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Hungarian press in illuminating the results of the XX CPSU Congress has been totally inadequate." See "I. O. Zaveduyushchego Evropeiskim Otdelom MID SSSR tov. Levychkinu K. D.," Cable No. 141 (Secret) from Yu. Andropov, 2 May 1956, in AVPRF, F. Referentura o Vengrii, Op. 36, Por. 15, Papka 48, D. 178, LI. 22-33. 159 This refers to a telegram published in major Soviet and Hungarian newspapers on 6 April 1956, shortly after the 20th Party Congress. The telegram, sent by Khrushchev (as party leader) and Bulganin (as prime minister) to their Hungarian counterparts, Rakosi and Hegedus, marked the 11th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary from Nazi occupation.

160 The local authorities in Gyor, including the security forces, had been supportive of the revolution from the outset. See Gyor-Sopron megyeiek emlekeznek az 1956-os forradalomra (Budapest: Zrinyi, 1991).

161 Judging from Malenkov's presence at Presidium sessions on 4 and 5 November, only Mikoyan and Brezhnev actually traveled to Budapest.

162 See Note 157 supra. This document, located by Janos Rainer, was published in Hungary in 1996. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds., Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A Szovjet Partelnokseg Vitai Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1996), pp. 92-93. The document is in Hungarian interspersed with a few Russian phrases and names. Horvath's notes show that the deliberations about this matter began at 8:45 p.m. (see Note 155 supra).

163 These three lines appeared in the far left col

umn of Horvath's notes.

164This statement is a candid acknowledgment of the extent to which the Soviet Union still controlled leadership politics and successions in Eastern Europe after Stalin's death. Khrushchev's reference to Mikoyan concerns the steps that Mikoyan took when he was in Budapest from 13 to 21 July 1956 (see Document No. 1 supra). During a preliminary meeting with Rakosi, Erno Gero, Andras Hegedus, and Bela Veg, Mikoyan took the initiative in bringing about Rakosi's dismissal. (The other Hungarian officials had long wanted to proceed with this step, but were unwilling to act until the Soviet authorities themselves told Rakosi he would have to go.) Mikoyan then participated in a crucial meeting of the HWP Politburo on 13 July, which voted to remove Rakosi from his posts as HWP First Secretary and a member of the HWP Politburo. At Mikoyan's behest, the HWP Politburo also chose Gero as the new party leader. See "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Matyashem Rakoshi, Andrashem Hegedushem, Erne Gere i Beloi Begom, 13 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov; "Zapis' vystuplenii na zasedaniya Politbyuro TSR VPT, 13 iyulya 1956 g.," 13 July 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov; and "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Yanoshem Kadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956 (Top Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, all in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, LI. 186-190, 191205, and 206-215, respectively. In ciphered telegrams on 16 and 18 July, Mikoyan explained in detail why he ended up supporting Gero to become the new HWP First Secretary. See "TsK KPSS," 16 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent),

Osobaya Papka; and "TsK KPSS," 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret - Urgent), Osobaya papka, both in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 183-185 and 225-236, respectively.

165 The nature of this statement is unclear (to say the least), but the mention of these countries at a time of escalating hostilities is another interesting indication of the role of the Suez Crisis in Soviet thinking about events in Hungary. 166 This topic was not included in the formal protocol for the session ("Protokol No. 51 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS," in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, LI. 60-61).

167 Most likely, there is a mistake or omission in Malin's text. These phrases, as given in the original, do not make sense.

168 The reference here is to financial, not military, assistance. A Soviet economic aid package for Hungary was approved on 5 November and announced the following day.

