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Stevenson says that in fact the issue about immediate suspension of the "quarantine” is purely academic. Soviet ships will probably not reach Cuba until next week, and meanwhile he hopes that the inspection of the Red Cross will be already in force, and then, naturally, there will be no need for the "quarantine."
A.I. Mikoyan reiterates that N.S. Khrushchev accepted the proposal of U Thant and the Americans did not accept it.
Stevenson. We believe that a certain understanding was achieved in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy.
A.I. Mikoyan. This is correct. What was envisaged in the letters must be implemented and will be implemented. However, had the United States adopted the same reasonable approach, permeated with good will, as was adopted by the Soviet Union, then they would have accepted the proposal of U Thant and would have lifted the blockade immediately.
McCloy. Would you make a stop on the way back [from Cuba) in New York?
A.I. Mikoyan. I have no definite plans on this score, but I would not exclude such a stop-over.
McCloy (in a jocular tone). But would Castro let you out?
A.I. Mikoyan. He and I are special friends and will work it out somehow
Stevenson. Perhaps you will bring him along over here?
A.I. Mikoyan. You showed such a poor hospitality to him, that he can hardly be convinced to come to New York again. Such a great power as the United States should be ashamed to mistreat such a small country. When Stevenson had not yet been the USA representative (in the United Nations trans.), he had good understanding of everything, but now apparently his official position makes him speak and act in a dif
missiles - trans.).
A.I.Mikoyan. It is correct that there is A.I. Mikoyan. Those who can assemble sufficient amount of armament in Cuba, but fast, can also disassemble fast. Our military we already stopped sending it there. are men of discipline, they punctually ful- McCloy. Yes, but we cannot risk, when fill the order of N.S. Khrushchev. But there it may happen that some arms are being are not enough ships around Cuba to carry withdrawn and other arms are being shipped away the equipment which is the subject of in. When the missile equipment will be the understanding, so in addition other ships shipped off, the political atmosphere will will be necessary. And your blockade stands ameliorate and it will be easier to agree. You in their way to Cuba and, consequently, preferred U.N. inspections to an inspection hampers the withdrawal of missiles. In other of the Red Cross. We agreed to that. We are words, the "quarantine” turns itself against interested in your ships reaching Cuba soon, your own interests.
and we will not obstruct their way. McCloy. We would gladly let your A.I. Mikoyan. Arms were not provided ships pass in both directions, if they carry to Cuba to attack the United States, but as a all your missiles away. I would like to be on means of containment (sderzhivaiyuchego), the ship that would transport the last mis- so that there was no aggression against siles from Cuba, added McCloy in jest. Cuba. But since in his answer to the letter
A.I. Mikoyan (in a jocular way). So lift of N.S. Khrushchev J. Kennedy gave the the “quarantine” and then everything will assurance that neither the United States, nor be in order. Stevenson will become the one its Latin American allies would attack Cuba, he had used to be before he was nominated we declared our readiness to pull out some [to his position) in the UN.
types of armaments from Cuba. Stevenson. When do your ships arrive Stevenson. I do not think there is any in Cuba?
disagreement on the issue that Soviet ships A.I. Mikoyan. But you have not yet should enter the ports of Cuba. It is only lifted the blockade. Our ships are now in that the “quarantine" should be preserved the open sea, about 4-5 days away from until the establishment of the Red Cross Cuba. They should reach Cuba, disembark inspection. We are interested to see that there their load, then load themselves and leave. will be no new shipments of arms, and we This would, of course, require a certain time, hope you will understand us. no less than 10-15 days.
A.I. Mikoyan. We agreed with the proStevenson. We could agree on a sched- posals of U Thant and declared that we ule. Next week one might agree on an in- would not bring armaments to Cuba pendspection of the Red Cross; then the “quar- ing the talks. Those ships that are now at antine” might be lifted.
sea carrying no weapons at all. I must say A.I. Mikoyan. I would like to know if that Stevenson is a good diplomat: I am [the leadership of) the United States think[s] pushing him in one direction of the talk, but that we should work out an agreement that he veers off. would seal what has been said in the ex- Then for some time the conversation change of letters between Kennedy and was focused on the issues of protocol naKhrushchev? Or you are interested only in ture. the dismantling and withdrawal of missiles? In the second half of the conversation Would you think that we should agree on the discussion of business resumes. other issues touched upon in the exchange A.I. Mikoyan. Yet I would like to pose of missives, and confirm the achieved un- the following question. Would the USA govderstanding in a written document? ernment think to come to an agreement
Stevenson. First of all we want to reach where all that was said in the exchange of understanding on the withdrawal of missile well-known letters would be fixed? I have equipment from Cuba and we do not want in mind the kind of document that would to tolerate that until the establishment of formulate the settlement of the crisis. We inspection by the Red Cross there would be think it is preferable to work out such a docuan uncontrolled flow of armaments into ment. Cuba.
