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The lack of East European input proved leagues, however, were averse to any week, a detailed Romanian proposal for unsatisfactory to several of the allied steps that would even marginally erode modifications to the alliance was leaked governments, who urged that they be the Soviet Union's exclusive authority to the French Communist newspaper, given some kind of role in nuclear-re- to order nuclear strikes, and it soon be- L'Humanite; the document called for, lease authorization. Their concerns came clear during the meeting that So- among other things, an East European were prompted in part by changes in viet views on such matters would pre- role in any decisions involving the poSoviet military doctrine in the mid- vail. As a result, the PCC communique tential use of nuclear weapons. 44 Sub1960s, which seemed to open the way simply called for both German states to sequently, at the July 1966 session of for a nuclear or conventional war con- forswear nuclear weapons, proposed the the PCC in Bucharest, officials from fined to Europe. Under Khrushchev, creation of a nuclear-free zone in cen- Romania, Czechoslovakia, and HunSoviet military doctrine had long been tral Europe, and advocated a freeze on gary renewed their bid for "greater predicated on the assumption that any all nuclear stockpiles.39 The implica- rights of co-determination in planning war in Europe would rapidly escalate tion was that arrangements within the and implementing common coalition to an all-out nuclear exchange between Warsaw Pact were best left unchanged. matters," including (by implication) the the superpowers; but by the time That stance was reaffirmed over the use of nuclear weapons. Khrushchev was ousted in October next few months in a series of conspicu- As on previous occasions, however, 1964, Soviet military theorists had al- ous Soviet declarations that “the War- the Soviet Union resisted whatever presready begun to imply that a European saw Pact is dependent on the Soviet stra- sure was exerted for the sharing of conflict need not escalate to the level tegic missile forces” and that “the se- nuclear-release authority. In Septemof strategic nuclear war.35 Under curity of all socialist countries is reli- ber 1966, a few months after the Brezhnev, Soviet military analyses of ably guaranteed by the nuclear missile Bucharest conference, the Warsaw Pact limited warfare in Europe, including the strength of the Soviet Union."40 (Ital- conducted huge “Vltava” exercises, selective use of tactical nuclear weap- ics added by the author.) The same which included simulated nuclear ons, grew far more explicit and elabo- message was conveyed later in the year strikes under exclusive Soviet con

36 rate. Although this doctrinal shift by the joint “October Storm” military trol. 46 The same arrangement was premade sense from the Soviet perspective, exercises in East Germany, which fea- served in all subsequent Pact maneuvers it stirred unease among East European tured simulated nuclear strikes autho- involving simulated nuclear exchanges. leaders, who feared that their countries rized solely by the USSR.41 In the

Thus, well before the signing of the might be used as tactical nuclear battle- meantime, the Soviet monopoly over 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty put a grounds without their having the slight- allied nuclear weapons procedures was symbolic end to the whole nuclear-sharest say in it.

being reinforced by the series of agree- ing debate, the Soviet Union had firmly The issue became a source of con- ments signed with Czechoslovakia, East established its exclusive, centralized tention at the January 1965 meeting of Germany, Hungary, and Poland, as dis- control over the Warsaw Pact's “joint" the Warsaw Pact's Political Consulta- cussed above. The codification of ex- nuclear forces and operations. tive Committee (PCC), where the as- clusive Soviet control over nuclear sembled leaders discussed NATO's weapons deployed in the other Warsaw The Lessons of the Crisis and plans to create a Multi-Lateral Force Pact countries all but eliminated any Allied Nuclear Arrangements (MLF) that would supposedly give West

basis for the East European governGermany access to nuclear-armed mis- ments to seek a role in the alliance's The legacy of the Cuban missile siles. The PCC warned that if an MLF nuclear command structure.

crisis helped ensure that the intra-Warwere formed and the West Germans Yet even after the Soviet Union saw Pact debate in the mid-1960s did were included, the Warsaw Pact would tried to put the matter to rest, contro- not bring about any change in the have to resort to “defensive measures versy persisted within the Warsaw Pact alliance's nuclear command-and-conand corresponding steps."