169 These points about the Suez Crisis are intriguing in light of what happened the following day (5 November). During the first several days of the Suez Crisis, Moscow's response was limited to verbal protestations through the media and at the UN. On 5 November, the day before a ceasefire was arranged, Soviet prime minister Nikolai Bulganin sent letters to the U.S., French, British, and Israeli governments. His letter to President Eisenhower warned that "if this war is not halted, it will be fraught with danger and might escalate into a third world war." Bulganin proposed that the United States and Soviet Union move jointly to "crush the aggressors," an action he justified on the grounds that the two superpowers had "all modern types of arms, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and bear particular responsibility for stopping the war." Not surprisingly, Eisenhower immediately rejected Bulganin's proposal. Bulganin's letters to France, Great Britain, and Israel were far more minatory, including thinly-veiled threats to use missiles if necessary to prevent Egypt's destruction. The letters to France and Britain contained identical passages: "In what position would [Britain and France] have found themselves if they had been attacked by more powerful states possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction? These more powerful states, instead of sending naval or air forces to the shores of [Britain or France], could use other means, such as missile technology." Bulganin's letter to Israel declared that "Israel is playing with the fate of peace and the fate of its own people in a criminal and irresponsible manner." This policy, Bulganin warned, “is raising doubts about the very existence of Israel as a state. We expect that the Government of Israel will come to its senses before it is too late and will halt its military operations against Egypt." For the texts of the letters and other Soviet statements during the crisis, see D. T. Shepilov, ed., Suetskii krizis (Moscow: Politizdat, 1956). Although the letters represented a much more forceful and conspicuous Soviet stance against the allied incursions, they came so belatedly that they had only a minor impact at best on efforts to achieve a ceasefire.

170 This passage refers to the appeal to the nation that Kadar's government issued when it was installed in power on 4 November.

171 Molotov is referring to Kadar's radio address

on 1 November, which was published in Nepszabad the following day.

172 This in fact is precisely what Ulbricht himself feared; see the detailed account by the chief of the East German State Security forces in 1956, Ernst Wollweber, in Wilfriede Otto, ed., "Ernst Wollweber: Aus Erinnerungen Ein Portrait Walter Ulbrichts," Beitrage zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, No. 3 (1990), esp. pp. 361378. For more on the impact of the 1956 crises on the East German communist leadership, see the papers presented by Hope M. Harrison and Christian F. Ostermann at the "Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," which took place in Budapest on 25-29 September 1996 and was organized by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the National Security Archive, and the Cold War International History Project. Copies of the papers, both of which draw extensively on the archives of the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), are available from the conference organizers.

173 Saburov is referring to the families of Soviet troops who were killed, not to the much larger number of Hungarians who died in the fighting. 174 This illustrates how concerned CPSU leaders were that the crisis was spilling over into the Soviet Union. Both before and after 4 November, unrest and protests occurred at a number of higher educational institutions in the USSR, including Moscow State University (MGU). At MGU, "protests against Soviet military intervention" were accompanied by “anti-Soviet slogans and posters." Both students and faculty took part in the actions. The KGB quickly moved in and restored order, but the crackdown was not as vigorous and sweeping as some CPSU officials wanted. See the first-hand account by the longtime deputy director of the KGB, Filipp Bobkov, KGB i vlast' (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. 144-145. Bobkov claims that Pyotr Pospelov and some other senior party officials, as well as a number of high-ranking personnel in the KGB, wanted to launch "mass repressions” to deter any further unrest, but their proposals were never formally adopted. Subsequently, a commission headed by Brezhnev issued secret orders and guidelines to all party organizations to tighten political controls.

175On 4 November, the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, sent a telegram to Moscow with information provided by Kardelj (at Tito's behest) about the refuge granted to Imre Nagy and his aides in the Yugoslav embassy. The response, as approved by the CPSU Presidium, called on the Yugoslav authorities to turn over the Hungarian officials to Soviet troops. See "Vypiska iz protokola No. P51/IV zasedaniya Prezidiuma TSK KPSS ot 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," 4 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, LI. 103-104.

176Nagy had appealed to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold on 1 November asking for support of Hungary's sovereignty and independence. The UN Security Council began considering the matter on 3 November. On 4 November, the UN Security Council took up the question of Soviet military intervention in Hungary, and the UN General Assembly voted to condemn the Soviet invasion. On 5 November, the CPSU

newspaper Pravda featured a letter purportedly sent by Kadar and Imre Horvath to Dag Hammarskjold. The letter claimed that Nagy's submission of the Hungarian question to the UN had been illegal, and requested that all consideration of the issue cease.

