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drawal of all foreign troops, and general elections in all Korea to be held under international supervision. However, at this stage of the war, after a miraculous landing at Inch'on and the recapture of Seoul when the KPA was in ruins, a ceasefire was out of question and totally unacceptable to the West. By now, the decision made in Washington, on mostly tactical grounds, to cross the 38th parallel, after Inch'on had become an official United Nations operation.

While waiting for Mao's reply, on October 2, Stalin received information that the North Korean frontier defenses had begun to crumble under incessant attacks from Rhee's revenge-hungry troops, and the ROK forces had pushed north beyond the parallel on the east coast road heading towards Kosong. He sent an angry ciphered telegram to Matveev in Pyongyang [Document #11], reiterating his earlier directive to his chief military representative in Korea to do his utmost to bring the remnants of the KPA mired in the south back into the north, and to hold the frontline along the 38th parallel.

In the meantime, in Beijing, the crisis was building on October 2: ignoring Zhou's warnings, ROK troops with U.S. backing had crossed the 38th parallel a day earlier; Kim Il Sung was begging for direct military assistance; and, finally, Stalin was personally urging Mao to intervene in Korea. Consequently, that day Mao convened the first of a series of enlarged meetings of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCP CC) Politburo in Beijing to formulate the Chinese response. New documents from the Russian Presidential Archive suggest that at their first meeting the CCP CC Politburo members discussed general reasons why the PRC should or should not enter the war in Korea and decided that the risks outweighed the benefits of China's direct military intervention at that time. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao's negative position prevailed, and Mao felt obliged to inform Stalin of the Chinese hesitations and lack of decision.

On October 3, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Roshchin, relayed Mao Zedong's negative response. [See Document #12.] Replying to Stalin's October 1 entreaty to enter the war, Mao acknowledged that the Chinese leadership had "originally planned" to send "several volunteer divisions" to assist the "Korean comrades" once the enemy crossed the 38th parallel. However, he ex

plained, after "thoroughly" considering the matter, many of his comrades now advocated a more cautious course of action. Consequently, the PRC would refrain from Consequently, the PRC would refrain from sending troops to Korea, at least for the time being. Mao attributed this reversal to three principal considerations. First, the Chinese principal considerations. First, the Chinese army was poorly armed, ill-prepared, and had "no confidence" it could defeat the modern American military, which could "force us into retreat." Second, Chinese intervention in the conflict would "most likely" lead to an open Sino-American war, which in turn could drag the USSR into the war due to its commitments under the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, "and the question would thus become extremely large." Finally, after decades of civil war, Chinese entry into the Korean conflict to confront a powerful American adversary would provoke widespread domestic resentment within the PRC spread domestic resentment within the PRC toward the newly-established People's Government, and wreck the leadership's plan for peaceful reconstruction.

Therefore, Mao reluctantly concluded, it was necessary to "show patience now," focus on building military strength for a possible later conflict, and in the meantime accept a temporary defeat in Korea while the North Koreans "change the form of the struggle to partisan war." Mao concluded his message by noting that this decision was provisional and awaited a final determination by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; in the meantime, he was ready to send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to Stalin's vacation home for direct consultations. In conveying Mao's telegram, which was dated October 2, an obviously shocked Roshchin noted that this new position flatly contradicted repeated assurances from Chinese leaders that the People's Liberation Army was ready, indeed, in high "fighting spirit," to aid the Koreans and to defeat the Americans. The Soviet envoy could only speculate on the reasons for the turnabout in the Beijing leadership's stand: the international situation, the "worsening" predicament in Korea, and/or Anglo-American "intrigues" through the intercession of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (It is important to note that this account of Mao's October 2 communication to Stalin, informing him of Chinese refusal to enter the war, based on newly-declassified documents int he Russian archives, fundamentally contradicts the purported Mao to Stalin message of

October 2 which was published in 1987 in an official Chinese document compilation and has since been relied upon for numerous scholarly accounts; see the attached footnote for further information.)30

