selves, then, confronted not by a theory but by a situation. To force these changes upon the economic and social life of the Emperor's subjects before either rulers or people were prepared for them was to court revolution. Not only was the reluctance of these advanced officials justified, but it became the duty of the representatives of those foreign nations who wished to see the unity of China preserved, to assist them in withstanding proposals that might discredit and ruin the empire. Short of this the diplomatic body in Peking could not stop consistently, with the Burlingame policy of "let alone" openly avowed by the Four B's and approved by their governments. To act otherwise was to plunge China once more into the abyss of anarchy from which their own statesmanship in the Tai-ping rebellion had rescued her.

If, however, the alternative of a break-up of China was discarded as it had been there remained the other course, that of intervention to secure necessary reforms. As official corruption and popular prejudices were the underlying obstacles to a proper observance of the treaties, the domestic politics of the empire became an object of concern to the foreign powers. Success in so delicate a business as this, confronted as they were by the superciliousness of

the palace and the precipitancy of the treaty ports, demanded harmony among the foreign governments upon the principles at issue. This was the other element of the Burlingame policy, the co-operative idea, seen to be more and more essential if China was to be preserved intact. Race antagonism and a certain contempt for Asiatics entertained by most Caucasians had developed a predilection for arbitrary methods on the part of the European mercantile class in the Far East, but the attitude of their governments had thus far been favourable to maintaining a fair field for the independent governments of China and Japan. Happily no question of frontiers in the remoter parts of Asia had become acute at that time, as in the case of the Near East, and the number of powers intimately involved was limited. Their merchants could easily be made to recognise the inexpediency of imperilling business by bringing on anarchy. The political situation could be saved if the two policies identified with Mr. Burlingame could be faithfully continued and the merchants shown that another course meant loss. Complications which the future would bring, with its increased facilities for transportation and more numerous competitors in the trade, might destroy forever such an opportunity for co-operation as this.

The author of these policies became thus their logical exponent before the world.

Some indecision is evident on the part both of China and Great Britain during the year 1867. But in facing the unknown in human affairs the most difficult thing to do is to wait. Unhappily, while Mr. Burlingame had been absent from his post there was no advocate either in London or Peking of the let-alone policy sufficiently exalted to enforce the admirable reasoning of Sir Rutherford and compel a course on the one hand of refraining from meddling and dictation, and on the other, of submitting Western culture to considerate study. Pandora's box was opened on the very inadequate premise that "it was time something was done." To prepare for a discussion that was not necessarily immanent memorials on the subject of their grievances were invited by the British legation from its nationals in the open ports; the minds of all Europeans and of the watchful Chinese became tense. An analysis of their wants showed "three or four cardinal defects, not of the treaties so much, as in their execution." These pertained to inland and local taxes on foreign goods, facilities of access and communication with the interior of China, which involved, of course, pleas for the introduction of steam locomotion and telegraphs,

privileges for working mines, and the establishment of an international tribunal with securities for execution of awards against Chinese debtors or defaulters. Anticipating, now, some formal consideration of these desires, British merchants naturally exerted all the pressure they could to bring about a general revisal of those checks and restraints under which trade had been conducted since the Arrow War. By the end of 1867 the Chinese and foreign elements engaged in commerce were profoundly stirred by the hopes and fears involved in a rearrangement of the status quo.

In the complex and delicate situation of parties if such they may be called in China at this time, it is impossible to deny that this bouleversement was an unfortunate hazard for her more progressive statesmen. It gave fresh ammunition to their opponents, the "Old Guard" of Chinese politics, and renewed former apprehensions that the foreigners proposed to bring about a rupture which should involve new conquests and further control. To the more responsible among them this was a dreadful crisis. They credited all foreign nations alike with insatiable avarice; they had really never understood why the invasions of 1840 and 1858 had been hurled against them; they saw that they

were as helpless before Western attack now as ever before; they realised that the foreigners "barbarians who never considered justice" had everything to gain and nothing to lose by instigating a fresh war. Goaded on by their fears and by the recriminations of their repulsive critics, they called upon the satraps in the provinces for advice. All China, native and foreign alike, was agog.

The secret circular addressed by the Tsung-li Yamên to the higher civil and military officials upon the barbarian question is of interest as exhibiting their view of the difficulties and dangers of the situation. They describe the foreigners as united in interest, while there was no one in the empire who could create disunion among them. It was necessary to be patient and humour them until such time as China might be vigorous enough to drive them all out of the country and return to her old isolation. Meantime, a rupture must be avoided at all hazards, and to this end suggestions were required upon the topics likely to be discussed at the conferences upon a treaty revision. These points were: the demand for imperial audience, for an embassy or permanent missions to foreign countries, telegraphs and railways, residence of European merchants in the interior, mining and salt privileges, and Christian missions. All of the