177 This brief session produced few results. The formal protocol for the session (in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 14, D. 73, L. 4) simply reads: "Defer consideration of the matter."

178 Voroshilov's name is not listed among the participants, but the notes below indicate that he actively took part.

179Other documents recently declassified by the Russian government shed light on what occurred at this meeting. On 5 November an official from the CPSU CC international department, Vladimir Baikov, who had been sent to Budapest the previous day to maintain liaison with Kadar, sent a secure, high-frequency message back to Moscow along with the draft text of a statement prepared by Kadar. Baikov's message reads as follows: "At the request of Cde. Kadar, I am conveying the translation from Hungarian of an Appeal by the Provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 'To Hungarian Communists! To Loyal Members of the Hungarian Workers' Party!' Cde. Kadar requested that I transmit the views and observations of the Soviet comrades regarding the text of the Appeal by 10:00 a.m. on 6 November." (See "Po VCh," APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 132.) The draft went to Mikoyan, who prepared a number of changes and suggestions before the Presidium meeting began. The most significant change was the addition of a reference to the "treacherous" activities of a "group of Imre Nagy, Losonczy, and Donath" after the condemnation of the "Rakosi clique." (See the marked-up draft in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 136.) Kadar incorporated this change, though he dropped the mention of Ferenc Donath, referring simply to the "Nagy-Losonczy group," which he claimed had committed "treason" and inspired the "counterrevolution." Other proposed changes also were included. The final text was released as a leaflet in Hungary on 6 November. It was published in the Szolnok newspaper Szabad Nep on 7 November and in Russian translation in the CPSU daily Pravda that same day. On 8 November it was published in Nepszabadsag. This was the first major programmatic statement by Kadar's gov

ernment.

180 This is the same telegram that Kadar mentioned earlier. See Note 159 supra.

181 The draft statement pledged that the HSWP would "make a decisive break with the harmful policy and criminal methods of the Rakosi clique, which shook the faith of the broad popular masses in our party." This was preserved in the final text along with other condemnations of "past mistakes."

182 Malenkov obviously is referring to a CC plenum of the HWP, not of the CPSU.

183 Again, the reference is to a CC plenum of the

HWP, not of the CPSU.

184 From exile in Moscow, Rakosi had made overtures about his possible readmission into the Hungarian Communist party.

185 The topic discussed here was a telegram re

ceived on 5 November 1956 from the Soviet am

bassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, transmitting a formal protest by the Yugoslav government about the death of Milenko Milovanov, a Yugoslav embassy employee in Budapest who was struck by shots fired from a Soviet tank. The Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovic, accused the Soviet tank of having deliberately opened fire on the embassy even though the compound was clearly marked and “the Soviet government had been informed by the Yugoslav side of who, other than Yugoslav diplomatic personnel, is in the Yugoslav embassy compound in Budapest." See "Shifrtelegramma," 5 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, LI. 143144. To reinforce Popovic's complaint, a similar protest was delivered by the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest, Dalibor Soldatic, to the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov. Soldatic requested that the Soviet military unit alongside the Yugoslav embassy be pulled back. Andropov relayed this message by telephone to the Soviet deputy foreign minister Valerian Zorin, warning that "the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet military unit from the building of the mission is of a suspicious nature." See "Telefonogramma," 5 November 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 130. These messages were discussed at the Presidium meeting not only by Zhukov and Shepilov (as indicated by Malin), but also by Khrushchev, who presented the draft of a cable intended for the Yugoslav government. Subsequently, the cable was transmitted via Firyubin to Popovic.

