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Having familiarized myself with the predicament of the KPA, I report:

The situation of the People's Army troops on the Western (Seoul) and Southeastern (Pusan) fronts is severe.

Seeking to encircle and destroy the main forces of the People's Army, it is in the general direction of Ch'ungju that the U.S. troops have concentrated the major efforts of the assault group which had landed in the area of Chemulp'o, as well as of the troops that had launched an offensive from the area to the North and Northwest of Taegu.

Using the support of the air force which has dominated the air space without hindrance and caused aircraft-fright [aviaboiazn'] both among the ranks within the People's Army and in the rear areas, the U.S. troops have managed to move from Suwon eastward and southeastward for 25 to 30 kilometers and some of their troops took

over Sangju and Antó to the north and north- Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense west of Taegu. Minister in his hands, to set up a Staff Office for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the command and control over troops, and to pay serious attention to the work of the rear.

According to the information which still needs to be verified, some tank units of the enemy's Seoul group continue to advance toward Ch'ungju, which creates the danger of encirclement of the First Army Group of the KPA.

The People's Army troops, suffering heavy losses, mainly from the enemy's airforce, having lost almost all their tanks and much artillery, are engaged in difficult battles to hold their positions. The troops lack ammunition and fuel the delivery of which has been virtually halted. The accounting for the available weapons and ammunition is organized unsatisfactorily. The top-down command and control system is set up poorly. The wire and radio communications work intermittently because of the interruptions inflicted by the enemy's air raids and due to the lack of qualified radio operators and the lack of fuel for radio station generators correspondingly. Courier mail is almost nonexistent.

The predicament of the KPA troops, in particular on the Southeastern front, remains unclear.

Upon our recommendation, on the night of 26.9.50 [26 September 1950], some Korean communications officers were dispatched to the Front Command and the Seoul group in order to collect information on the troops' situation.

On 25.9.50, at 19:00 pm, local time, Kim Il Sung's order was forwarded to the troops, according to which the Seoul grouping and the Second Army Group operating in the northern part of the southeastern front were told to go on the defensive and hold up the enemy by any means.

The troops of the Second Army Group operating in the central and southern parts of the southeastern front were ordered to begin general retreat northwestward with the aim of getting to the area of Chénchang, Taejon, Poún for further levelling off the front line approximately following the line Seoul, Yóju, Ch'ungju [in Russian translation: Seoul, Reisiu, Tsiusiu, Naidzio, Urutsin].

On 26.9.50, KIM IL SUNG received our group.

The meeting was also attended by Foreign Minister PAK HÓN-YÓNG and Com

rade SHTYKOV.

As a result of our conversation, KIM IL SUNG decided to combine the duties of the

At present, they have begun to form only six infantry divisions in the northern part of Korea, whereas the current military situation has made impossible the formation of nine infantry divisions manned with the Southerners.

KIM IL SUNG issued a directive to take immediate steps aimed at withdrawing the remaining KPA troops from South Korea so that to use it to form new divisions in North Korea and deny this opportunity to the South.

In connection with the fact that the Chinese railroads are overloaded transporting supplies to Korea, it is desirable that the armaments designated for use by the six divisions which are being newly formed be shipped first, and only then should the ammunition be delivered.

After our conversation with KIM IL SUNG we got down to work in order to assist in:

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Then KIM IL SUNG briefly explained to me the predicament of his troops on the basis of the report of the Front Commander and asked my advice as to what one could do in order to improve the situation at the front. KIM IL SUNG believes that in the wake of the enemy's having occupied the Syarye mountain range and moving into the rear of the Second Army Group the front situation is becoming particularly troublesome. Earlier they hoped that they would be able to withdraw troops in an organized manner. But because of their poor discipline and failure to fulfill orders, the enemy managed to cut off the First Army Group and is moving to cut off the Second Army Group by its breakthrough toward P'UNGGI [BUNKEI] and JIJYON [TISEN].

The situation in Seoul is also murky. His orders notwithstanding, CH'OE YONGGÓN does not report anything, despite the fact that a line of communications with him is available.

I replied that it was hard for me to advise anything regarding this matter because I did not know the predicament of the KPA troops and their location, however, I would consider it expedient for KIM IL SUNG to take urgent steps to organize defense along the 38th parallel, including im

mediate deployment of troops at the already CH'ÓNGJU, to cut off the Second Army

prepared fortifications there.

KIM IL SUNG asked me, how do you consider [the situation], will the adversary cross the 38th parallel northward?

I replied that it was not clear yet, but that they had to undertake urgent measures to set up defenses along the 38th parallel.