Stalin, while undoubtedly sorely disappointed, did not know whether Mao had given his final word or was simply for bargaining for better terms for China's participation in the war. During the day of October 5, Stalin conferred with the members of the (VKP(b) CC) Politburo. Although the official agenda was designated as "the Question of Comrade Shtykov," the real issue under consideration was the nature of the Soviet national security interest in Korea and how to protect it on the ground. All Politburo members agreed that a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation in Korea should be avoided at all costs, even if the USSR had to abandon North Korea. In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalls that "When the threat [after Inch'on] emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea that North Korea would be annihilated, and that the Americans would reach our border. I remember quite well that in connection with the exchange of opinions on the Korean question, Stalin said: 'So what? Let the United States of America be our neighbors in the Far East. They will come there, but we shall not fight them now. We are not ready

to fight."31 The upshot of the Politburo

discussion was a decision to increase pressure on Mao to extract an unequivocal commitment from China to enter the war.

Thus, it appears that as a result of cumulative discussions and a series of incremental decisions dated September 27, September 30, and October 5, the Soviet Politburo adopted a major policy shift in the Soviet policy toward Korea. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided to begin to limit Soviet military and political exposure in Korea, and at the same time permit a greater Chinese role in the alliance decision-making on Korea.

In this light, given the continuous deterioration of the military situation in Korea, as well as the Soviet leaders' determination to see Chinese, not Soviet, troops fighting there, the Politburo overruled the Foreign Ministry's objections and decided, as one of the first steps aimed at curtailing the Soviet presence in Korea, to grant Ambassador Shtykov the evacuation powers that he requested with respect to some Soviet specialists employed by the DPRK government and

by Soviet organizations in Korea [Politburo Decision No. P78/168, Document #14]. He was notified of this policy change by wire the same day. Ironically, the permission arrived just as Shtykov, sensing a policy shift in Moscow, losing all his faith in Kim Il Sung's ability to defend his regime on his own, and unsure if any help was coming from Moscow or Beijing, requested even more extended evacuation powers, now including the families of the Soviet citizens of

32

Korean nationality,52 the personnel of the Soviet Air Force units stationed in Korea,33 and all other Soviet citizens in Korea [Document #16]. It took less than a day for Vasilevsky and Gromyko to get Stalin's approval and immediately wire the affirmative response.

After the conference with his Politburo associates sometime during the day of October 5, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Mao and Zhou [Document #13]. Without mentioning the latest policy shift in Moscow, he outlined his reasoning why it was in China's national interest to dispatch the Chinese "Volunteers" to save the collapsing North Korean regime and why this had to be done immediately. First, he reiterated his conviction that the United States was not ready to fight a major war at present, while Japan, whose militaristic potential had not yet been restored, was not currently capable of militarily assisting the Americans. Therefore, he argued, the U.S. would be compelled to concede in the Korean question to China, which was backed by its ally, the USSR, and to agree to terms of settlement favorable to (North) Korea thus preventing the Americans from transforming the peninsula into their springboard. Following the same hardnosed realpolitik reasoning, Stalin stated that, consequently, not only would Washington have to abandon Taiwan, but also they would have to reject the idea of separate peace with the Japanese "revanchists," and to jettison their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their bridgehead in the Far East.

Having depicted his vision of an emerging new geopolitical order in the Far East, Stalin blandly told Mao that he proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if she were to

but it would not be able to get back even
Taiwan, which at that time the United States
was clinging to; not for the benefit of Nation-
alist Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang
Kai-shek), in Stalin's view, but to use the
island as its own strategic base or for a
militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

In conclusion, Stalin displayed a singu-
larly unusual propensity for high-stakes gam-
bling which was fraught with the potential
for global disaster. He reassured Mao that he
had taken into account the possibility that the
United States, albeit unready to fight a major
war then, could still be drawn into a big war
(i.e., with China) on a question of prestige,
(i.e., with China) on a question of prestige,
which, in turn, would drag the USSR, which
was bound with China by a Mutual Assis-
tance Pact, into the war. Stalin asked Mao:
"Should we be afraid of this possibility? In
my opinion, we should not, because, to-
gether, we will be stronger than the United
States and Great Britain, whereas none of the
other European capitalist states (with the
exception of Germany, which is unable to
provide any assistance to the United States
now) possess any military power at all. If
war is inevitable, let it be waged now, and not
in a few years when Japanese imperialism
will be restored as a U.S. ally and when the
U.S. and Japan will have a ready-made bridge-
head on the continent in the form of all Korea
run by Syngman Rhee." This telegram was
a call for action. Stalin forcefully indicated
to Mao that all the chips were down, and Mao
had to show what hand he was playing after
all.

