have done. They intend to give such efficiency to the new college that it can gradually furnish them with their own interpreters and even higher functionaries. Even now they obtain through this channel translations of many articles in the newspapers at Shanghai and Hongkong, among which are the addresses to Mr. Browne and his recent letter, with other criticisms on their policy and position. All these things must have their effect in gradually opening up new vistas to them.1

Mr. Burlingame had, however, his own reasons for concern, and after their reluctance to expedite the completion of his treaty by an exchange of ratifications became manifest, he dispatched Mr. McLeavy Brown from Paris to explain to the Tsung-li Yamên the urgency of the adventure and to solicit action. The necessity was really very great. So eager had the enemies of the Mission become that, after exploiting all in its disparagement that could be squeezed from tales of its equivocal credentials, of Mr. Burlingame's prevarications, of China's refusal to accept the treaty, and others of the sort, they proclaimed Mr. Brown's return to China to be a recall to his former duties by his government and, consequently, England's determination to cast loose from her participation in a discredited Embassy. The errand was satisfactorily exe

1 United States Department of State, “China,” vol. 28, no. 65.

cuted. Mr. Brown was soon able to convince the ministers of the hurtful effects of further procrastination, and the treaty received the seal of the Emperor on November 20.1 Mr. Williams as Chargé d'Affaires was obliged to take upon himself the responsibility of officiating as commissioner for the United States without official appointment, under circumstances explained in his dispatch to the Department of State.

PEKING, November 24, 1869.

. I have now the honour to inform you that the Emperor has ratified the eight Additional Articles, having affixed his seal to them on the 20th inst. He also issued a commission on that day appointing Tung Siun, one of the chief members of the Foreign Office, to be his imperial commissioner for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications, which was yesterday accomplished with all due formality. . .

In proceeding to complete the exchange of these ratifications, I can not doubt that I have done what you would have had me do. There were some special reasons for effecting it now, which seemed to override all the objections that I might adduce for delay because I had no commission from the President for this specific purpose. One of these was, that the bad effects of the rumours widely circulated and believed in the south of China and abroad, that the Imperial Government had definitely refused to accept these articles, would thus be wholly neutralised, and the credit of the Chinese Embassy upheld. These

1 The exchange of ratifications was effected on November 23.

rumours had already led to various unjust inferences as to the motives of the ruling statesmen in Peking for their delay, and had consequently strengthened the idea that they were tired of their Embassy, and regretted the expenses it had entailed on them.

Another reason had reference to the importance of the ratified treaty reaching you before the rising of Congress, and the closing of navigation in the Peiho was too near at hand to admit of delay if this copy was to be sent to Washington this winter. The personal explanations of Mr. Brown the secretary of the Chinese Embassy, who showed the officials the injury they were doing their cause by this delay, were successful in changing their minds; and after he had thus brought about a result which all my efforts had failed to do, it certainly was hardly proper to refuse to meet their proposals to exchange the ratifications in consequence of an informality arising from the departure of the late United States minister at Peking.

I have confided this copy to the care of Mr. J. McLeavy Brown, who returns to his post in the Embassy by way of Washington, and will deliver it to you.1

1 Williams to Fish. Ibid., vol. 28, no. 69.

THE END OF THE MISSION

T

HE Mission concluded its long stay in
Paris in September and visited the cap-

itals of northern Europe, where it was received with due cordiality in turn by the sovereigns of Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Their Majesties, in replying to the credential letter of the Chinese Emperor, each expressed appreciation of his desire to maintain and cement the good relations between their states and complimented him upon the character of his envoys. The minister of foreign affairs in The Hague entertained the hope that this distinguished Mission might impress the members of the States-General sufficiently to enable him to carry out his plan for establishing a legation in Peking, but he was unsuccessful.1

In anticipation of the arrival of the Mission in Berlin, Mr. Hamilton Fish, the new secretary of state, had acquainted the United States minister there with the views of President Grant's administration as to American policy in China. There had been no change in this respect, indeed, since the Mission left America, but some uncer1 H. Cordier, "Relations de la Chine," I, p. 301.

230

tainty had naturally been occasioned by reports of Mr. Ross Browne's speeches. It was a fortunate accident that the American minister to Prussia was an old friend of Mr. Burlingame's, the historian George Bancroft, whose personal conviction added sincerity to the carrying out of his instructions from the department. No serious obstacles, however, presented themselves in this instance. The Prussian Government, after its successful struggle with Austria, and already intent upon fulfilling its national destiny in the conflict which was soon to come with France, desired to act in harmony with Great Britain and America in matters outside of Europe. But the dispatch of Mr. Fish is a document of such importance in setting forth the spirit which still animated American purposes in China that attention should be paid to it before following the exchange of notes between Count Bismarck and Mr. Burlingame. Though not given the same publicity as the Clarendon letter of the preceding year, this summary of the sentiments of the United States toward China was made known to all the chancelleries of Europe, and assured their governments that America remained unmoved either by reports of Chinese recalcitrancy or by solicitude as to race invasion.