V.V. Kuznetsov. The need in working McCloy. There is already too much out such a document stems from the underarmament there. We cannot tolerate its build- standing achieved between the sides about up.
the settlement of the crisis.
Stevenson. We learn in government office, but we forget nothing. We immediately accepted the proposal on inspection by the Red Cross. I do not know how many Soviet ships are approaching Cuba, but I would prefer that there will be more of them, so that they would sooner take away your missiles. I must tell you that we were very favorably impressed by the speed with which Soviet officers dismantle the missiles.
McCloy. I am struck by the speed of assembling as well as disassembling (of the
Stevenson. In our opinion, the sole problem that confronts us - it is to work out conditions for inspection that should be carried out by representatives of the Red Circle. This is relatively easy task. One could set up two check-points at the approaches to Cuba's ports,
in the South and in the North, where two ships of the Red Cross could be located. These might be ships of neutral countries or any other ships, perhaps even sailing hospitals. On board there could be Red Cross inspectors who could check on ships going for Cuba, so that the character of this check-up would be via radio - inquiring on the ship's origins, where it goes and with what cargo. Inspectors would not board ships. I think that such (a form of] inspection should not create problems. We would be glad to hear from you which ships, in your opinion, must be utilized for these aims. I would like to repeat that one could easily reach understanding on this issue.
There is, however, one problem: measures to check the fulfillment of obligations on dismantling and withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba. As I understood from U Thant, Castro did not agree to UN inspections stipulated in the exchange of letters between J. Kennedy and N.S. Khrushchev. We hope that you will discuss this issue once again in Havana.
McCloy. I must emphasize that we do not accept the 5 conditions of Castro as the conditions for fulfillment of what had been said in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.
Stevenson. The problem that concerns us most is that an inspection should be carried out before you report to the Security Council about the completion of withdrawal of missile equipment. Naturally, there should be a check-up of how this undertaking is implemented. I think that such a check-up need not be difficult to carry out.
In addition to that, of course, there is the issue of the form of USA assurance that Cuba will not be subjected to invasion. This also need not present any difficulties.
McCloy. And to a certain extent this is an answer to the question previously posed by Mr. Mikoyan.
A.I. Mikoyan. You keep focusing all attention only on the issue of withdrawal of armaments from Cuba and on inspection. However, the first-order question is to grant to Cuba guarantees of non-intervention against it on the part of other countries of the Western hemisphere, recognition of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the spection would cover only its territory, if
Kennedy had not told of guarantees of nonCastro puts forward also a demand to intervention against Cuba, we would not liquidate the U.S. base in Guantanamo. Why have agreed to dismantle and withdraw misare you refusing to discuss this issue? While sile equipment from Cuba. But now it comes pressing your demands, you do not want to out as follows: we are withdrawing weaphear the legitimate demands of the other ons, and you are back-pedaling on your side. Of course, this is an issue of Ameri- commitments. Castro does not have trust in can-Cuban relations, but in any case this is- your word and he has a right [not to), since sue must be discussed with Castro.
the territory of Cuba has already been inThe exchange of letters between N.S. vaded. It would be a different matter if there Khrushchev and Kennedy - this is in essence would be an official document enforced, already an agreement. But by itself the ex- containing appropriate guarantees for Cuba change of letters cannot be considered as a and approved by the Security Castro. final document. One must carry out nego
I would like to know your opinion tiations to work out such a final document about the guarantees. What can I tell Castro on the basis of the exchange of letters, since when I meet him? We stem from the fact this issue has acquired a bilateral interna- that the letter from Kennedy already contional character.