The embattled Mao must have received
this telegram amidst a series of tense emer-
gency sessions of the CCP CC Politburo in
Beijing sometime on October 6. It was at one
of these meetings that Mao reportedly an-
nounced his decision to appoint Peng Dehuai
as the commander of the Chinese People's
Volunteers (CPV). Later that evening, Mao
dined together with Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai,
and Gao Gang. Reportedly, they agreed that
"now it seems that we have to fight a war,"
and that Zhou Enlai would fly to Moscow to
solicit Soviet military aid. The next morn-

ing, a supreme military conference presided
ing, a supreme military conference presided
over by Zhou is said formally to have ap-
proved of Mao's decision to send Zhou and
Lin Biao to the USSR to discuss the details of

adopt a passive wait-and-see policy. With- military cooperation.34
out some serious struggle and an imposing
display of force, he argued, not only would
China fail to obtain all these concessions,

On October 7, Stalin received Mao's
reply; in Stalin's own words, "Mao expressed

solidarity with the main ideas of my [October
solidarity with the main ideas of my [October

5] letter and stated that he would send nine, not six, divisions to Korea, but that he would not do it right away; instead, he intended to do it some time soon. In the meantime, he asked me to receive his representatives and discuss with them a plan of military assistance to Korea in detail" [see Document #13]. Evidently, Mao's October 7 telegram contained only his conditional consent to send troops to Korea. He had taken a step toward Stalin's position but hinted that, once again, the decision was not yet final, and could be rendered final only after Stalin received in person and succeeded in persuading the chief CCP CC Politburo opponents of China's entry into the Korean War: Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Stalin accepted Mao's request with understanding, realizing that he had to bolster Mao if he wanted the latter to deliver.

While Moscow and Beijing bickered about why, when, on what terms, and whether troops should be sent to defend Kim Il Sung's crumbling regime-and whose troops they should be the Western allies intensified their diplomatic offensive at the United Nations and stepped up their military offensive on the battleground, anticipating a quick mop-up of the entire Korean campaign. On October 4, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly rejected the Soviet draft resolution of October 2, and, on October 7, the UN General Assembly passed by a 47-5-7 vote a "Go after the DPRK" resolution, proposed by the United Kingdom, which recommended that: "1. a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; b) all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the U.N., for the establishing of a united, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea." In a nutshell, this resolution gave Gen. MacArthur and the Western powers carte blanche to occupy all of North Korea and rearrange its political and economic systems to their liking. On the day this crucial vote was taken, in Korea the advanced units of the 1st Cavalry of Gen. Walton Walker's Army crossed the 38th Parallel in the Kaesong area.

At 10:15 p.m. on the night of October 7 Stalin asked Bulganin to forward to Kim Il Sung via Shtykov his long-delayed response to Kim's October 1 plea for help. It had taken almost a week for Stalin to respond, although he was well aware that Kim was

desperate and hanging over a precipice. Stalin had tarried simply because he did not yet have any good news to deliver. Only after receiving Mao's conditional commitment did he decide to write to Kim. In his telegram, which Shtykov gave Kim on the afternoon of October 8, Stalin for the first time told Kim Il Sung about his ongoing negotiations with Mao, noting that the Chinese comrades still had doubts and hesitated to make a final commitment to fight, but, at the same time, emphasizing that negotiations continued, and therefore Kim Il Sung had to battle tenaciously for each inch of his land because help was on its way [Document #13].

