(Malinin, apparently, became nervous and left the session.)

Officers from the state security (Hungarian) are with our troops." 89

Consideration of the Draft Declaration (Shepilov, Molotov, Bulganin)

Cde. Bulganin-we should say in what connection the question of a Declaration

arose.

Page 2, Par. 2, don't soften the self-criticism. Mistakes were committed.

Much use should be made of "Leninist principles."

Cde. Khrushchev-expresses agreement. We should say we are guided by Leninist principles.

Page 2, Par. 5—we should say we are making a statement, not an explanation. Page 3-we should speak about economic equity, make it the main thing.

We should say that no troops are stationed in the majority of countries.

We should say that on the territory of the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian states the stationing of troops is done with the consent of their governments and in the interests of these gov'ts and peoples.90

Cde. Khrushchev sets forth the various

considerations.

We should reexamine our assessment and should not withdraw our troops from Hungary and Budapest. 100 We should take the initative in restoring order in Hungary. If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French-the imperialists.

They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive. We would then be exposing the weakness of our positions.

Our party will not accept it if we do this. To Egypt they will then add Hungary, 101

We have no other choice.

If this point of view is supported and endorsed, let's consider what we should do.

Agreed: Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Saburov 102

We should say we tried to meet them halfway, but there is not now any government. What line are we now adopting?

We should create a Provisional Revol. Gov't 103 (headed by Kadar). Best of all-a deputy. Munnich-as premier and min. of defense and internal affairs. 104

This government-we should invite them to negotiations about the withdrawal of troops and resolve the matter.

If Nagy_agrees, bring him in as dep. premier, 105

Munnich is appealing to us with a request for assistance. We are lending assistance and restoring order.

We should negotiate with Tito.

We should inform the Chinese comrades, the Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgarians, 106

There will be no large-scale war.

Cde. Saburov-after yesterday's session this discussion is all pointless. It will vindicate NATO.

Cde. Molotov-yesterday was only a compromise decision.

Cdes. Zhukov, Voroshilov, Bulganin: We should reject the view that we are reexamining our position.

Cde. Furtseva-What further should be done?

We showed patience, but now things have gone too far. We must act to ensure that

Notes of a Telephone Message from F. N. Gryaznov, a Counselor at the USSR Embassy in Yugoslavia, on 31 October 1956

The message was transmitted through

Kardelj.

Cde. Tito is at Brioni. Kardelj reported that Tito is prepared to meet with Cdes. Khrushchev and Malenkov on 1 November. However, because the doctors have forbidden him to leave his current premises in view of his illness, Tito requests that our delegation, if possible, come to Brioni.

As Kardelj further said, it would be desirable if the aircraft carrying the delegation arrived at the airport in Pula at roughly 5:00 p.m. Belgrade time so they can leave from the airport for Brioni with the approach of darkness.

Instructions about the flight path and the landing in Pula will be given in due

course.

Kardelj requested that we let him know the time of departure for the aircraft and the time of arrival in Pula.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LI. 64-65, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT No. 10

Notes of a Telephone Message116

There was a certain common understanding. The position is what we expected. This is an internal affair. There should not be interference.

Reaction is rearing its head.
8-10% at elections.

Arm the workers, let them keep the weapons.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 66, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

DOCUMENT NO. 11

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 1 November 1956

(Re: Point I of Protocol No. 50)117

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Konev, Serov 118

On the Situation in Hungary. (Cdes. Mikoyan)

The demand for the withdrawal of troops became universal.

Anti-Soviet sentiments have intensified. (Cde. Mikoyan)

In current circumstances it is better now to support the existing gov't.

Right now, the use of force will not help anything.

We should enter into negotiations. For 1015 days.

If the regime slips away, we'll need to decide what to do. We simply cannot allow Hungary to be removed from our camp.

We shouldn't quarrel right now with the army.

If the situation stabilizes, we should decide at that point whether we'll withdraw the troops.

We should wait another 10-15 days and support this government.

If the situation stabilizes, everything will change for the better.

