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Khrushcheva," p. 73. 105 “Protocol No. 54 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 24 oct. 1956," 24 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman (Arh. CCPCR), Bucharest, F. Biroul Politic, Dosar (Do.) 354/56, ff. 1-5. This document is included in the valuable new collection edited by Corneliu Mihai Lungu and Mihai Retegan, 1956 Explozia: Perceptii romane, iugoslave si sovietice asupra evenimentelor din Polonia si Ungaria (Bucharest: Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996).
gents was recently declassified at the main Russian military archive, TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 17, LI. 33-48. 82.
“Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 25 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 8. 83
Important samples of these messages, declassified in 1992, are available in “Vengriya, oktyabr’-noyabr' 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK KPSS," Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), No. 5 (1993), pp. 132-141. 84 “-Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.," LI. 62-620b. 85
Citations here are from “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.," LI. 54-63. 86 “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956," 28 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LI. 54-63. 87 “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” 30 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, LI. 6-14. 88
Ibid., L. 14. 89 “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, p. 1. For the CPSU Presidium decision to issue the declaration, see "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/1 (Strictly Secret), 30 October 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 25-30. 90.
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.," LI. 9, 10. 91
"TSK KPSS," High-Frequency Transmission, 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 12, L. 2. 92
Kovacs's remarks, at a meeting of the Independent Smallholders Party in Pecs, were reported in the first issue of the revived party newspaper Kis Ujsag (Budapest), 1 November 1956, p. 2. 93
See the first-hand comments by Gyorgy G. Heltai, the Hungarian deputy foreign minister under Nagy's government, “International Aspects,” in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect, East European Monograph No. XL (Boulder, Col.: East European Quarterly, 1978), esp. pp. 52-53. The negotiations are also briefly recounted in Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin: Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution, trans. by Howard L. Katzander (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), pp. 163-165; and “Szemtol
szembe Mikojannal es Szuszloval,” Igazsag (Budapest), 1 November 1956, p. 1. 94 The theme of Hungarian neutrality was emphasized in several of Nagy's essays in On Communism: In Defense of the New Course (London: Thames and Hudson, 1957). The Soviet Union's backing for Rakosi against Nagy in March-April 1955 was clearly one of the factors that prompted Nagy to consider the prospect of neutrality 95
Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 73-74. 96 “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 15-180b. 97
“Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49NVI (Strictly Secret), 31 October 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41. 98
For a detailed survey of the crisis as recorded in declassified U.S. documents, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. XVI: Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990). 99 “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.," L. 61. 100
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 31 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, LI. 15-180b. If Khrushchev had been privy to secret U.S. deliberations, he would have realized that the United States had no intention of directly supporting the French-British-Israeli operation, either militarily or diplomatically. See, for example, “Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, 30 October 1956, 10:06-10:55 am,” in FRUS, 1955-5 Vol. XVI, pp. 851-855. 101
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 34. On this same point, Sandor Kopasci recounts a very intriguing comment that Ivan Serov, the head of the Soviet KGB, allegedly made when he was arresting Kopasci just after the invasion: "Suez caught us [in Moscow] by surprise. We were compelled to resort to military measures in the Danube Basin because of that area's strategic importance to any operations we might conduct in the Near East.” See Kopasci, Au nom de la classe ouvriere, p. 201. If Kopasci recorded Serov's statement accurately, and if—assuming the statement is accurate—Serov was being sincere, this passage sheds valuable light on Khrushchev's remarks. 102 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 136. 103
Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha
107 “Protocol No. 55 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 26 oct. 1956," 26 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. Biroul Politic, Do. 355/56, ff. 1-5. 108 “Protocol Nr. 58 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 30 oct. 1956,” 30 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. Biroul Politic, Do. 358/56, ff. 3-5. 109
“Stenograma conferintei organizatiei regionale al CC al PMR,” 23 November 1956 (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. 85, Do. 84/56, Ff. 1-8. This report is not included in the Lungu/ Retegan volume. I am grateful to Mihai Retegan for providing me with a copy of the document. 110
Ibid. 111 Ibid. See also Constantin Botoran, “National Interest in Romanian Politics During the Cold War" (Bucharest: Institute for Military Theory and History, Romanian Ministry of Defense, March 1994), pp. 7-8. 112 “Protocol Nr. 58 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 30 oct. 1956," ff. 3-5. 113 “Stenograficky zapis ze zasedani UV KSC,” 5-6 December 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA, Arch. UV KSC, F. 07, Sv. 14, Archivna jednotka (A.j.) 14. 114..
