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CPSU Central Committee, at a dinner both Kennedy brothers and be believing what he and Khrushchev party at the home of Interior Secretary Khrushchev-a prospect the Americans had said—that there were no long-range Stewart Udall on the evening of No- thought would last through a second missiles in Cuba. In any case I said that vember 30an occasion one American Kennedy Administration-ended with this matter was far more serious than present described as a “strange, seem- the U.S. president's assassination in the air space over Cuba and involved ingly unreal evening” as enemies who Dallas in November 1963 and peoples all over the world. had nearly engaged in thermonuclear Khrushchev's toppling less than a year I said that he had better understand war only weeks war wiled away the later.

the situation and he had better commuhours in drinking, toasts, and (some

nicate that understanding to Mr. times forced) convivial conversation.13

Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he A wily diplomatic trouble-shooter since

had misled us. The Soviet Union had the Stalin era, Mikoyan was passing Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandum secretly established missile bases in through Washington after three weeks for Dean Rusk on Meeting with Cuba while at the same time proclaimof difficult negotiations in Cuba with Anatoly F. Dobrynin on ing, privately and publicly, that this Fidel Castro over the outcome of the

27 October 1962

would never be done. I said those miscrisis and a day before the Udall affair

sile bases had to go and they had to go had met with President Kennedy at the TOP SECRET

right away. We had to have a commitWhite House. Office of the Attorney General

ment by at least tomorrow that those Before the meal was served (as Washington, D.C.

bases would be removed. This was not Mikoyan related in a cable printed in October 30, 1962

an ultimatum, I said, but just a statethis Bulletin), Robert Kennedy invited

ment of fact. He should understand that Mikoyan into a separate room for a tete- MEMORANDUM FOR THE if they did not remove those bases then a-tete in which he underlined the im- SECRETARY OF STATE FROM we would remove them. His country portance above all ("even more impor- THE ATTORNEY GENERAL might take retaliatory actions but he tant than the fates of my children and

should understand that before this was your grandchildren") of restoring per- At the request of Secretary Rusk, I over, while there might be dead Amerisonal trust between his brother and telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at cans there would also be dead Russians. Khrushchev. Mikoyan not only agreed approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, He then asked me what offer we and assured Robert Kennedy that October 27th. I asked him if he would were making. I said a letter had just Khrushchev felt the same way, but said come to the Justice Department at a been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy that the Soviet government applauded quarter of eight.

which stated in substance that the misthe president's “self-possession" and We met in my office. I told him sile bases should be dismantled and all willingness to compromise at “the most first that we understood that the work offensive


should be removed dangerous moment, when the world was continuing on the Soviet missile from Cuba. In return, if Cuba and stood at the edge of thermonuclear war.” bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to Castro and the Communists ended their

Moscow, moreover, Mikoyan him that in the last two hours we had subversive activities in other Central added, had “noticed the positive role found that our planes flying over Cuba and Latin-American countries, we that you, the president's brother, played had been fired upon and that one of our would agree to keep peace in the Carduring the confidential negotiations" U-2’s had been shot down and the pilot ibbean and not permit an invasion from between the U.S. and Soviet leaderships killed. I said these men were flying un- American soil. during the crisis. Robert Kennedy ex- armed planes.

He then asked me about pressed an interest in visiting the USSR, I told him that this was an ex- Khrushchev's other proposal dealing an idea which Mikoyan warmly en- tremely serious turn in events. We with the removal of the missiles from dorsed, especially should relations be- would have to make certain decisions Turkey. I replied that there could be no tween the two rivals improve after sur- within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. quid pro quo no deal of this kind viving (and resolving) the rough Cuban There was a very little time left. If the could be made. This was a matter that passage.