KIM IL SUNG reiterated his earlier stated desire to unify the country by his own means, he stated that he wanted to form 15 divisions and to continue the struggle, but it was not clear for him whether the adversary would cross the 38th parallel or not. Should the enemy cross the 38th parallel, they [the North Korean leadership - AM] would be unable to form new troops and they would have no means to render any serious resistance to the enemy.

In this connection, he would like to ask my advice regarding his letter to Comrade STALIN. They discussed this idea and want to send the letter.

I responded that I could give no advice on this matter. At that moment, PAK HÓNYÓNG joined the conversation and said that they had already drafted a letter, that the WPKS Political Council had discussed it, and they wanted to familiarize me with its content.

I dodged the reading by saying that it was up to the Political Council what its members were going to write in their letter.

On 28.9.50, [A.I.] SHABSHIN, a member of MATVEYEV'S group, told MATVEYEV and myself that at a chance meeting with PAK HÓN-YÓNG the latter

told him that the Political Council had discussed and adopted a text of the letter addressed to comrade Stalin, containing a request to aid Korea with air support.

PAK informed SHABSHIN that they had dispatched a letter in reply to MAO ZEDONG which contained a hint about aid.

It was obvious that they [Kim and Pak AM] were not satisfied with my earlier reply and they did not know what to do with their letter to Comrade STALIN.

KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YÓNG are nervous. In the present difficult situation one can feel some confusion and hopeless

ness.

The military situation has worsened dramatically lately. The adversary managed to cut off the entire First Army Group composed of six divisions and two brigades, as well as, by advancing to the vicinity of

Group composed of 7 divisions. Seoul fell. There are no standby troops ready to render any serious resistance to the enemy advancing to the 38th parallel.

New military units being formed in the North advance to the frontline very slowly because the railroads in fact do not function due to the demolished bridges and ruined railway stations, while automobile transport is scarce.

These new units lack armaments. The newly formed units and groupings designated to defend CHEMULP'O, HAEJU, WÓNSAN, and CH'ÓNGJIN have weapons designed for training purposes only.

The political situation is also getting more and more complicated.

The enemy stepped up its activity of dropping paratroopers into the territory of North Korea with the task of gathering intelligence on what deliveries are being shipped from the Soviet Union and to conduct subversive activities. Reactionary forces are raising their heads in North Korea.

30.IX.50

No. 1340

SHTYKOV

Typed by Lobyseva on 09/30/50 at 16:55 p.m.

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 46-49]

Document 6: Ciphered Telegram, DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South Korean Communist leader Pak HonYong to Stalin (via Shtykov), 29 September 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600308/sh

Sent from Pyongyang by wire on 09/30/50 at 20:35 p.m.

Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 23:32 p.m.

Arrived in the 8 MDGS on 09/30/50 at 23:30 p.m.

Deciphered by Mikhaylenko on 10/01/50 at 0:35 a.m.

Distribution list - 12 copies:

Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1,
Beria -1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1,
Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1.

Extremely Urgent restore its prestige and to implement by any

MOSCOW

To Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Comrade GROMYKO

means its long-held plans of conquering Korea and transforming it into its militarystrategic bridgehead, on 16.9.50, the U.S. performed an assault landing operation and landed a considerable number of troops and armaments in the vicinity of Inch'ón after having mobilized almost all its land, naval, and air troops deployed in the Pacific ocean. ceived from KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN- The enemy took over Inch'ón and is engaged YÓNG (translation from the Korean). in street combats in the city of Seoul itself. This letter was handed over to me by The military situation became perilous. PAK HÓN-YÓNG in person.

I herewith relay the text of a letter addressed to Comrade STALIN which I re

No. 1351

Enclosure: 4-page letter.

SHTYKOV

This letter was cabled to Comrade Stalin on 10.01.50 at 12:50 p.m.

Typed by Shcherbakova on 10/01/50 at 1:45 a.m.

* * * * *

Moscow, Kremlin.

DEEPLY RESPECTED Iosif

Vissarionovich STALIN.

On behalf of the Workers' Party of Korea, we express to You, the liberator of the Korean people and the leader of the working peoples of the entire world, our profound gratitude for compassion and assistance which You constantly provide to our people struggling for the freedom and independence of its Motherland.

In this letter, we would like to brief You on the current situation at the fronts of the liberation war of our people against the American aggressors.

Prior to the assault landing at Inch'ón (Chemulp'o) one could not judge the situation at the fronts as unfavorable to us. The adversary, suffering one defeat after another, was cornered into a tiny piece of land at the southern-most tip of South Korea and we had a great chance of winning a victory in the last decisive battles.