"Zabezpeceni klidu na uzemi CSR a statnich hranic s Mad’arskem,” Report from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Jaroslav Dockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Vojensky historicky archiv (VHA) Praha, Fond Ministra narodni obrany (MNO) CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8-39b.
115 Ibid., p. 5.
116 "Souhrn hlaseni operacniho dustojnika Generalniho stabu cs. armady," Notes from Col.General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, to the KSC Central Committee (Top Secret), 27 October 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-49b. 117 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 1 noyabrya 1956 g.," 1 November
1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 22. 118 Wilfried Otto, ed., “Ernst Wollweber: Aus Erinnerungen - Ein Portraet Walter Ulbrichts," Beitraege zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin), No. 3 (1990), pp. 365-367. 119
Speech by Grotewohl to the CC plenum of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), 13 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv (Berlin), DY 30/IV 2/1/ 166, p. 247. 120
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 350b. For illuminating analyses of the impact of the 1956 events on the East German authorities, see Hope M. Harrison, “The Effect of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising on the East German Leadership," and Christian F. Ostermann, "East Germany and the Hungarian Revolution, 1956,” both presented at the “Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956." 121 For a detailed, top-secret account of the disorders, see “Zakrytoe pis’mo," 12 March 1956 (Top Secret), from S. Statnikov, Tbilisi correspondent for Trud, to the CPSU Central Committee, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 140, Ll. 53-67. 122
“Prikaz No. 14 Nachal'nika Tbilisskogo garnizona,” from Major-General Gladkov, commander of the Tbilisi garrison, 9 March 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 140, L. 68. 123 “O kul'te lichnosti i preodolenii ego posledstvii,” in KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 8th ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), Vol. 7, p. 212. 124 For a cogent analysis of this matter based on newly declassified materials, see M. R. Zezina, “Shokovaya terapiya: Ot 1953-go k 1956 godu,” Otechestvennaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 2 (1995), esp. pp. 129-133. 125
See the first-hand account by the former KGB deputy director, Filipp Bobkov, KGB i vlast' (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. 144-145. 126
"TSK KPSS: Informatsiya,” 7 November 1956 (Top Secret), from regional KGB stations to the CPSU Presidium, in TsKHSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 141, L. 67. 127
“Rabochaya zapis’zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," 4 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 360b. 128 Bobkov, KGB i vlast', p. 145. On the new arrests, see Zezina, “Shokovaya terapiya,” p. 130. 129 Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, p. 153. 130
Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," p. 76.
132 “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 1 noyabrya 1956 g.," 1 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, LI. 19-22. 133
See, for example, Mikoyan's comments during the secret proceedings of the June 1957 CPSU CC plenum (which removed the Anti-Party Group), in “Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun’ 1957 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet,” No. P2500 (Strictly Secret), 22-29 June 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 259, LI, 270b-280b. 134
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," 2 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 23-29; and “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” 3 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, LI. 31-33ob. 135
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 240b. 136
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” L. 32. 137
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 29. 138
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.,” Ll. 31-33. 139
In addition to Kadar's account in “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," see the cable sent to Moscow by Andropov
1 November"Shifrtelegramma," 1 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, LI. 17-19—which provides valuable corroboration of Kadar's remarks. 140 “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.," LI. 15-180b. 141
Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 74-75. 142
“Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.," in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, LI. 6-14. The principles of Pancha Shila were endorsed in a joint statement by Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The five principles were intended to “guide relations between the two countries” as well as “relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world.” For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (19491962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8. 143
In addition to Khrushchev's account of the airport meeting, see the contemporary observations recorded by Micunovic in Moscow Diary,
pp. 132 and 138, which fully bear out Khrushchev's version. Unfortunately, all Chinese archives that might shed greater light on China's role in the 1956 events are still closed. For an assessment based on Chinese-language evidence that has surfaced to date-largely memoirs (whose reliability is questionable) and published compilations of documents selected and edited by Chinese authorities—see Chen Jian, “Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956,” presented at the “Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956." Chen Jian and other scholars are seeking additional evidence on this matter, and their findings will appear in future CWIHP publications. 144
First-hand accounts of the meetings are available in Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” pp. 75-77, which have been well corroborated by other sources, including Khrushchev's observations at the time, as recorded in Micunovic, Moscow Diary, pp. 135, 138-139. Newly declassified documents pertaining to the meetings are cited below. 145
See "Zapis' telefonogrammy,” c. 1 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 66. 146 “Protokol Nr. 135 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dn. 1.XI.1956 r.," 1 November 1956 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Warsaw, Archiwum Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Rabotniczej (Arch. KC PZPR), Paczka (Pa.) 15, Tom (T.) 58, Dokument (Dok.) 134. This protocol is included in the valuable collection of declassified Polish documents edited by Janos Tischler, Rewolucja wegierska 1956 w polskich dokumentach, Dokumenty do dziejow PRL No. 8 (Warsaw: Instytut Studiow Politycznych, 1995). 147 “Odezwa Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Rabotniczej do klasy robotniczej, do narodu polskiego,” Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 2 November 1956, p. 1. 148 “Rozmowy radziecko-wegierskie,” Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 3 November 1956, p. 1. 149 Gomulka's conflicting thoughts about the matter can be seen in “Stenogram Krajowej Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada 1956 r.: Wystapenia W. Gomulki,” 4 November 1956 (Top Secret), in AAN, Arch. KC PZPR, 237N-241. 150 “Protokol Nr. 136 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dniu 4 listopada 1956 r.," 4 November 1956 (Top Secret), in AAN, Arch. KC PZPR, Pa. 15, T. 58, Dok. 135. 151 “Usneseni 151 schuze politickeho byra UV KSC k bodu 1: Udalosti v Mad'arsku," 2 November 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA Praha, Arch.