Cubans were shooting at our planes, had to be considered by NATO and that Those relations did in fact improve then we were going to shoot back. This it was up to NATO to make the decisomewhat in the succeeding months, could not help but bring on further in- sion. I said it was completely imposleading to, among other events, John F. cidents and that he had better under- sible for NATO to take such a step unKennedy's conciliatory American Uni- stand the full implications of this mat- der the present threatening position of versity speech in April 1963 and the ter.

the Soviet Union. If some time clapsed signing of U.S.-Soviet pacts on a lim- He raised the point that the argu- - and per your instructions, menited nuclear test ban and a hot line be- ment the Cubans were making was that tioned four or five months tsaid tween Washington and Moscow. But we were violating Cuban air space. I was sure that these matters could be the post-Cuban Missile Crisis opening replied that if we had not been violat- resolved satisfactorily: (crossed out by for a continued rapprochement between ing Cuban air space then we would still hand-ed.)

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

RFK: amn

(Source: John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; provided to CWIHP by Prof. Peter Roman, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA.)

Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 75, 77-80.

indeed, were in your favor. The success does not 4

Dobrynin's cabled report (dated 24 October upset us either—though that is of course your 1962) of the October 23 meeting with RFK can internal affair. You managed to pin your politibe found in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 71- cal rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did not draw 73; see also Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, tears from our eyes either...." See James A. 65-66, and Schlesinger, Jr., Robert F. Kennedy Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisted and His Times, 553-554, which cites RFK's un- (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 290. published memorandum of the meeting. Neither


See Dobrynin cable of 12 November 1962, of those accounts note RFK's agitated state, which printed in this Bulletin, and also Schlesinger, Dobrynin highlighted. Dobrynin's cable clearly Robert F. Kennedy and His Times, 567-568.

13 served as a principal source for the account pub- See Mikoyan report on the Udall dinner, 30 lished in Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: November 1962, in this Bulletin; the American Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War account of the party is from George Ball, The Past Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), 81- Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: 82. Dobrynin notes that he deliberately did not Norton, 1982), 308-309. sugarcoat Robert Kennedy's critical comments about the Kremlin leadership in order to get across the seriousness of the situation.] 5 See Dobrynin cable of 5 November 1962 in this Bulletin. 6

See transcript of 16 October 1962 ExComm
meeting, 6:30-7:55 p.m., John F. Kennedy Li-
brary, Boston, MA. The transcript quotes RFK
as wondering “...whether there is some other way
we can get involved in this through, uh,

there's some ship that, you know, sink the Maine
again or something."

See Schlesinger, Robert F. Kennedy and His
Times, 546, 548-49.

Dobrynin, In Confidence, 82-83.

See Dobrynin cable of 30 October 1962 printed in this Bulletin. Although Robert Kennedy's notes for this meeting and a memorandum to Rusk have been cited from the RFK papers by his biographer-see Schlesinger, Jr., Robert F. Kennedy and

http://www.seas.gwu/nsarchive/cwihp Hist Times, 563-564—State Department historians have been unable to locate a U.S. record of this meeting: see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961

-and to learn about 1963, Vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges the National Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), source note on p. 189. The letter Robert

Archive, the leading Kennedy handed back, from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy dated 28 October 1962, was first pub- user of the Freedom lished in the Spring 1992 issue of Problems of Communism, 60-62, and also appears in FRUS. of Information Act to 1961-1963, Vol. VI, pp. 189—190. 10 See Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 90-91.

obtain the declassifi11 Nixon had been defeated by his Democratic

cation of American rival in the California gubernatorial elections, upon which he announced his retirement from

documents, visit: politics. The relevant passage in Khrushchev's 12 November 1962 message read: “Now the elections in your country, Mr. President, are over. You

http://www.seas.gwu/nsarchive made a statement that you were very pleased with the results of these elections. They, the elections,

For the Electronic Bulletin and more on the latest findings on Cold communist archives, come visit CWIHP's site on the World

Wide Web:

