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territory, so that there would be no invasion of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insisting on that, there will be additional complications.

A.I. Mikoyan. U Thant expressed this idea.

McCloy. No, he did not suggest it. I repeat: nothing will come out of it.

A.I. Mikoyan. Today in conversation with me U Thant reiterated this idea and said that this issue should be discussed at the Organization of American States.

Stevenson. We believe that the exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev contains concrete and clear formulas. I think that there is no need for any new understanding, except for resolution of the issue about the inspection method. If we fail to carry out ground inspection, let us seek other means which would assure us that the armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise the danger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that, when the atmosphere will clear up and the missile equipment will be withdrawn from Cuba, it will be easier to agree on other issues. Kennedy has already given appropriate assurances concerning non-intervention against Cuba, and we can confirm it.

We would like to say clearly that any discussion of the issue about liquidation of our base in Guantanamo is out of question. It was given up [ustuplena] to us by the government of Cuba on a legal basis, and the American people will under no circumstances renounce it.

A.I.Mikoyan. But the government of Cuba puts forward this question, so it should be discussed.

V.V.Kuznetsov. The government of Cuba has put this question even earlier.

McCloy. We will not concede on this. The position of Castro represents an obstacle on the way to fulfilling commitments formulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.

A.I.Mikoyan. Castro is not and will not be an obstacle to fulfillment of these commitments. The armaments we are talking about is Soviet weaponry and it will be evacuated. As for Castro, he has declared that he would assist the evacuation of these armaments.

McCloy. But he has 145 thousand soldiers against 10 thousand Russians. He can obstruct the dismantling [of missiles-trans.]. Moreover, I think he is already obstructing it.

A.I.Mikoyan. The government of Cuba

has the right of sovereignty and one must seek its agreement on any kind of inspection on Cuban territory. It put forward five conditions, including the demand about liquidation of the American base in Guantanamo. However, beside the issue of the base, there are four more points in Castro's program, and these points are in full agreement with what Kennedy wrote in his letter to Khrushchev. Why don't you want to accept them?

Stevenson. There is only one issue between the Soviet Union and the USA: about full withdrawal from Cuba of certain types of armaments under conditions of inspection and in the presence of the understanding that the supplies of this weaponry will not be resumed. Under these conditions the guarantees of Cuba's security on the part of the United States will be ensured.

Castro raised a number of other issues, but they have nothing to do with SovietAmerican relations. In our negotiations we should begin to consider the issues that are within the realm of Soviet-American relations, in the framework of the understanding between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

A.I.Mikoyan. Speaking about the exchange of letters between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy, you blow up only one aspect and maintain silence on the other. You dodge such issues as lifting of the blockade, granting the guarantees of independence to Cuba. We believe that all this should be fixed [zafiksirovano] in the document where certain formulas should be reiterated and specified. We believe that our negotiations should result in a document registered in the United Nations and approved by the Security Council. Otherwise, what is happening? The ink has not yet dried up on the letter, but Rusk is already declaring that the United States has not guaranteed the independence of Cuba. It was published in your newspapers, and I read about it on my way to New York.

Stevenson. Rusk said nothing to disavow the guarantees that have been granted in Kennedy's letter. The press gave a wrong interpretation to his declaration.

A.I.Mikoyan. We are proposing to you to prepare jointly an appropriate document and introduce it jointly to the Security Council, then there will be no other interpretations.

Stevenson. I would like to say a few words about the procedure. U Thant believes

that the operation could be finalized in two statements: the Soviet Union could make announcement about the end of withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba, and the United States would make an announcement that we made sure that these weapons are withdrawn from Cuba. Earlier it was supposed that the appropriate checkup should be done by the forces of the UN, but after Castro's refusal to let UN representatives into Cuba, the question emerged about the method of inspection.

After the withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba will be confirmed, the USA will declare the abolition of the "quarantine" and that it guarantees non-intervention of Cuba. I see no reason for any other treaties and documents. If the Soviet side has some draft proposals, it is desirable to obtain them, and the American side then will do the same thing.