about the allocation of responsibility for trol structure. Had it not been for the ture of these "corresponding steps" was tactical nuclear weapons. At a closed dangers that were so clearly revealed by never specified, but Romanian and meeting of Pact leaders in East Berlin the events of October 1962, Soviet leadCzechoslovak officials at the meeting in February 1966, Romania again ers might have been willing to consider maintained that the obvious solution pressed for greater East European par- an arrangement for the Warsaw Pact was for the Soviet Union to grant its ticipation in all aspects of allied mili- similar to the "dual-key" system that Warsaw Pact allies a direct say in the tary planning, and was again re- NATO adopted. When Operation use of nuclear weapons stationed on

buffed.42 A few months later, the “Anadyr” was first being planned in the East European soil.38 The Romanians Czechoslovak Defense Minister, Army- late spring of 1962, Khrushchev had were especially insistent on having re- General Bohumir Lomsky, publicly de- flirted with the idea of giving Fidel sponsibility shared for all Warsaw Pact clared that the East European states Castro broad command over Soviet tacnuclear systems, including those de- should be given increased responsibil- tical nuclear weapons in Cuba as well ployed with the various Groups of So- ity for the full range of issues confront- as over all non-nuclear forces on the viet Forces. Brezhnev and his col- ing the Warsaw Pact.43 That same island. Ultimately, Khrushchev decided

.-37 The na

not to share or delegate any responsi- same was true of Soviet tactical weap- tant about ordering the nuclear destrucbility for the nuclear-capable weapons ons by the early to mid-1970s.47

Con- tion of a site in Western Europe, not based in Cuba, but the very fact that the cerns in Moscow about the physical least because the launch of nuclear issue was considered at all suggests that security of nuclear weapons were hardly

security of nuclear weapons were hardly weapons against West European targets if the Cuban missile crisis had not in- negligible before October 1962—in part might well have provoked retaliatory tervened, the Soviet Union might have because of the possibility that requisite strikes by NATO against East European been receptive to some form of nuclear procedures might not be followed—but sites. The problem would have been es"sharing" with its East European allies. it was not until after the Cuban missile pecially salient in the case of East GerIndeed, a "dual-key” arrangement for crisis that Soviet leaders fully appreci- man officials who would have been the Warsaw Pact, which would not have ated the magnitude of this risk. asked to go along with nuclear strikes provided any independent authority to The Cuban missile crisis also against targets in West Germany. Thus, the East European countries, could eas- heightened Soviet concerns about the even though Soviet officials could have ily have been justified as a response to particular dangers posed by crises. To developed a hedge against the risks that NATO's policy and as a useful means be sure, Soviet leaders were hardly emerged during the Cuban missile criof strengthening allied cohesion. But complacent before October 1962 about sis, the safeguards needed for this purafter October 1962, when Soviet lead- the need to maintain tight political con- pose would have been extremely burers evidently drew a number of lessons trol over nuclear operations; indeed, the densome, depriving the Pact of the abilabout the risks of even sharing, much stringent centralization of nuclear com- ity to respond in a timely manner. From less delegating, nuclear authority, the mand was a consistent theme in Soviet the Soviet perspective, it made far more prospects of adopting a "dual-key” sys- military planning.48 Even so, it was sense to circumvent the problem entem for the Warsaw Pact essentially van- not until after the Cuban missile crisis— tirely by eschewing any form of shared ished.

and especially in light of the unexpected authority. Although Moscow's willingness to interventions by Fidel Castro—that this It is ironic that the Cuban missile share control over the Warsaw Pact's factor became a paramount reason to crisis, which barely involved the War"joint” nuclear arsenal would have been deny any share of nuclear-release au- saw Pact at all, would have had such an sharply constrained even before Octo- thorization to the East European gov- important long-term effect on the alliber 1962 by the lack of permissive-ac- ernments. Although East European of- ance. It is also ironic that the actions of tion links (PALs) and other use-denial ficials could not have ordered the use a third party, Fidel Castro, posed one mechanisms on Soviet nuclear weap- of nuclear weapons on their own, they of the greatest dangers during an event ons, that factor alone would not have might have inadvertently (or deliber- that has traditionally been depicted as a been decisive if the Cuban missile cri- ately) taken steps in a crisis that would bilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Not sis had not occurred. After all, when have caused NATO governments to be- only must the Cuban missile crisis be Soviet officials seriously contemplated lieve that a Warsaw Pact nuclear strike

