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We will inform Fidel Castro of the content of the documents (not further identified-ed.). He has entrusted me to convey a translation of the draft to President Dorticos, and to reach an agreement with him on all points.

Dorticos, having read through the document, said that in principle the document serves the interests of Cuba, and that it would be approved.

Separate remarks will be introduced after the discussion of our proposals with Fidel Castro and the other leaders, and also after their talks with Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, which are slated for today.

2.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

(Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.)

Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in New
York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

From the following telegram you will learn the details of the important statement made by McCloy in the talks on monitoring the dismantling of the “offensive weaponry.” He declared that in view of Castro's refusal to agree to a ground-based monitoring, the Americans were willing not to insist (on that), knowing the forms and methods of monitoring put forth in Khrushchev's message, [but) that it was necessary to find other methods for convincing the Americans that the dismantling process had been completed and that everything had been removed.

In response to my question about whether there was some concrete proposal as to how this should be done, he said the following: to allow them the possibility of flights over Cuba for inspections from the air, without ground-based monitoring; this was the first point. The second was that the Soviets provide the Americans with information about how much of the weaponry has been dismantled and removed, and when. The important part of this is not to impart secret military information that reveals the nature and capacities of this weaponry.

I rejected here the possibility of flights over Cuba, since that would affect the sovereignty of Cuba itself. The proposal about

information from our side, I said, should be Yesterday in the hour-long discussion discussed with our military specialists, who with McCloy and Stevenson, the positions arrived with me to aid Kuznetsov.

of the parties on all issues connected with McCloy reported with great satisfac- the Cuban conflict were explained, as well tion that on 1 November their plane had as the American position in the form in flown over Cuba without being fired at, and which the Americans consider it necessary had made photos. He attributed this to the to define it. presence of Soviet specialists at the anti-air- We will be sending to you a short excraft missile installations.

position of the most important points of the I conclude that if our agreement with discussion within 2 or 3 hours, and today, 2 Castro not to shoot down American planes November and 1:00 in the afternoon I will retains its force, then when they fly one or be flying to Cuba. Our comrades will comtwo more times it will mean that inspections pose a detailed record of the conversation, on the dismantling have been carried out. and will send it after I am gone. The conThere remains the issue of inspections on versation was important, and you should the removal of the dismantled weaponry, become familiarized with that detailed which could be resolved through means sug- record of it. gested by McCloy.

McCloy has declared that with the aim In view of this, Castro's position, which of speeding up the removal of the missiles, rejects the possibility of on-site inspections, before the fine-tuning of the observation will cease to be an obstacle to settling with system by the Red Cross has been reached, the Americans the issue of monitoring the they agree to and are interested in allowing dismantling and removal of the weaponry. Soviet vessels bound for Cuba entry into

I consider all this to be expedient. Cuban ports without inspection, by way of

In my talks with Castro I will fully ex- a hail like the one that was given to the plain our position on the issue of monitor- tanker “Bucharest." ing in accordance with Khrushchev's mes- We are introducing a proposal to give sage, I will show him its correctness and instructions to all our vessels bound for acceptability, from our point of view, for Cuba to proceed to their destinations. Cuba. In connection with the Americans' pro

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN
posal laid out earlier, and taking into account
the Cubans' arrogance, I consider it expedi- (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,
ent not to insist or ensure that they reject provided to CWIHP, and on file at National
their position on not allowing observers onto Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-
their territory to check on the dismantling lation by John Henriksen.)
and removal process, the position which
they have made clear to U Thant and have Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister
published several times in the press. A. Gromyko to unidentified recipient, 2
In truth, in Castro's speech yesterday

November 1962
this position was made to seem somewhat
more flexible.

2 November 1962
I await instructions concerning this
matter in Havana.

The head of the American delegation

at the negotiations in New York, McCloy, 2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN has informed Comrade Kuznetsov on 31

October that Washington has decided that (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, until the Red Cross has begun its monitorprovided to CWIHP, and on file at National ing of the vessels bound for Cuba, it would Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- not carry out inspections on these vessels, lation by John Henriksen.)

but to apply to them the same procedure that

was applied to the tanker “Bucharest.” DurTelegram from A.I Mikoyan in New ing this time the “quarantine” will be offiYork to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962 cially continued.