tains a basis for an agreement on granting We suggest to conduct negotiations on to Cuba the guarantees of non-intervention. this basis and believe that the United States, This is a bilateral problem and both sides the Soviet Union, and Cuba should sign a must resolve it and fix it in an agreement. protocol, with participation of U Thant. Such McCloy. In our opinion, the most ima protocol might fix all the basic premises portant [thing) is to withdraw appropriate contained in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev (offensive - trans.) types of armaments from and J. Kennedy
Cuba as soon as possible. If it is not done, I repeat, we think that you should con- the situation will worsen very much. One sider the proposals advanced by Castro. can speak about the assurances of Kennedy They are legitimate ones. You should also concerning non-intervention against Cuba, consider the issue of the base in but Castro must not set new conditions on Guantanamo. I see that you disagree with withdrawal of missile equipment. MeanCastro's demand, but it does not mean that while, Castro told U Thant that he would you should turn down any discussion of his not tolerate UN inspections. The Soviet demands. One cannot turn such a discussion Union and Cuba must agree between each down, when one wants to normalize the situ- other on what would be the form of inspecation.
tion. It is a matter of your relationship. We I would touch on an interesting plan have only one interest: that the armaments advanced by U Thant; after an agreement on which we have achieved the understandamong the parties involved, which could be ing would be shipped away and that we approved by the Security Council, one might would be convinced that they are really agree on the presence of UN inspectors in shipped away. the area of the Caribbean Sea, including I do not think that there would be any Cuba, and on the South-East coast of the problems on the question of the access of United States and the neighboring Latin ships and on the withdrawal of missile American countries. These inspectors could equipment from Cuba. The main thing is to watch over implementation of the under- remove missile equipment. standing on mutual non-interference be- As to the question on granting the guartween the United States and Cuba. This is a antees of non-intervention to Cuba, if you very important proposal and its implemen- think that what the President said is not tation would give a change to fully settle enough, one could talk about some kind of the conflict. One should take into account appropriate commitment (obiazatelstve). that Cuba is an independent state. It is im- You are posing a question about the possible to demand that some kind of in- possible presence of UN observers on USA
territory, so that there would be no invasion of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insisting on that, there will be additional complications.
A.I. Mikoyan. U Thant expressed this idea.
McCloy. No, he did not suggest it. I repeat: nothing will come out of it.
A.I. Mikoyan. Today in conversation with me U Thant reiterated this idea and said that this issue should be discussed at the Organization of American States.
Stevenson. We believe that the exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev contains concrete and clear formulas. I think that there is no need for any new understanding, except for resolution of the issue about the inspection method. If we fail to carry out ground inspection, let us seek other means which would assure us that the armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise the danger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that, when the atmosphere will clear up and the missile equipment will be withdrawn from Cuba, it will be easier to agree on other issues. Kennedy has already given appropriate assurances concerning non-intervention against Cuba, and we can confirm it.
We would like to say clearly that any discussion of the issue about liquidation of our base in Guantanamo is out of question. It was given up (ustuplena] to us by the government of Cuba on a legal basis, and the American people will under no circumstances renounce it.
A.I.Mikoyan. But the government of Cuba puts forward this question, so it should be discussed.
V.V.Kuznetsov. The government of Cuba has put this question even earlier.
McCloy. We will not concede on this. The position of Castro represents an obstacle on the way to fulfilling commitments formulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.
A.I.Mikoyan. Castro is not and will not be an obstacle to fulfillment of these commitments. The armaments we are talking about is Soviet weaponry and it will be evacuated. As for Castro, he has declared that he would assist the evacuation of these armaments.
McCloy. But he has 145 thousand soldiers against 10 thousand Russians. He can obstruct the dismantling (of missiles-trans.). Moreover, I think he is already obstructing it.
A.I.Mikoyan. The government of Cuba
has the right of sovereignty and one must seek its agreement on any kind of inspection on Cuban territory. It put forward five conditions, including the demand about liquidation of the American base in Guantanamo. However, beside the issue of the base, there are four more points in Castro's program, and these points are in full agreement with what Kennedy wrote in his letter to Khrushchev. Why don't you want to accept them?
Stevenson. There is only one issue between the Soviet Union and the USA: about full withdrawal from Cuba of certain types of armaments under conditions of inspection and in the presence of the understanding that the supplies of this weaponry will not be resumed. Under these conditions the guarantees of Cuba's security on the part of the United States will be ensured.
Castro raised a number of other issues, but they have nothing to do with SovietAmerican relations. In our negotiations we should begin to consider the issues that are within the realm of Soviet-American relations, in the framework of the understanding between Khrushchev and Kennedy.