lieve that a Warsaw Pact nuclear strike thought of as a “triangular” showdown; allotting partial nuclear authority to was forthcoming, regardless of what its repercussions can now be seen to Castro in 1962, that was long before actual Soviet intentions were. That, in have been at least as great for Soviet Soviet tactical weapons were equipped turn, might have triggered a preemptive allies, notably Cuba and Eastern Euwith PALs. The physical separation of nuclear attack by NATO. Only by ex- rope, as for the Soviet Union itself. warheads from delivery vehicles, as had cluding the East European states altobeen planned for the missiles based in gether from the nuclear-release process 1 This statement is based on a perusal of docuCuba, was regarded at the time as a suf- could the Soviet Union avoid the unin

ments from the East German, Czechoslovak, and ficient (if cumbersome) barrier against tended escalation of a crisis.

Polish archives. See, e.g., “Odvolanie opatreni v

zavislosti s usnesenim VKO UV KSC, 25.10.62 unauthorized actions. That approach The risks posed by a "dual-key” (Karibska krize)” 25 October 1962 (Top Secret), had long been used for tactical weap- arrangement could have been mitigated in Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) Praha, ons deployed by Soviet forces in East- if the Soviet Union had built in extra

Fond (F.) Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany (MNO)

CSSR, 1962, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu ern Europe, and it would have been just procedural and technical safeguards, but

cs. armady (GS/OS), 8/25. as efficacious if a "dual-key" system this in turn would have created opera

2

"V shtabe Ob"edinennykh Vooruzhenykh Sil had been adopted—that is, if the East tional problems for Soviet troops who stran Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Pravda (MosEuropean armies had been given con- might one day have been ordered to use

cow), 23 October 1962, p. 1. For the effects of

the alert from 27 October through 23 November, trol over the Pact's nuclear-capable de- the weapons. If a future conflict had

see the series of top-secret memoranda to the livery vehicles. After the Cuban mis- become so dire that Soviet leaders had CPSU CC Presidium from Soviet Defense Minsile crisis, however, the option of rely- decided to authorize the employment of ister Rodion Malinovskii and the Chief of the ing solely on the physical separation of tactical nuclear weapons, they would

Soviet General Staff, Mikhail Zakharov, 5 No

vember 1962, 17 November 1962, and 24 Nowarheads and delivery vehicles was have wanted their orders to be carried

vember 1962, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi deemed inadequate. In the latter half out as fast as possible, before the situa- Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, F. 89, Opis’ of the 1960s, the Soviet Union began tion on the battlefield had changed. 49 (Op.) 28, Delo (D.) 14, Listy (Ll.) 1-8.

3 incorporating electronic use-denial fea- By contrast, East European political and

"V shtabe Ob"edinennykh vooruzhenykh sil tures into its strategic missiles, and the military officials might have been hesi

stran Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Krasnaya zvezda

17

(Moscow), 22 November 1962, p. 1.

See the account by the Hungarian charge d'affaires in Washington, D.C. in October 1962 (who later defected), Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 137. China, too, was not informed in advance about either the placement or the withdrawal of the missiles in Cuba. This point was noted by Chinese leaders during the bitter SinoSoviet polemics in 1963. See, for example, the exchanges in “On the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA,Peking Review (Beijing), 15 March 1963, pp. 11-13; “Otkrytoe pis’mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza partiinym organizatsiyam i vsem kommunistam Sovetskogo Soyuza,” Pravda (Moscow), 14 July 1963, p.1; and “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21,Peking Review (Beijing), 6 September 1963, pp. 7-11. See also the article by M. Y. Prozumenschikov in this issue of the Bulletin. 5

“Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam,” Report No. 24762s (TOP SECRET) from Col.-General P. Ivashutin, chief of the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, to Marshal M. V. Zakharov, head of the General Staff Military Academy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony (TSAMO), Delo (D.) 158, esp. Listy (L.) 352-3, 411-2, 423, and 400. I am grateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing me with a copy of this document. 6

