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Hungarian people alone and not by for- to combat “imperialist intrigues” and garian government would collapse, and eign intervention.” This statement ap- "preserve the system of people's de- the Soviet intervention would not appeared in slightly modified form) in the mocracy in Hungary.”151

pear to be directed against a specific PZPR newspaper Trybuna Ludu the fol- On 2 November, Khrushchev and leader. 154 It turned out that Tito was lowing day. 147 Moreover, on 2 No- Malenkov flew to Yugoslavia, where unable or unwilling to fulfill his promvember, Gomulka publicly offered War- they met with Tito at his villa on the ise- -a failure that caused great irritasaw as a forum for Soviet-Hungarian Adriatic island of Brioni from 7 p.m. tion in Moscow later on-but negotiations, which he (and Imre Nagy) until 5 a.m. the following day.

152

Khrushchev did not foresee that when hoped would lead to the settlement of When the two Soviet leaders were en he left Brioni. 155 Even if he had foreproblems in bilateral relations."148

route to Brioni, they were apprehen- seen it, the very fact that Tito was so When Gomulka's last-ditch efforts sive-particularly after the recent ses- firmly supportive of the upcoming inproved futile and the invasion began as sion in Brest with Gomulka—that Tito, vasion was enough for Khrushchev to scheduled on 4 November, the Polish too, would strongly oppose the Soviet regard the talks as a "pleasant surleader briefly considered voicing his ob- decision; but their concerns proved to prise."156 jections openly. After further thought, be unwarranted. During the ten hours On the morning of 3 November, however, Gomulka decided that he of talks, Khrushchev declined to pro- Khrushchev and Malenkov returned to should maintain a discreet public stance vide Tito with a precise timetable for Moscow having largely accomplished to avoid undue antagonism with Mos- the invasion, but he made clear that their task of overcoming any reservaCOW.

149 At his behest, the PZPR Po- Soviet troops would soon be interven- tions that allied Communist states (with litburo instructed the Polish envoy at the ing in Hungary to defend socialism” the exception of Poland) might have

“ United Nations to vote against a U.S.- and "halt the killing of honest Commu- about the impending military action. sponsored resolution condemning the nists." The Yugoslav leader, for his part, Khrushchev had ample reason to be Soviet invasion. 150

Gomulka re- left no doubt that he agreed with the pleased when he briefly presented the mained distinctly uneasy about the Soviet decision, if only because it was results of the talks at a CPSU Presidium whole matter, but he kept his reserva- the sole remaining way to “crush the meeting later that day. 157 tions out of public view. To that extent, counterrevolution” and “prevent the The military side of the invasion the Soviet consultations with Polish restoration of capitalism in Hungary.” proceeded just as rapidly as the politiofficials in Brest on 1 November were Tito's earlier support for Nagy had es- cal consultations. On 1 November, a qualified success. Had Gomulka not sentially disappeared by this point. 153 Marshal Konev was appointed the subeen informed at all about the invasion When the question came up of who preme commander of Soviet forces in beforehand, he might well have been should be brought in to replace Nagy, Hungary. That same day, tens of thouinclined to adopt a much less accom- Khrushchev mentioned that Janos sands of Soviet troops, who had supmodating position when Soviet troops Kadar and Ferenc Munnich were the posedly been withdrawing from Hunmoved in.

leading candidates, with a decided pref- gary, instead received orders to move The Soviet consultations after the erence for the latter. Tito and other back into Budapest to quell the uprisBrest meeting went far more smoothly. Yugoslav officials at the talks (Edvard ing. They were reinforced by many tens Molotov returned to Moscow on the 1st Kardelj, Aleksander Rankovic, and the of thousands of additional Soviet troops so that he could inform the other mem- Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, who had been congregating in Romabers of the CPSU Presidium about Veljko Micunovic) argued that it would nia and the Transcarpathian Military Gomulka's reaction. In the meantime, be better to go with Kadar because of District, along Hungary's southern and Khrushchev and Malenkov traveled to his credentials as a prisoner during the eastern borders.