UV KSC, F. 02/2—Politicke byro UV KSC 1954-
Kommunistov Yugoslavii,” L. 4.
Mezinarodni oddeleni UV KSC 1954-1962, Sv. 155
For Tito's explanation of why the promise 110, Ar. Jed. 371. For a thorough survey of the could not be fulfilled, see “Pis’mo Tsentral'nogo role of the Hungarian army in 1956, see Imre Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 Okvath, “Magyar tisztikar a hideghaboru fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu idoszakaban, 1945-1956," Uj Honvedsegi szemle Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," (Budapest), No. 1 (1994), pp. 14-27, which is Ll. 17-18.
based on documents from the 1956 collection 156
Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha (1956-os Gyujtemeny) of the Military History Khrushcheva," p. 75.
Archives of the Hungarian National Defense 157 See Imre Horvath's handwritten summary (in Ministry (Hadtortenelmi Leveltar, Honvedelmi Hungarian) of Khrushchev's remarks, in Magyar Miniszterium). A recent volume by Miklos Orszagos Leveltar, XIX J-1-K Horvath Imre Horvath, 1956 katonai kronologiaja (Budapest: kulugyminiszter iratai, 55, doboz. For some rea- Magyar Honvedseg Oktatasi es Kulturalis son, Malin did not record Khrushchev's speech Anyagellato Kozpont, 1993), also draws on these in the notes from the full session (“Rabochaya documents. For a useful first-hand account, see zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 Bela Kiraly, “Hungary's Army: Its Part in the noyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 31-33ob.
Revolt,” East Europe, Vol. 7, No. 6 (June 1958), 158
A detailed first-hand account of the military pp. 3-16. Kiraly, as commander of Hungarian operations can be found in Malashenko, “Osobyi troops in Budapest at the time, led the armed rekorpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 3), pp. 33-37 sistance against the invasion.
166 and (Part 4), pp. 30-36.
On the preparations by Maleter, see Miklos 159 See, e.g., “Zprava o opatrenich k zesileni Horvath, Pal Maleter (Budapest: Osiris/ bojove pohotovosti vojsk,” Report from Col.- Szazadveg/1956-os Intezet, 1995), esp. pp. 223General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czecho- 228. slovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Evzen 167 “Stav Mad'arske lidove armady a priciny Chlad, chief of the Main Logistical Directorate, jejiho rozkladu,” LI. 4-5. The quoted phrase is to the MNO Collegium (Top Secret), 31 October from “Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta,” Cable 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS 2/8- from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU 49b. See also “Rozkaz k provedeni vojenskych Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in opatreni na hranicich s Mad’arskem," from Col.- AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2. General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czecho
On the disarming operations, see slovak General Staff, to the 2nd Military District “Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po in Trencin (Strictly Secret), 28 October 1956, in sostoyaniyu na 21.00 4 noyabrya 1956 goda," VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-2b. Report No. 31613 (Top Secret), from Soviet de160 “Usneseni 151 schuze politickeho byra UV fense minister G. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium, KSC k bodu 1,” pt. 1.
and “Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po 161 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne sostoyaniyu na 9.00 5 noyabrya 1956 goda,” ReBudapeshte" (Part 3), p. 33.
port No. 31614 (Top Secret), from Soviet defense 162 Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ogne minister G. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium, both Budapeshta" (Part 4), pp. 32-33.