A.I. Mikoyan. There is no time to consider this issue in detail. It seems to me we should think how to continue the talks.

V.V.Kuznetsov. If the American side agrees, we will discuss this issue.

A.I.Mikoyan. On our side we prefer to have a protocol.

Stevenson. The Soviet Union can and must ensure the withdrawal of the certain types of armaments and a verification that would satisfy the USA and Latin American countries.

The question, however, emerges on what form of inspection is feasible under current circumstances. Four days have already elapsed, and there is no inspection in sight. Therefore, now we should discuss possible forms of inspection. We do not want to constrain you by those formulas that were advanced concerning international inspection. If Castro does not want such an inspection, one can think of different forms of control.

McCloy. We should look at what is acceptable and feasible, but in any case the inspection should be introduced. Therefore we should adapt ourselves to the new situation.

In the first order, of course, we should, as they say, remove the pistol from the negotiating table, in other words to dismantle and withdraw the missiles.

Stevenson. I do not think that some kind of protocol will be necessary, besides the declarations that will be made in the Security Council.

A.I.Mikoyan. Normalization would be complete if the Soviet Union, the USA and Cuba signed a joint document together with the UN Secretary General on the basis of the exchange of letters between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case, this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba. A decision in which Cuba is not a party will not be binding for her. Cuba must have guarantees of non-intervention.

I would like to know: do you have any ideas about forms of control? If you have them discuss them in the next few days

with V.V. Kuznetsov.

Stevenson. As to the territorial integrity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter of Kennedy are simple and clear: after certain types of weapons will be removed from Cuba, the USA will make an announcement about the guarantee against any kind of invasion of Cuba.

McCloy. As to the forms of verification, the ideal form in my mind would be regular overflights by planes doing aerial photo-reconnaissance, and ground inspection. I hope that the Soviet Union would bear on Castro so that he will agree to the conduct of such inspection as was stipulated in the letter of N.S.Khrushchev. However, if Castro refuses to accept such inspection, we should look for another form. The USA might continue overflights by its planes giving us confidence that one does not resume in Cuba assembly of types of weapons that represent danger for us. But in this case we would like to have assurances that our plans will not be downed. One could also consider yet another possibility. Could you pass to us the lists of armament that is being with drawn from Cuba? We know approximately how many missiles you now have in Cuba. If you could pass to us the lists of what you will transport on your ships (of course, I understand that these documents will not contain specifications of these armaments), then through comparison of this data with the data about the presence of armaments in Cuba, that is in our disposal, we would follow the process of evacuation of armaments that are of danger for us. I believe that this would be enough. In this case we would get on along ground inspection.

The system of passing of the lists of cargo removed from Cuba would not touch on your security interests. As to overflights, you, as we understand, cannot guarantee that the Cubans would not shoot at our planes.

But we are glad that when today our plane flew over Cuba, it was not shot at. As far as we know, the anti-aircraft missiles deployed in Cuba are not in the hands of the Cubans, but in the hands of your people. Today we intercepted radio-commands and conversations of the anti-aircraft units deployed in Cuba and that confirmed us again in our conclusion. I must say that we are glad that these anti-aircraft missiles are in the hands of the Russians whose hands are not itching like the hands of the Cubans.

In passing, I would like to say that although we do not include anti-aircraft missiles into the category of offensive weapons, we would very much like that you withdraw these missiles as well.

A.I.Mikoyan. As I see, your sense of humor has completely disappeared.

Stevenson. In your conversations in Havana you could cite good arguments in favor of ground inspection: on one side, it would assure us that you are fulfilling your obligations, on the other hand, Castro would obtain confidence that no invasion of Cuba would take place: since U.N. observers would be around.

A.I.Mikoyan. I believe that in the course of today's conversation we laid the ground for upcoming negotiations. I think that we should not now go into detail. You should reflect on what we have spoken about here. We will prepare our drafts as well. It seems to me that until the election day it would be hard for you to take any decisions, but, on the other hand, one should not procrastinate with liquidation of the Cuban crisis.