186 The formal protocol for this session ("Vypiska iz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g.,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 141) indicates that the Presidium "affirmed the draft response to the Yugoslavs in connection with the unfortunate case of an employee at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest." The telegram, signed by foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovic, via the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest, Veljko Micunovic. It stated that the Soviet military commander in Hungary had been ordered to make a careful study of how the incident happened. The telegram also conveyed the Soviet government's "deep condolences" regarding the death of Milenko Milovanov, and promised assistance in transporting Milanov's body to Yugoslavia. The telegram said that the Soviet military government would take “all necessary measures" to safeguard the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, and in a follow-on conversation with Micunovic, Shepilov indicated that the Soviet military command would comply with the Yugoslav request to "pull back the military unit next to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound." See "O besede s poslom Yugoslavii v SSSR Michunovichem," No. 486 (Secret), from D. T. Shepilov to the CPSU Presidium, 7 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, LI. 1-3. The investigation into the incident was completed by mid-day on 7 November. It concluded that the Soviet tank had come under fire from a house alongside the Yugoslav embassy. When the tank responded by firing back, one of the shots had strayed into the embassy, killing Milovanov. It is unclear whether this version of events is more accurate than the original Yugoslav account, but whatever the case may have been, steps were

taken to prevent further “unfortunate incidents." 187 These notes were compiled by Malin's deputy, Vladimir Naumovich Chernukha, not by Malin himself. Hence, they are somewhat sketchier than other notes from this period. No list of participants in the session is given, but the formal protocol for the session (“Vypiska iz Protokola No. 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 27 noyabrya 1956 g.," in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, L. 181) indicates that, in addition to those listed here, the participants included Brezhnev, Shvernik, Furtseva, Belyaev, and Pospelov. The protocol does not mention Andrei Gromyko. 188 The Presidium is discussing a telegram that was sent on 26 November by V. F. Nikolaev, an official at the Soviet embassy in Bucharest. The telegram indicated that the Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej intended to seek toplevel negotiations with Yugoslavia as soon as possible to alleviate the dispute that Yugoslavia was having with the Soviet Union and Hungary about the fate of Imre Nagy. During negotiations with the Yugoslavs, Kadar's government had given assurances of safety for Nagy and his aides if they left the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. When Nagy's group went outside on 22 November, they were immediately arrested by Soviet military personnel. Soon thereafter, they were transported as prisoners to Romania. A senior aide to Gheorghiu-Dej, Emil Bodnaras, told Nikolaev that the Romanians "hadn't expected that the Yugoslavs would raise a fuss about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania. However, as you know, they presented a note of protest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. It's possible that this question might be raised at the UN, etc. We believe that we must be ready for different speeches and discussions regarding Imre Nagy. But first of all we believe it is necessary to discuss this matter with the Yugoslavs." See "Shifrtelegramma," 26 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, LI. 13-14.

189 The formal protocol for this session (“Vypiska iz Protokola No. 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS," 27 November 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, L. 177) stated that "on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the session of the CPSU CC Presidium, Cde. Bulganin is instructed to hold negotiations with Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej.” Later that day, Bulganin had a telephone conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej, which he promptly recounted in writing for the other members of the CPSU Presidium: "I told Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest level with the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy and his group will not produce a good solution, since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this matter, and such a meeting might complicate the situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meeting with Imre Nagy and the others, which would hardly be worthwhile.... Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej asked that I let the CPSU CC Presidium know that they are working via plenipotentiaries with Imre Nagy and his group. They have set out to persuade Imre Nagy and his group to issue a statement in which they would acknowledge their criminal actions and indicate that the only correct course at present is to support and consolidate the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government of Kadar, and to strengthen the re

gime of people's democracy. In this way, said Gheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy." See "Informatsiya," 27 November 1956 (Top Secret). in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, LI. 16-17. 190 This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagy and his aides were arrested. A bus had been brought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, supposedly to transport the officials and their families to their apartments. It turned out that the bus was merely part of an elaborate plot devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagy from the embassy. A Soviet military officer was sitting in the bus, and others quickly approached. Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompanying the Hungarians were forced out of the bus, and the remaining passengers were placed under arrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar's government had given to the Yugoslavs. This episode is recounted in detail in the note of protest that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovic sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on 24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, LI. 19-26. See also "Telefonogramma," Secure High-Frequency Transmission, from Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, 23 November 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, LI. 95-96. 191 No title for this section is given, but the formal protocol for the session (No. 60, as cited in Note 187 supra) indicates that Point II dealt with "Questions of Hungary." According to the Protocol, "the USSR Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and the USSR Ministry of Defense [were] instructed to prepare materials about Imre Nagy and his group in accordance with the exchange of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidium's session."