This point is stressed in the top-secret cables adduced in note 2 supra. 7

On the state of the Russian archives, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” Cold War International History Bulletin, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 1, 14-37. 8

“Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam,” pp. 332-3. 9

“Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda,” Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR (Moscow), No. 24 (31 December 1990), pp. 67-80, esp. pp. 71-73. This correspondence was first released in November 1990 by the Cuban, not Soviet, government. Fidel Castro was seeking to rebut a claim made in a portion of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs that appeared in English for the first time in 1990. Khrushchev had recalled that Castro was urging him to launch a preemptive nuclear attack against the United States, whereas Castro insisted (correctly) that he had called for an all-out Soviet nuclear attack against the United States only if U.S. troops invaded Cuba. Soon after this correspondence was published in Spanish in the 23 November 1990 issue of the Havana daily Granma (and in English in the weekly edition of Granma), the Soviet government realized it had nothing to gain by keeping the Russian version secret any longer. Hence, the full correspondence was published in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's in-house journal, as cited here. (Ed. note: For Khrushchev's version, see Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold

L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), pp. 170-83, esp. pp. 177, 183; for an English translation of the correspondence and an accompanying commentary in Granma, see Appendix 2 of James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch (with the assistance of David Lewis), Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), pp. 474-91; the key letter, of Castro to Khrushchev on 26 October 1962, is on pp. 481-2.) 10 “Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," pp. 73-5. This point was reemphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyan during their conversations in November 1962. See “Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s prem'erministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitelstva Kuby F. Kastro," 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and “O besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro,” 20 November 1962 (Top Secret), both published in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' (Moscow), Nos. 11-12 (November-December 1992), pp. 143-7 and 14750, respectively. See esp. p. 149. 11

It should be noted, however, that a decision to send 901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6 bombs to Cuba for the Frogs and Il-28s was not finalized until 8 September 1962, by which time Khrushchev may already have changed his mind about the command-and-control arrangements. See "Nachal’niku 12 glavnogo upravleniya Ministerstva oborony," 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), Memorandum from Defense Minister R. Malinovskii and Chief of the General Staff M. Zakharov, in TSAMO, “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr," F. 16, Op. 3753. It is eminently possible that the nuclear-capable weapons would not have been equipped with nuclear warheads if they had been placed under Castro's command. 12

“Dogovor mezhdu pravitelstvom Respubliki Kuby i pravitel'stvom Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o voennom sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi oborone," undated, Article 10. 13

See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya (Moscow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis,” esp. p. 12. I am grateful to Khrushchev's son, Sergei, for providing me with a copy of the 3,600-page transcript of his father's memoirs. For an English translation of most of the account about the Cuban missile crisis, see Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans, and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 170-83. 14

Maj.-General (ret.) V. Makarevskii, “O prem'ere N. S. Khrushcheve, marshale G. K. Zhukove i generale I. A. Plieve,Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (Moscow), Nos. 8-9 (August-September 1994), p. 197. Makarevskii served for many years under Pliev's command. Pliev's close friendship with Khrushchev and Malinovskii is overlooked in the jaundiced assessment offered by General Anatolii Gribkov in Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), pp. 25-6. 15

“Komanduyushchemu gruppoi sovetskikh voisk na o. Kuba,” 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), in TsAMO, “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu

‘Anadyr”,"GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753; reproduced in Operation ANADYR, p. 183. For a discussion of this matter and relevant citations, see Mark Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Cold War International History Bulletin, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 40-46, esp. 42-3, 46. 16 “Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 4/389 (Top Secret) from R. Malinovskii (Direktor), 22 October 1962, reproduced in Operation ANADYR, p. 181. See also Sergei Pavlenko, “Bezymyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu 'stoyat' nasmert'," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 29 December 1994, p. 4. For further discussion and relevant citations, see Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 45-6.