158

Some considerBucharest, where they spoke with top Stalin-era purges, and the Soviet lead- ation was given to having Romanian Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Bulgar- ers readily agreed. Tito also urged and Bulgarian soldiers take part alongian officials. Not surprisingly, the del- Khrushchev and Malenkov to be sure side the Soviet forces and to having egations from all three East European that the new “Provisional Workers' and Czechoslovak troops move in simultacountries vehemently endorsed the So- Peasants' Government” would con- neously from the north. 159 Romanian viet decision. The Czechoslovak leader, demn the Rakosi era and adopt reforms and Bulgarian leaders had told Antonin Novotny, and the Romanian needed to win popular support. Khrushchev that "they wanted to have leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, reem- Khrushchev assented to these propos- their own military units participate in phasized the concerns they had been als (except for Tito's suggestion that the ... the struggle against the Hungarian expressing over the past several days newly-formed workers' councils in counterrevolution," and the Czechosloabout the growing spillover from the Hungary be preserved), and in return vak Politburo likewise expressed its revolution. They were joined by the Tito pledged to use his special contacts "readiness not only to support intervenBulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, in ar- with Geza Losonczy (a close aide to tion, but also to take an active part in guing that "it is essential to adopt ev“ Nagy) to try to persuade Nagy to step

In the end, however, ery appropriate measure, including mili- down immediately, before Soviet troops Khrushchev and his colleagues decided tary intervention, as soon as possible” entered. That way, the existing Hun- that the invasion should be carried out

it.160

exclusively by Soviet troops. Although Pact and its declaration of neutrality ber, a final signal was given for Operaone might have thought that Marshal with an appeal to the UN General As- tion “Whirlwind" (Vikhr'—the codeKonev, as commander-in-chief of the sembly. 163 Any hopes of receiving out- name of the invasion) to commence. Warsaw Pact, would have preferred a side support, however, were quickly The fighting in Budapest and many joint operation with the East European dashed. The United States expressly other cities on 4, 5, and 6 November armies, he in fact was among those who prohibited NATO forces from taking was intense, and even in a small town recommended that the task be left to the any actions that might be deemed at all like Dunapetele the defenders managed Soviet Union alone.

provocative. 164 Once it was clear that to hold out for four days despite being To ensure that mistakes made dur- the “imperialist” armies would not be hopelessly outnumbered. 169 Eventuing the initial Soviet intervention in late intervening, Konev and his subordinates ally, though, Soviet forces crushed the October would not be repeated, Konev were able to concentrate their planning resistance and installed a pro-Soviet met with General Lashchenko and other and resources on Budapest and other government under Kadar and Munnich. Soviet officers who had been in Hun- cities where the revolution was at its Officials in Moscow were able to maingary from the outset. 161 For a variety height.

tain direct contact with the new Hunof reasons, as one of Lashchenko's aides The West's failure to intervene left garian government via Leonid Brezhlater explained, the Soviet Union's Nagy's government in a hopeless situ- nev and Anastas Mikoyan, who had chances of success were much greater ation. Although Hungarian army units been sent to Budapest on 3 November during the second intervention: had been fighting mainly on the side of for precisely that reason.

170

Some limthe rebels since 28 October (when a ited fighting continued in Hungary unIn November our combat operations ceasefire was declared and a National

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til 11 November, especially in areas well took place under more auspicious cir- Guard was formed), the military over- outside Budapest (notably in Pecs, cumstances than at the end of October.

all could no longer function as a cohe- where some 200 fighters held out until Budapest was already under martial law;

sive whole. 165 In early November, the 14th), but the revolution was effecarmed groups were less successful in carrying out sudden attacks; and our

Hungarian defense minister Pal Maleter tively over by the 8th. Marshal Konev troops controlled the situation on the

began preparing as best he could to de- had promised Khrushchev on 31 Octocity streets. We also had a lot more

fend against a Soviet attack, but in the ber that it would take Soviet troops three forces and equipment at our disposal

absence of Western military support to four days to “destroy the counterrevothan in October. In addition, our troops Nagy was reluctant to order large-scale lutionary forces and restore order in were no longer hampered by contradic- armed resistance, for fear of precipitat- Hungary,” and his forecast was largely tory directives issued by the Hungarian ing mass bloodshed without any possi

borne out.