Reportedly, Mao also sent a telegram to Kim Il Sung via his Ambassador in Pyongyang, who went to Kim's underground headquarters and handed it to him on the night of October 8. It said: "In view of the current situation, we have decided to send volunteers to Korea to help you fight against the aggressor." Chinese sources report Kim Il Sung to have reacted gleefully.35

The next morning, on October 9, at 7:05 a.m., Shtykov wired Kim's reply to Stalin [Document #16], adding that he concurred with its content. Clearly, this letter reflected Kim's new, more positive mood and his newly found self-confidence. Although Shtykov did not mention any contacts between Kim and the Chinese representatives the night before, surely Mao's cable had lifted Kim's spirit. In his letter, Kim expressed his belief that the U.S. aggressor would not stop until it had occupied Korea entirely and converted it into its militarystrategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East; therefore, the struggle of the Korean people for their independence, freedom, and state sovereignty would be protracted and very hard.

In contrast to his previous letter of September 29, in which he had requested "direct military assistance" from the Soviet Union, Kim now asked Stalin only to aid the KPA by training 2,000 pilots, 1,000 tank drivers, 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering officers in the territory of the USSR. Of course, if one looks at the numbers, the inescapable impression is that Kim basically asked Stalin to help train an entirely new professional officers corps for the KPA, with the exception of the infantry officers. In other words, Kim Il Sung's fortunes were still very much dependent on professional

military advice and arms supplies from the USSR. Nonetheless, once informed of Mao's commitment to send ground troops to fight in Korea, he apparently began to distance himself from Stalin. No longer did he request Soviet ground troops or even air cover, because he knew Mao would probably take care of it by himself.36

In the meantime, the Western allies continued to advance. On October 9 in Washington, President Truman and the JCS directed MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel, even if Chinese intervention occurred, so long as "in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success." At once, MacArthur issued his final unconditional surrender deissued his final unconditional surrender demand, stating that unless North Korea capitulated, he would proceed to "take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations." The same day, advanced ROK I Corps units moving up the east coast from the perimeter reached Wonsan, over 110 miles north of the parallel. The 1st Cavalry and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade pushed north towards Kumchon, Sariwon, and Pyongyang itself.37 On October 9, two F-80 jets raided "by mistake" a Soviet airfield sixty miles inside the USSR border near Vladivostok. The days of Kim Il Sung's state appeared to be numbered. It is plausible to assume that Stalin was aware of these developments in Korea when he first received Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao at a dacha near the Black Sea late that night.

The Stalin-Zhou talks of 9-10 October 1950 are crucial in understanding the evolution of the Soviet-Chinese alliance and the terms of the Chinese entry into the Korean War. They reveal how domestic political considerations influenced the foreign policy priorities of these two communist giants, as well as the pivotal role of misperceptions and miscommunications in the mismanagement of the alliance relationship.

The newly declassified Russian documents from the APRF by and large confirm the account of Mao's interpreter, Shi Zhe,38 (except dates) of what transpired between Stalin and Zhou at the former's dacha during these two days. In brief, Zhou told Stalin that the CCP CC Politburo had decided not to send troops to Korea because: 1) China lacked adequate money, arms, or transport; 2) the CCP's domestic political opposition had not been pacified yet, and reactionary

forces could use this opportunity to raise their heads again; and, finally, 3) the U.S. could declare war on China, should the latter intervene in Korea.

Aware of these arguments from his previous correspondence with Mao and bearing in mind that Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao were the chief opponents within the CCP CC Politburo of China's entry into the war, Stalin went on the offensive. First, he noted that the Great Patriotic War (World War II) had just ended, and therefore it would be very difficult for the USSR to fight another large-scale war right away. Besides, the Soviet-North Korean border was too narrow to allow massive troop transfers. Notwithstanding this, if U.S. actions were to jeopardize the fate of world socialism on a global scale, the Soviet Union would be ready to take up the American challenge. However, he stressed that, at that time, U.S. imperialism was in a weak strategic position because it could not rely for assistance on traditional military powers such as Germany and Japan, as well as Britain, all of which were profoundly weakened by the Second World War. Hence, Washington would not dare to launch a world war. Since any kind of U.S. attack against China would trigger the mutual military assistance provision of the Soviet-Chinese Alliance Treaty and draw the U.S. into a global conflict with the USSR, for which it was not ready, America was unlikely to risk a war with China on the latter's own territory. Hence, in Stalin's opinion, at that moment, Beijing could help the North Koreans without fear of U.S. retaliation against Mainland China. Moreover, Stalin emphasized that it was in China's national interest to ensure the survival of a friendly government in North Korea. For, if the U.S. occupied the North and deployed its forces along the Yalu and Tumen rivers, this would pose an enormous threat to Chinese security, because the Americans could harass China from the air, land, and sea at their discretion and could also endanger the economic development of northeast China.

