網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

HWP Politburo from 24 October 1956 (and of the HWP Presidium from 28 October); member of the HSWP Executive Committee from 1 to 4 November 1956; took refuge along with Imre Nagy in the Yugoslav embassy on 4 November 1956; arrested by Soviet troops when he left the embassy on 18 November 1956; transferred to Romania along with Imre Nagy and other former officials five days later; permitted to return to Hungary in 1958

TILDY, Zoltan: one of the leaders of the Independent Smallholders Party until August 1948; under house arrest from August 1948 to April 1956; a state minister in Imre Nagy's government from 27 October 1956 to 4 November 1956; arrested in May 1957 and sentenced to six years in prison in June 1958; amnestied in 1960

TITO, Josip Broz: General Secretary of the Yugoslav League of Communists; president of Yugoslavia

TOGLIATTI, Palmiro: General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party

ULBRICHT, Walter: General Secretary of the (East) German Socialist Unity Party (SED)

VAS, Zoltan: top-ranking official in the HCP and HWP from 1945 on; served as chairman of the Government Commission on Consumer Supplies during the 1956 revolution; took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on 4 November 1956; arrested when he left the embassy on 18 November 1956; transferred along with Nagy and other former officials to Romania five days later; allowed to return to Hungary at the end of 1958

VEG, Bela: HWP Secretary from 1953 to October 1956

ZORIN, Valerian: Soviet deputy foreign minister

[blocks in formation]

Furtseva, Shepilov

On the Situation in Budapest and Overall in Hungary 21

(Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Khrushchev)

Information of Cde. Zhukov.

A demonstration by 100 thous. in Budapest The radio station is on fire.22

In Debrecen the obkom [provincial party committee-trans.] and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs-trans.] buildings were occupied.

Cde. Khrushchev speaks in favor of sending troops to Budapest.23

Cde. Bulganin believes Cde. Khrushchev's proposal to send troops is justified.

Cde. Mikoyan: Without Nagy they can't get control of the movement, and it's also cheaper for us. Expresses doubt about the sending of troops. What are we losing? The Hungarians themselves will restore order on their own. We should try political measures, and only then send troops.

Cde. Molotov-With Nagy left on his own, Hungary is coming apart. Favors the sending of troops.

Cde. Kaganovich-The government is being overthrown. There's no comparison with Poland. Favors the sending of troops.

Cde. Pervukhin-Troops must be sent.

Cde. Zhukov-There is indeed a difference with Poland. Troops must be sent. One of the members of the CC Presidium should travel there. Martial law should be declared in the country, and a curfew introduced.

Cde. Suslov-The situation in Poland is different. Troops must be sent.

Cde. Saburov-Troops must be sent to uphold order.

Cde. Shepilov-Favors the sending of troops

Cde. Kirichenko-Favors the sending of troops. Cdes. Malinin and Serov should be dispatched to Budapest.

Cde. Khrushchev-We should recruit Nagy for political action. But until then we shouldn't make a chairman of the govern

ment.

Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov are to fly to Budapest.24

[blocks in formation]

Hungarian party workers (126 cdes.) are studying at the Higher Party School.2 29 We should provide information to them. Instruct them, carry out work. We mustn't turn them against the Directory and CC, but should say there are vacillations within the CC.3 30

Convene a meeting with them with participation of the Hungarian ambassador and military officers (in the school), and then send them back there (to Hungary). Hold a meeting with the students and inform them (at the colleges) perhaps with the

ambassador present.31

Perform the work.

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

Prepare a flight.

Reinforce the troops.

Cdes. Molotov, Zhukov, and Malenkov are 38 to fly off. 3

Later we can say definitively.

Regarding Cde. Mikoyan's trip to Austria39 it should be deferred."

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LI. 53-53ob, 62-62ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 6

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 28 October 195640

[blocks in formation]

Nagy said that if you act he will relinquish his powers.

Then the coalition will collapse.49

There is no firm leadership there, neither in the party nor in the government.

The uprising has spread into the provinces. The [Hungarian] troops might go over to the side of the insurgents.50

We can't persist on account of Hegedus.
Two options.

The gov't takes action, and we help.

This might soon be completed, or Nagy will turn against us.

He will demand a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops, followed by capitulation.

What might the alternatives be?

1) The formation of a Committee, which takes power into its hands (this is the worst alternative), when we ...51

2) This gov't is retained, and officials from the gov't are sent into the provinces. A platform is needed.

Perhaps our Appeal to the population and to workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia should be prepared, or else we're just shooting.

3) Would it not be appropriate if the Chinese, Bulgarians, Poles, Czechs, and Yugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians? 4) Decisively suppress the armed forces of the insurgents.

Cdes. Brezhnev, Pospelov, Shepilov, and Furtseva are to prepare documents.

It is agreed: the fraternal parties should appeal to the Hungarians.

Do we support the present government once the declaration is issued?52 Yes, support it. There is no alternative.

Cde. Bulganin: ... 53

Cde. Voroshilov: We acted correctly when we sent in troops. We should be in no hurry to pull them out.

American secret services are more active there than Cdes. Suslov and Mikoyan are. A group of comrades should go there. Arrange to form a gov't and then withdraw the troops. We sent you there for nothing.54 (Cdes. Khrushchev and Kaganovich object.)

Cde. Bulganin: We acted properly when we sent in troops, but I can't agree with the assessment offered by Cde. Voroshilov. We should endorse the actions taken by Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.

We must draw the right conclusion: In Budapest there are forces that want to get rid of Nagy's and Kadar's government. We should adopt a position of support for the

current government.

Otherwise we'll have to undertake an occupation.

This will drag us into a dubious venture.