Stevenson. We could agree even tomorrow in all details with a plan of inspection of ships by the forces of the Red Cross if both sides approve of the proposal of U Thant. We should not put off resolution of this issue. What flag would be on these two inspection ships is of no significance to us.

As to the oversight of the territory of Cuba, if Castro refuses to agree on ground inspection, we could limit ourselves to unilateral conduct of aerial reconnaissance. For this we would only need your assurance that our planes will not be shot at.

McCloy. It seems that it would take not 10-15 days, but probably a month for removal of your missiles.

A.I.Mikoyan. All these are [mere] details. We brought with us military experts a general and colonel, who could discuss all

these technical issues with you. I would like to speak on another, more important question. It is out of question that we agree with you now on overflights of your plans over Cuba: it is sovereign Cuban territory. But if the USA agreed to the inspection over the area of Miami, it would be a good thing. Then, possibly. the Cubans would agree to such inspection over their territory. One cannot not carry out unilateral inspection - no matter which, ground or aerial. The Cubans would have full reason to be offended, if you were granted the right of regular and permanent overflight over their territory, in a unilateral way.

As for inspections which must ensure a verification of the dismantling and withdrawal of our missiles, here we stand on the same position that was expressed in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev.

Stevenson. As to ground inspection, it was U Thant, not us, who came up with a proposal about the presence of UN inspectors during the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles. Incidentally, he had in mind permanent inspection till the end of dismantling of the missiles. This would serve the interests of both sides. I understand that Cuba is an independent country, but if it agrees with this, then there would be no need to seek other forms of check-up.

A.I.Mikoyan. We agree to conduct ground inspection, as the letter of N.S. Khrushchev stated, but it is necessary to have some kind of element of reciprocity so that this understanding does not affect the national feelings of the Cubans. This also flows from my conversation with U Thant. I would like to know if McCloy and Stevenson consider today's exchange of opinion useful?

Stevenson. The conversation was useful and I became persuaded that our positions stay not too far apart.

A.I.Mikoyan. There is misunderstanding [nedoponimaniie] as far as the issue of reciprocity of inspections is concerned. U Thant said that Castro is concerned with the presence on the USA of camps where Cuban emigres prepare themselves for invasion similar to one that took place last year. McCloy. I must assure you that these camps no longer exist, they are closed everywhere.

A.I.Mikoyan. You mean that they do not exist in Latin American countries as well?

McCloy. The camps are closed everywhere. Perhaps there is something somewhere, but in any case the USA does not support this business.

A.I.Mikoyan. But you count Cuban emigres among your own military forces?

McCloy. We are not training them for invasion of Cuba. We allow volunteers of any nationality to be enlisted in our military forces, even Russians can do it. In any case, I assure you that there are no more camps in the USA where Cuban emigres are trained, prepared for invasion of Cuba.

However I would like to tell you frankly, that any inspection on USA territory is out of question. You have to trust in our word.

Stevenson. I want to say that the USA is trying to normalize the situation in the area of the Caribbean sea, but on condition of Castro's cooperation. We might work out some form of mutual guarantees acceptable for Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is afraid of them, they, too, are afraid of him. I believe that after the settlement of the Cuban crisis the situation in this region will

THE MIKOYAN-CASTRO TALKS, 4-5 NOVEMBER 1962:

THE CUBAN VERSION

[Editor's Note: While a large, albeit incomplete, complex of Russian documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis has become available to researchers since 1991-as exemplified by the selction of translated materials in this and past Bulletins-documents on the events of the fall of 1962 are still only beginning to trickle out of Cuban archives. The two documents below, translated from Spanish, represent a rare and encouraging sign (as does Piero Gleijeses' article on Cuban policy in Africa elsewhere in this issue) that prospects for historical research in Cuban archives may improve.

