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(Hegedus had been prime minister in had “ignored the impact of [the Soviet underscored the extent of popular opthe government that immediately pre- Union's) actions on other socialist coun- position both to the Communist regime ceded Nagy's return to power in Octo- tries”-charges that were not entirely and to the Soviet role in Eastern Euber 1956.) Molotov averred that Janos

without merit. 174
Khrushchev man- rope.

177 Two years of intensive “norKadar was still a furtive supporter of aged to deflect those allegations and to malization," including wholesale Nagy and should not be given any top oust his opponents, but the events in purges, arrests, deportations, and execupost. Although Molotov eventually both Hungary and Poland in 1956 had tions, culminating in the executions (by backed down on this issue, he contin- highlighted the risks of allowing de- hanging) of Nagy and Pal Maleter in ued to insist that it was improper for Stalinization in Eastern Europe to move June 1958, were carried out to elimiKadar's new government to condemn too fast. Although Khrushchev ce- nate the most active opposition to the "Rakosi-Gero clique" and to give a mented his status as the top leader in Kadar's regime. By the time the pronew name to the revived Hungarian 1957, he pursued a much more cautious cess was completed, more than 100,000 Communist party. These differences policy in Eastern Europe from then on. people had been arrested, 35,000 had produced a number of acerbic ex

been tried for "counterrevolutionary changes with Khrushchev and other Consequences and Costs

acts,” nearly 26,000 had been sentenced Presidium members. On 4 November,

to prison, and as many as 600 had been Khrushchev declared that he "simply By reestablishing military control executed. 178 Similarly, in Poland the cannot understand Cde. Molotov; he over Hungary and by exposing-more Poznan riots and the mass protest ralalways comes up with the most perni- dramatically than in 1953—the empti- lies that preceded and accompanied cious (vredneishie) ideas." Molotov ness of the “roll-back” and “liberation” Gomulka's return to power were indicaresponded by telling Khrushchev that rhetoric in the West, the Soviet inva- tive of widespread disaffection with the he “should keep quiet and stop being sion in November 1956 stemmed any extant political system. That discontent


further loss of Soviet power in Eastern merely festered in subsequent years, as The exchanges became even more Europe. Shortly after the invasion, Gomulka gradually abandoned the reacrimonious at the session on 6 Novem- Khrushchev acknowledged that U.S.- formist mantle and reverted to an orber, where Molotov brought a flood of Soviet relations were likely to deterio- thodox Communist approach. Ironicriticism upon himself by declaring his rate for a considerable time, but he in- cally, it was Kadar, not Gomulka, who "vehement objection” to Khrushchev's dicated that he was ready to pay that ended up pursuing a more relaxed poideas about the regime that Janos Kadar price because the Soviet Union “had litical and economic line once he had was establishing in Hungary. Maksim proved to the West that [it is) strong and consolidated his hold on power; and as Saburov accused Molotov and resolute” while “the West is weak and a result, Hungary experienced no furKaganovich of being “rigid and dog- divided."175 U.S. officials, for their ther instances of violent upheaval and matic," and Mikoyan insisted that "Cde. part, were even more aware than they mass disorder. By contrast, Gomulka's Molotov is completely ignoring the con- had been in 1953 of how limited their eschewal of genuine reform left Poland crete situation and is dragging us back- options were in Eastern Europe. Senior as politically unstable as ever by the ward.” Averki Aristov noted that “Cdes. members of the Eisenhower adminis- time he was forced out in December Molotov and Kaganovich were always tration conceded that the most they 1970. transfixed by Stalin's cult, and they are could do in the future was “to encour- The events of 1956 also made Sostill transfixed by it.” Severest of all age peaceful evolutionary changes" in viet leaders aware of the urgent need were the criticisms that Khrushchev the region, and they warned that the for improved economic conditions in himself expressed, accusing Molotov United States must avoid conveying any Eastern Europe, insofar as the unrest in and Kaganovich of wanting to indulge impression “either directly or by impli- both Poland and Hungary—and in East in “screeching and face-slapping." He cation ... that American military help Germany three years earlier-had expressed particular disdain for will be forthcoming" to anti-Commu- stemmed, at least initially, from ecoKaganovich, asking him “when are you

nist forces. 176 Any lingering U.S. nomic discontent. The danger of allowfinally going to mend your ways and hopes of directly challenging Moscow's ing “basic economic and social probstop all this toadying (to Molotov]?” sphere of influence in Eastern Europe lems to go unresolved” was one of the In June 1957, when the leadership thus effectively ended.