in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 102 and 103163
Nagy's cable to UN Secretary-General Dag 104, respectively. See also Malashenko, “Osobyi Hammarskjold can be found in UN Doc. A/3251. korpus v ogne Budapeshta” (Part 3), pp. 34, 37. The appeal and declaration of neutrality were 169 "Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po broadcast on Budapest radio on the evening of 1 sostoyaniyu na 21.00 6 noyabrya 1956 goda,” November. According to Kadar's detailed expla- Report No. 31618 (Top Secret), from Soviet denation at a CPSU Presidium meeting on 2 No- fense minister G. K. Zhukov to the CPSU Prevember, Zoltan Tildy was the one who came up sidium, in AVPRF, F. 0536, Op. 1, P. 5, D. 65, L. with the idea of a declaration of neutrality. All 63. Among the other cities in which Soviet troops the members of the Hungarian cabinet ultimately encountered fierce resistance were Budaorsi, voted in favor of it. See “Rabochaya zapis' Csepel, Jaszberenyi, Kaposvar, Kecskemet, zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya Kobanya, Komlo, Mezokovesd, Miskolc, Obuda, 1956 g.," LI. 23-29.
Pecs, Soroksar, Szolnok, Szombathely, Thokoly, 164 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 156.
Ulloi, and Veszprem. 165 “Stav Mad'arske lidove armady a priciny 170 “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Prezidiuma jejiho rozkladu,” Report compiled by KSC CC TSK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 30.
was declassified. See “Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Soyuza
171 Department No. 14 for the KSC CC Politburo, 9 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha April 1957, in SUA, Arch. UV KSC, F. 100/3 Khrushcheva," pp. 77-78.
Quotations here and in the following paragraph are from “Rabochaya zapis’zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," LI. 34-360b; and “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS, 6 noyabrya 1956 g.," 6 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, LI. 41-45ob. This bickering was first described by Khruschev in his memoirs (“Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 77-78), and a few additional details (not mentioned in Malin's notes) came to light in the recently declassified transcript of the June 1957 CPSU Central Committee plenum (“Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda,” Ll. 270b-280b). The Malin notes confirm and add a great deal to these earlier sources. 173 The Russian phrase that Molotov used (odernut' nado, chtoby ne komandoval) is slightly awkward in the original, but it can be roughly translated as it is here. 174
See “Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda," Ll. 2, 25. The charge of “dangerous zigzags” was leveled by Molotov at a CPSU Presidium meet
ing a few days before the Central Committee ple-
Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 156.
“Sobytiya v Vengrii 1956 g.," in Col.-General G. A. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti snyat: Poteri vooruzhenykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), p. 397. The number of Soviet deaths was 720, the number of Soviet wounded was 1,540. The number of Hungarian deaths was 2,502, and the number of Hungarian wounded was 19,226. 178 Attila Szakolczai, “A forradalmat koveto megtorlas soran kivegzettekrol," in Evkonyv, Vol. 3 (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1994), pp. 237256. Szakolczai provides a considerably lower figure (229) for the number of executions. The figure of 600 comes from Maria Ormos, “A konszolidacio problemai 1956 es 1958 kozott," Tarsadalmi Szemle, Vol. 44, Nos. 8-9 (1989), pp. 48-65. See also Janos Balassa et al., eds., Halottaink, 2 vols. (Budapest: Katalizator, 1989). 179
“Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," L. 12. 180 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," p. 81. 181 Testimony of former national defense minister Lajos Czinege in Magyar Orszaggyules, A Honvedelmi Bizottsag 1989 oktoberi ulesszakan letrhozott vizsgalobizottsag 1989 december 11-i, 1990 januar 3-, 1990 januar 15-i, 1990 februar 6-i ulese jegyzokonyvenek nyilt reszlete, 5 vols. (1994), Vol. 1, p. 261. 182 Tov. Orlovu A.L.," Memorandum No. 18691 2 (Top Secret), 28 December 1956, transmitting a report prepared by I. Tugarinov, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry's Information Committee, in AVPRF, F. Referentura po Vengrii, Op.36, Por.9, Pap.47a, D.110, L1.11-18. An English translation of this document, as well as an insightful commentary by James Hershberg, can be found in the Cold War International History Bul. letin, Issue No.4 (Fall 1994), pp.61-64. 183 Micunovic, Moscow Diary, p. 134. 184 Khrushchev, “Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 80-82. 185 The notion of a tradeoff between “cohesion" and “viability” is well presented in James F. Brown, Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its East European Allies: A Survey, R-1742-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975).