171 government (whether and when to open bility of victory.166 Among other fire, etc.), which had seriously impeded

things, Nagy was well aware that the Further Rifts Within the Soviet Leadour troops' actions and resulted in need

Soviet Union had systematically pen- ership less casualties. ... The considerable experience acquired by our units in Oc

etrated the Hungarian military establishtober also contributed to the greater suc

ment from the late 1940s on. He feared Even after the final decision to incess of our subsequent operations.

that dozens of Soviet agents who were tervene on a massive scale was adopted

still entrenched in the Hungarian officer on 31 October, the leadership struggle In addition to helping out with the final corps and national defense ministry, as continued to buffet Soviet deliberations military plans, Lashchenko retained a well as a “field staff for Soviet troops about Hungary. This was evident not key command role in Budapest. Re- in Budapest that operated in direct con- only at the Presidium meeting on 1 sponsibility for operations elsewhere in tact with the Hungarians” from the out- November, when Mikoyan (having just Hungary was assigned to General set of the crisis, would prevent most of returned to Moscow) tried to undo the Mikhail Kazakov and General Mikhail the Hungarian army from being used to decision to invade, but also at the meetMalinin, both of whom had played a key support the government. 167 As a re- ings held during the first few days of part in the earlier intervention.

sult, the majority of Hungarian troops the invasion, on 4-6 November. 172 One of Kazakov's first tasks was remained confined to their barracks on Molotov and Kaganovich disagreed to ensure that enough Soviet troops 4 November and were systematically with the others about the best way to were deployed along the border with disarmed by Soviet forces that reentered handle the post-invasion regime in HunAustria to forestall any prospect of Budapest. 168 Although some middle

gary. Initially, Molotov had wanted the Western intervention. Soviet leaders and lower-ranking Hungarian officers, former prime minister Andras Hegedus, decided to err on the side of caution in conscripts, and reservists, under the who had escaped to Moscow on 28 this regard, not least because Nagy and leadership of General Bela Kiraly, took October, to be made the head of a new his colleagues had made a last-ditch at- up arms in a last-ditch defense of the “Provisional Workers' and Peasants' tempt on 1 November to obtain mili- uprising, their efforts could not make Government." Such a step, Molotov tary support from either the United Na- up for the inaction of most Hungarian claimed, would simply amount to the tions or NATO by combining Hungary's soldiers.

reinstatement of Hegedus's government formal withdrawal from the Warsaw Early in the morning of 4 Novem- as the legitimate authority in Hungary.

so overbearing."173

(Hegedus had been prime minister in had “ignored the impact of [the Soviet underscored the extent of popular opthe government that immediately pre- Union's) actions on other socialist coun- position both to the Communist regime ceded Nagy's return to power in Octo- tries"-charges that were not entirely and to the Soviet role in Eastern Euber 1956.) Molotov averred that Janos without merit

. 174 Khrushchev man

177 rope.

Two years of intensive “norKadar was still a furtive supporter of aged to deflect those allegations and to malization," including wholesale Nagy and should not be given any top oust his opponents, but the events in purges, arrests, deportations, and execupost. Although Molotov eventually both Hungary and Poland in 1956 had tions, culminating in the executions (by backed down on this issue, he contin- highlighted the risks of allowing de

highlighted the risks of allowing de- hanging) of Nagy and Pal Maleter in ued to insist that it was improper for Stalinization in Eastern Europe to move June 1958, were carried out to elimiKadar's new government to condemn too fast. Although Khrushchev ce- nate the most active opposition to the "Rakosi-Gero clique" and to give a mented his status as the top leader in Kadar's regime. By the time the pronew name to the revived Hungarian 1957, he pursued a much more cautious cess was completed, more than 100,000 Communist party. These differences policy in Eastern Europe from then on. people had been arrested, 35,000 had produced a number of acerbic ex

