« 上一頁繼續 »
Тарищ Мао Вэ-дун: Главне Лили вопрос о в настоящее
"Еновления предзеңного уров -
- MAY 2-8 1997 е находится в аав та моста
ХОЛОДНАЯ ВОЙНА В Азии
0- перспектів на мир. В связи с этим ЦК КТК поручило ине
Твери Сталин: в Катее, таким образом, идет всў. на за
-Сопрос о мире более всего зан ::Меег и Советский Союз ,хо-
го епосредственно угрозы для него в настоя -
чет: злоная еще не стало на ноги и поэто
а; Америка , хотя и кричит о всйне ,но
The Cold War
The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International
Cold War International History Project Bulletin
Editor: James G. Hershberg
Table of Contents
Stalin's Conversations With Chinese Leaders
Talks with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1949-53, with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny,
2 Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from
New Evidence on Sino-Soviet Relations
The Emerging Disputes Betwen Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958,
Mao Zedong and Dulles's “Peaceful Evolution” Strategy: Revelations from Bo Yibo's Memoirs, introduction and
Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: The Workers' Defense Committee “KOR”, and Ya.Ya.
Talks With Mao Zedong, December 1949-January 1950,
And With Zhou Enlai, August-September 1952
with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok
This issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin leads off with translations of five meetings between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and top leaders (Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai) of the newly-created People's Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 1952. The originals of the documents, which constitute some of the most intimate glimpses of the personal interaction between Soviet and Chinese leaders yet to emerge from the formerly closed archives of the communist world, are kept in the Russian Presidential Archives (officially known as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) in Moscow. They were recently declassified by Russian authorities in connection with efforts to gather materials related to the Korean War for presentation by the Russian Government to South Korea. CWIHP obtained copies of these documents, as well as many other Russian archival records concerning the Korean War which appear later in this issue of the Bulletin, as a consequence of its cooperation with a research project involving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia University, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
(Photocopies of all the Russian documents obtained by CWIHP are available to researchers through the National Security Archive, a non-governmental documents repository, library, and research institute located on the seventh floor of The Gelman Library at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and will also be made available through Columbia University.)
The documents that follow begin with transcripts of two conversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950, during the Chinese leader's two-month visit to the USSR shortly after the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. Those conversations came as the two countries negotiated the terms of the incipient Sino-Soviet alliance following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and also constituted the first and only personal encoun
ter between these two communist titans and major figures of 20th-century world history.
Next come three transcripts of conversations in Moscow between Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in August-September 1952, where issues on the table for discussion included the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and the relationship of both to the broader Cold War. The transcripts yield insights into these issues, and also into the state of mind of Stalin himself in his final months (he died in March 1953), one of the murkiest periods in his nearly-three decade reign over the USSR.
To assess the significance of these documents, the CWIHP Bulletin has assembled four specialists familiar with SinoSoviet relations, and the personalities of Stalin and Mao, from various perspectives: Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale), author of China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Prof. Vojtech Mastny (Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, currently at the University of Hokkaido, Japan), author of The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953 (Oxford University Press, 1996), a forthcoming sequel to his Russia's Road to the Cold War, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Dr. Odd Arne Westad (Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute), author of Cold War and Revolution: Soviet American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Dr. Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), coauthor (with Constantine Pleshakov) of Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, March 1996).
Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHP by Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from Kathryn Weathersby and Chen Jian.
- Jim Hershberg, Editor, CWIHP Bulletin
WITH CHINESE LEADERS
I: Conversation between Stalin and and mutual assistance between China and troops does not mean that Soviet Union Mao, Moscow, 16 December 1949 the USSR.
refuses to assist China, if such assistance is Comrade Stalin: This question we can needed. The fact is that we, as communists, [Classification level blacked out: discuss and decide. We must ascertain are not altogether comfortable with station“NOT SECRET” Stamped] whether to declare the continuation of the ing our forces on foreign soil, especially on
current 1945 treaty of alliance and friend- the soil of a friendly nation. Given this RECORD OF CONVERSATION ship between the USSR and China, to an- situation anyone could say that if Soviet BETWEEN COMRADE
nounce impending changes in the future, or forces can be stationed on Chinese territory, I.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMAN to make these changes right now.
