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hydrogen and rocket armament enable us to maintain defense capabilities at the necessary level, because we do not want war, therefore we want to cut the army, because we do not get ready for attack, the Soviet Union has never sought conquests, nor have socialist countries - then why we need such a huge army? To maintain this huge army would mean to reduce our economic potential. We have a chance to reduce the army. And if our enemies do not follow our example - one should not consider it as if it would cause us some damage. On the contrary, the countries which would maintain big armies, in the situation which emerges in socialist countries (i.e., their economic potential and, more importantly, powerful thermonuclear and rocket armament in their possession), these armies would, so to say, be sucking from their budgets, depleting national economies, and if one takes this in the light of struggle between communism and capitalism, they [i.e., the imperialist countries) would to a certain extent be our "ally," since they would devour their budgets, reduce the economic development of these countries, thereby contributing to the increasing advantages of our system.

I gave much thought to this issue, and decided before my arrival to Moscow to send such a note, so that the members and alternate members of the CC Presidium could read it, and, when I arrive, discuss it. If the comrades agree with me, then one could adopt necessary proposals. In my opinion, one could do the following: to convene a session of the Supreme Soviet, for instance, the session could be convened at the end of January or in February (one should select a time, but not delay) before the Committee of Ten starts, which is convened for February to discuss our proposals. So we should convene a session of the Supreme Soviet before this Committee starts its work, to approve a rapporteur, to report to the Supreme Soviet, to summon arguments and to take the decision, to accept an appeal that would say that, regardless of the reaction of other countries to our appeal, whether they would follow our example or not, we would abide by the decision of the Supreme Soviet.

I am confident that this would be a very powerful, fantastic (potryasaiuxchii] step. Moreover, this step would not in any way cause damage to our defenses, but would give us major political, moral, and economic

advantages. Therefore, if we fail to do this, people in the army, one should accommothen speaking in economic terms, it would date them: officers, military officials (solmean failing to make a full use of the pow- diers are easy to accommodate), so that they erful capital our socialist policy and our so- would be all set and accommodated. And cialist economy have accumulated. For our then we would see in which direction it goes, economy is prospering, developing fast. Our because we are not cutting at once: it would science has advanced to such an extent that take a year, year and a half, two (but no more it has given us advantages in creating means than two years). It would be logical. If we to defend our country. And there are not only introduced a proposal at the session of the discoveries of science, but skillfully imple- [U.N.) General Assembly about general and mented scientific discoveries for practical complete disarmament in 4 years, then a needs.

partial, unilateral disarmament we might I think that it would not make sense carry out within two years or less. This now to have atomic and hydrogen bombs, would also be logical and convincing. And rockets, and to maintain at the same time a besides, it would not be dangerous. large army.

Presenting for deliberation of the PreIn addition, one should keep in mind sidium these proposals that I have thorthat since we possess modern armaments of oughly thought through, I hope that we will the strongest kind, against which so far there discuss them well at the Presidium and will is no defense, and (since) we maintain the weigh all arguments for and against. Perlargest army in the world, this indeed scares haps I cannot foresee everything. But it our enemies, and it scares even honest seems to me that these proposals of mine, if people among those who otherwise would we implement them, would not cause any welcome a fair disarmament, but who are damage to our country and would not afraid that perhaps this is just our tactical threaten our defense capabilities vis-a-vis move. Their argument is the following: the the enemy forces, but would rather enhance Soviet Union introduced a proposal for a our international prestige and strengthen our new reduction of armed forces, but does not country. make these reductions within its own terri- I have some details in these proposals, tory. This might scare off some honest but I do not outline them in the note. When people, among those who seek disarmament; we begin discussing them, I will explain my and the reactionary forces, who resist the arguments in more detail than [I do) in this reduction of international tension, these ag- note. For instance, while reducing armed gressive and militarist forces would of forces, at a certain time, to a certain degree, course use it for their ends.

perhaps one should move to a territorial sysIf, however, we carry out a further re- tem (militia formations). In other words, duction of our armed forces, then such a step there would be regiments and divisions built would encourage those forces in bourgeois on a territorial principle (with citizens recountries, those liberal bourgeois, capital- cruited to serve in them without leaving their ist circles who seek to improve the interna- industries). Of course, one should have an tional situation, to live by the principles of appropriate cadre of officers for such regipeaceful coexistence. This would ments and units, armament must be stored strengthen them and weaken the arguments somewhere in warehouses. We must have of aggressive, militarist circles, who take transport aviation, because in case of emeradvantage of our might and intimidate other gency one must transfer these regiments countries.

quickly from one place to another. For inHow we could do it and all the details stance, if one has to transfer several divi- for this one should already exchange opin- sions to Germany, we must do it practically ions; we will give instructions to the Minis- in a few days. Armament for these territoter of Defense, to the General Staff so that rial divisions must be stored in a suitably they prepare la proposal) in a concrete way. reasonable variety near the sites of deploy

Such a reduction, such a reduction ment of these formations. And these divi(considerable) would be better extended sions, for instance from Moscow, Leningrad, over a year, year and half, or two. Thus dur- Kiev, Kharkov, would get together right ing this time we would take a decision, away, on alert, to a gathering point, would would gradually start to reduce the army, board planes and leave. because, while cutting such a number of And there are other considerations we


military councils of military districts for discussion of practical measures in the army, related to the proposals com. Khrushchev N.S. outlined in [his) note to the CC Presidium.

To entrust the chairmanship of the conference to com. Khrushchev N.S.

people for military schools who will work,
will train cadres without denying them to
industrial economy, and will prepare officer
cadres for all branches of the military. These
commanders will be of the kind that will be
even closer to the people, will be free of the
so-called caste spirit that is emerging as a
result of better material supply for students
of military schools.