The Cuban records concern the tense conversations between Fidel Castro (and other members of the Cuban leadership) and senior Soviet envoy Anastas I. Mikoyan on 4-5 November 1962, in the immediate aftermath of USSR Premier Nikita Khrushchev's acceptance on October 28 of U.S. President John F. Kennedy's demand that he withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. They were apparently released

become more relaxed.

A.I.Mikoyan. It is very important what you are saying. Castro might ask me: is the USA going to restore diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba or this question is not on the agenda? Perhaps you have in mind not to do it right away, but after some time? I would like to know what I can tell Castro.

Stevenson. You understand that I cannot answer this question. It is within the competence of the Organization of American States. We cannot conduct business with Castro without its involvement. But one could think of certain regional arrangements providing confidence to the countries of the Caribbean sea. I hope that we would be able gradually to liquidate the antagonism between Cuba and her neighbors. Now this antagonism is being heated by subversive activities which, perhaps, reciprocate each other in this region.

McCloy. I would say that Cuba is the source of infection, and the recent events in Venezuela provide an example. But I would not like to dwell now on this issue. I I am

in response to the publication in the Bulletin in 1995 of lengthy Soviet records of the same conversations.1 The materials were obtained from the Institute of History in Cuba by Prof. Philip Brenner (American University), who provided them to CWIHP, and translated from Spanish by Carlos Osorio (National Security Archive).

While the Cuban documents themselves do not offer any startling information or insights not present in the far more detailed Soviet records of the same conversations-a quick comparison of the two versions of the identical conversations finds them broadly compatible-they are presented as a symbol of what historians can hope will be a thorough process of eventually reconstructing Soviet-Cuban relations on the basis of solid archival evidence from both sides, which can then be compared and cross-checked. Given the amount of passion and controversy that has surrounded this question during the Cold War, and which continues to infuse U.S.-Cuban relations (as Fidel Castro remains in charge nearly four decades after the revolution that brought him to power), the availability of scholarly perspectives and contemporaneous docu

satisfied with today's exchange of opinions. I would be glad to meet you and follow up on this conversation, on your way back from Cuba.

The conversation lasted for 3 hours 40 minutes. Those present were com. V.V. Kuznetsov, A.F. Dobrynin, M.A. Menshikov, G.A. Zhukov; from the American side participated J. McCloy, A. Stevenson, A. Akalovsky.

Note-takers:
G.Zhukov
Yu. Vinogradov.

[Source: AVP RF; obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, copy on file at National Security Archive; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

mentary evidence from Cuban, Russian, and American sources, as well as a continuation of the oral history process that has begun to involve senior Cuban officials in international explorations of such key events as the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis,2 is clearly a precondition for a serious and comprehensive analysis.

Unfortunately, little information is available at present on the provenance of the Cuban documents provided below, including their precise archival location or who took the notes that are presented; the Bulletin hopes to supply additional information, as well as further evidence from Cuban archives should it emerge, in future issues.]

[Translator's Note: The translations at times read awkwardly, for the Spanish documents themselves are occasionally confusing, mixing tenses, subjects and objects in the same phrase. Mikoyan, a Soviet national, appears to be speaking a Castillian Spanish, as he often uses the auxiliary “haber" for the past tense. The note-taker is presumably a Cuban national, so he sometimes skips transcribing the past tense as was used continued on page 339

We will inform Fidel Castro of the content of the documents [not further identified-ed.]. He has entrusted me to convey a translation of the draft to President Dorticos, and to reach an agreement with him on all points. Dorticos, having read through the document, said that in principle the document serves the interests of Cuba, and that it would be approved.

Separate remarks will be introduced after the discussion of our proposals with Fidel Castro and the other leaders, and also after their talks with Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, which are slated for today.

2.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in New York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

From the following telegram you will learn the details of the important statement made by McCloy in the talks on monitoring the dismantling of the "offensive weaponry.” He declared that in view of Castro's refusal to agree to a ground-based monitoring, the Americans were willing not to insist [on that], knowing the forms and methods of monitoring put forth in Khrushchev's message, [but] that it was necessary to find other methods for convincing the Americans that the dismantling process had been completed and that everything had been removed.