main lessons that Khrushchev emphastruggle reached its peak, the Hungar- Despite these obvious benefits for sized to his colleagues from the very ian crisis resurfaced. One of the accu- Soviet policy, the revolts in both Poland start: “Ideological work alone will be sations leveled by Molotov and other and Hungary in 1956 had demonstrated of no avail if we do not ensure that livmembers of the “Anti-Party Group” serious weaknesses in the region that ing standards rise. It is no accident that against Khrushchev was what they de- would continue to endanger Soviet con- Hungary and Poland are the countries scribed as his mismanagement of intra- trol. The bloodiness of the three-day in which unrest has occurred."179 bloc affairs. Molotov argued that conflict in Hungary, in which roughly Khrushchev also concluded that the recKhrushchev had committed “dangerous 22,000 Hungarians and nearly 2,300 tification of “certain inequalities in our zigzags” vis-a-vis Eastern Europe and Soviet soldiers died or were wounded, economic relations with the fraternal

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countries” would be “crucial to the pro- nificant increase in hostile statements cess of normalization” in both Poland about the Soviet Union” in key South [If we had failed to take action), there and Hungary.180 Although Kadar was Asian countries, including India, Paki

are people in the Soviet Union who eventually able to redress some of the

would say that as long as Stalin was in stan, Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), most acute economic grievances in and Indonesia. 182 Tugarinov noted that

command, everyone obeyed and there

were no great shocks, but now that Hungary through the adoption of a New the governments in these countries, and

[these new bastards) have come to Economic Mechanism in 1968 and even many leftist commentators there,

power, Russia has suffered the defeat other reforms in subsequent years, his were publicly “drawing an analogy be

and loss of Hungary.183 retention of state ownership and cen- tween the English-French-Israeli agtralized economic management gression in Egypt and the participation This point was further highlighted by thwarted any hope of genuine prosper- of Soviet troops in the suppression of the acrimonious exchanges during the ity. This was even more the case in the counterrevolutionary uprising in CPSU Presidium meetings in early Poland, where, despite some leeway Hungary.” The report cited an official November (see the previous section) granted for private activity (especially protest from the Indian government in

and by the accusations which the Antiin agriculture, retail trade, and light in- mid-December which declared that “the Party Group lodged against Khrushchev dustry), the economic policies under events in Hungary have shattered the

in June 1957, as cited above. UltiGomulka and his successors spawned beliefs of millions who had begun to mately, Khrushchev was able to overperiodic outbreaks of widespread pub- look upon the USSR as the defender of

come the political fallout from the two lic unrest. No matter how often the peace and of the rights of the weakest

crises, but the events of 1956 clearly Polish authorities claimed that they people.” What was even more disturb- took their toll on the process of dewould pursue drastic economic im- ing, according to Tugarinov, was the Stalinization in Eastern Europe. Even provements, they always proved unwill- “increased prestige that the United though Khrushchev suspected that the ing to accept the political price that such States had derived from recent events

Warsaw Pact countries would remain improvements would have necessitated. in Hungary and the Near East." While

vulnerable to recurrent crises unless the From a purely military standpoint, Asian officials were condemning Soviet indigenous regimes became more "vithe invasion in November 1956 “aggression” in Hungary as “a direct able” and the Soviet Union forged a achieved its immediate goals, but in the violation of the spirit and letter of the

more equitable relationship, he was delonger term it exacted significant costs. Bandung Conference declaration,” they termined to proceed far more cautiously When the revolution was crushed by were making "extremely favorable" ref- in the future. 184 Repressive leaders in Soviet troops, the morale and fighting erences to the “U.S. position in both