Cde. Kaganovich: Regarding the sending of troops, we acted properly in sending them.

There is no reason to attack Mikoyan and Suslov.

They acted properly. It's unfair to lay the blame on them.

If we don't offer support, there'll be an occupation of the country.

That will take us far afield.

We should do what is needed to support the gov't.

Changes shouldn't be made in the declaration regarding the withdrawal of troops.55 So that they speak about friendship.

The question is how to strengthen the party. We don't need to send additional people there.

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

An appeal from the fraternal parties.64 A ciphered cable to Yugoslavia.65

Cde. Pospelov is to be included in preparations of the report for 6.XI.56

If there is to be a leaflet from the military command, let...66

Hegedus Gero Piros

them to Bulgaria.67 On the Situation in Hungary68 (Cde. Suslov)

Cde. Suslov: The situation is complicated. On 23 Oct. our troops entered.69 On 25 Oct. only one pocket of resistance was left; we found out about it on 26 Oct. It was in the "Corvin" cinema, a group headed 70 by a colonel from the Horthyite army. Single gunshots are heard (often). They're beating officers.

3,000 wounded, 350 dead (Hungarians). Our losses are 600 dead.

The popular view of our troops now is bad (and has gotten worse). The reason is the dispersal of the demonstration on 24 Oct. 56.71 Shooting began. 70 ordinary citizens were killed. Many flags were hung up on the sidewalk.

Workers are leaving their enterprises.

Councils are being formed (spontaneously) at enterprises (around various cities).72

There is an anti-Soviet trend in the demonstrations.

How can we regain control of the situation? The establishment of a relatively strong gov't.

Our line is not to protest the inclusion of several democrats in the gov't. Yesterday a government was formed.

On the morning of 28 Oct., at 5:00, Kadar arrived and pointed out that the trade unions had demanded a reassessment of the insurgents, reclassifying the events as a nationaldemocratic uprising.73

They want to classify it according to the example of the Poznan events.

Kadar reported that he had succeeded in agreeing with the trade unions to eliminate the formula of a national-democratic movement and about the organs of state security.

In his address, Nagy inserted a point about the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

They're also insisting on a ceasefire.

Our line now: this time the gov't is recommending a ceasefire, and the military command is devising an order for the withdrawal of troops from Budapest.74

Nagy and Szanto raised the question of removing Hegedus from the Directory.

There's no need to hold elections.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LI. 54-63, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 7

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 195676

(Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)77

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov

On the Situation in Hungary

Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serov is read aloud. 78

Cde. Zhukov provides information about the concentration of mil.-transport aircraft in the Vienna region.79

Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin's opinion).

Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.80

On Discussions with the Chinese comrades. 81

(Khrushchev)

We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people's democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based.

The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position.

One document for the Hungarians, and another for the participants of the Warsaw Pact.

On Rokossowski-—I said to Gomulka that this matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.82

Cde. Bulganin―The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect impression of our relations with the countries of people's democracy.

On our appeal to the Hungarians-we should prepare it.

A declaration should be prepared.

Cde. Molotov-Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

There is the Warsaw Pact.

This must be considered with other countries.

On the view of the Chinese comrades-they suggest that relations with the countries of the socialist camp be built on the principles of Pancha Shila. 83

Relations along interstate lines are on one basis and interparty relations on another.

Cde. Voroshilov: We must look ahead. Declarations must be composed so that we aren't placed into an onerous position. We must criticize ourselves-but justly.

Cde. Kaganovich-Pancha Shila, but I don't think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila.

Two documents-an appeal to the Hungarians and a Declaration.

In this document we don't need to provide self-criticism.

There's a difference between party and state relations.

Cde. Shepilov-The course of events reveals the crisis in our relations with the countries of people's democracy. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. The underlying reasons must be revealed. The foundations remain unshakable. Eliminate the elements of diktat, not giving play in this situation to a number of measures to be considered in our relations. The declaration is the first step. There is no need for an appeal to the Hungarians.

On the armed forces: We support the principles of non-interference.

With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We'll have to keep up a struggle with national-Communism for a long time.

Cde. Zhukov―Agrees with what Cde. Shepilov has said.

The main thing is to decide in Hungary. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole.

This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.

Cde. Zhukov-With regard to troops in the GDR and in Poland, the question is more serious.

It must be considered at the Consultative Council.84

The Consultative Council is to be convened.

To persist further-it is unclear what will come of this.

A quick decision, the main thing is to declare it today.

Cde. Furtseva―We should adopt a general declaration, not an appeal to the Hungarians. Not a cumbersome declaration.

The second thing is important for the internal situation.

We must search for other modes of relations with the countries of people's democracy.

About meetings with leaders of the people's democracies (concerning relations).

We should convene a CC plenum (for informational purposes).85

Cde. Saburov: Agrees about the need for a Declaration and withdrawal of troops. At the XX Congress we did the correct thing, but then did not keep control of the unleashed initiative of the masses.

It's impossible to lead against the will of the people.

We failed to stand for genuine Leninist principles of leadership.

We might end up lagging behind events. Agrees with Cde. Furtseva. The ministers are asking; so are members of the CC.86

With regard to Romania-they owe us 5 billion rubles for property created by the people. 87

We must reexamine our relations. Relations must be built on an equal basis.

Cde. Khrushchev: We are unanimous. As a first step we will issue a Declaration.

Cde. Khrushchev-informs the others about his conversation with Cde. Mikoyan.

Kadar is behaving well.

5 of the 6 are firmly hanging in there.88 A struggle is going on inside the [HWPtrans.] Presidium about the withdrawal of troops.

The minister of defense will issue a directive about the suppression of insurgents in the cinema, using the armed forces.

« 上一頁繼續 »