A.I.Mikoyan. Speaking about the exchange of letters between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy, you blow up only one aspect and maintain silence on the other. You dodge such issues as lifting of the blockade, granting the guarantees of independence to Cuba. We believe that all this should be fixed [zafiksirovano) in the document where certain formulas should be reiterated and specified. We believe that our negotiations should result in a document registered in the United Nations and approved by the Security Council. Otherwise, what is happening? The ink has not yet dried up on the letter, but Rusk is already declaring that the United States has not guaranteed the independence of Cuba. It was published in your newspapers, and I read about it on my way to New York.
Stevenson. Rusk said nothing to disavow the guarantees that have been granted in Kennedy's letter. The press gave a wrong interpretation to his declaration.
A.I.Mikoyan. We are proposing to you to prepare jointly an appropriate document and introduce it jointly to the Security Council, then there will be no other interpretations.
Stevenson. I would like to say a few words about the procedure. U Thant believes
that the operation could be finalized in two statements: the Soviet Union could make announcement about the end of withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba, and the United States would make an announcement that we made sure that these weapons are withdrawn from Cuba. Earlier it was supposed that the appropriate checkup should be done by the forces of the UN, but after Castro's refusal to let UN representatives into Cuba, the question emerged about the method of inspection.
After the withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba will be confirmed, the USA will declare the abolition of the “quarantine" and that it guarantees non-intervention of Cuba. I see no reason for any other treaties and documents. If the Soviet side has some draft proposals, it is desirable to obtain them, and the American side then will do the same thing.
A.I. Mikoyan. There is no time to consider this issue in detail. It seems to me we should think how to continue the talks.
V.V.Kuznetsov. If the American side agrees, we will discuss this issue.
A.I.Mikoyan. On our side we prefer to have a protocol.
Stevenson. The Soviet Union can and must ensure the withdrawal of the certain types of armaments and a verification that would satisfy the USA and Latin American countries.
The question, however, emerges on what form of inspection is feasible under current circumstances. Four days have already elapsed, and there is no inspection in sight. Therefore, now we should discuss possible forms of inspection. We do not want to constrain you by those formulas that were advanced concerning international inspection. If Castro does not want such an inspection, one can think of different forms of control.
McCloy. We should look at what is acceptable and feasible, but in any case the inspection should be introduced. Therefore we should adapt ourselves to the new situation.
In the first order, of course, we should, as they say, remove the pistol from the negotiating table, in other words to dismantle and withdraw the missiles.
Stevenson. I do not think that some kind of protocol will be necessary, besides the declarations that will be made in the Security Council.
A.I.Mikoyan. Normalization would be But we are glad that when today our plane these technical issues with you. I would like complete if the Soviet Union, the USA and flew over Cuba, it was not shot at. As far as to speak on another, more important quesCuba signed a joint document together with we know, the anti-aircraft missiles deployed tion. It is out of question that we agree with the UN Secretary General on the basis of in Cuba are not in the hands of the Cubans, you now on overflights of your plans over the exchange of letters between N.S. but in the hands of your people. Today we Cuba: it is sovereign Cuban territory. But if Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case, intercepted radio-commands and conversa- the USA agreed to the inspection over the this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba. tions of the anti-aircraft units deployed in area of Miami, it would be a good thing. A decision in which Cuba is not a party will Cuba and that confirmed us again in our Then, possibly. the Cubans would agree to not be binding for her. Cuba must have guar- conclusion. I must say that we are glad that such inspection over their territory. One canantees of non-intervention.
these anti-aircraft missiles are in the hands not not carry out unilateral inspection - no I would like to know: do you have any of the Russians whose hands are not itching matter which, ground or aerial. The Cubans ideas about forms of control? If you have like the hands of the Cubans.
would have full reason to be offended, if them - discuss them in the next few days In passing, I would like to say that al- you were granted the right of regular and with V.V. Kuznetsov. though we do not include anti-aircraft mis
permanent overflight over their territory, in Stevenson. As to the territorial integ- siles into the category of offensive weap
a unilateral way. rity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter of ons, we would very much like that you with- As for inspections which must ensure Kennedy are simple and clear: after certain draw these missiles as well.
a verification of the dismantling and withtypes of weapons will be removed from A.I.Mikoyan. As I see, your sense of drawal of our missiles, here we stand on the Cuba, the USA will make an announcement humor has completely disappeared. same position that was expressed in the letabout the guarantee against any kind of in- Stevenson. In your conversations in ters of N.S. Khrushchev. vasion of Cuba.