Such a situation considerably damaged the military authority of the United States. Therefore, in those conditions, in order to

The units of our People's Army heroically fight against advancing assault landing units of the enemy. However, we consider it necessary to report to You about the emergence of very unfavorable conditions for us.

The enemy's air force numbering about a thousand airplanes of various types, facing no rebuff from our side, totally dominate the air space and perform air raids at the fronts and in the rear day and night. At the fronts, under the air cover of hundreds of airplanes the motorized units of the enemy engage us in combat at their free will and inflict great losses to our manpower and destroy our armaments. Moreover, by freely destroying railroads and highways, telegraph and telephone communications lines, means of transportation and other facilities, the enemy's air force impedes the provision of supplies to our combat units and bars maneuvers by our troops, thereby making their timely redeployments impossible. We experience this difficulty on all fronts.

Having cut off all the communications lines of our troops and joined the assault force that landed in Inch'ón with the units of their southern front that broke through our frontline, the adversary has a real opportunity to take over the city of Seoul completely.

As a result, the units of the People's Army that are still fighting in the southern part of Korea have been cut off from the northern part of Korea, they are torn into pieces and cannot receive munitions, armaments, and food rations. Moreover, some units do not have any communication with each other, while some of them are surrounded by enemy troops.

After taking over Seoul completely, the enemy is likely to launch a further offensive into North Korea. Therefore, we believe that if in future the above-mentioned conditions unfavorable to us continue, then the Ameri

can aggression ultimately will be successful. In order to provide troops with all the necessary supplies and to feed the frontline without any interruption, first of all, we need to have an appropriate air force. But we do not possess well-trained pilots.

Dear Comrade STALIN, we are determined to overcome all the difficulties facing us so that Korea will not be a colony and a military springboard of the U.S. imperialists. We will fight for the independence, democracy and happiness of our people to the last drop of blood. Therefore, with all our energy we are taking decisive measures for the formation and training of many new divisions with the aim of using more than 100,000 troops mobilized in South Korea [captured in South Korea - AM] in the most advantageous operational areas, as well as arming the entire people so as to be prepared to fight a protracted war.

This notwithstanding, if the enemy does not give us time to implement the measures which we plan, and, making use of our extremely grave situation, steps up its offensive operations into North Korea, then we will not be able to stop the enemy troops solely with our own forces.

Therefore, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, we cannot help asking You to provide us with special assistance. In other words, at the moment when the enemy troops cross over the 38th parallel we will badly need direct military assistance from the Soviet Union.

If for any reason this is impossible, please assist us by forming international volunteer units in China and other countries of people's democracy for rendering military assistance to our struggle.

We request Your directive regarding the aforementioned proposal.

Respectfully, The CC of the Workers' Party of Korea

KIM IL SUNG, PAK HÓN-YÓNG

29 September 1950

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 41-45]

Document 7: Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador in Beijing (N.V. Roshchin) with message for Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 3172

Coded, only by wire
Submitted at 23:45 p.m. on 07/05/50
Distribution List - 3 copies: Stalin - 2,
Molotov -1

TO BEIJING, [SOVIET] AMBASSA-
DOR

Re Your ciphered telegrams ## 11121126

Tell Zhou Enlai the following:

1. We agree with the opinion of Chinese comrades regarding the Indian intermediation in the matter of admitting the People's [Republic of] China into the UN membership.

2. We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteers' actions in North Korea in the event of the enemy's crossing the 38th parallel. We will do our best to provide the air cover for these units.

3. Your report about the flights of the Soviet aircraft over the Manchurian territory has not been confirmed. But we have issued an order not to permit such overflights.

373/sh

FILIPPOV [STALIN]

5.7.50 [5 July 1950] Typed by Stepanova at 0:55 a.m. on 07/ 06/50

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 331, list 79]

Document 8: Draft Telegram, Chan Fu (Stalin) to Matveyev (Zakharov), 30 September 1950

VKP(b) CC

# P78/118

09/30/50

To: Cmrds. Malenkov, Bulganin, Vasilevsky

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC

VKP(b) Decision dated 30 September 1950

118. Telegram from Comrade Matveyev # 1298.

The attached draft of the reply to Comrade Matveyev regarding his telegram #1298 has been approved.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

Attachment to the Decision of the Politburo #78 on #118

PYONGYANG

TO MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV] RE: # 1298

We consider correct the decisions adopted by Kim Il Sung at his meeting with You, in particular, regarding the combining of the duties of the Supreme Commander-inChief and Defense Minister in the hands of Kim Il Sung, the establishment of the Staff at the office of the Supreme Commander-inChief, the formation of six divisions and withdrawal of manpower reserves from South Korea.