But, despite these arguments, Zhou did not yield to Stalin's pressure. Stalin appears to have almost yelled in exasperation, “That you do not want to send troops to Korea is your decision, but socialism in Korea would collapse within a very short period of time." After regaining his composure, Stalin changed his tactics and laid out a stark alternative for Zhou. He suggested that both the

Soviet Union and PRC provide sanctuary for Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA if they could no longer fight on their own; the main forces, arms, equipment, and some cadres of the KPA would be redeployed to northeast China, while the disabled and wounded men, as well as Koreans of Soviet origin, could be moved to the Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East. In their new bases in northeast China they would train new troops, master new weaponry, and prepare themselves for the day of their reentry into Korea. Stalin reiterated that since the Chinese did not intend to send troops, the Soviet Union and China should work out concrete plans to provide shelter for their Korean comrades and their forces, and make sure that one day they would be able to return to Korea.

Reportedly, Zhou was stunned at what he heard. He backed away from his initial tough stance, and asked Stalin whether China could count on Soviet air cover should it decide to fight in Korea. Without a pause, Stalin responded positively: "We can send a certain number of aircraft to offer cover [for the CPV in Korea-AM]." Stalin also reassured Zhou that the Soviet Union would take care of weapons and equipment supplies for the CPV, including their replacements, immediately after the Chinese side ascertained its needs in actual combat.

The Stalin-Zhou talks lasted for two days, and yet no mutually agreed upon decisions were reached at the end. Zhou simply said that he needed to communicate with Beijing in order to ask for new instructions. Stalin replied that he could wait but that time was fast running out. They parted, reportedly, both confused about each other's true intentions.39

Contrary to Goncharov, Xue, and Lewis' account in Uncertain Partners40_ citing the recollections of Zhou aide Kang Yimin-Stalin and Zhou Enlai did not agree to send a joint telegram to Mao Zedong the next day. Nor did Molotov call Zhou after the latter's arrival in Moscow with "startling news that the Soviet Union would not offer any military equipment to China." These are stories, perhaps elaborated by Zhou's entourage in order to persuade Mao that Stalin, not Zhou's obduracy, was to blame for the "breakdown of talks;" that Stalin was an unreliable ally; and that, after all, China should not fight a war in Korea alone, which was Zhou's belief from the

very beginning.41 Not only did these fictional events never occur, they could not even have happened the way they were described. Stalin never co-signed his telegrams with anybody, regardless of the status of the other party or the addressee, including Mao and Zhou. In the Stalinist era, Soviet Politburo members never used the telephone to communicate important decisions, no matter how urgent those might be, let alone to talk to foreign leaders. These fictional events contradict the then-prevailing Soviet party bureaucratic practices.42 The present author has never encountered evidence of such unorthodox procedures anywhere in the Russian Archives.

In reality, all along Stalin reiterated his willingness to provide the CPV with air cover if Mao sent his troops to Korea. 43 Nonetheless, on October 11, Zhou reportedly sent a telegram to Mao in Beijing, stating that "Comrade Filippov [a pseudonym for Stalin-AM] did not express his objections to the CCP CC Politburo's decision not to send troops to Korea." It was Gao Gang who told the Soviet Consul-General in Shenyang, A.M. Ledovsky, and General Vazhnov about Zhou's cable from Moscow during a conversation on October 25 in Shenyang. He added that it was this telegram from Zhou that reignited a fierce debate in the CCP CC Politburo regarding the merits of China's intervention in Korea. 44 The result was that Mao put on hold all Chinese preparations in the northeast for the dispatch of troops to Korea. 45

I would interpret what happened during the Stalin-Zhou talks on October 9-10 as follows. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to see Stalin with a strong belief that China could not and should not intervene in Korea. During the talks, Stalin failed to convince them of the potentially dire consequences of the North's collapse for Chinese security and its international standing. Therefore, Zhou and Lin decided to stick to their original antiintervention stand in their debate with Mao, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang. At the same time, they invented a "respectable" excuse for their obduracy, i.e., an alleged refusal by Stalin to provide the CPV with air cover. At that moment, there was a brief rupture in bilateral communications, and both sides were left to make decisions for themselves.