1 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir
of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton,
1969; citations from Mentor/New American Li-
brary paperback edition, 1969). Questions about
the book's reliability deepened after another
former Kennedy aide, speechwriter Theodore
Sorensen, acknowledged that, as an uncredited
editor of the manuscript, he had taken it upon him-
self to delete “explicit” references to the arrange-
ment he and Soviet ambassador Anatoly F.
Dobrynin reached on the evening of 27 October
1962 regarding the removal of U.S. Jupiter mis-
siles from Turkey as part of the settlement of the
crisis. Also problematic is the fact that Robert
Kennedy's original diary, on which the book is
based, has not been opened to researchers.
Sorensen made his confession upon being chal-
lenged by Dobrynin at a January 1989 oral his-
tory conference on the crisis held in Moscow. See
Barton J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile
Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the Ameri-
can Jupiters in Turkey,” in James A. Nathan, ed.,
The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York:
St. Martin's 1992), 55-129, esp. 56-57, 94-96,
125-126 fn 183.
2 The most detailed account of Robert F.
Kennedy's part in the missile crisis, and his life
generally, can be found in Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., Robert F. Kennedy and His Times (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1978; citations from Futura
Publications paperback edition, 1979).

See Jim Hershberg, “Anatomy of a Controversy:
Anatoly F. Dobrynin's Meeting with Robert F.
Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962;" CWIHP

“Lessons” of the Cuban Missile Crisis for

Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations

by Mark Kramer

Union to handle on its own, not a mat- been concerned well before the Cuban ter for the Warsaw Pact.

missile crisis about the difficulty of reThe role of the Warsaw Pact in the Despite the near-irrelevance of the taining secure control over nuclear Cuban missile crisis was negligible. All Warsaw Pact during the crisis, the weapons and about the danger of unauevidence suggests that the Soviet Union events of October 1962 did have impor- thorized actions, the crisis put these neither consulted nor even informed its tant effects on the alliance, particularly risks into a whole new light. By unEast European allies about the installa- on the nuclear command-and-control derscoring how easily control could be tion of medium-range and tactical arrangements that were established in lost, the crisis inevitably bolstered nuclear missiles in Cuba before the de- the mid-1960s. This article will draw Moscow's determination to ensure strict ployment of the former was revealed by on recent disclosures from the East Ger- centralized command over all nuclear the U.S. government. Nor did the So- man, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hun- operations, including nuclear operations viet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact garian archives to show how the Cuban conducted by the Warsaw Pact. allies about the removal of the missiles. missile crisis influenced Warsaw Pact One of the most disconcerting lesAlthough the Pact declared a joint mili- nuclear operations. No definitive judg- sons of the Cuban missile crisis from tary alert on 23 October 1962 (the day ments about this matter are yet possible the Soviet perspective was the potenafter President John F. Kennedy's tele- because the most crucial documents are tial for nuclear weapons to be misused vised revelation of the Soviet missile de- all in Moscow, and the archival situa- if the aims of local actors were not idenployments), the alert had no more than tion in Russia is still highly unsatisfac- tical to Soviet goals. It is now known a symbolic impact and was carried out tory.? Nevertheless, enough evidence that at the height of the crisis Fidel solely at Moscow's behest.2 The joint has emerged from East-Central Europe Castro sent a top-secret cable to Mosalert was formally cancelled on 21 No- to permit several tentative conclusions. cow urging the Soviet Union to launch vember 1962, the same day that the The article will begin by briefly re- a nuclear strike against the United States Soviet Union ended its own unilateral viewing the “lessons” that the Cuban

if U.S. forces invaded Cuba. 9 Castro alert (and a day after the U.S. naval missile crisis offered for Soviet nuclear apparently had been led to believe that blockade of Cuba was lifted).” So pe- weapons deployments abroad. It will the Soviet Union would be willing to ripheral was the alliance to the Soviet then delineate the command-and-con- go to war—and risk its own destrucUnion's handling of the crisis that it was trol arrangements that were set up in the tion-in defense of Cuba. Nikita not until long after the matter had been mid-1960s for Warsaw Pact nuclear Khrushchev's response to Castro's plea resolved that the Soviet Prime Minis- operations, and examine the East Euro- indicates that the Soviet leader had no ter, Anastas Mikoyan, bothered to in- pean states' unsuccessful efforts to al- intention of ordering the use of nuclear form the East European governments ter those arrangements. The article will weapons, regardless of what happened about the Soviet Union's motives for de- conclude with some observations about ploying and withdrawing the missiles.4 the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis For Khrushchev, this episode was

The marginal significance of the for Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, a especially unnerving because he iniWarsaw Pact during the Cuban missile legacy that endured until the Pact itself tially had given serious consideration crisis hardly comes as a great surprise. collapsed in 1990-91.

to providing Castro with direct comIn 1962 the Pact was still little more than

mand over Soviet forces in Cuba, ina paper organization and had not yet “Lessons” from the Missile Crisis cluding the nuclear-capable Frog acquired a meaningful role in Soviet

("Luna") missiles and Il-28 aircraft.