Havana you could cite good arguments in Stevenson. As to ground inspection, it McCloy. As to the forms of verifica- favor of ground inspection: on one side, it was U Thant, not us, who came up with a tion, the ideal form in my mind would be would assure us that you are fulfilling your proposal about the presence of UN inspecregular overflights by planes doing aerial obligations, on the other hand, Castro would tors during the dismantling and withdrawal photo-reconnaissance, and ground inspec- obtain confidence that no invasion of Cuba of the missiles. Incidentally, he had in mind tion. I hope that the Soviet Union would bear would take place: since U.N. observers permanent inspection till the end of dismanon Castro so that he will agree to the con- would be around.
tling of the missiles. This would serve the duct of such inspection as was stipulated in A.I.Mikoyan. I believe that in the interests of both sides. I understand that the letter of N.S.Khrushchev. However, if course of today's conversation we laid the Cuba is an independent country, but if it Castro refuses to accept such inspection, we ground for upcoming negotiations. I think agrees with this, then there would be no need should look for another form. The USA that we should not now go into detail. You to seek other forms of check-up. might continue overflights by its planes giv- should reflect on what we have spoken about A.I.Mikoyan. We agree to conduct ing us confidence that one does not resume here. We will prepare our drafts as well. It ground inspection, as the letter of N.S. in Cuba assembly of types of weapons that seems to me that until the election day it Khrushchev stated, but it is necessary to represent danger for us. But in this case we would be hard for you to take any decisions, have some kind of element of reciprocity would like to have assurances that our plans but, on the other hand, one should not pro- so that this understanding does not affect will not be downed. One could also consider crastinate with liquidation of the Cuban cri- the national feelings of the Cubans. This also yet another possibility. Could you pass to sis.
flows from my conversation with U Thant. us the lists of armament that is being with Stevenson. We could agree even tomor- I would like to know if McCloy and drawn from Cuba? We know approximately row in all details with a plan of inspection Stevenson consider today's exchange of how many missiles you now have in Cuba. of ships by the forces of the Red Cross if opinion useful? If you could pass to us the lists of what you both sides approve of the proposal of U Stevenson. The conversation was usewill transport on your ships (of course, I Thant. We should not put off resolution of ful and I became persuaded that our posiunderstand that these documents will not this issue. What flag would be on these two tions stay not too far apart. contain specifications of these armaments), inspection ships is of no significance to us. A.I.Mikoyan. There is misunderstandthen through comparison of this data with As to the oversight of the territory of ing (nedoponimaniie) as far as the issue of the data about the presence of armaments Cuba, if Castro refuses to agree on ground reciprocity of inspections is concerned. U in Cuba, that is in our disposal, we would inspection, we could limit ourselves to uni- Thant said that Castro is concerned with the follow the process of evacuation of arma- lateral conduct of aerial reconnaissance. For presence on the USA of camps where Cuments that are of danger for us. I believe this we would only need your assurance that ban emigres prepare themselves for invathat this would be enough. In this case we our planes will not be shot at.
sion similar to one that took place last year. would get on along ground inspection.
McCloy. It seems that it would take not McCloy. I must assure you that these The system of passing of the lists of 10-15 days, but probably a month for re- camps no longer exist, they are closed evcargo removed from Cuba would not touch moval of your missiles.
erywhere. on your security interests. As to overflights, A.I.Mikoyan. All these are (mere] de- A.I.Mikoyan. You mean that they do you, as we understand, cannot guarantee that tails. We brought with us military experts - not exist in Latin American countries as the Cubans would not shoot at our planes. a general and colonel, who could discuss all well?
satisfied with today's exchange of opinions. I would be glad to meet you and follow up on this conversation, on your way back from Cuba.
The conversation lasted for 3 hours 40 minutes. Those present were com. V.V. Kuznetsov, A.F. Dobrynin, M.A. Menshikov, G.A. Zhukov; from the American side participated J. McCloy, A. Stevenson, A. Akalovsky
McCloy. The camps are closed everywhere. Perhaps there is something somewhere, but in any case the USA does not support this business.
A.I.Mikoyan. But you count Cuban emigres among your own military forces?