In early 1994, General Anatolii Gribkov claimed that Pliev not only wanted to move several nuclear warheads out of storage on 26 October 1962, but had actually issued orders to that effect without authorization from Moscow. See Operation ANADYR, p. 63. Gribkov also elaborated on this assertion in a seminar organized by the Cold War International History Project and held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on 5 April 1994. However, he produced no evidence to back up his assertion that warheads were actually moved out, and in a lengthy interview in Moscow on 29 September 1994 he said he could not be certain that Pliev had given such an order. Gribkov's initial claim had already been contradicted by the Soviet officer who was in charge of the "central nuclear base” (i.e., the storage site for all nuclear warheads) in Cuba during the crisis, Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who testified in late 1992 that “nuclear weapons could have been used only if the missile officers had received orders via their own chain-of-command from the General Staff, and only if we, the officers responsible for storing and operating warheads, had received our own special codes. At no point did I receive any signals to issue warheads for either the mediumrange missiles or the tactical weapons." See Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 6 November 1992, p. 2. Beloborodov reemphasized this point several times during an interview in Moscow on 28 September 1994: "No nuclear munitions of any type, whether for the mediumrange or the tactical weapons, were ever moved (byly dostavleny) out of storage during the crisis. Nor could they have been moved without my knowledge." Beloborodov's account was endorsed by General Leonid Garbuz, the deputy commander of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962, in an interview that same day in Moscow. 18

The exact contents of Pliev's telegram on the 26th are unknown, but the numbering of telegrams that are available makes clear that he sent at least two that day, the second of which is the one in question. (The first of his telegrams on the 26th, which was declassified in October 1992, pertained only to air defense operations against possible U.S. air strikes.) The text of the Soviet leadership’s response to Pliev's second cable is available (see next note), and, combined with retrospective comments by ex-Soviet officials, it suggests that Pliev referred to Castro's efforts and requested authority to move the warheads (though

45

“Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Bruderstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages," July 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 2/202/431. 46

“Komplexny material: Cvicenie ‘VLTAVA’," in VHA Praha, F. HPS, 1966, HPS 30/2; and “Vyhodnotenie cvicenia 'VLTAVA”.” VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1966, OS/GS, 4/2. 47 Maksimov et al., eds., Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya, pp. 125-126. 48 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 125-6. See also “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam,” pp. 325-34. 49

See ibid., pp. 330-36 and passim.

22

not yet authority for actual use). For greater detail about this issue, see Mark Kramer, “The Cuban Missile Crisis and Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn 1995),

171-9. 28

“Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 76639 (Top Secret), 27 October 1962, reproduced in Operation ANADYR, p. 182. See also Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 46; and Pavlenko, “Bezymyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu," p. 4. 20 Marshal V. F. Tolubko, “Glavnaya raketnaya sila strany,Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 19 November 1963, p. 1. 21 See Khrushchev's comments on this point in Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis," p. 18.

Army-General Yu. P. Maksimov et al., eds., Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya: Voenno-istoricheskii trud (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), pp. 109-10. Detailed first-hand accounts by high-ranking Soviet air defense personnel who took part in the shootdown are available in "Voina ozhidalas's rassvetom,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1993, p. 2. 23 The rules of engagement are spelled out briefly in the cable from Malinovskii to Pliev, as cited in Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” p. 2. More elaborate rules are specified in documents now stored in the Russian General Staff archive; see “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr”," in GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753, D. 1, Korebka 3573. 24 Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis," pp. 17-8.

"Vystuplenie glavy Sovetskoi delegatsii Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khrushcheva na Soveshchanii Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora 24 maya 1958 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 27 May 1958, p. 3. 26 Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe, 19451970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 150-1, 487-9.

“Was ist der westdeutsche Militarismus?” Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 26 January 1959, pp. 1-2. See also “Wortlaut der Rede Walter Ulbrichts auf dem XXI. Parteitag der KPSSU,” Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 30 January 1959, p. 1. 28 Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Militarische Planungen des Warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: Eine Studie, February 1992, p. 5. (Ed. note: For an English translation of the report, see Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., “Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations From the East German Archives," CWIHP Bulletin 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 1, 13-19.) 29 Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (Potsdam), VAStrausberg/29555/Box 155. 30 “Dohoda CSSR-ZSSR o vzajemnych dodavkach vyzbroje a voj. techniky v rr. 19631965,” in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 19601962, OS/GS, 26/2. 31