11 military strategy. Moreover, the crisis

Several features of the Cuban mis- (Only the medium-range SS-4 and SSwas far outside the European theater, sile crisis were of direct relevance to 5 missiles would have been left under and East European leaders had resisted Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Moscow's command.) As it turned out, Soviet efforts to extend the alliance's Europe later on. The "lessons” that Khrushchev decided not to give Castro purview beyond the continent. Despite Soviet officials derived from the crisis any direct jurisdiction over Soviet tacfears that the showdown over Cuba were of course not the only factor (or tical nuclear forces; indeed, the draft might spark a NATO-Warsaw Pact con- even the most important factor) shap- treaty on military cooperation between frontation in Berlin, the situation in ing the Warsaw Pact's nuclear command the Soviet Union and Cuba, which was Germany remained calm throughout the structure, but they seem to have been due to take effect once the presence of crisis. 6 Hence, the standoff in the Car- of considerable influence, at least im- the Soviet missiles in Cuba was pubibbean was a matter for the Soviet plicitly. Although Soviet leaders had licly announced by Moscow and Ha

to Cuba. 10

vana later that fall, would have left the cedural restrictions—at least for tacti- trol over all nuclear operations, was the “military units of the two states under cal missiles—even after he received the role that accidents played. The most the command of their respective gov- two telegrams that "categorically" for- conspicuous instance came on 27 Ocernments.”12 Even so, the Cuban bade him to order the issuance or use tober when an American U-2 reconnaisleader's message on 26 October still of nuclear weapons without express au- sance aircraft was shot down over struck a raw nerve in Moscow. 13 It was thorization. On 26 October he sent a

Cuba. 22 The rules of engagement for a vivid reminder of the dangers that cable to Moscow in which he apparently Soviet troops in Cuba did not permit the might have resulted if the Soviet Union mentioned that Castro wanted him to downing of American planes except had delegated any responsibility for prepare for a nuclear strike and that,


those carrying out an attack.23 When nuclear operations.

a result, he had decided it was time to the U-2 was shot down, no one in MosA related lesson about the dangers move nuclear warheads closer to the cow was quite sure what had happosed by local actors pertained to the missiles (though without actually issu- pened—Khrushchev and most others role of the commander of Soviet forces ing them to the missile units). Pliev then mistakenly thought that Castro had orin Cuba, Army-General Issa Pliev, who requested that his decision be approved dered Soviet troops to fire at the planewas chosen for the post because of his and that he be given due authority to but everyone was certain that further long-standing and very close friendship order the preparation of tactical missiles incidents of this sort might cause the with both Khrushchev and the Soviet for launch if, as appeared imminent, crisis to spin out of control.24 The risks Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion U.S. troops invaded the island. 18 So- posed by accidents would have been Malinovskii. 14 At no time during the viet leaders immediately turned down especially great if the local commander crisis did Pliev have authority to order both of his requests and reemphasized (i.e., Pliev) had been given independent the use of either medium-range or tac- that no actions involving nuclear weap- authority to order the use of nuclear tical nuclear missile but it is now ons were to be undertaken without di