192Nagy's surname is omitted in this line of

Malin's notes.

Mark Kramer, a scholar based at the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University, is a frequent contributor to the CWIHP Bulletin.

RESEARCH NOTES:

THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT: SETTING UP THE A-BOMB EFFORT, 1946

by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, A. S. Stepanov

On 16 July 1945, the USA conducted the world's first test of an atomic bomb, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, it used the new weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world faced the fact of the USA's monopolistic possession of the new, unprecedently powerful device. The atomic bombardments of the Japanese cities, some believed, also constituted a demonstration by America's leaders of their readiness to employ these weapons later on as well.

The events of 1945 forced the Soviet leadership to undertake emergency measures to speed up the creation of the USSR's own nuclear weapons. It was clear that solving the problem of making the atomic bomb as soon as possible would require mobilization of all the country's resources, which had been entirely directed to securing the victory over fascist Germany and its allies.

Focusing all the country's forces on the solution of this complex problem called above all for the establishment of a new state management body endowed with appropriate power. Such a body, which was entrusted with practically unlimited authority, was the Special Committee, headed by L. P. Beria (a member of State Defense Committee and Vice Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars) and was founded by the USSR State Defense Committee's Resolution No. GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. The Committee was founded under the State Defense Committee, but after the State Defense Committee was abolished in September 1945, the Special Committee functioned as a body of USSR Council of People's Commissars (and after March 1946 as a body of the USSR Council of Ministers).

In reality, the Special Committee was an independent state control body

directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V. Stalin. It functioned for almost eight years until it was abolished in accordance with a CC CPSU Presidium Resolution of 26 June 1953-the same tumultuous meeting at which Beria was arrested. Thus, the Special Committee's activities covered a most important, formative period of the Soviet atomic project, that is, the establishment and growth of the USSR atomic-energy industry, the development and testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) and early improved atomic bomb designs, and the development and virtual completion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested in August 1953.

Considering and resolving all the most basic issues which arose in the course of the early Soviet atomic project, the Special Committee was empowered to supervise

all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium:- the development of scientific research in this sphere;- the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium...;- the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and the construction of atomic energy facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb.1

The Special Committee's decisions either were of unilaterally decisive character or were made to support draft resolutions and directions of the USSR Government previously submitted to Stalin for approval. Throughout the lifetime of the Special Committee, more than 140 sittings were held. The approximate volume of of the Special Committee's protocols is 1000 typewritten pages. The complete work of the Special Committee fills about 1700 dossiers containing more than 300,000 typewritten pages. These materials are currently stored in the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF).

These materials, documenting events from 1943 to 1953, constitute an invaluable treasure of early Soviet atomic project history.

Some particular items in the Special Committee's documentary collections deserve special mention. Besides the Committee's meeting protocols, these are protocols and related materials of meetings of the Technical (Scientific and Technical) and Engineering and Technical Councils which were active in 1945-1946 within the Special Committee and then within the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers; resolutions and orders of the USSR Council of People's Commissars Council of Ministers on the atomic issues; correspondence with First Main Directorate organizations and enterprises and other Ministries and agencies; and important documents of the First Main Directorate. Among the Special Committee's materials are unique documents signed by Stalin and Beria, and manuscripts by leading scientists and administrators in the Soviet atomic project, including its leader, physicist I. V. Kurchatov.

For more than 40 years since the Special Committee's abolishment, its documents have been practically inaccessible for research. But an important step toward the opening of these materials, as well as relevant documents of other agencies, was taken on 17 February 1995 with the issuance of Russian Federation Presidential Decree No. 160, "On the Preparation and Publication of an Official Compilation of Archival Documents Pertaining to the History of the Development of Nuclear Weapons in the USSR."2 To produce an objective account of domestic atomic-energy industry growth and USSR nuclear weapons development, this Decree provides for the preparation and publication of archival documents pertaining to the history of nuclear weapons development in the USSR up to 1954. To fulfill the decree's requirements, to study and compile the archival documents and develop proposals for their declassification, in accordance with. Russian Federation Government's Direction No. 728-r of 24 May 1995, a Working Group chaired by Russian Deputy Federation Minister for Atomic Energy, was set up. The Working Group included representatives of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (L.D. Ryabev,

Minatom), the Russian archives, the Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, and State Technology Commission of Russia.