been tried for “counterrevolutionary changes with Khrushchev and other Consequences and Costs

acts," nearly 26,000 had been sentenced Presidium members. On 4 November,

to prison, and as many as 600 had been Khrushchev declared that he “simply By reestablishing military control executed. 178 Similarly, in Poland the cannot understand Cde. Molotov; he over Hungary and by exposing-more Poznan riots and the mass protest ralalways comes up with the most perni- dramatically than in 1953—the empti- lies that preceded and accompanied cious (vredneishie) ideas.” Molotov ness of the “roll-back” and “liberation” Gomulka's return to power were indicaresponded by telling Khrushchev that rhetoric in the West, the Soviet inva- tive of widespread disaffection with the he “should keep quiet and stop being sion in November 1956 stemmed any extant political system. That discontent

further loss of Soviet power in Eastern merely festered in subsequent years, as The exchanges became even more Europe. Shortly after the invasion, Gomulka gradually abandoned the reacrimonious at the session on 6 Novem- Khrushchev acknowledged that U.S.- formist mantle and reverted to an orber, where Molotov brought a flood of Soviet relations were likely to deterio- thodox Communist approach. Ironicriticism upon himself by declaring his rate for a considerable time, but he in

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cally, it was Kadar, not Gomulka, who "vehement objection" to Khrushchev's dicated that he was ready to pay that ended up pursuing a more relaxed poideas about the regime that Janos Kadar price because the Soviet Union "had litical and economic line once he had was establishing in Hungary. Maksim proved to the West that (it is] strong and consolidated his hold on power; and as Saburov accused Molotov and resolute” while “the West is weak and a result, Hungary experienced no furKaganovich of being “rigid and dog- divided."175 U.S. officials, for their ther instances of violent upheaval and matic," and Mikoyan insisted that "Cde.

part, were even more aware than they mass disorder. By contrast, Gomulka's Molotov is completely ignoring the con- had been in 1953 of how limited their eschewal of genuine reform left Poland crete situation and is dragging us back- options were in Eastern Europe. Senior as politically unstable as ever by the ward.” Averki Aristov noted that “Cdes. members of the Eisenhower adminis- time he was forced out in December Molotov and Kaganovich were always tration conceded that the most they 1970. transfixed by Stalin's cult, and they are could do in the future was “to encour- The events of 1956 also made Sostill transfixed by it.” Severest of all age peaceful evolutionary changes" in viet leaders aware of the urgent need were the criticisms that Khrushchev the region, and they warned that the for improved economic conditions in himself expressed, accusing Molotov United States must avoid conveying any Eastern Europe, insofar as the unrest in and Kaganovich of wanting to indulge impression “either directly or by impli- both Poland and Hungary—and in East in “screeching and face-slapping." He cation ... that American military help Germany three years earlier-had expressed particular disdain for will be forthcoming” to anti-Commu- stemmed, at least initially, from ecoKaganovich, asking him “when are you

Any lingering U.S. nomic discontent. The danger of allowfinally going to mend your ways and hopes of directly challenging Moscow's ing “basic economic and social probstop all this toadying (to Molotov]?" sphere of influence in Eastern Europe lems to go unresolved” was one of the In June 1957, when the leadership thus effectively ended.

main lessons that Khrushchev emphastruggle reached its peak, the Hungar- Despite these obvious benefits for sized to his colleagues from the very ian crisis resurfaced. One of the accu- Soviet policy, the revolts in both Poland start: “Ideological work alone will be sations leveled by Molotov and other and Hungary in 1956 had demonstrated of no avail if we do not ensure that livmembers of the "Anti-Party Group" serious weaknesses in the region that ing standards rise. It is no accident that against Khrushchev was what they de- would continue to endanger Soviet con- Hungary and Poland are the countries scribed as his mismanagement of intra- trol. The bloodiness of the three-day in which unrest has occurred."179 bloc affairs. Molotov argued that conflict in Hungary, in which roughly Khrushchev also concluded that the recKhrushchev had committed “dangerous 22,000 Hungarians and nearly 2,300 tification of “certain inequalities in our zigzags" vis-a-vis Eastern Europe and Soviet soldiers died or were wounded, economic relations with the fraternal