weapons. After all, Pliev and other ofknown that several weeks before the rect authorization from Moscow. 19 ficers based in Cuba, whose lives were crisis—in the late summer of 1962- Still, the very fact that Pliev sought directly at risk during the crisis, were Malinovskii had considered the possi- to have the restrictions lifted, and his naturally inclined to overreact to uninbility of giving Pliev pre-delegated au- seeming willingness to use tactical tended "provocations" from the opposthority to order the use of tactical mis- nuclear weapons if necessary, provided ing side. To the extent that such oversiles against invading U.S. troops if a sobering indication of the risks en- reactions could not be avoided in future Pliev's lines of communication with tailed in giving discretion to local com- crises, it was essential that the conseMoscow were severed and all other manders. The risks would have been quences be minimized and that further means of defense against an invasion especially acute in this instance because escalation be prevented. Obviously, it had proven insufficient. A written or- there were no technical safeguards on would be vastly more difficult to regain der to this effect was prepared on 8 Sep- the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve any semblance of control if local actors tember 1962, but in the end Malinovskii as a fallback in case Pliev (or someone "accidentally" resorted to the use of declined to sign it.15 Thus, at the time else) attempted to circumvent the pro- nuclear weapons. of the crisis Pliev had no independent cedural safeguards.20 This is not to say Hence, the accidents that occurred authority to order the use of nuclear that it would have been easy for Pliev during the Cuban missile crisis underweapons or even to order that nuclear to evade the procedural limits—to do scored the need for rigid safeguards, warheads, which were stored separately so he would have had to obtain coop- both procedural and technical, to prefrom the missiles, be released for pos- eration from troops all along the chain clude the use of Soviet nuclear weapsible employment. The limitations on of command—but there was no techni- ons except in the most dire emergency. Pliev's scope of action during the crisis cal barrier per se to unauthorized ac- This lesson, like the others that were reinforced by two cables transmit- tions.

Khrushchev and his colleagues derived ted by Malinovskii on 22 and 25 Octo- Thus, one of the clear lessons of from the crisis, survived the change of ber, which "categorically" prohibited the crisis was the need not only to main- leadership in Moscow in October 1964. any use of nuclear weapons under any tain stringent procedural safeguards for Although Leonid Brezhnev altered circumstances without explicit authori- all Soviet nuclear forces, but also to many aspects of Khrushchev's military zation from Moscow. 16

equip those forces with elaborate tech- policies, he was just as determined as The strictures imposed by the So- nical devices that would prevent unau- his predecessor to retain stringent poviet leadership held up well during the thorized or accidental launches. This litical control over Soviet nuclear crisis, as the procedural safeguards for applied above all to nuclear weapons forces. nuclear operations proved sufficient to deployed abroad, where the lines of forestall any untoward incidents. 17 For

communication were more vulnerable Nuclear Operations and the most part, Khrushchev's and to being severed or disrupted.21

the Warsaw Pact Malinovskii's faith in Pliev was well- One further lesson from the Cuban founded. Nevertheless, it is clear that missile crisis, which reinforced the per- Nuclear weapons first became an Pliev wanted to ease some of the pro- ceived need for strict, centralized con- issue for the Warsaw Pact in mid-1958

when, allegedly in response to deploy- 1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exer- slovakia was concluded just after the ments by NATO, Khrushchev warned cises included combat techniques for Soviet Union had worked out a similar that the Pact would be “compelled by nuclear warfare (as they routinely did arrangement with Hungary.32 The Soforce of circumstance to consider sta- from early 1962 on), the decision on viet-Hungarian agreement was signed tioning (tactical nuclear] missiles in the when to “go nuclear” was left entirely by Brezhnev and the Hungarian leader, German Democratic Republic, Poland, to the Soviet High Command and po- Janos Kadar, and was kept secret from and Czechoslovakia."25 Shortly there- litical leadership.28 In every respect, , almost all other Hungarian officials. after, the Czechoslovak, East German, then, the East European governments

Much the same was true of an agreeand Polish armed forces began receiv- were denied any say in the use of the ment that the Soviet Union concluded ing nuclear-capable aircraft and surface- Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal.