As far as Zhou Enlai's role is concerned, if this scenario is correct, he rose up between Stalin and Mao, and almost had them at each

other's throat because they both disagreed with his own beliefs. Zhou seems to have viewed his visit to Stalin as a last opportunity to prevent China from entering the Korean war and to shift the entire burden of saving Kim's regime onto Stalin's broad shoulders. Once he realized that Stalin did not want to accept this responsibility and preferred to see the Chinese fighting, Zhou opted to bluff and may even have misrepresented the Soviet position in his correspondence with Mao. But, to his regret, he miscalculated Stalin's high risk-taking propensity in his gambling on the future of North Korea altogether, as well as Mao's own determination to fight in Korea, and failed to foresee that Mao would decide to fight even when his back was pushed against the wall and he was left ostensibly alone, allegedly without Soviet air support.

In the meantime, in Korea, on October 12, the Interim Committee of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, created by the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, advised the United Nations Command to take over the civil government of North Korea, which meant in practice that the U.S. military was authorized to rule the "liberated" provinces of North Korea. Kim Il Sung moved his headquarters to Kosangjin, near Kanggye, not far from the Chinese border. The newlyrebuilt KPA Front Line Command was moved to Tokch'on in South P'yongan Province. The KPA forces desperately tried to halt the advancing ROK and U.S. troops that had broken through the 38th parallel and reached as far as Chunghwa, a few miles from Pyongyang.

On the morning of October 13, Stalin received a report from Admirals Golovko and Fokin informing him of a large concentration of U.S. heavy battleships and amphibious assault vessels, manned with troops, apparently ready for an amphibious landing in the harbor of Wonsan [Document #17]. That day, Wonsan was the target of ferocious U.S. air raids and Navy fire. Stalin could easily foresee the strategic implications of the forthcoming U.S. landing in Wonsan: the KPA would be again split in half, this time along the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, and, with its rear absolutely unprotected, the ROK I Corps and U.S. X Corps could march unimpeded toward the YaluTumen rivers on the North Korean-Chinese and North Korean-Soviet borders, while Gen.

Walker's Eighth Army mopped up KPA remnants in the Pyongyang area and then advanced toward the northwest.

This was a decisive moment for Stalin. A week earlier, the Soviet Politburo had decided that the USSR would rather abandon North Korea than risk a direct military confrontation with the U.S., unless the latter deliberately attacked Soviet territory. Therefore, Stalin did not intend to send Soviet ground troops to save Kim Il Sung. As Zhou had told Stalin a couple of days earlier, the Chinese also decided to refrain from sending the CPV to Korea for the time being. Realizing that neither he nor Mao was willing to save Kim Il Sung from total defeat, Stalin evidently resigned himself to viewing the entire Korean situation as a matter of cutting his losses and saving face.

Such a conclusion is supported by the dramatic order Stalin appears to have sent a Kim Il Sung via Ambassador Shtykov on the afternoon of October 13.46 Informing Kim

of his talks with Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, Stalin reported with regret that Zhou had stated that the Chinese were not yet ready to enter the war. Consequently, they concluded that it would be better for Kim to withdraw the remnants of his forces from Korea to China and the USSR. Therefore, Stalin ordered that Kim Il Sung "evacuate North Korea and pull out his Korean troops to the north." He also directed that Shtykov assist Kim in drawing up a plan of measures to implement this evacuation order. In effect, Stalin was fed up with Kim Il Sung and had thrown in the towel.