Since its establishment, the Working Group has carried out a great amount of work. It has specified subjects of the collection sections and decided to focus initial efforts on two basic areas to complete the compilation sections as quickly as possible:

-on the history of the development of the first atomic bomb and improved atomic bomb designs (during the period through 1954) in the USSR;

-on Soviet efforts to develop the hydrogen bomb (during the period through 1954).

The compilation section devoted to documents pertaining to the early period of works on the Soviet atomic project (1942-1945) is being prepared for publication.

To prepare the compilation, documents are being studied and selected in various Russian archives. In addition to the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), great attention is paid to the archives of R. F. Minatom and Russian Federal Nuclear CenterAll-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (RFNCVNIIEF). Valuable materials are also located in the files of the Russia Foreign Intelligence Service which has indicated its readiness to present a large amount of intelligence materials for the commission.

In its activities the commission intends to be guided by the principle of maximum possible openness. The basic restriction remains only the provisions of the 1968 Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bars the disclosure of information which would facilitate the spread of nuclear weapons. These provisions hamper the commission's work as most documents are of a technical character and contain data whose review for publication requires thorough analysis.

Another difficulty is that thus far there is no special funding for the commission's activities. However, in

August 1996 the Russian Federation Government decided to approve some funding for preparing the compilations. Though the funding amount is not large, this decision will allow us to assure a more effective continuation of the commission's activities. By now the commission has reviewed the protocols of the Special Committee's meetings and basic resolutions and orders by State Defense Committee and USSR Government from 1943 to 1948.

Anticipating the publication of the historical documents pertaining to the Soviet atomic project history in the compilation, we present below the full texts of the two most important governmental resolutions of 1946 from the APRF: USSR Council of Ministers (CM) Resolution No. 805-327 of 9 April 1946 (“Issues of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2"), and USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 1286-525 of 21 June 1946 (“On the Plan of the Works for Design Bureau No.11 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2"). The latter resolution is published with annexes No.1 and No.4 (annexes No. 2 and 3, of a narrow economic character, are omitted).

USSR CM Resolution No. 805-327 of 9 April 1946 is a historic act which established Design Bureau No.11 (KB11), the Soviet analog of the secret wartime American nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico. (Design Bureau No. 11 later became RFNC-VNIIEF.) USSR CM Resolu

tion No. 1286-525 of 21 June 1946 specified the early missions of KB-11, i.e. development of atomic bombs, which were referred to in the resolution as "jet engines S," in two versions, S-1 and S-2 (abbreviated as RDS-1 and RDS-2). RDS-1 meant the analog of the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested on 16 July 1945 in New Mexico (and of the U.S. atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki on 9 August 1945). This bomb was successfully tested in the USSR on 29 August 1949. RDS-2 signified the analog of the uranium-235 gun type bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. This bomb passed a design verification in the USSR, but was not tested. Later the abbreviation RDS-2 was used

to denote the improved plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested in 1951. During the period through 1954 the USSR verified and tested three more types of improved atomic bombs: RDS3, RDS-4, and RDS-5. The documents reflecting the development of the RDS1, RDS-2, RDS-3, RDS-4 and RDS-5 atomic bombs that will constitute the first part of the compilation being prepared by the commission. The second part will be composed of documents reflecting the Soviet work on the hydrogen bomb, whose first version (referred to as RDS-6s) was successfully tested on 12 August 1953.

Returning to the USSR CM resolution of 21 June 1946, readers should note the extremely short duration of the work phases set by that resolution. Thus the technical task orders for the RDS-1 and RDS-2 designs had to be developed by 1 July 1946, the main unit designs by 1 July 1947. The work on the design development had to be conducted in parallel with the establishment of special laboratories at KB-11 and arrangement of the works of these laboratories (the first phase laboratories had to start functions in the period from September to December 1946, the second phase laboratories in the period from January to June 1947).