Eastern Europe, such as Walter Ulbricht elan of the Hungarian armed forces Hungary and Suez.” Tugarinov re- in East Germany, Gheorghe Gheorghiuwere bound to dissolve as well. The ported that some Indian officials had Dej in Romania, Todor Zhivkov in Bulremains of the Hungarian army were even begun insisting that “it makes garia, and Antonin Novotny in Czechoregarded by Soviet commanders (and sense for India to reorient its foreign slovakia, were able to win even stronby Kadar) as politically and militarily policy more closely toward the United

ger backing from Khrushchev because unreliable. More than 8,000 officers, States.” This raised the distinct possi- they convinced him that their presence including a large number who had at- bility," in Tugarinov's view, that there

was the only safeguard against "unextended Soviet military colleges and will be a major improvement in Indo

pected developments" of the sort that academies, were forced out of the Hun- American relations, with a detrimental

occurred in Hungary and Poland. When garian armed forces in late 1956 and impact on India's relations with the faced with a tradeoff between the “vi1957.181 The country's army thus es- USSR.” Although the adverse effects ability” of the East European regimes sentially disintegrated and had to be re- of the 1956 invasion on Soviet-Third

and the “cohesion” of the Eastern bloc built almost from scratch, leaving a gap World relations proved, for the most after 1956, Khrushchev consistently in Warsaw Pact military planning and part, to be relatively ephemeral, the sup- chose to emphasize cohesion, thus forecombat preparations for many years pression of the uprising did cause at

stalling any real movement toward a thereafter.

least temporary disruption in more durable political order. 185 From a diplomatic standpoint as Khrushchev's strategy vis-a-vis the well, the invasion entailed significant Non-Aligned Movement. costs, at least in the short term. The Finally, the fact that an invasion large-scale use of force in Hungary had been necessary at all underscored This brief review of some of the alienated numerous Third World coun- the dangers of Moscow's incoherent

latest findings about the 1956 crises tries that had been sedulously courted and drifting policy in Eastern Europe leaves numerous topics unaddressed, by the Soviet Union. A top-secret following Stalin's death. Khrushchev

but it should be enough to indicate that memorandum prepared in December was well aware of the potential for re- the new archival evidence does not just 1956 by Igor Tugarinov, a senior offi- criminations, as he indicated during his confirm what everyone knew all along. cial at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, ac- conversation with Tito in early Novem

More often than not, the new evidence knowledged that there had been a “sig- ber:

undercuts long-established views and


p. 4.

reveals unknown events. Disagree- torous revisionists” in Hungary who had claimed ments about how to interpret the past that the events of 1956 were a “popular uprising” will persist even if all the archives are and who in 1989-90 were carrying out a second someday open, but the new documen- "counterrevolution.” The article was unstinting tation is enabling scholars to achieve a in its denunciation of the “traitors” led by Imre far more accurate and complete under- Nagy and of the “new counterrevolutionaries in standing not only of specific episodes our midst today who regard themselves as the (e.g., the Soviet Union's responses to heirs of 1956." The chief editor of the Soviet the Polish and Hungarian crises) but of journal, Major-General Viktor Filatov, endorsed the entire course of the Cold War. the Hungarian author's arguments and warmly

recommended the article to his readers. Filatov 1

“Zayavlenie rukovoditelei Bolgarii, Vengrii, added that “upon reading the article, one cannot GDR, Pol'shi, i Sovetskogo Soyuza" and help but notice features of that (earlier) counter**Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Soyuza,” both in Pravda revolutionary period that are similar to the (Moscow), 5 December 1989, p. 2.

changes occurring in the East European countries 2 F. Luk’yanov, “Vengriya privetsvuet zayavlenie at the present time.” Moskvy,Izvestiya (Moscow), 24 October 1991, 9 Jelcin-dosszie Szoviet dokumentumok 1956 rol.