with Poland in early 1967.33 Only a to-surface missiles from the Soviet The exclusivity of Soviet command few top Polish officials were permitted Union.26 The Bulgarian and Hungar- was reinforced by secret agreements to find out about the document. ian armies also soon obtained nuclear- that the Soviet Union concluded in the The Soviet agreements with all four capable aircraft and missiles from Mos- early to mid-1960s with Czechoslova- countries covered nuclear warheads cow; and even the Romanian military kia, East Germany, Hungary, and Po- slated for use on delivery vehicles bewas eventually supplied with nuclear- land regarding the storage of nuclear longing to Soviet troops stationed in capable Frog-7 and Scud-B missiles. In warheads in those countries. Although those countries. Some of the warheads all cases, the deployment of these de- all the agreements were bilateral, they were also intended for weapons delivery vehicles was well under way by were described as coming "within the ployed by the local armies, but in that the time of the Cuban missile crisis. framework of the Warsaw Pact.” The case the delivery vehicles would have

The wartime command-and-con- first such agreements were signed with been transferred to direct Soviet comtrol arrangements for the new East Eu- East Germany and Czechoslovakia be- mand. Under the new agreements East ropean weapons were still in flux in fore the Cuban missile crisis. The So- European officials had no role in the use 1962, and a variety of options were un- viet-East German agreements, signed at of the Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal, nor der consideration. One such option had various intervals in the early 1960s, any control over the reinforced storage been alluded to in 1959 by the East covered some 16 storage sites, all of bunkers for nuclear warheads (or even German government, which announced which were controlled exclusively by the housing for elite units assigned to that it would "request its allies to place special troops assigned to the Group of guard the bunkers). A senior East Eu[nuclear] missile weapons at its dis- Soviet Forces in Germany.29 The East ropean military official later confirmed posal" if the West German government German authorities had no say at all in that “the procedures for the defense and gained a role in NATO's nuclear opera- the location or maintenance of these protection of these special-purpose stortions.27 At the time, Soviet officials facilities, not to mention the use of the age centers for nuclear warheads were had reacted warily to this proposal, but munitions stored there.

such that no one from our side had perhad not dismissed it out of hand. Soviet agreements with Czechoslo- mission to enter, and even Soviet offiMoscow's stance changed, however, in vakia were somewhat more complicated cials who were not directly responsible the aftermath of the Cuban missile cri- because no Soviet troops had been for guarding and operating the buildsis. From then on, all wartime com- present on Czechoslovak territory since ings were not allowed in."34 mand-and-control arrangements for al- the end of 1945. Two preliminary Thus, by the late 1960s the Soviet lied nuclear operations were made to fit agreements were signed in August 1961 and East European governments had a single pattern. The East European and February 1962 entitling the Soviet forged a nuclear command-and-control countries’ weapons were still officially Union to dispatch nuclear warheads structure for the Warsaw Pact that gave described as components of the “War- immediately to Czechoslovakia in the exclusive say to the Soviet Union. Even saw Pact's joint nuclear forces” and event of an emergency.

before the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet were used for simulated nuclear strikes Cuban missile crisis, those two agree- leaders had been inclined to move in this during Pact exercises, but all nuclear ments were supplanted by a much more direction, but the crisis greatly accelerwarheads for the delivery systems re- far-reaching "Treaty Between the Gov- ated the trend and effectively ruled out mained under exclusive Soviet control, ernments of the USSR and CSSR on anything less than complete control in and the delivery vehicles themselves Measures to Increase the Combat Moscow. would have come under direct Soviet Readiness of Missile Forces,” which command if they had ever been was signed by Malinovskii and his Intra-Pact Debate on Nuclear equipped with nuclear warheads during Czechoslovak counterpart, Army-Gen

"Sharing" a crisis. Moreover, the thousands of eral Bohumir Lomsky, in December tactical nuclear weapons deployed by 1965.31 The treaty provided for the The effects of the Cuban missile Soviet forces on East European terri- permanent stationing of Soviet nuclear crisis could also be felt, if only implictory were not subject to any sort of warheads at three sites in western itly, when the Soviet Union had to deal “dual-key” arrangement along the lines Czechoslovakia.

with complaints from its allies about the that NATO established in the mid- This third agreement with Czecho- Warsaw Pact's nuclear arrangements.

30 After the

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