“Dogovor mezhdu pravitelstvami SSSR i ChSSR o merakh povysheniya boegotovnosti raketnykh voisk,” 15 December 1965, in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 2/16. 32 See the reports on “Hungary: USSR Nuclear Weapons Formerly Stored in Country," translated in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service,

25

Nuclear Proliferation, JPRS-TND-91-007, 20 May 1991, pp. 14-16. 33 “O przedsiewzieciu majacym na celu podwyzszenie gotowosci bojowej wojska,” 25 February 1967, in Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, Paczka 6, Tom 234. 34

Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, in Jan Bauer, “Jaderna munice: Asi tady byla,” Ceske a moravskoslezske zemedelske noviny (Prague), 4 July 1991, p. 1. 35 See, e.g., Col.-General I. Glebov, “Razvitie operativnogo iskusstva,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 2 April 1964, pp. 2-3; and Col.-General S. M. Shtemenko, “Sukhoputnye voiska v sovremennoi voine i ikh boevaya podgotovka," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 3 January 1963, pp. 2-3. See also Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii et al., Voennaya strategiya, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), pp. 373-4. This theme is also evident in “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," passim. 36 See, e.g., Col.-General N. Lomov, “Vliyanie Sovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogo iskusstva," Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil (Moscow), No. 21 (November 1965), pp. 16-24. 37 Cited in “Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," Pravda (Moscow), 25 September 1965, p. 2 (emphasis added). 38 -Stenografische Niederschrift der Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages,” January 1965 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, J IV, 2/202/130. 39 “O zasedanii Politicheskogo konsultativnogo komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi pomoshchi,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 21 January 1965, p. 1. See also Colonel V. F. Samoilenko, Osnova boevogo soyuza: Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoi moshchi sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981), p. 259. 40

See, e.g., Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, “Moguchii strazh bezopasnosti narodov," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1965, p. 3; Marshal A. A. Grechko, “Nadezhnyi shchit mira i bezopasnosti narodov," Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil (Moscow), No. 9 (May 1965), p. 13; and Marshal A. A. Grechko, “Boevoi soyuz bratskikh narodov," Pravda (Moscow), 13 May 1965, p. 1. 41 “Informacna sprava o vysledkach cvicenia Oktobrova Burka',"' 16-22 October 1965 (Top Secret), in VHA Praha, F. Hlavna Politicka Sprava (HPS), 1965, HPS 1/2. 42 “Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages: Stenografische Niederschrift,” February 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 27/ 208/85. 43 “Oplot mira i sotsializma," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 14 May 1966, p. 5. 44 “La Roumanie n'a formule aucune demande en ce qui concerne le Pacte de Varsovie: Mise au Point du ministere des Affaires etrangeres a Bucarest,L'Humanite (Paris), 19 May 1966, p. 3.

Mark Kramer, a researcher based at the Davis Center for Russian Studies (formerly the Russian Research Center) at Harvard University, is a frequent contributor to the CWIHP Bulletin. The above article was originally presented as a paper at a conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis in Moscow in September 1994. It supersedes an earlier version which appeared in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 59, 110, 112115, 160, and, due to technical production errors, contained errors in the placing and numbering of footnotes. The Bulletin reprints the article, with apologies to readers and the author (and slight revisions by the latter), in this is

sue.

27

New Evidence on 1953, 1956 Crises: CONFERENCES IN BUDAPEST, POTSDAM SPOTLIGHT COLD WAR FLASHPOINTS

In the autumn of 1996, the Cold War 29 September 1996, and was hosted by mation in U.S.-Soviet relations. International History Project and the the Institute for the History of the 1956 The Budapest and Potsdam conferNational Security Archive, along with Hungarian Revolution and the Hungar- ences, like others in the “Flashpoints" European partner institutions, co-spon- ian Academy of Sciences. The interna- series, offered a venue for dozens of sored and jointly organized two major tional symposium on “The Crisis Year American, Russian, Central-East Eurointernational scholarly conferences at 1953 and The Cold War in Europe" con- pean, and other scholars to present new which scholars presented and debated vened in Potsdam, Germany, on 10-12 evidence from Western and Eastern arnew evidence from both Eastern and November 1996, and was hosted by the chives, and in some cases for former Western archives and sources concern- Center for Contemporary History Re- participants in the events to recall their ing two major Cold War episodes in search (Zentrum fur Zeithistorische experiences. Key topics covered at Europe: the 1953 East German Upris- Forschung).