Budapest: Dohany, 1993); and Hianyzo Lapok: 3

See, e.g., Army-General A.D. Lizichev, 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP “Oktyabr' i Leninskoe uchenie o zashchite KP Leveltarabol (Budapest: Zenit Konyvek, revolyutsii,” Kommunist (Moscow), No. 3 (Feb- 1993). ruary 1987), p. 96; Admiral A. I. Sorokin, ed., 10 “O sobytiyakh 1956 goda v Vengrii,” Sovetskie vooruzhenye sily na strazhe mira i Diplomaticheskii vestnik (Moscow), Nos. 19-20 sotsializma (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 254; V. (15-31 October 1992), pp. 52-56. V. Semin, ed.,

11 Voenno-politicheskoe "Vengriya, aprel'-oktyabr' 1956 goda: sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran (Mos- Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i cow: Nauka, 1988), esp. pp. 127-141, 181-220; M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta”; “Vengriya, and the interview with Army-General V. N. Lobov oktyabr’-noyabr' 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK in “I tol'ko pravda ko dvoru,Izvestiya (Mos- KPSS"; and “Vengriya, noyabr' 1956-avgust 1957 cow), 8 May 1989, pp. 1, 3.

g.," all in Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), Nos. 4, Colonel I.A. Klimov, “KPSS ob ukreplenii 5, and 6 (1993), pp. 103-142, 132-160, and 131edinstva i boevogo sotrudnichestva vooruzhenykh 144, respectively. sil sotsialisticheskikh stran," Voenno-istoricheskii 12 See, in particular, the segment of Khrushchev's zhurnal (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1987), p. 80. memoirs published in “Memuary Nikity 5

V.F. Khalipov, Voennaya politika KPSS (Mos- Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," Voprosy istorii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), esp. pp. 256-257. cow), No. 4 (1995), pp. 68-84. Another extremely 6

Army-General P. I. Lashchenko, “Vengriya, useful account is available in the memoir by the 1956 god,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Mos- former Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko cow), No. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42-50. Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by David Floyd 7

Budapest Domestic Service, 28 January 1989. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980). Because 8.TSK KPSS: Ob izuchenii arkhivov TsK KPSS, of his fluency in Russian and close ties with Tito, kasayushchikhsya sobytii 1956 g. v Vengrii,” Micunovic regularly had direct contacts with Report No. 06/2-513 (Secret), from R. Fedorov Khrushchev and other senior figures. Less reliand P. Laptev, deputy heads of the CPSU CC able, but potentially illuminating (if used with International Department and CPSU CC General caution), are the relevant portions of the memoir Department, respectively, 23 November 1990, in by the police chief in Budapest during the revoTsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii lution, Sandor Kopacsi, Au nom de la classe (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.)89, Opis' (Op.) 11, ouvriere (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1979), Delo (D.) 23, List (L.) 1. The memorandum which is also available in English translation unwarned that the “new Hungarian authorities” were der the same title (In the Name of the Working "clearly intending to use this question [i.e., the Class). Kopasci ended up siding with the insur1956 invasion) as a means of pressure against us." gents and was arrested in November 1956. He For the article praising the invasion, see Lieut.- was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1958, Colonel Jozsef Forigy, “O kontrrevolyutsii v but was granted amnesty in 1963. In 1974 he Vengrii 1956 goda,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal was permitted to emigrate to Canada. (Moscow), No. 8 (August 1990), pp. 39-46. This


A few well-connected Russians have had priviarticle was explicitly intended to counter the “trai- leged access to Malin's notes from the Presidium

meetings dealing with Khrushchev's secret speech
at the 20th CPSU Congress, but these notes have
not been made more widely available. See V. P.
Naumov, “K istorii sekretnogo doklada N. S.
Khrushcheva na XX s'ezde KPSS,” Novaya i
noveishaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 4 (July-Au-
gust 1996), pp. 147-168; Vladimir Naumov,
“Utverdit' dokladchikom tovarishcha,'"
Moskovskie Novosti, No. 5 (4-11 February 1996),
p. 34; and Aleksei Bogomolov, “K 40-letiyu XX
s”ezda: Taina zakrytogo doklada,” Sovershenno
sekretno (Moscow), No. 1 (1996), pp. 3-4.
14 Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds.,
Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg
vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: 1956-os
Intezet, 1996).
15 The notes about Hungary appeared in two parts
under the title “Kak reshalis' 'voprosy Vengrii':
Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS,
iyul’-noyabr' 1956 g.," Istoricheskii arkhiv (Mos-
cow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp. 73-104 and 87-
121, respectively. The notes about Poland ap-
peared in Issue No. 5 of the same journal.