Cde. Suslov: The unstable polit. situation. The danger of a bourgeois restoration has reached its peak.

The situation will be clarified in the next few days.

Events are developing wildly, but without the control of the party.

A schism in the HWP-the intra-party struggle has spilled out onto the streets. I don't believe that Nagy organized the uprising, but his name is being used.

If we back this gov't-there is no guaran

tee.

Only by means of an occupation can we have a government that supports us.

Cde. Serov-the demonstrations were meticulously prepared. Nagy was connected with the rebels.

We must take decisive measures. We must occupy the country.

Cde. Bulganin—provides information about the decision taken on 31-X-56 and about the discussions with the Chinese comrades. 119

Cde. Bulganin: The international situation has changed, 120

If we don't take measures-we will lose Hungary.

Cde. Konev-Budapest is in the hands of the rebels.

moving into Szolnok.

This was at noon. The government has been thrown into a nervous state.

They summoned Andropov. He responded: the withdrawal of wounded soldiers.

Nagy was convinced that a strike against Budapest is being prepared. Tildy requested that Hungarian tanks approach the parliament.

In the army-a Rev. Council, Maleter, Kovacs, 141 and Kiraly are not subordinate to the gov't.

They don't want bad ministers.

The whole gov't was inclined to the view that if the troops move toward Budapest, the city must be defended.

In this atmosphere the idea of neutrality

arose.

The initiator of it was Zoltan Tildy.
Everyone supported it.

I was a supporter of the view that no sorts of steps should be taken without having spoken with Andropov.

The whole cabinet, other than Kadar, declared that the Sov. gov't is deceiving the Hungarian gov't.

They deferred it for two hours.

The Sov. gov't's explanation didn't satisfy them. They told Andropov that they'll be taking this step. 142

When Andropov left, they took their step about neutrality and decided to issue an appeal to the UN.

If these are just maneuvers, they'll withdraw the question from the UN.

When Andropov left, Kadar voted for neutrality, too.

The renaming of the party: the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (a name used back in 1925).

The HWP has been compromised in the view of the overwhelming masses. The peak of the HWP's authority was in 1948 (the alliance with the Soc.-Dems.). The Rajk affair shattered its authority.

About the future.

Yesterday I voted for these two decisions of the government.

If they will withdraw Soviet troops in the
near future (within two-three
months)—the decision on the withdrawal of
troops is the important thing-our party and
other parties would be able to fight against
the counterrev.

But I'm not sure this will be successful.
There's no unity within the coalition.

My point of view is: if the Soc.-Dems. and the Smallholders party are going to operate on the basis of their old progams, they will be deceitful.

The people believe in nationalism and regard it as their affair. 143

If the Communists declare that they support nationalism, the authority of the other parties will stop increasing.

The looming danger-the counterrevolution wouldn't embolden these coalition parties.

My view is that there's another path. The armed forces could be deployed to support Hungary.

But then there will be skirmishes.

The use of military force will be destructive and lead to bloodshed.

What will happen then? The morale of the Communists will be reduced to zero.

The socialist countries will suffer losses. Is there a guarantee that such circumstances will not arise in other countries?

The counterrev. forces are not meager.
But this is a matter of struggle.

If order is restored by force, the authority of the socialist countries will be eroded.

Munnich:

A gloomy situation.

Why did this situation arise?

The isolation of the leaders from the masses. Certainty that the regime exists and is preserved only through the support of the USSR. 144

This is the source of anti-Soviet sentiments

(facts: soccer, radio broadcasts). 145 In Hungary: total chaos.

What would be the result if the troops are withdrawn-this would respond to the sentiment of the masses.

Counterrev. elements are receiving reinforcement, and their actions are not being stopped.

We have no more forces left.

On the military nature of the events. Anti-Soviet sentiments are being spread by counterrev. elements.

Cde. Kadar a concrete request: preserve the party cadres.

Cde. Bata:

The question is pointedly raised about the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Everything all of them are doing will lead to a confrontation of Soviet and Hungarian troops.