In response to my question about whether there was some concrete proposal as to how this should be done, he said the following: to allow them the possibility of flights over Cuba for inspections from the air, without ground-based monitoring; this was the first point. The second was that the Soviets provide the Americans with information about how much of the weaponry has been dismantled and removed, and when. The important part of this is not to impart secret military information that reveals the nature and capacities of this weaponry.

I rejected here the possibility of flights over Cuba, since that would affect the sovereignty of Cuba itself. The proposal about

information from our side, I said, should be discussed with our military specialists, who arrived with me to aid Kuznetsov.

McCloy reported with great satisfaction that on 1 November their plane had flown over Cuba without being fired at, and had made photos. He attributed this to the presence of Soviet specialists at the anti-aircraft missile installations.

I conclude that if our agreement with Castro not to shoot down American planes retains its force, then when they fly one or two more times it will mean that inspections on the dismantling have been carried out. There remains the issue of inspections on the removal of the dismantled weaponry, which could be resolved through means suggested by McCloy.

In view of this, Castro's position, which rejects the possibility of on-site inspections, will cease to be an obstacle to settling with the Americans the issue of monitoring the dismantling and removal of the weaponry. I consider all this to be expedient. In my talks with Castro I will fully explain our position on the issue of monitoring in accordance with Khrushchev's message, I will show him its correctness and acceptability, from our point of view, for Cuba.

In connection with the Americans' proposal laid out earlier, and taking into account the Cubans' arrogance, I consider it expedient not to insist or ensure that they reject their position on not allowing observers onto their territory to check on the dismantling and removal process, the position which they have made clear to U Thant and have published several times in the press.

In truth, in Castro's speech yesterday this position was made to seem somewhat more flexible.

I await instructions concerning this matter in Havana.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from A.I Mikoyan in New York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

Yesterday in the hour-long discussion with McCloy and Stevenson, the positions of the parties on all issues connected with the Cuban conflict were explained, as well as the American position in the form in which the Americans consider it necessary to define it.

We will be sending to you a short exposition of the most important points of the discussion within 2 or 3 hours, and today, 2 November and 1:00 in the afternoon I will be flying to Cuba. Our comrades will compose a detailed record of the conversation, and will send it after I am gone. The conversation was important, and you should become familiarized with that detailed record of it.

McCloy has declared that with the aim of speeding up the removal of the missiles, before the fine-tuning of the observation system by the Red Cross has been reached, they agree to and are interested in allowing Soviet vessels bound for Cuba entry into Cuban ports without inspection, by way of a hail like the one that was given to the tanker "Bucharest."

We are introducing a proposal to give instructions to all our vessels bound for Cuba to proceed to their destinations.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A. Gromyko to unidentified recipient, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

The head of the American delegation at the negotiations in New York, McCloy, has informed Comrade Kuznetsov on 31 October that Washington has decided that until the Red Cross has begun its monitoring of the vessels bound for Cuba, it would not carry out inspections on these vessels, but to apply to them the same procedure that was applied to the tanker “Bucharest.” During this time the “quarantine" will be officially continued.

As is well known, the tanker "Bucharest" passed through a region under American “quarantine” without hindrance.

Six Soviet vessels now on the open sea beyond the announced limits of the “quarantine" have received orders to proceed into the Cuban ports, and at present they are now on their way toward Cuba.

A. G.

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 3 November 1962

3 November 1962

On 3 November Morozov, Mendelevich, and Timerbaev had a meeting with Narasimhan and Loutfi (replacing U Thant) for the examination of technical issues connected with the sending of observers from the International Red Cross Committee to ascertain that on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba there is no weaponry considered offensive by the USA.

Narasimhan said that the the secretariat of the UN in New York had not yet received the definitive consent of the International Red Cross to its participation in the organization of the monitoring. An answer from the Red Cross could be received today, 3 November.

Narasimhan also laid out the thoughts of the Americans, as he understood them, regarding the Red Cross's monitoring procedure.

