that "if the treaty powers could agree among themselves to the neutrality of China, and together secure order in the treaty ports, and give their moral support to that party in China in favour of order, the interests of humanity would be subserved.” 1 After reaching the capital he

found the other ministers to be in accord with him in this general principle. He obtained their support in negotiations for regulating trade on the Yangtse, in relation to the employment of foreign officers in operations against the Taipings, and in the difficult matter of concessions and independent authority demanded by foreign merchants in the treaty ports. The British and French envoys readily appreciated "the advantage that would flow from the casting down of all jealousies and by a co-operation on every material question in China." In view of collateral changes in policy before the end of the century, it is interesting to note that Mr. Burlingame "found Mr. Balluzeck, the Russian minister, prompt to answer, in the spirit of the Russian treaty, that his government did not desire to menace at any time the territorial integrity of China, but on the contrary wished to bring it more and more into the family of nations,

1 Quoted in his own dispatch to Seward, June 20, 1863. ("Diplomatic Correspondence," 1864, part I, p. 859.)

subject in its relations with foreign powers to the obligations of international law; that he was but too happy to co-operate in a policy that would ingraft Western upon Eastern civilisation without a disruption of the Chinese Empire."

The text of the proposition constituting Mr. Burlingame's principle of action in China is embodied in a portion of this same dispatch:

The policy upon which we agreed is briefly this: that while we claim our treaty right to buy and sell and hire in the treaty ports, subject, in respect to our rights of property and person, to the jurisdiction of our own governments, we will not ask for, nor take concessions of, territory in the treaty ports, or in any way interfere with the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government over its own people, nor ever menace the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. That we will not take part in the internal struggles in China beyond what is necessary to maintain our treaty rights. That the latter we will unitedly sustain against all who may violate them. To this end we are now clear in the policy of defending the treaty ports against the Tai-pings, or rebels; but in such a way as not to make war upon that considerable body of the Chinese people by following them into the interior of their country. In this connection, while we feel desirous, from what we know of it, to have the rebellion put down, still we have become (sic) to question the policy of lending government officers to lead the Chinese in the field, for fear of complications among ourselves, grow

1 Burlingame to Seward, June 20, 1863.

ing out of the relative number to be employed, etc. That while we wish to give our moral support to the government, at the present time the power in the country which seems disposed to maintain order and our treaty rights, we should prefer that it organise its own defence, taking only foreigners for instruction in the arts of peace and war, and these, as far as possible, from the smaller treaty powers. . . .

...

I need not attempt to prove the advantages which must flow from co-operation; that we should do so, all must admit. By the favoured-nation clause in the treaties, no nation can gain, by any sharp act of diplomacy, any privilege not secured to all. The circumstances conspire to make this a fortunate moment in which to inaugurate the co-operative policy. The treaty powers are represented here by men of modern ideas, by men who, in this land where everything is to be done, do not choose to embarrass each other by sowing distrust in the Chinese mind, but who, with an open policy and common action, deepen each other's confidence and win the respect of the Chinese. That the too sanguine hopes in relation to China of our more advanced civilisation may be fully realised by any action we may take, ought not to be expected.

The trouble here now is that we are dealing with a regency which, in a few years, must hand over its doings to the Emperor and those he may call around him. The regency dare not depart in the smallest particular from the old traditions, and yet these will not do for these times. They are distrustful of us, and are afraid of their censors and distant local authorities. Besides, there is a large anti-foreign party here. There are members of the Foreign Board who, if left to themselves, would at once

place China in perfect international relations with us; but sitting with them are spies, who paralyse them in their action with us, to fall, as they frequently do, far short of their promises. In their weakness they resort to tergiversations to such an extent as to menace, and to cause us in our passionate moods, almost to despair of holding, with dignity, any relations at all with them. Our only hope is in forbearance and perfect union among ourselves; if these are maintained, and our government sustains us in the policy we have adopted, I cannot but be hopeful of the future, and feel that a great step has been taken in the right direction in China.

A review of the correspondence between Mr. Burlingame and the secretary of state, during the five years which followed this dispatch, reveals both his loyalty to the principle here propounded and his chivalrous faith in the regeneration of China brought to pass by the exercise of patience and fair play. Whatever the obstacles contrived by the duplicity of officials, the criticisms directed upon him and his coadjutors by designing and disreputable Europeans at the ports, or the temptations brought up by hope long delayed to revert to the old practice of bullying China, the minister maintained his attitude consistently. Secure in his confidence of moral support from his three confrères in the other legations, he was content to let the disappointed traders cavil and to

await the work of time. As the representative, during this period, of the only foreign power which had never fought China, the only one, moreover, which at this time was unable to bring a single soldier across the ocean to enforce its demands, his control of the situation based upon a firm moral conviction was extraordinary. Under his monition the "Four B's," as they were called, ― Balluzeck, Berthemy, Bruce, and Bur-lingame, constituted a self-appointed committee of safety for China, and insured her passage into a peaceful period of internal reconstruction which endured for twenty years. The conservatism of an empire which had never in its long history consciously received any contribution from Western culture proved obdurate, indeed, and disappointed the expectations of its well-wishers; but the proper measure of the Burlingame plan is to be sought rather in a consideration of the alternatives involved. Had the exasperations comprehended in a policy of pin-pricks and exaggerated claims for indemnity been allowed to drive the Chinese once more to armed resistance, another European invasion of China would inevitably have brought other powers — notably Prussia to claim a share in the spoils of conquest; and in the partition of the empire amongst them it is hard to