The formation of six divisions must be accelerated. Necessary armaments, ammunition, and other materials will be supplied from October 5 to October 20.

As far as the question about the expediency of recommending that Kim Il Sung ask the Chinese friends to dispatch drivers to Korea, You may give such advice but without citing Moscow.

Upon the directive of Instantsia CHAN FU [STALIN] [Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 100-101]

Document 9: Memorandum Gromyko to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft cable from Gromyko to Shtykov

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Comrade STALIN I.V.

The Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Comrade Shtykov has reported that as a result of air bombardments by the U.S. Air Force many enterprises of the DPRK have been ruined and are not in operation. At the present time, Koreans do not intend to rebuild these factories and plants.

In this situation Comrade Shtykov considers it expedient to send some of the Soviet specialists back to the Soviet Union and asks to be given the right to dispatch the Soviet experts back to the USSR regardless of the length of their stay in Korea upon consultations with the government of the DPRK.

Comr. Shtykov also requests that he be permitted, at his judgement and upon consultations with heads of the Soviet organizations in Korea, to evacuate some of their personnel working in Korea without whom they can still continue to do their work.

The Ministry of] F[oreign] A[ffairs of the] USSR considers it possible to recall some of the Soviet specialists from the DPRK only if the initiative for their return to the Soviet Union were to come from the government of the DPRK.

As far as Comr. Shtykov's suggestion about the evacuation of the personnel of the Soviet organizations from the DPRK, the MFA [of the] USSR proposes that we maintain the existing procedures according to which the recall of personnel is to be done via the MFA of the USSR upon consultations with appropriate ministries and organizations of the USSR.

A draft [cable to Shtykov - AM] is attached.

I request Your consideration.

A. GROMYKO

30 September 1950 # 182-sh 1 copy

Attachment

TOP PRIORITY

To PYONGYANG,
To SOVIET AMBASSADOR

In connection with the present situation the evacuation of the Soviet specialists from Korea may take place only when the initia

tive for the return of any such specialists comes from the government of the DPRK. You should not display any initiative of your own in raising the issue of the evacuation of Soviet specialist before the Koreans do.

The return of the personnel of the Soviet organizations working in the DPRK to the Soviet Union should be done in the previously-established order, that is, via the MFA of the USSR upon consultations with appropriate ministries and organizations of the USSR.

Army Groups' Commands failed to imple-
ment Kim Il Sung's order for the withdrawal
of troops northward, which allowed the U.S.
troops to cut them off and surround them.
Our Korean friends have no troops capable
of resistance in the vicinity of Seoul. Hence,
one needs to consider the way toward the
38th parallel wide open.

I think that if in the current situation you
consider it possible to send troops to assist
the Koreans, then you should move at least
five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at
once so as to give our Korean comrades an
opportunity to organize combat reserves
north of the 38th parallel under the cover of
your troops. The Chinese divisions could be
considered as volunteers, with Chinese in
A. Gromyko command at the head, of course.

You should inform the MFA of the USSR about each case of pending return of the Soviet specialists from Korea well in advance.

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I am far away from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from events in Korea. However, judging by the information that I have received from Moscow today, I see that the situation of our Korean friends is getting desperate.

It was on 16 September already that Moscow warned our Korean friends that the landing of the U.S. troops at Chemulp'o [Inchon] had great significance and was aimed at cutting off the First and Second Army Groups of the North Koreans from their rear in the North. Moscow admonished them to withdraw at least four divisions from the South immediately, to set up a frontline to the north and east of Seoul, and later to gradually pull out most of the troops fighting in the South northward, thereby providing for the defense of the 38th parallel. However, the 1 [First] and 2 [Second]

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We constantly point out to You the exceptional importance of the withdrawal of troops out of the encirclement. In this matter, the crucial point is to bring the manpower and commanding officers back to the north.

In the current situation, without delay you must give instructions to the soldiers and officers who are still fighting in the south to retreat by any means, in groups or person by person, to the north. There is no continuous frontline. These troops are fighting on their own territory, so the population feels compassion toward them and will help

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Document 12: Ciphered telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin], 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION
OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
SOVIET SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov,
Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 12:15
3.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

TO FILIPPOV [STALIN]

I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG to your [telegram] No. 4581:

"I received your telegram of 1.10.50 [1 October 1950]. We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to re

treat.

In the second place, it is most likely that

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