See the assessment of this meeting and the
annotated translation of the Czech notes by Mark
Kramer, “Hungary and Poland, 1956:
Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on
East European Crises, 24 October 1956," Cold
War International History Project Bulletin, Issue
No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56. The Czech
document, “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24.
rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku,” 25
October 1956, in Statni Ustredni Archiv (Praha),
Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru Komunisticke Strany
Ceskoslovenska (Arch. UV KSC), Fond (F.) 07/
16 — A. Novotny, Svazek (Sv.) 3, was compiled
by Jan Svoboda, a senior aide to the then-leader
of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, who at-
tended the CPSU Presidium meeting.
17 Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, "Osobyi
korpus v ogne Budapeshta," Voenno-istoricheskii
zhurnal (Moscow), Nos. 10, 11, and 12 (Octo-
ber, November, and December 1993) and No. 1
(January 1994), pp. 22-30; 44-51, 33-37, and 30-
36, respectively.

See the analysis and valuable collection of declassified documents in Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta: Wojsko Polskie w Czerwca 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992). For broader overviews of the crisis, see Jan Ptasinski, Wydarzenia poznanskie czerwiec 1956 (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicze, 1986); Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds., Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1990); and Maciej


Roman Bombicki, Poznan 56 (Poznan: Lawica, 1992). 19“Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.," 12 July 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LI. 22ob. 20 “Pol'skii narod kleimit organizatorov provokatsii,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 July 1956, p. 6. 21

The best overview of the events in Poland in 1956 is Pawel Machcewicz, Polski rok 1956 (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1993). Leszek Gluchowski has done excellent work on the Soviet-Polish crisis; see, for example, his “Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the Polish October'," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 38-49. See also Jerzy Poksinski, “Wojsko Polskie w 1956

problemy polityczne (1) i (2),” Wojsko i Wychowanie (Warsaw), Nos. 1-2 (1992), pp. 4078; and Robert Los, Pazdziernik 1956 roku w perspektywie stosunkow polsko-radzieckich, Ph.D. Diss., University of Lodz, 1993. For a sample of other perspectives on the 1956 Polish crisis, see Zbyslaw Rykowski and Wieslaw Wladyka, Polska proba Pazdziernik ‘56 (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989), pp. 232-234; Sprawozdanie z prac Komisii KC PZPR powolanej dla wyjasnienia przyczyn i przebiegu konfliktow spolecznuch w dziejach Polski Ludowej, special issue of Nowe Drogi (Warsaw), September 1983, see esp. pp. 21-32; Benon Dymek, ed., Pazdziernik 1956: Szkice historyczne (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych, 1989); Bogdan Hillebrandt, ed., Ideowopolityczne kontrowersje i konflikty lat 1956-1970 (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych, 1986); Grzegorz Matuszak, Kryzysy spoleczno-polityczne w procesie budowy socjalizmu w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych PZPR, 1986); and Antoni Czubinski, “Kryzys polityczny 1956 roku w Polsce,” in Antoni Czubinski, ed., Kryzysy spoleczno-polityczne w Polsce Ludowej (Warsaw: Instytut Podstawowych Problemow MarksizmuLeninizmu, 1983), pp. 80-114. 22 “Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave,” No. 233 (Special Dossier Strictly Secret), notes by A. Mikoyan, 19-20 October 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 65, D. 2, LI. 1-14. Further details about this meeting are contained in “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," LI. 1-4. 23

Ibid. 24

Ibid. and “Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave," L. 4.