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nist forces. 176

and Indonesia. 182

countries” would be “crucial to the pro- nificant increase in hostile statements cess of normalization” in both Poland about the Soviet Union” in key South [If we had failed to take action), there and Hungary. 180 Although Kadar was Asian countries, including India, Paki- are people in the Soviet Union who eventually able to redress some of the stan, Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka),

would say that as long as Stalin was in most acute economic grievances in

command, everyone obeyed and there Tugarinov noted that

were no great shocks, but now that Hungary through the adoption of a New the governments in these countries, and

[these new bastards) have come to Economic Mechanism in 1968 and even many leftist commentators there,

power, Russia has suffered the defeat other reforms in subsequent years, his were publicly “drawing an analogy be

and loss of Hungary. 183 retention of state ownership and cen- tween the English-French-Israeli agtralized economic management gression in Egypt and the participation

gression in Egypt and the participation This point was further highlighted by thwarted any hope of genuine prosper- of Soviet troops in the suppression of the acrimonious exchanges during the ity. This was even more the case in the counterrevolutionary uprising in CPSU Presidium meetings in early Poland, where, despite some leeway Hungary.” The report cited an official November (see the previous section) granted for private activity (especially protest from the Indian government in and by the accusations which the Antiin agriculture, retail trade, and light in- mid-December which declared that the

Party Group lodged against Khrushchev dustry), the economic policies under events in Hungary have shattered the

in June 1957, as cited above. UltiGomulka and his successors spawned beliefs of millions who had begun to mately, Khrushchev was able to overperiodic outbreaks of widespread pub- look upon the USSR as the defender of

come the political fallout from the two lic unrest. No matter how often the peace and of the rights of the weakest

crises, but the events of 1956 clearly Polish authorities claimed that they people.” What was even more disturb

took their toll on the process of dewould pursue drastic economic im- ing, according to Tugarinov, was the Stalinization in Eastern Europe. Even provements, they always proved unwill- “increased prestige that the United though Khrushchev suspected that the ing to accept the political price that such States had derived from recent events

Warsaw Pact countries would remain improvements would have necessitated. in Hungary and the Near East.” While

vulnerable to recurrent crises unless the From a purely military standpoint, Asian officials were condemning Soviet indigenous regimes became more “vithe invasion in November 1956 "aggression” in Hungary as “a direct able” and the Soviet Union forged a achieved its immediate goals, but in the violation of the spirit and letter of the more equitable relationship, he was delonger term it exacted significant costs. Bandung Conference declaration,” they termined to proceed far more cautiously When the revolution was crushed by were making "extremely favorable" ref- in the future. 184 Repressive leaders in Soviet troops, the morale and fighting erences to the “U.S. position in both

Eastern Europe, such as Walter Ulbricht elan of the Hungarian armed forces Hungary and Suez." Tugarinov re

in East Germany, Gheorghe Gheorghiuwere bound to dissolve as well. The ported that some Indian officials had

Dej in Romania, Todor Zhivkov in Bulremains of the Hungarian army were even begun insisting that “it makes garia, and Antonin Novotny in Czechoregarded by Soviet commanders (and sense for India to reorient its foreign slovakia, were able to win even stronby Kadar) as politically and militarily policy more closely toward the United ger backing from Khrushchev because unreliable. More than 8,000 officers, States." This raised the distinct possi- they convinced him that their presence including a large number who had at- bility," in Tugarinov's view, that there

was the only safeguard against "unextended Soviet military colleges and will be a major improvement in Indo- pected developments" of the sort that academies, were forced out of the Hun- American relations, with a detrimental