As is well known, the tanker 2 November 1962 “Bucharest" passed through a region under

American “quarantine" without hindrance. Six Soviet vessels now on the open sea be- could be reduced to radio interrogations of carrying out of such inspections. In future yond the announced limits of the “quaran- passing ships, Narasimhan answered that in negotiations we should proceed from the tine” have received orders to proceed into many cases it will be precisely that, but that assumption that the Soviet Union will asthe Cuban ports, and at present they are now the International Red Cross observers should sume expenses only for the maintenance of on their way toward Cuba.

have the right to carry out inspections (to Soviet vessels. As far as the maintenance of

check documents, to inspect ship holds, and the International Red Cross vessels is conA. G. so on), if such a necessity should arise. cerned, we will push for the USA or the UN

Our representatives remarked that such bearing the burden of these expenses. (It is (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, a proposal from Narasimhan concerning the not out of the question that the International provided to CWIHP, and on file at National conferral to the International Red Cross Red Cross will itself pay the expenses for Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- groups of inspection rights contradicts the the upkeep of the groups.) lation by John Henriksen.)

views expressed earlier by Stevenson. We On the issue of how long the inspec

will continue to insist that the inspections tion procedure by the International Red Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign be limited to interrogations by radio. Cross would be continued, Narasimhan said Minister V. V. Kuznetsov and Ambassa

The USA, Narasimhan continued, is that it should be carried out for a period of dor to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSR prepared to provide its own transportation three to four weeks. But it is possible that Foreign Ministry, 3 November 1962 for the International Red Cross inspectors. the duration could be shorter. Everything de

This may be ordinary transportation for the pends on how long the removal of weap3 November 1962 conveyance of troops, even though they onry from Cuba would continue. As soon

would be unarmed and would contain on as all the weaponry is removed, the inspecOn 3 November Morozov, Mendel- board civilian passengers.

tions, it seems, should cease. evich, and Timerbaev had a meeting with We told Narasimhan that the Soviet We emphasized that the inspections on Narasimhan and Loutfi (replacing U Thant) Union, as had already been declared to U vessels by the International Red Cross for the examination of technical issues con- Thant, had given its consent to the convey

should be of a short-term nature, as was nected with the sending of observers from ance of the International Red Cross observ- declared by U Thant in his provisional prothe International Red Cross Committee to ers either by Soviet or by neutral vessels. posal concerning this issue, which was apascertain that on the Soviet vessels bound Narasimhan responded that he knew about proved by the Soviet Union. In the future, for Cuba there is no weaponry considered this, but all the same considered it possible with regard to time limits we will proceed offensive by the USA.

to inform the Soviet Union of this proposal with aim of imposing the shortest possible Narasimhan said that the the secretariat by the USA, which, Narasimhan said, works limits. We will aim for ceasing the inspecof the UN in New York had not yet received towards the interests of a speedy organiza- tions immediately after the removal of the the definitive consent of the International tion of the inspections. The USA, in his dismantled installations, and the approval Red Cross to its participation in the organi- words, has no objections to the use of So- by the Security Council of corresponding zation of the monitoring. An answer from viet ships. Narasimhan asked us to explain, resolutions for the conclusive settlement of the Red Cross could be received today, 3 if possible by 5 November, how soon the the Cuban crisis. November.