then why could not the British, for example, OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
As you know, this treaty was concluded station their forces in Hong Kong, or the GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S between the USSR and China as a result of Americans in Tokyo? REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO ZEDONG the Yalta Agreement, which provided for We would gain much in the arena of on 16 December 1949
the main points of the treaty (the question of international relations if, with mutual agree
the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port ment, the Soviet forces were to be withAfter an exchange of greetings and a Arthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty was drawn from Port Arthur. In addition, the discussion of general topics, the following concluded, so to speak, with the consent of withdrawal of Soviet forces would provide a conversation took place.
America and England. Keeping in mind this serious boost to Chinese communists in their
circumstance, we, within our inner circle, relations with the national bourgeoisie. EvComrade Mao Zedong: The most im- have decided not to modify any of the points eryone would see that the communists have portant question at the present time is the of this treaty for now, since a change in even managed to achieve what (Nationalist Chiquestion of establishing peace. China needs one point could give America and England nese leader) Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would the legal grounds to raise questions about could not. The Chinese communists must be used to bring the economy back to pre- modifying also the treaty's provisions con- take the national bourgeoisie into considerwar levels and to stabilize the country in cerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, ation. general. Decisions on the most important etc. This is why we searched to find a way The treaty ensures the USSR's right to questions in China hinge on the prospects to modify the current treaty in effect while station its troops in Port Arthur. But the for a peaceful future. With this in mind the formally maintaining its provisions, in this USSR is not obligated to exercise this right CC CPC (Central Committee of the Com- case by formally maintaining the Soviet and can withdraw its troops upon Chinese munist Party of China) entrusted me to as- Union's right to station its troops at Port request. However, if this is unsuitable, the certain from you, comr[ade). Stalin, in what Arthur while, at the request of the Chinese troops in Port Arthur can remain there for 2, way and for how long will international
government, actually withdrawing the So- 5, or 10 years, whatever suits China best. Let peace be preserved.
viet Armed forces currently stationed there. them not misunderstand that we want to run Comrade Stalin: In China a war for Such an operation could be carried out upon away from China. We can stay there for 20 peace, as it were, is taking place. The quesChina's request.
years even. tion of peace greatly preoccupies the Soviet One could do the same with KChZhD Comrade Mao Zedong: In discussing Union as well, though we have already had [Chinese Changchun Railroad, which the treaty in China we had not taken into peace for the past four years. With regards to traverses Manchuria), that is, to effectively account the American and English positions China, there is no immediate threat at the modify the corresponding points of the agree- regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act present time: Japan has yet to stand up on its ment while formally maintaining its provi- in a way that is best for the common cause. feet and is thus not ready for war; America, sions, upon China's request.
This question merits further consideration. though it screams war, is actually afraid of If, on the other hand, the Chinese com- However, it is already becoming clear that war more than anything; Europe is afraid of rades are not satisfied with this strategy, they the treaty should not be modified at the war; in essence, there is no one to fight with can present their own proposals.
present time, nor should one rush to withChina, not unless Kim Il Sung decides to Comrade Mao Zedong: The present draw troops from Port Arthur. invade China?
situation with regard to KChZhD and Port Should not Zhou Enlai visit Moscow in Peace will depend on our efforts. If we Arthur corresponds well with Chinese inter
Arthur corresponds well with Chinese inter- order to decide the treaty question? continue to be friendly, peace can last not ests, as the Chinese forces are inadequate to Comrade Stalin: No, this question you only 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhaps effectively fight against imperialist aggres- must decide for yourselves. Zhou may be even longer.
sion. In addition, KCHZhD is a training needed in regard to other matters. Comrade Mao Zedong: Since Liu school for the preparation of Chinese cadres Comrade Mao Zedong: We would like Shaoqi's return to China, CC CPC has been in railroad and industry.
to decide on the question of Soviet credit to discussing the treaty of friendship, alliance Comrade Stalin: The withdrawal of China, that is to draw up a credit agreement