occurred in Hungary and Poland. When garian armed forces in late 1956 and impact on India's relations with the

faced with a tradeoff between the “vi1957.181 The country's army thus es- USSR." Although the adverse effects ability" of the East European regimes sentially disintegrated and had to be re- of the 1956 invasion on Soviet-Third and the “cohesion" of the Eastern bloc built almost from scratch, leaving a gap World relations proved, for the most after 1956, Khrushchev consistently in Warsaw Pact military planning and part, to be relatively ephemeral, the sup- chose to emphasize cohesion, thus forecombat preparations for many years pression of the uprising did cause at

stalling any real movement toward a thereafter. least temporary disruption in

more durable political order. From a diplomatic standpoint as Khrushchev's strategy vis-a-vis the well, the invasion entailed significant Non-Aligned Movement. costs, at least in the short term. The Finally, the fact that an invasion large-scale use of force in Hungary had been necessary at all underscored This brief review of some of the alienated numerous Third World coun- the dangers of Moscow's incoherent

latest findings about the 1956 crises tries that had been sedulously courted and drifting policy in Eastern Europe

leaves numerous topics unaddressed, by the Soviet Union. A top-secret following Stalin's death. Khrushchev but it should be enough to indicate that memorandum prepared in December was well aware of the potential for re- the new archival evidence does not just 1956 by Igor Tugarinov, a senior offi- criminations, as he indicated during his

confirm what everyone knew all along. cial at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, ac- conversation with Tito in early Novem

More often than not, the new evidence knowledged that there had been a "sig- ber:

undercuts long-established views and

* * * *

reveals unknown events. Disagreements about how to interpret the past will persist even if all the archives are someday open, but the new documentation is enabling scholars to achieve a far more accurate and complete understanding not only of specific episodes (e.g., the Soviet Union's responses to the Polish and Hungarian crises) but of the entire course of the Cold War.

1

“Zayavlenie rukovoditelei Bolgarii, Vengrii, GDR, Pol'shi, i Sovetskogo Soyuza" and “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Soyuza,” both in Pravda (Moscow), 5 December 1989, p. 2. 2 F. Luk’yanov, “Vengriya privetsvuet zayavlenie Moskvy,Izvestiya (Moscow), 24 October 1991, p. 4. 3

See, e.g., Army-General A.D. Lizichev, “Oktyabr' i Leninskoe uchenie o zashchite revolyutsii,” Kommunist (Moscow), No. 3 (February 1987), p. 96; Admiral A. I. Sorokin, ed., Sovetskie vooruzhenye sily na strazhe mira i sotsializma (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 254; V. V. Semin, ed., Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), esp. pp. 127-141, 181-220; and the interview with Army-General V. N. Lobov in “I tol'ko pravda ko dvoru,” Izvestiya (Moscow), 8 May 1989, pp. 1, 3. 4

Colonel I.A. Klimov, “KPSS ob ukreplenii edinstva i boevogo sotrudnichestva vooruzhenykh sil sotsialisticheskikh stran," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1987), p. 80. 5

V.F. Khalipov, Voennaya politika KPSS (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), esp. pp. 256-257. 6

Army-General P. I. Lashchenko, “Vengriya, 1956 god,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42-50. 7

Budapest Domestic Service, 28 January 1989. 8-TSK KPSS: Ob izuchenii arkhivov TSK KPSS, kasayushchikhsya sobytii 1956 g. v Vengrii," Report No. 06/2-513 (Secret), from R. Fedorov and P. Laptev, deputy heads of the CPSU CC International Department and CPSU CC General Department, respectively, 23 November 1990, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 11, Delo (D.) 23, List (L.) 1. The memorandum warned that the “new Hungarian authorities” were "clearly intending to use this question (i.e., the 1956 invasion) as a means of pressure against us." For the article praising the invasion, see Lieut.Colonel Jozsef Forigy, “O kontrrevolyutsii v Vengrii 1956 goda," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 8 (August 1990), pp. 39-46. This article was explicitly intended to counter the "trai