Soviet Union could prepare its ships for the If our approval of the conveyance of Narasimhan also laid out the thoughts International Red Cross observers. For his the International Red Cross representatives of the Americans, as he understood them, part, Narasimhan will make inquiries by this on Soviet ships is still valid, we ask that you regarding the Red Cross's monitoring pro- time about the possibility of chartering neu- inform us immediately of which vessels in cedure. tral vessels located near Cuba.

particular are being selected for this purpose, The USA considers it expedient to de- Narasimhan raised the issue of reim- and when they can arrive in the Caribbean ploy two vessels with observers from the bursing the costs of chartering the vessels

Sea area. International Red Cross on the open sea near and constituting the International Red Cross Since the Cubans will evidently not the Cuban coast—one 8 to 10 miles off Ha- groups. In response to the question of how agree to admit the International Red Cross vana, and another in the strait between Cuba the USA imagines covering the costs asso- observers onto the territory of Cuba in orand Haiti. The vessels should have radio ciated with the carrying out of inspections der to then admit them onto Soviet ships, contact with the UN. On each vessel there by the International Red Cross, Narasimhan we ask that you inform us what would the should be two groups of International Red said that it was proposing two possible vari- most appropriate port in the Caribbean Sea Cross observers. Each group should contain ants either through the UN (that is, accord- area in which to take on board these Intereight observers. In this way, 32 observers ing to their pay scale), or to divide the costs national Red Cross observers. will be needed in all.

equally between the USSR and the USA. The next meeting with Narasimhan is In response to our question about how Our representatives answered that the slated for the morning of 5 November. to manage such a large number of observ- USA had illegally imposed the so-called ers, especially when bearing in mind that “quarantine,” that they were now pushing

3.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV Stevenson in his talks with us on 1 Novem- for inspections on vessels bound for Cuba,

V. ZORIN ber of this year had expressed his view that and that it was completely clear that it is the International Red Cross inspections they who should covers the expenses for the (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University:)

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to
Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign

Ministry, 4 November 196218

4 November 1962

Today talks were conducted between A.I. Mikoyan and Comrades Fidel Castro, 0. Dorticos, R. Castro, E. Guevara, E. Aragonez, and C.R. Rodriguez, as well as myself.

Comrade Mikoyan conveyed warm, fraternal greetings from the Presidium of the CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev to the Cuban leaders. He expressed a lofty appreciation of the Cuban revolution, and support for the rebuff to the interventionists; he spoke about our support for Cuba; and he remarked that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was delighted by the courage and fearlessness displayed by the leaders of Cuba's revolution in these perilous days, and the readiness of the Cuban people to hold firm. Then Comrade Mikoyan said that when the Central Committee learned of the misunderstanding arising in Cuba of several issues and decisions made by us, they came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to clarify these issues by way of mere correspondence. The Central Committee made the decision to send Comrade Mikoyan to Cuba to clarify to our friends our position, and to inform them of issues that are of interest to them. Comrade Mikoyan remarked that he naturally did not have any intention of exerting pressure; his task was simply to explain our position.

Knowing our Cuban friends, A.I. Mikoyan said, I am sure that they too will agree with this. It could of course turn out such that even after the explanations there will be certain points on which our points of view will remain different.

Fidel Castro declared that he has already informed the Cuban comrades present at the talks of the issues raised by him yesterday before Comrade Mikoyan, and made a short resume of these issues.

A.I. Mikoyan remarked that Fidel Castro spoke yesterday in detail and with sincerity, and asked whether the other com

rades wanted to add anything to this,
whether they had other remarks to make. Your thoughts on the statement that

0. Dorticos asked for an explanation Stevenson should make in connection with
of why N.S. Khrushchev approved the pro- his letter and memorandum do not provoke
posal made by Kennedy to declare that there any objections.
would be no attack on Cuba on the condi- In addition it is necessary for you to
tion of the removal of Soviet missiles from say the following:
Cuba, even though the Cuban government Since when have the planes named by
had not yet at this time expressed its own Stevenson (IL-28 bombers—ed.] become
opinion on this proposal.

offensive weaponry[?] After all, these planes C.R. Rodriguez put a question to Com- are of a type considered outmoded both in rade Mikoyan- where does the Soviet lead- its altitude ceilings and in its speed. The ership see the essence of victory, does it putting forth of such a demand constitutes consist in military success or in diplomatic an intentional seeking out of issues that ensuccess? We believed, Rodriguez noted, that courage discord and a continuation of the we could not yet talk about victory, since tense state of our relations. the guarantees from the USA were ephem- The planes mentioned by Stevenson eral.