FUNDS SOUGHT TO PROCESS
$50,000 to finance critical research, inRADIO FREE EUROPE TAPES
volving processing of the tapes that ON 1956 HUNGARIAN EVENTS
were previously believed lost and/or
missing, and acquisition of additional For forty years, various politicians, materials from other foreign radios and historians, and public figures have de
archives. The sources and the profesbated the existence of Radio Free
sional contacts are already established. Europe's tapes of broadcasts made dur
Processing the collection and ing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
complementing it with additional In the summer of 1995, Mr. Gyorgy broadcast and recorded materials, will Vamos, Director of Documentation for
create a basis for a meaningful and obHungarian National Radio, and Judy jective analysis of the American and Katona, M.A., A.B.D., researcher and
Western policies of the time. All matejournalist, found the recordings in Ger
rials, of course, would be made freely, many—over 500 hours of tape, which equally, and openly available to rereveal what was broadcast and raise
searchers. serious questions concernig policy and
In the future, in a second phase of intent.
the research, a major English language These holdings constitute a unique
source document can be published with and invaluable record for the study of
content analysis of the broadcasts, footHungarian history, the role of the United
notes, and detailed references. States and American radio in the 1956
In the first phase of the implemenHungarian Revolution, and in general, tation of the project, money would be the role of U.S. media abroad in pro
spent on researchers' stipends, translamoting ideology, and internal divergen
tions, acquisition of materials, transcripcies which led broadcasters to convey
tion, duplications, and travel. messages about American intentions
For further information, contact Judy which were at odds with the actual in
Katona at (703) 913-5824 (telephone) tentions of top policy makers during this
or firstname.lastname@example.org (e-mail). tense period of the Cold War.
We are seeking support of US
Mark Kramer, a scholar based at the Davis
for Russian Studies at Harvard University, is a frequent contributor to the CWIHP Bulletin.
THE “MALIN NOTES” ON THE CRISES IN HUNGARY AND POLAND, 1956
Translated and Annotated by Mark Kramer
The translated items below are in chronological order. They include Vladimir Malin's notes of CPSU Presidium meetings that dealt with the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956. The notes are supplemented by several other newly released documents that shed direct light on portions of the notes. Most of the documents, including Malin's notes, were translated from Russian, but two documents (both from the Hungarian National Archive) were translated from Hungarian.
Extensive annotations have been included because of the idiosyncratic style of the notes and the large number of references (to events, individuals, etc.) that may not be familiar to most readers. Rather than putting in separate annotations to identify specific persons, I have compiled an identification list of all individuals mentioned in the notes. This list and a list of abbreviations precede the notes and should be consulted whenever unfamiliar names or abbreviations turn up.
As best as possible, the flavor and style of the original have been preserved in the English translation, but in a few cases I have expanded Russian and Hungarian abbreviations and acronyms to avoid confusion. For example, there is no equivalent in English for the Russian abbreviation “m.b.,” short for mozhet by’, meaning “perhaps” or “maybe.” Hence, in this particular instance the English word has been written out in full. In most cases, the translation seeks to replicate abbreviations and acronyms, but they have been used only when it does not cause confusion.
The English translation is not identical to the published Hungarian and Russian compilations of the Malin notes. Both of these earlier publications contain several errors, including a few that substantially alter the meaning of the original. The fact that mistakes cropped up is mainly a reflection of how difficult it is to work with the handwritten originals, which, aside from problems of legibility, are occasionally out of sequence in the archival folders. In some cases the mispagination is easy to correct, but in a few instances the reordering of pages necessitates very close textual analysis. I have corrected all these mistakes in the English translation, and have included details about the corrections in the annotations.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
APRF = Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi
tary History Archive), Budapest
IN THE MALIN NOTES
Three points are worth mentioning
Second, the entries for some HungarPZPR = Polska Zjednoczona Partia ian Communist party officials include as Robotnicza (Polish United Workers' Party) many as three titles for the party. The ComSUA = Statni ustredni archiv (Central State munist party in Hungary was called the Archive), Prague
Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar TSAMO = Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva Kommunista Part) until June 1948, when it oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Central compelled the Hungarian Social Democratic Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Rus- Party (Magyar Szocial-Demokrata Part) to sian Federation)
merge with it. The combined party was reTsKhSD = Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi named the Hungarian Workers' Party Dokumentatsii (Center for the Storage of (Magyar Dolgozok Partja). The HungarContemporary Documentation), Moscow ian Workers' Party was dissolved at the end UV = Central Committee (of the KSC) of October 1956, and a new Hungarian SoVHA = Vojensky historicky archiv (Military- cialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Historical Archive), Prague
Munkaspart) was formed on 1 November 1956. The acronyms HCP, HWP, and