torous revisionists” in Hungary who had claimed that the events of 1956 were a “popular uprising” and who in 1989-90 were carrying out a second "counterrevolution.” The article was unstinting in its denunciation of the “traitors” led by Imre Nagy and of the "new counterrevolutionaries in our midst today who regard themselves as the heirs of 1956." The chief editor of the Soviet journal, Major-General Viktor Filatov, endorsed the Hungarian author's arguments and warmly recommended the article to his readers. Filatov added that “upon reading the article, one cannot help but notice features of that (earlier) counterrevolutionary period that are similar to the changes occurring in the East European countries at the present time." 9 Jelcin-dosszie Szoviet dokumentumok 1956 rol. Budapest: Dohany, 1993); and Hianyzo Lapok: 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a voli SZKP KP Leveltarabol (Budapest: Zenit Konyvek, 1993). 10

“O sobytiyakh 1956 goda v Ven ii," Diplomaticheskii vestnik (Moscow), Nos. 19-20 (15-31 October 1992), pp. 52-56. 11 “Vengriya, aprel'-oktyabr' 1956 goda: Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta”; “Vengriya, oktyabr'-noyabr' 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK KPSS"; and “Vengriya, noyabr' 1956-avgust 1957 g.,” all in Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), Nos. 4, 5, and 6 (1993), pp. 103-142, 132-160, and 131144, respectively. 12 See, in particular, the segment of Khrushchev's memoirs published in “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” Voprosy istorii (Moscow), No. 4 (1995), pp. 68-84. Another extremely useful account is available in the memoir by the former Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans, by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980). Because of his fluency in Russian and close ties with Tito, Micunovic regularly had direct contacts with Khrushchev and other senior figures. Less reliable, but potentially illuminating (if used with caution), are the relevant portions of the memoir by the police chief in Budapest during the revolution, Sandor Kopacsi, Au nom de la classe ouvriere (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1979), which is also available in English translation under the same title (In the Name of the Working Class). Kopasci ended up siding with the insurgents and was arrested in November 1956. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1958, but was granted amnesty in 1963. In 1974 he was permitted to emigrate to Canada. 13 A few well-connected Russians have had privileged access to Malin's notes from the Presidium

meetings dealing with Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress, but these notes have not been made more widely available. See V. P. Naumov, “K istorii sekretnogo doklada N. S. Khrushcheva na XX s'ezde KPSS,” Novaya i noveishaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 147-168; Vladimir Naumov, ***Utverdit' dokladchikom tovarishcha,' Moskovskie Novosti, No. 5 (4-11 February 1996), p. 34; and Aleksei Bogomolov, “K 40-letiyu XX s'ezda: Taina zakrytogo doklada,” Sovershenno sekretno (Moscow), No. 1 (1996), pp. 3-4. 14

Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds., Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1996). 15

The notes about Hungary appeared in two parts under the title “Kak reshalis' 'voprosy Vengrii': Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, iyul’-noyabr' 1956 g.," Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp. 73-104 and 87121, ctively. The notes about Poland appeared in Issue No. 5 of the same journal. 16

See the assessment of this meeting and the annotated translation of the Czech notes by Mark Kramer, “Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56. The Czech document, “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad’arsku,” 25 October 1956, in Statni Ustredni Archiv (Praha), Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru Komunisticke Strany Ceskoslovenska (Arch. UV KSC), Fond (F.) 07/ 16 — A. Novotny, Svazek (Sv.) 3, was compiled by Jan Svoboda, a senior aide to the then-leader of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, who attended the CPSU Presidium meeting. 17 Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), Nos. 10, 11, and 12 (October, November, and December 1993) and No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 22-30; 44-51, 33-37, and 3036, respectively. 18 See the analysis and valuable collection of declassified documents in Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta: Wojsko Polskie w Czerwca 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992). For broader overviews of the crisis, see Jan Ptasinski, Wydarzenia poznanskie czerwiec 1956 (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicze, 1986); Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds.. Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1990); and Maciej

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