow's Third World Ventures (London: British Academic Press, 1993).

69

Charles Kupchan, “Getting In: The Initial Stage of Military Intervention," in Levite et al., eds., Foreign Military Intervention, 259. For Afghanistan, see Odd Arne Westad, "Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978-1979,”International History Review 1:1 (February 1994), 49-69.

70 The possible exception is of course Vietnam, but even there it is unlikely that Soviet aid was decisive for the outcome (see Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 232-253). On perceptions, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

71 On Soviet foreign policy ideology, see Stephen Shenfield in Ideology and Soviet Politics, edited by Stephen White and Alex Pravda (London: Macmillan, 1988), 203-24.

CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS

The Cold War International History Project awards a limited number of fellowship for scholars from countries on "the other side" of the Cold War to conduct up to one year of archival research in the United States. Recipients are based at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Applications should include: CV; letter of nomination and three letters of recommendation; research proposal, indicating topic to be investigated and sources to be utilized; writing samples in English welcomed, though not required. Applicans should have a working ability in English. Preference will be given to scholars who have not previously had an opportunity to do research in the United States. Applications may be sent or faxed to: David Wolff, Director; Cold War International History Project; Woodrow Wilson Center; 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW; Washington, D.C. 20560 USA; fax: (202) 357-4439.

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON ANGOLA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1975-79

Ed. note: Following are illustrations of Russian archival documents on Soviet policy toward Angola and Southern Africa in the 1970s. Most were culled from the files of the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow (TsKhSD; the repository for records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CC CPSU] from 1952 thru 1991) and declassified in early 1995 in connection with the "Carter-Brezhnev Project."

This international project, led by the the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, organized a series of conferences bringing together former U.S. and Soviet officials, scholars, and newly-declassified documents to explore the reasons behind the collapse of superpower detente in the 1970s and its possible lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. (These documents were among a much larger collection specifically declassified by Russian authorities in preparation for a conference on superpower rivalry in the Third World held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, in March 1995.)

The Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive— a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University-cooperated with the Carter-Brezhnev Project and played a major role in obtaining the release of these Russian documents and supporting the translation of some of them into English. The full set of photocopies of Russian, American, and East German documents obtained by the Project may be examined by interested researchers at the National Security Archive, which is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, George Washington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037; tel. (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005.