McCloy. We are not training them for invasion of Cuba. We allow volunteers of any nationality to be enlisted in our military forces, even Russians can do it. In any case, I assure you that there are no more camps in the USA where Cuban emigres are trained, prepared for invasion of Cuba.
However I would like to tell you frankly, that any inspection on USA territory is out of question. You have to trust in our word.
Stevenson. I want to say that the USA is trying to normalize the situation in the area of the Caribbean sea, but on condition of Castro's cooperation. We might work out some form of mutual guarantees acceptable for Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is afraid of them, they, too, are afraid of him. I believe that after the settlement of the Cuban crisis the situation in this region will
become more relaxed.
A.I.Mikoyan. It is very important what you are saying. Castro might ask me: is the USA going to restore diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba or this question is not on the agenda? Perhaps you have in mind not to do it right away, but after some time? I would like to know what I can tell Castro.
Stevenson. You understand that I cannot answer this question. It is within the competence of the Organization of American States. We cannot conduct business with Castro without its involvement. But one could think of certain regional arrangements providing confidence to the countries of the Caribbean sea. I hope that we would be able gradually to liquidate the antagonism between Cuba and her neighbors. Now this antagonism is being heated by subversive activities which, perhaps, reciprocate each other in this region.
McCloy. I would say that Cuba is the source of infection, and the recent events in Venezuela provide an example. But I would not like to dwell now on this issue. I am
(Source: AVP RF; obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, copy on file at National Security Archive; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]
Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to
Ministry, 2 November 1962
2 November 1962
THE MIKOYAN-CASTRO in response to the publication in the mentary evidence from Cuban, Russian, TALKS, 4-5 NOVEMBER 1962: Bulletin in 1995 of lengthy Soviet and American sources, as well as a conTHE CUBAN VERSION records of the same conversations. The tinuation of the oral history process that
materials were obtained from the Insti- has begun to involve senior Cuban of[Editor's Note: While a large, al- tute of History in Cuba by Prof. Philip ficials in international explorations of beit incomplete, complex of Russian Brenner (American University), who such key events as the Bay of Pigs and documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis provided them to CWIHP, and trans- Cuban Missile Crisis, is clearly a prehas become available to researchers lated from Spanish by Carlos Osorio condition for a serious and comprehensince 1991—as exemplified by the (National Security Archive).
sive analysis. selction of translated materials in this While the Cuban documents them- Unfortunately, little information is and past Bulletins-documents on the selves do not offer any startling infor- available at present on the provenance events of the fall of 1962 are still only mation or insights not present in the far of the Cuban documents provided bebeginning to trickle out of Cuban ar- more detailed Soviet records of the low, including their precise archival lochives. The two documents below, same conversations—a quick compari- cation or who took the notes that are translated from Spanish, represent a rare son of the two versions of the identical presented; the Bulletin hopes to supply and encouraging sign (as does Piero conversations finds them broadly com- additional information, as well as furGleijeses' article on Cuban policy in patible—they are presented as a sym- ther evidence from Cuban archives Africa elsewhere in this issue) that pros- bol of what historians can hope will be should it emerge, in future issues.) pects for historical research in Cuban a thorough process of eventually reconarchives may improve.
structing Soviet-Cuban relations on the [Translator's Note: The translaThe Cuban records concern the basis of solid archival evidence from tions at times read awkwardly, for the tense conversations between Fidel both sides, which can then be compared Spanish documents themselves are oc
Castro (and other members of the Cu- and cross-checked. Given the amount casionally confusing, mixing tenses, ban leadership) and senior Soviet en- of passion and controversy that has sur- subjects and objects in the same phrase. voy Anastas I. Mikoyan on 4-5 Novem- rounded this question during the Cold Mikoyan, a Soviet national, appears to ber 1962, in the immediate aftermath War, and which continues to infuse be speaking a Castillian Spanish, as he of USSR Premier Nikita Khrushchev's U.S.-Cuban relations (as Fidel Castro often uses the auxiliary "haber” for the acceptance on October 28 of U.S. Presi- remains in charge nearly four decades past tense. The note-taker is presumably dent John F. Kennedy's demand that he after the revolution that brought him to a Cuban national, so he sometimes skips withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from power), the availability of scholarly per- transcribing the past tense as was used Cuba. They were apparently released spectives and contemporaneous docu
continued on page 339