are associated with coastal defense weapThen A.I. Mikoyan, developing argu- onry. Such a plane cannot appear in condiments made in N.S. Khrushchev's letters to tions of war over enemy territory, since it Fidel Castro, and also from the discussion does not possess the capacity for attaining of the issue in the Central Committee of the the necessary altitude and speed. It can apCommunist Party of the Soviet Union, of- pear over such territory only with an air esfered additional arguments with the aim of cort. Virtually any military expert would driving away any doubts from the minds of recognize that these planes cannot be placed our Cuban comrades. He spoke moreover in the category of offensive weaponry at the of the main points of his talks with U Thant,

present time. McCloy, and Stevenson.

If the USA honestly gave assurances We will send a full record of the con- that it would not invade Cuba, then the posversation to Moscow via diplomatic mail. session of these planes by the Cubans should Further information on certain new points not elicit any concern. touched on in Mikoyan's explanations will We understood the concerns of the be provided by separate telegram.

Americans when talk began to turn to a defiThe talks lasted seven hours, more than nite sort of missile weaponry. Missiles are five hours of which were taken up by Com- indeed an uninterceptable and instantarade Mikoyan's explanations. Our Cuban neously effective sort of weapon. There is comrades listened with attentiveness to A.I. no reason to put outdated weaponry in the Mikoyan, were interested in details, and offensive category. Such weaponry will sustained the general feeling of cordiality have a defensive, auxiliary function. and trust.

As far as photo reconnaissance and reWe agreed to continue the talks in the connaissance in general are concerned, used same composition tomorrow, on 5 Novem- as they are by all countries, experience ber, at 2:00 in the afternoon local time. shows that it does not always reflect the ac

tual situation. 4.XI.62 ALEKSEEV All this provides the grounds for con

cluding that the most important issues here (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, must be talked about. We must mutually provided to CWIHP, and on file at National fulfill the obligations assumed by all parSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- ties, and then the issue will be exhausted. lation by John Henriksen.)

A. Gromyko
Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister
Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,
Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN provided to CWIHP, and on file at National
Zorin in New York, 4 November 1962 Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-

lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer4 November 1962 sity.)

Telegram (No.4448) from the Minister of the USSR Merchant Fleet to Captain of Ship “Amata” via Soviet ambassador in Havana (Alekseev), 5 November 1962

5 November 1962

I ask that you transmit information on the location of the ship “Amata." Your ship has been selected for use by the Organization of the United Nations for the conveyance of a group of representatives from the International Red Cross consisting of 16 people. Your location, after you take this group on board, should be near the port of Havana, but beyond the 12-mile zone of Cuba's territorial waters. The vessel chosen for these operations should arrive in Havana on 6 November. If you have cargo in your holds leave it in the holds, since the deck should be free. Your ship's number has already been communicated to the UN, as well as the fact that you will be operating at a frequency of 500 kilohertz; beginning on 6 November they will be able to contact you from the UN radio station. On your arrival in Havana, immediately contact our envoy. Bring the vessel into complete order, temporarily move your equipment and crew into tighter quarters, and prepare room for the comfortable accommodation of the representatives of the Red Cross. It is assumed that this group will be with you until 12 November of this year. You will have to come to an agreement with the head of this group concerning food-related matters. You should have ready for operation the ship's motor boat, on which the representatives will be able to travel out onto the arriving vessels. You should follow all the instructions of the group. Report on your carrying out of these instructions, and keep us regularly informed, through closed communication, of your operations.

Zorin in New York, 5 November 1962 mentioned bombers in this category, then

say the following: You must adhere to the following po- In Cuba there are none of our bombers sition in your negotiations on the lifting of which could be put in the category of offenthe blockade, elimination of tension, and sive weaponry. They do so with the IL-28 normalization of the situation in the Carib- bomber. But this machine is 15 years old. bean Sea.