Late on the night of October 13, Shtykov, following Stalin's instructions, met with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong and read the text of Stalin's telegram to them. In Shtykov's telegram addressed to Fyn Si (another Stalin pseudonym), which he wired from Pyongyang at 3:15 a.m. on October 14 [Document #18], he described the North Koreans' reaction as follows: "Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong were very much surprised by the content of the telegram. Kim Il Sung stated that it was extremely hard for them to implement such advice; however, since there was such advice, they would implement it." Then, Kim asked Shtykov to give him his practical recommendations and directed that Pak HonYong write them down. Also, he asked Shtykov and Matveyev to assist him in drafting a plan of measures to be taken regarding the KPA evacuation plan.

After receiving Stalin's evacuation order on the night of October 13, Kim Il Sung called Major-General Ch'oe Kyong-dok47 to his headquarters in Kosangjin and ordered that Ch'oe leave immediately for the northeastern provinces of China in order to set up guerrilla bases for Kim and the KPA remnants there. Ch'oe is said to have departed with two adjutants the same night. In the next several hours, Kim is said to have repeatedly told his close associates that they would have to wage a guerrilla war from China again. Within a day Ch'oe and his two aides had mysteriously disappeared. Kim Il Sung dispatched a small team of scouts to find them, but in vain.48

Meanwhile, however, even before seeing Kim's response, Stalin had changed his mind and dramatically reversed himself, thanks to some welcome news from Beijing. Early in the morning of October 14, at 3:20 a.m., he received two extremely urgent telegrams (#2406 and #2408) from the Soviet envoy to the PRC described a late-night meeting with Mao which took place immediately after the CCP CC Politburo finally decided, at a emergency session, to intervene in Korea before the war ended in a U.S. victory. Roshchin cited Mao as saying: "Our leading comrades believe that if the U.S. troops advance up to the border of China, then Korea will become a dark spot for us and the Northeast [China] will be faced with constant danger." Mao confirmed that "past hesitations by our comrades occurred because the questions of the international situation, the questions of the Soviet assistance to us, the question of air cover were not clear to them," and stressed that "at present, all these questions have been clarified." Furthermore, Mao pointed out, "now it is advantageous for us to dispatch Chinese troops into Korea. China has the absolute obligation to send troops to Korea" [Document #19]. He mentioned that at this point they were sending a first contingent of nine divisions. Although poorly armed, it would be able to fight the troops of Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chinese comrades would prepare a second echelon. As for air cover, Mao expressed hope that the Soviet air force would arrive in northeast China as soon as possible, but not later than in two months. Mao concluded by saying that the CCP CC believed that the Chinese must assist Korean comrades in their difficult struggle; therefore, he had

asked Zhou Enlai to discuss the matter of China's entry into the Korean War with Comrade Filippov again. He stressed that "Zhou Enlai was being sent new instructions."

What is important about this telegram is that it contains Mao's admission that, in essence, Zhou's position was to stonewall because of the hesitations and reservations displayed by some prominent CCP CC leaders in Beijing. However, once these domestic political disputes were resolved, Mao wanted Stalin back in the game.

Indeed, Stalin rejoiced at Mao's new decision because he had been so reluctant to abandon North Korea to begin with. At once, he hand-wrote a note to Shtykov for immediate delivery to Kim Il Sung [Document #20], the second telegram within hours, temporarily halting the implementation of his order of October 13.49 It said: “I have just received a telegram from Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CCP Central Committee discussed the situation again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao Zedong. In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I ask you to postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to you yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and withdrawal of the Korean troops to the north." This telegram makes perfectly clear that the crucial consideration in Stalin's position on intervention in Korea was the role of China. When Mao balked, so did Stalin. When Mao decided to make a commitment to Kim Il Sung, Stalin again followed suit. Still unsure whether Mao's decision was irrevocable, Stalin displayed some caution and ordered that Kim Il Sung "temporarily" postpone, not cancel, the implementation of measures advised to him a day earlier.

Only after Stalin received further clarifications and proof from Beijing that this time Mao meant it, did he order that his previous recommendations to Kim be annulled. He reiterated his commitment to supply the CPV with weapons and equipment. Most importantly, he felt compelled to indicate to Kim that he was relinquishing some of his authority on the Korean matter to Mao and his CPV commanders. A few hours later on October 14, he dispatched a

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