At the time, there were still 79 Soviet officers, including 28 generals, serving in the Polish army. See Edward Jan Nalepa, Oficerowie Radziecky w Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968: Studium historyczno-wojskowe (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, 1992), p. 43. For a valuable discussion of the military confrontation, see "Wojskowe aspekty pazdziernika 1956 r.,Polska Zbrojna (Warsaw), 18-20 October 1991, p. 3. 26

This account is based on documents recently declassified at the Internal Military Service Archive (Archiwum Wojskowej Sluzby Wewnetrznej, or AWSW) and the Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, or CAW) in Warsaw, which were provided to the author by Leszek Gluchowski. See, in particular, the two reports compiled by Major Witold Osinski, deputy chief of the 2nd Section of the KBW's Military Counterintelligence Directorate, in AWSW, sygn. 2859/20/K and CAW, sygn. 1812/92/8. See also the invaluable first-hand account by Wlodzimierz Mus, the KBW commander at the time, “Spor generalowo Pazdziernik 1956: Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna?Polityka (Warsaw), No. 42 (20 October 1990), p. 14. 27

“Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheve v Varshave,” L. 4. 28 Comments by Stefan Staszewski, former PZPR CC Secretary, in Teresa Toranska, ed., Oni (London: Aneks, 1985), p. 148. 29 “Komunikat o naradach Biura Politycznego KC PZPR i delegacji KC KPZR w Warszawie," Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 20 October 1956, p. 1. 30 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 20 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 20 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LI. 49-50. 31

This was evident, for example, when Ochab stopped in Moscow in September 1956 on his way back from Beijing. See “Priem Posla Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki v SSSR tov. V. Levikovskogo, 10 sentyabrya 1956 g.," 11 September 1956 (Secret), memorandum from N. Patolichev, Soviet deputy foreign minister, in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. Referentura po Pol'she, Op. 38, Por. 9, Papka, 126, D. 031, L. 1. 32 «Antisovetskaya kampaniya v polskoi presse,” Pravda (Moscow), 20 October 1956, p. 1. 33 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 21 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 21 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 2. 34

“Zprava o jednani na KSSS 24. rijna 1956," L. 8. 35 Jacek Kuron, Wiara i wina: Do i od

komunizmu (Warsaw: BGW, 1990), p. 119. 36 Mus, "Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna?" p. 14. 37 “Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa Gomulki,” Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 25 October 1956, p. 1, which appeared under the banner headline “Ponad 300 tysiecy warszawiakow na spotkaniu z nowym kierownictwem partii.” 38.

“Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 26 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 53. 39.

“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 21 oktyabrya 1956 g.," L. 2. 40 “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 23 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, LI. 4-40b. 41

Compare Khrushchev's account in “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva" with Molotov's less favorable reminiscences in Feliks Chuev, ed., Sto sorok besed s Mol vym (Moscow: Terra, 1991), p. 113. 42

Khrushchev's comments, as recorded in Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 139. 43

“Telefonogramma po VCh,” 15 November 1956 (Top Secret), from I. Maslennikov of the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in AVPRF, F. Referentura po Pol'she, Op. 38, Por. 20, Pap. 127, D. 178, LI. 32-33. 44

Quotations are from “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.,"L. 4; and “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 28 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 58. 45

For the full transcript of these sessions, see “Jegyzokonyv a Szovjet es a Magyar part-es allami vezetok targyalasairol,” 13-16 June 1953 (Top Secret), in Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, 276, F. 102/65, oe. The document was declassified in 1991 and published the following year in the Hungarian journal Multunk. A preliminary translation by Monika Borbely was included in Christian F. Ostermann, ed., The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17 June Uprising in East Germany: The Hidden History, a compendium of documents prepared by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the National Security Archive for a November 1996 international conference (hosted by the Center for Contemporary History Research in Potsdam) on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe.” 46 “Plenum TsK KPSS XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma chetyrnadtsatogo zasedaniya 12 iyulya 1955 g. (utrennego)," July 1955 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 176, L. 143.

47 “Shifrtelegramma,” Special Nos. 316-319/No. 16595 (Strictly Secret), from Yu.V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium and CPSU Secretariat, 30 April 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 1, L. 2. 48

Ibid., L. 5. 49

9 «Vypiska iz protokola zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS ot 3 maya 1956 g.,” No. P13/XXIII (Strictly Secret), 3 May 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, L. 133. 50

"Telefonogramma iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS,” 13 June 1956 (Top Secret), from M. A. Suslov to the CSPU Presidium and Secretariat, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 146-149. 51 "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva s kitaiskimi tovarishchami 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine," 2 October 1959 (Top Secret/Special Dossier), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 331, L. 12. For other disparaging remarks by Khrushchev about Rakosi, see Micunovic, Moscow Diary, pp. 135136, 140. 52