The American military figures surely know The negotiations are being conducted very well that this was the first Soviet plane with the aim of eliminating the tense situa- with a turboreactive engine. Fifteen years tion which has been threatening to explode ago they indeed were rather cutting-edge into thermonuclear war.

machines. But now technology has made so The basis of these negotiations is the many steps ahead that we have not only reagreement reached through an exchange of moved these machines from the arsenal of messages between Comrade N.S. our army, but have even refused to use them Khrushchev and President Kennedy. The as targets for the training of anti-aircraft essence of this agreement is as follows. units in the Soviet Union. These machines

The USA is giving assurances that no are soon going to be scrapped, and if we invasion will be inflicted on Cuba, not only sold them to some country, it would only be on the part of the United States, but also on for using them as training machines for pithe part of their allies— the other countries lot instruction, and to some extent as defenof the Western hemisphere. The Soviet sive means— for the coastal defense of a Union for its part will remove from the Cuba territory with the escort of anti-aircraft mathe missile weaponry that the President of chines, and nothing more. These planes are the USA has called offensive, and will not so far from answering the currents needs for install such types of weaponry in Cuba speed and altitude that their use for other again.

purposes would mean sending people to Such is the basis of the agreement, and certain death. We are sure that the Ameriwe are adhering to it, because it is the only can military and USA intelligence underpossible basis now for eliminating the tense stands this well. situation that has been created. The agree- Indicate that if the representatives of ment is the result of a compromise reached the USA insist on their demand concerning through mutual concessions, and it satisfied the IL-28 planes, then by doing so they will both parties.

only put the USA in a position in which the In accordance with this agreement the whole world will see that the United States Soviets undertook on 28 October the dis- is not keeping its word, and is imposing mantling of the missiles. The dismantling unacceptable conditions that create the poswas completed on 2 November, and the dis- sibility of a prolongation of the conflict. At mantled missiles have been transported to that time the whole world will understand ports for shipping. As you have already been that this is precisely the purpose behind the informed, these missiles will be removed imposition of such conditions. from Cuba on 7 or 8 or at the latest 10 No- In Stevenson's letter of 3 November, vember of this year.

another issue is raised—it asserts that acTell the Americans that if they wish to cording to the reports of American intelliraise other issues, then they will find many gence in Cuba, the assembling of IL-28 such issues on our side as well, issues which bombers is still going on. In response to this, really affect the vital interests of our coun- say that such assertions are an invention of try and which create concerns about our se- American intelligence, because it is imposcurity. But we are not raising any of these sible to see what is not there. Moreover, issues at present, because they are too broad, American photos do not corroborate this. It and their resolution will take a great amount is clear that this false information is pursuof time; moreover, these issues affect not ing the aim of avoiding a settlement of the only our two states, but the large circle of conflict and a normalization of our relations, states, i. e. they belong to the category of and indeed a tightening of tensions. global problems.

As far as other sorts of weaponry are If the USA representatives say that concerned which the American representaPresident Kennedy, in his speech on 22 Oc- tives are now trying to put in the offensive tober speaking about offensive weaponry, category, tell the Americans that it is neces

BAKAEV

(Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.)

Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister
Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN

sary to rigorously proceed from the agree- tries around the Soviet Union.

telegram immediately, I have not had time ment reached through the exchange of let- For this reason, if the parties talk about to submit it to the approval of Comrade ters, that it is necessary for the Americans what was mentioned in the course of the Mikoyan. The talks with Castro will take to hold to the statement of their own Presi- polemic, and it was indeed a polemic, and place on 5 November at 14:00 local time. dent. He said that he was against offensive if each side insists on having things its own weaponry, but in favor of the right of each way, then it will render impossible an agree

5.XI.62 ALEKSEEV side to possess defensive weaponry. ment and the elimination of the tense situa

Say that in general we are not presently tion- in other words, we will return to the (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, authorized to carry on negotiations on points same incendiary situation that existed be- provided to CWIHP, and on file at National that directly concern the defense interests fore, and that was escaped with such diffi- Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; transof the Republic of Cuba. We have not been culty.

lation by J. Henriksen.) authorized by Cuba to carry on such nego- For this reason it is necessary to show tiations. For this reason, if the Americans understanding and respect for the sover- Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister insist on this, it will only complicate the eignty of each state, and to recognize the Gromyko to Mikoyan and Alekseev in settlement. equal rights of all countries to self-defense.