On the other hand, it would make sense
and the costs would be less expensive.

These are the questions that I would consider necessary to offer for deliberation at the CC Presidium.



Document 3: CC CPSU Plenum

protocol, 26 December 1959

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should take into account so that the defense capabilities of our country would not diminish, but increase. The burden of maintaining armies would be smaller, and the political position domestically, as well as internationally, would grow stronger, since we would free the resources that are sapped by the maintenance of a huge army and armament. And we would conquer even more (ground) in our favorable position in the international arena in the struggle for peace, the prestige of our country would grow even further. And all this would promote our Marxist-Leninist ideas, our teaching, our struggle for peace, because not only workers, but also peasants, petit bourgeois elements would become more sympathetic to us with every new year. Their sympathies would grow. They would move first from fear to neutral positions, and then would develop sympathies toward our country. This I take to be natural, and we should work to achieve it.

When I am saying that one perhaps should have not only a cadre army, but also in part territorial, militia forces, in doing so we essentially, to some extent, repeat what Lenin did after the October (1917) revolution, but in a different situation and somewhat in another way, since back then we had no other option, we had no army; and today we have both resources and armaments, we have an army. And we cannot be left without an army and we do not want to be. But we should build this army in such a way, that it would be reasonable, without excessive frills (bez izlishestv), so that it would be combat-ready and meet the needs of national defense.

Of course, we would have to revise the system of military schools: their profile and number. Perhaps, if we switch to a new system, we should also establish such military schools where officers would be trained without leaving their jobs in industries. This is also of great importance.

All these measures will undoubtedly take the burden off the national budget. We have big opportunities for implementation of the proposals I have outlined on a unilateral reduction of our armed forces.

A couple of words about our military schools. When we created our multiple military schools, we did not have a sufficient number of trained people in our country. Today all young people have education, and therefore it is possible to enlist enough

To com. Khrushchev.

To approve the measures aimed at the

reduction of international tension, outlined Excerpt from protocol no. 253 of meeting in the note of com. Khrushchev N.S. of 8 of the CC Presidium of 14 December 1959 "December 1959 and in his report to the CC

About further steps in the struggle for re-
duction of international tension.


4 nk 1. To approve the proposals laid out in the note of com. Khrushchev N.S. to the CC (Source: Center for the Storage of ContemPresidium about the unilateral implementa- porary Documentation (TsKhSD), f. 2, op. tion by the Soviet Union of measures di- 1, d. 416, II. 1-11; translation by Vladislav rected at the reduction of international ten- M. Zubok (National Security Archive). ] sion.

The question about the unilateral Vladislav M. Zubok, a research fellow implementation of measures directed at the at the National Security Archive, is coreduction of international tension, should be author (with Constantine V. Pleshakov) put on the agenda of a session of the Su- of Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From preme Soviet of the USSR.

Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: 2. To commission the Ministry of De- Harvard University Press, 1996) and a fense (com. (Rodion] Malinovsky) to intro- frequent contributor to the CWIHP duce concrete proposals on this issue for Bulletin. deliberation of the CC CPSU, while taking into account the exchange of opinions that took place at the meeting of the CC Presidium.

3. To convene in the CC CPSU on 18 December this year a conference of commanders, chiefs of staffs, and members of


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to the new ambassador from the USA to continued from page 102

Ethiopia, Chapin. dertake any steps in response to the evic- The countries of the Common Market tion from Ethiopia of the Federal Republic coordinate their activities in Ethiopia within of Germany's ambassador or to the rejec- the framework of the European Economic tion of the services of specialists, working Community, which has its official represenin the Ethiopian special services.

tation in Ethiopia. According to the declaIn their turn, the Ethiopians have taken ration of the Italian ambassador, the program a relatively soft position with regard to of assistance to Ethiopia from the EEC comFrance and Italy. For instance, to this day prises 80 million dollars; however, accordthey have not come out with any criticism ing to his words, the Ethiopians have exof the French actions in the province of pended only 1% of that sum. Ethiopia and Shaba. According to available information, the EEC have recently concluded a general their interest in maintaining good relations agreement on the realization of a project for with France is caused by the fact that the improving coffee plantations in the counlatter facilitated the normalization of rela- try, at a cost of 20 million dollars. tions between Ethiopia and Djibouti and the Japan occupies a particular place in departure from there of a contingent of three Ethiopian relations with capitalist countries. thousand Somali troops.

From the very outset of the revolution, JaWith regard to Italy, the latter on the pan has conducted a very restrained and strength of the presence of economic inter- scrupulous policy with regard to internal ests in Eritrea, might have played a positive Ethiopian affairs. Japan devotes most of its role in the resolution of the Eritrean prob- attention to the strengthening of its ecolem. In May of this year there was an Ital- nomic position in the country and to the ian governmental delegation in Ethiopia development of commerce between Japan which was well received. In the course of and Ethiopia. Japanese assistance in the negotiations a broad circle of questions was form of loans and credits up to the current discussed, concerning first and foremost time comprises 11.5 million rubles. Over bilateral commercial and economic rela- the course of 1977, Ethiopian exports to Jations, and likewise the status of Italian busi- pan comprised 17 million rubles at the same nessmen in Ethiopia.

time that imports totaled 46 million rubles. What draws attention to itself is the fact that precisely at the moment when the Ital- ATTACHE OF THE EMBASSY OF THE ian delegation was in Addis Ababa and im- USSR IN SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA mediately after the discussion of the French

[signed) lu. Budakov ambassador with Mengistu, which was organized on the initiative of the latter, the (Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1173, II. PMAC made the decision to give agreement 155-161.)

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