See Janos Kadar's remarks to this effect in “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.," 3 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 31-330b. 53

The resolution was broadcast on Hungarian domestic radio on 30 June and published in Szabad Nep the following day. For an English translation, see Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February-November 1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 328331. 54 “Shifrtelegramma,” from Yu. V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat, 9 July 1956 (Special Dossier Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162. All quotations in this paragraph are from Andropov's cable. 55 “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.," Ll. 2-2ob. 56 "TSK KPSS,” 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret Urgent), Osobaya papka, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, L. 231. 57

Ibid., L. 232. 58 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.," L. 2. 59 "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 28 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 12 iyulya 1956 g.," 12 July 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 14, D. 41, LI. 1-2. 60 “Rastut i krepnut mezhdunarodnye sily mira, demokratii i sotsializma," Pravda (Moscow), 16 July 1956, pp. 2-3. 61

“Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Matyashem Rakoshi, Andrashem Hegedushem, Erne Gere i Beloi Vegom, 13 iyulya 1956 g.,” 17 July 1956

(Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, LI. 186-190. 62 “Zapis’ vystuplenii na zasedaniya Politbyuro TSR VPT, 13 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, LI. 191-205; and “TSK KPSS," 16 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya Papka, APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, LI. 183-185. See also "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Yanoshem Kadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956 (Top Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, L1. 206-215. 63 "TSK KPSS,” 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret Urgent), Osobaya papka, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, LI. 225-236. On the eve of the plenum, Mikoyan also held talks with key members of the HWP Central Leadership to ensure that Gero's candidacy would be supported. 64 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), pp. 23-24. 65 “Plan deistvii Osobogo korpusa po vosstanovleniyu obshchestvennogo poryadka na territorii Vengrii," 20 July 1956 (Strictly Secret), as recorded in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony (TSAMO), F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, LI. 130-131. 66 "TSK KPSS” (cited in Note 63 supra), L. 231. 67 “Zapis' besedy s Erno Gere, 2 sentyabrya 1956 g.,” 27 September 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 394, LI. 254-256. 68

Ibid., L. 256. 69 “Shifrtelegramma,” 12 October 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent - Special Dossier), from Yu. V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 64-75. 70

Ibid., L. 71. 71 Countless books and articles about the Hungarian revolution have been published since 1956. For a vivid and well-researched account of the events of 23-24 October, see Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London: Allison & Busby, 1976), esp. pp. 106-123. For other useful perspectives, see Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961); Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986); and Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). Until recently, reliable Hungarian-language accounts were relatively few in number, but that has changed dramatically since Communism ended. The large number of publications put out in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution are

a particularly rich source, as are some of the monographs sponsored by the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Reassessments of the 1956 crises, based on newly declassified materials and new memoirs, were presented at a landmark international "Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence,” which was organized in Budapest on 26-29 September 1996 by the National Security Archive, the CWIHP, and the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. 72 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), pp. 24-25. 73

Other key sources are “Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956,” Ll. 8-14; Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), pp. 22-30; and "TsK KPSS," Memorandum from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret — Special Dossier) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, LI. 8587. 74 The written request, dated 24 October 1956 and signed by then-prime minister Andras Hegedus, was transmitted by Andropov in a ciphered telegram on 28 October. See “Shifrtelegramma” (Strictly Secret — Urgent), 28 October 1956, from Yu. V. Andropov, in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P.6, D. 5, L. 12. (Ed. note: For an English translation, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), p. 30.) 75

“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.," LI. 4-40b. 76

“Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," L. 9. 77 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), p. 27. 78 The preliminary directives are recorded in TSAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130-131. 79

"TSK KPSS," Memorandum from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956 (Strictly SecretSpecial Dossier) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87. This memorandum lays out in detail the complexion and assignments of the Soviet ground and air forces. 80 “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2. (Ed. note: For an English translation, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 22-23, 29.) 81 The Soviet defense ministry's complete list of Hungarian army units that defected to the insur

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