Havana, 5 November 1962 If the Americans take as their goal a return to an incendiary situation, it will

5.XI A. G.

5 November 1962 scarcely be in the interests of either the USA or the USSR, or in the interests of the world. (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, In response to the telegram from ComWe propose to choose reasonable positions, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National rade Alekseev. In the event that it is necesand to proceed in the negotiations from the Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- sary, you should explain to Fidel Castro that agreement that has been reached. We have lation by John Henriksen.)

the readiness to dismantle the installations already fulfilled our obligations, have dis

of the so-called “offensive weaponry” was mantled our missiles, have loaded them onto Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to first mentioned only in N.S. Khrushchev’s ships, and in the coming days, that is, not Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign message to Kennedy of 27 October. later than 10 November, all these materials Ministry, 5 November 1962

It is obvious that some misunderstandwill be removed from Cuba. The other side,

ing could arise from the fact that Kennedy's the United States, should also carry out its

5 November message to N.S. Khrushchev of 27 October obligations, and lift the blockade that has

spoke (with reference to N.S. Khrushchev's been called a “quarantine.” Let us formal- In connection with our explanations to message of 26 October) of the “removal" ize this in documents with the aim that each Fidel Castro of how the decisive moment of the weaponry from Cuba; but that was side affirm its statements in documents, that for us did not allow time for consultation his, Kennedy's, interpretation of the issue. is, let us formalize this agreement on the with him on the issue of dismantling, he As N.S. Khrushchev's message of 26 Octobasis of which this dangerous moment in drew his own conclusions from the ex- ber makes clearly evident, it made absothe history of our countries, which really change of messages betwen N.S. lutely no reference to an agreement about could erupt in a catastrophic thermonuclear Khrushchev and Kennedy, and doubts crept the “removal" of our weaponry from Cuba. war, can be eliminated.

into his mind as to whether we had famil- Since N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy Say that we believe that the elimina- iarized him with all the letters.

did not exchange any other messages or tion of this especially difficult situation, and In particular, he says that it follows statements in those days, besides the ones the formalization of this in documents, from Kennedy's open message of 27 Octo- familiar to our Cuban friends, Fidel Castro's would serve as a good beginning in the reso- ber that our decision regarding the disman- doubts about whether we might have given lution of issues that our states and indeed tling had been communicated to Kennedy our consent to the dismantling of the weapthe whole world faces. This is the issue of even before that date.

onry and its removal from Cuba before 27 disarmament, the issue of the elimination Before 27 October, I passed on to October should disappear completely. of bases, the prohibition of thermonuclear Castro two confidential letters from N.S. arms testing, the signing of agreements on Khrushchev to President Kennedy: of 23 and

A. G. non-agression between Warsaw Pact and 26 October. NATO countries.

On the basis of the correspondence I (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, Emphasize that if the USA intends to have come to the opinion that Kennedy did provided to CWIHP, and on file at National insist on discussing the issues it has raised, not yet have a basis in the message of 27 Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; transbecause the President spoke about them and October for drawing the conclusion that we lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univerbecause they allegedly also relate to the con- gave our consent for the dismantling before sity.) ditions of the agreement, then it is fitting to that date, and it is necessary somehow to remind them that N.S. Khrushchev also explain this to Castro. Comrade Mikoyan Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to raised other issues in his messages. Both we has entrusted me with the task of looking the USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign and the Americans know that USA missile into the issue raised by Castro.

Ministry, 5 November 1962 bases are distributed throughout many coun- In view of the necessity of sending this

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