The USA considers it expedient to deploy two vessels with observers from the International Red Cross on the open sea near the Cuban coast-one 8 to 10 miles off Havana, and another in the strait between Cuba and Haiti. The vessels should have radio contact with the UN. On each vessel there should be two groups of International Red Cross observers. Each group should contain eight observers. In this way, 32 observers will be needed in all.

In response to our question about how to manage such a large number of observers, especially when bearing in mind that Stevenson in his talks with us on 1 November of this year had expressed his view that the International Red Cross inspections

could be reduced to radio interrogations of passing ships, Narasimhan answered that in many cases it will be precisely that, but that the International Red Cross observers should have the right to carry out inspections (to check documents, to inspect ship holds, and so on), if such a necessity should arise.

Our representatives remarked that such a proposal from Narasimhan concerning the conferral to the International Red Cross groups of inspection rights contradicts the views expressed earlier by Stevenson. We will continue to insist that the inspections be limited to interrogations by radio.

The USA, Narasimhan continued, is prepared to provide its own transportation for the International Red Cross inspectors. This may be ordinary transportation for the conveyance of troops, even though they would be unarmed and would contain on board civilian passengers.

We told Narasimhan that the Soviet Union, as had already been declared to U Thant, had given its consent to the conveyance of the International Red Cross observers either by Soviet or by neutral vessels. Narasimhan responded that he knew about this, but all the same considered it possible to inform the Soviet Union of this proposal by the USA, which, Narasimhan said, works towards the interests of a speedy organization of the inspections. The USA, in his words, has no objections to the use of Soviet ships. Narasimhan asked us to explain, if possible by 5 November, how soon the Soviet Union could prepare its ships for the International Red Cross observers. For his part, Narasimhan will make inquiries by this time about the possibility of chartering neutral vessels located near Cuba.

Narasimhan raised the issue of reimbursing the costs of chartering the vessels and constituting the International Red Cross groups. In response to the question of how the USA imagines covering the costs associated with the carrying out of inspections by the International Red Cross, Narasimhan said that it was proposing two possible variants either through the UN (that is, according to their pay scale), or to divide the costs equally between the USSR and the USA.

Our representatives answered that the USA had illegally imposed the so-called “quarantine," that they were now pushing for inspections on vessels bound for Cuba, and that it was completely clear that it is they who should covers the expenses for the

carrying out of such inspections. In future negotiations we should proceed from the assumption that the Soviet Union will assume expenses only for the maintenance of Soviet vessels. As far as the maintenance of the International Red Cross vessels is concerned, we will push for the USA or the UN bearing the burden of these expenses. (It is not out of the question that the International Red Cross will itself pay the expenses for the upkeep of the groups.)

On the issue of how long the inspection procedure by the International Red Cross would be continued, Narasimhan said that it should be carried out for a period of three to four weeks. But it is possible that the duration could be shorter. Everything depends on how long the removal of weaponry from Cuba would continue. As soon as all the weaponry is removed, the inspections, it seems, should cease.

We emphasized that the inspections on vessels by the International Red Cross should be of a short-term nature, as was declared by U Thant in his provisional proposal concerning this issue, which was approved by the Soviet Union. In the future, with regard to time limits we will proceed with aim of imposing the shortest possible limits. We will aim for ceasing the inspections immediately after the removal of the dismantled installations, and the approval by the Security Council of corresponding resolutions for the conclusive settlement of the Cuban crisis.

If our approval of the conveyance of the International Red Cross representatives on Soviet ships is still valid, we ask that you inform us immediately of which vessels in particular are being selected for this purpose, and when they can arrive in the Caribbean Sea area.

Since the Cubans will evidently not agree to admit the International Red Cross observers onto the territory of Cuba in order to then admit them onto Soviet ships, we ask that you inform us what would the most appropriate port in the Caribbean Sea area in which to take on board these International Red Cross observers.

The next meeting with Narasimhan is slated for the morning of 5 November.

3.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV V. ZORIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,

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