The short duration and arrangement of the parallel works became possible thanks to availability in the USSR of intelligence materials about the designs of the U.S. atomic bombs "Fat Man" and "Little Boy," prototypes of RDS-1 and RDS-2, Soviet atomic bombs, which the leaders of the USSR atomic project decided in 1946 should be copied as closely as possible from the American designs.

It should be emphasized that the availability of the intelligence materials could not substitute for independent experimental, theoretical, and design verification of the Soviet atomic bombs which were being prepared for testing. Owing to the extraordinary responsibility of the leaders of and participants in the Soviet atomic project, RDS-1 was tested only after thorough confirmation of the available information and a full cycle of experimental, theoretical, and design studies whose level corre

sponded to the maximum capabilities KB-11 construction and arrangement of of that time. works.

The 21 June 1946 resolution set stringent control over the KB-11 works. I. V. Kurchatov, the scientific leader of the Soviet atomic project, and P.M. Zernov and Yu. B. Khariton, leaders of KB-11, had to report to the Special Committee on the progress of KB-11 works on a monthly basis.

The annexes to the 21 June 1946 resolution contain detailed description of the measures on preparation, arrangement, and support of the KB-11 works. According to Annex No.1, for KB-11 construction in the Mordovia State reserve zone and Gorky (now Nizhni Novgorod) region a territory of roughly Novgorod) region a territory of roughly 100 square kilometers was taken from the settlement of Sarov. KB-11 was transferred to Plant No. 550 in Sarov which heretofore belonged to Ministry of Agricultural Machine Engineering. of Agricultural Machine Engineering. The plant's buildings and equipment became the base of the KB-11 production zone. When the USSR CM Resolutions of 9 April and 21 June 1946 were adopted, the settlement of Sarov disappeared from all geographic maps published in the USSR.

The KB-11 laboratory received special dispensations and privileges of many varieties. It was permitted to construct new buildings and facilities without previously approved projects and estimated costs and make payments for the works according to actual expenditures. Special attention was paid to social issues. KB-11 workers received high wages, and enhanced food-stuff norms given in Annex No.4* (note that the ration card system existed in the USSR up until the end of 1947), and reserved high-quality residences. A library was created which automatically received copies of important literature on physics, chemistry, mathematics and fiction published in the USSR, and special allocations of additional funding in foreign currency to obtain foreign books and journals. Aircraft were allotted to KB-11, permitting regular aerial transport links with Moscow.

Under the hard post-war conditions, including severe shortages of resources, a great amount of materials and necessary equipment was directed for

The measures taken for KB-11's creation and development, alongside the huge complex of the measures to create an interconnected network of atomic-energy industry scientific research institutes and enterprises, allowed the USSR to solve the historic problem of domestic nuclear weapons development within a short time period.

Naturally, even a multi-volume compilation cannot contain all significant historical documents reflecting the immense work on the USSR atomic project, which was indeed a major exploit of Soviet science and industry. The document sets, such as a complete collection of protocols of the Special Committee, and of the Technical and Engineering and Technical Councils of the Special Committee, voluminous reports about the work of the First Main Directorate from 1945 to 1946 signed by B. L. Vannikov, A. P. Zavenyagin and I. V. Kurchatov, compilation of atomic intelligence materials, etc. are worthy of special attention and might be published individually. The obvious interest of Russia and the international public in such historical materials allows us to expect that eventually the problem of financial support of such publications can find a positive resolution.

Document I: USSR Council of Ministers Resolution of 9 April 1946 Establishing Design Bureau No. 11

Top Secret (Special dossier)

USSR Council of Ministers
Order No. 805-327ss/op of 9 April 1946.
Kremlin, Moscow

Issues of Laboratory No.2

1. Reorganize Sector No. 6 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 to Design Bureau of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2 for jet engine [atomic weapon] design development and prototype manufacture.

2. Hereupon refer to the above Design Bureau as Design Bureau No. 11 (KB-11) of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2.

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