Budapest included the Polish upheaving (and the post-Stalin succession Both conferences grew out of the als, which immediately preceded the struggle in Moscow), and the 1956 Pol- "Cold War Flashpoints" Project of the Hungary invasion; Soviet policy toward ish and Hungarian crises.

National Security Archive, a non-govThe conference, “Hungary and the ernmental research institute and declas

MORE ON THE MALIN NOTES World, 1956: The New Archival Evi- sified documents repository based at dence,” took place in Budapest on 26- George Washington University. Previ

The publication in this issue of the ous activities of the Project, undertaken THE SOVIET UNION AND THE

CWIHP Bulletin of the full translation of the by the Archive in close cooperation with HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956:

Malin Notes on the 1956 Polish and HunCWIHP and Czech and Polish partners, THE DOCUMENTARY ANTHOLOGY included the holding of a major inter

garian Crises marks their first complete apnational conference in Prague in April

pearance in English. However, versions of A group of Russian and Hungarian schol

them were published in 1996 in Russian and

1994 on new evidence on the 1968 ars and archivists has cooperated to prepare for publication a Russian-language anthol- Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion Hungarian by the Russian scholar ogy of archival documents—many of them of Czechoslovakia and a scholarly Vyacheslav Sereda and the Hungarian

scholar Janos M. Rainer: in a two-part senever previously published-on Soviet workshop in Warsaw in August 1995 on

ries presented by Vyacheslav Sereda in Nos. policy and the events in Hungary in 1956. new sources on the 1980-81 Polish CriThe Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis sis, as well as meetings with scholars

2 and 3 (1996) of the Russian journal of 1956: The Documentary Collection is

Istoricheski Arkhiv [Historical Archives), in Bucharest and Sofia in October 1996 scheduled for publication in 1997. Among

and in a book entitled Dontes a Kremlben, on possibilities for collaborative rethe Russian academic and archival institusearch in Romanian and Bulgarian ar

1956: A szovjet partelnokseg vitai tions collaborating to produce the volume chives on Cold War topics.

Magyarorszagrol [Crisis in the Kremlin, are the Institute for Slavonic and Balkan

1956: The Debates of the Soviet Party PreStudies (Russian Academy of Sciences) and

Future meetings are also scheduled.

sidium on Hungary] (Budapest: 1956-os the Institute of History (Russian Academy In June 1997, the “Flashpoints” Project Intezet

, 1996), published by the Institute for of Sciences); the Archive of Foreign Policy, plans to hold an oral history conference

the History of the 1956 Hungarian revoluRussian Federation; the Archive of the Presi- in Poland on the 1980-81 crisis, gatherdent, Russian Federation; and the Center for ing key participants, scholars, and

tion. In addition, two important analyses of the Storage of Contemporary Documenta

the notes have appeared in English: Janos sources from Poland, Russia, the United tion. Co-editors include: V.Y. Afiani, B. States, ,

M. Rainer's two-part series, “The Road to Zhelizki, T. Islamov, S. Melchin, I. Morozov, is also working with various scholars. Budapest

, 1956: New Documentation of the V. Sereda, A. Stykalin, I. Vash, I. Vida, E.

Kremlin's Decision To Intervene," in The Dorken, T. Haidu. Financial support for the archives, and scholarly institutions and

Hungarian Quarterly 37:142 (Summer publication was provded by the National projects toward the holding of a series

1996), 24-41, and 37:143 (Autumn 1996), Security Archive and the Cold War Interna- of meetings to present new evidence on

16-31; and Mark Kramer, “New Light Shed tional History Project and East European the End of the Cold War, including the

on 1956 Soviet Decision to Invade HunProgram of the Woodrow Wilson Center. 1989 revolutions in Europe, the collapse For ordering and publication information of the Soviet Union, and the transfor

gary," Transition 2:23 (15 November 1996),

35-40. please contact the editors.

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