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ПОДЛЕЖ!! ПОЗВРАТУ ЧЕРЕЗ 8 СУТОК, В ОТДЕЛ ВТОРОТО ГЛАВНЕ УПРАВ.

НИЯ ГЕНШТАБА СОВЕТСКОЙ АРМИИ

this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large [kraine bol’shim].

Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send out troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for

peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.

Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war.

We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is

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MAO TO STALIN, 2 ОСТОВER 1950: THE RUSSIAN VERSION

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Докладываю ответ НЛО ЦЭВ-ДУБА на дал 45613

"Вана телеграмка от 1.10.50г. полученв. ун пері воначально планировали двинуть несколько доброволь ческих дивизий в Северную Корею для оказания походк корейским товаришем, когда прогизник выступит совер нее 38 параххехн.

Однако, твательно продумав считаем теперь, что такого рода действия могут вызвать крайне серьезине последствия.

— Во-первых, нескольнные дивкаиями очень трудно
репить корейский вопрос (оспаление наших войс

ма слабое, не: уверенности з успехе военной опе
с американскими войсками); гротивник может злот
нас отступить.
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Во-вторых, наиболее вероятно, что это вызовет
крытое столкновение США и Китая, вследствие чего со-
ветский Сока также может быть втянут., войду
ким образом вопрос стах бы крайне больяни.`

...

Многие товария в ЦК К считают, что здесь пе—
обходимо проявить осторожность.

Конечно, не послать НАЛИ ВОЙСКА для оказания
моди — очень шохо для корейских товарищей; нах
КАКОЯ В ПЕСТОЯЩее время в талон затруднительном под
жения, к мы слых весьма это переживаем;
выдвинем несколько дивизий, а противник
отступить к тому же это вызовет открыт

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YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU SHAOQI with me, which were reported at the time. In these conversations, it was noted by them that the people and the PLA [People's Liberation Army] are ready to help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to defeat the American troops, regarding them as weaker than the Japanese.

2. The Chinese government undoubtedly could send to Korea not only five-six battle ready divisions, but even more. It goes without saying that these Chinese troops are in need of some technical equipping in antitank weapons and to some extent in artillery.

The reasons for the changes in the position of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It is possible to suppose that it has been influenced by the international situation, the worsening of the position in Korea, [and] the intrigues of the Anglo-American bloc through [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward patience and abstention [from intervention] in order to avoid catastrophe.

No. 2270 3.10

ROSHCHIN

Dec[iphered by] Araushkin 12.50 3.10 [12.50 p.m. 3 October]

Typ[ed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10 [1.20 p.m. 3 October]

Typ[ed in] 10 copies [copies no.] 9-10 -(to file)

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov.]

Document 13: Letter, Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 8 [7] October 1950

PYONGYANG, To SHTYKOV for KIM IL SUNG

Comrade Kim Il Sung!

My reply has been delayed because of my consultations with the Chinese comrades, which took several days. On 1 Octo

ber, I sent a letter to Mao Zedong, inquiring whether he could dispatch to Korea immediately at least five or six divisions under the cover of which our Korean comrades could form reserve troops. Mao Zedong replied with a refusal, saying that he did not want to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese army was weak in technical terms, and that the war could cause great dissatisfaction [nedovol'stvo] in China. I replied to him by the following letter:

"I considered it possible to turn to You with the question of five-six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard or a bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan against China.

While raising before You the question of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered 5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, and I was proceeding from the following considerations of an international character:

1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war [k bol'shoi voine];

2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable of rendering military assistance to the Ameri

cans;

3) the USA will be compelled to yield in the Korean question to China behind which stands its ally, the USSR, and will have to agree to such terms of the settlement of the Korean question that would be favorable to Korea and that would not give the enemies a possibility to transform Korea into their springboard;

4) for the same reasons, the USA will not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to reject the idea of a separate peace with the Japanese reactionaries, as well as to abandon their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their springboard in the Far East.

In this regard, I proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if it were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy, and that without seri

ous struggle and an imposing display of force not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan which at present the United States clings to as its springboard not for Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], who has no chance to succeed, but for themselves or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

Of course, I took into account also [the possibility] that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of [considerations of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.

Such were the considerations and prospects of an international nature that I proceeded from when I was requesting a minimum of five-six divisions from You."

In response to this [letter], on October 7, I received letter from Mao on 7 September [sic-October], in which he expresses solidarity with the fundamental positions discussed in my letter and declares that he will dispatch to Korea nine, not six, divisions. But [he said] that he will send them not now, but after some time. He also requested that I receive his representatives and discuss some details of the mission with them. Of course, I agreed to receive his representatives and to discuss with them a detailed plan of military assistance to Korea.

It is obvious from the above mentioned that you must stand firm and fight for every tiny piece of your land, that You have to strengthen resistance to the American occupiers of Korea and prepare reserves, using for this purpose the military cadres of the Korean People's Army coming out from the encirclement. Also, this shows that You are absolutely right in your proposal that we transfer all Korean comrades studying in the USSR into the pilot training program.

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nizations and their families, follow the instructions laid out in our telegram # 18909. Second. You must decide the question of the evacuation of families of Soviet citizens of Korean nationality from the territory of Korea on the spot, bearing in mind changes in the situation on the ground.

Third. All the Soviet personnel of the air commandants' offices and families of Soviet military advisers must be evacuated from the territory of Korea.

Fourth. We agree with your proposal that, in case of emergency, all the Soviet citizens, including Soviet citizens of Korean nationality, be evacuated to the territory of the USSR and China.

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the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its conversion into its military-strategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East. In my opinion, the struggle of our people for its independence, freedom and state sovereignty will be protracted and very hard.

For a successful struggle against a strong enemy armed with the latest achievements of military science and technology we will have to train pilots, tankists, radio operators, and engineering officers urgently.

It is very difficult to train them inside our country. Therefore, we turn to You, comrade STALIN, with the following request:

1. To permit the training of 200-300 pilots from among Korean students studying in the Soviet Union.

2. To permit the training of 1,000 tankists, 2,000 pilots, 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering officers from among Soviet Koreans residing in the Soviet Union.

I ask You, comrade STALIN, to render us assistance in this regard.

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According to electronic intelligence data gathered by the Seventh Fleet, as of 8:00 a.m., 13 October, the following U.S. battleships were noticed in the vicinity of Ch'óngjin: USS "Missouri," three heavy aircraft carriers ("Valley Forge," "Leyte," "The Philippine Sea"), two escort aircraft carriers ("Sicily," "Beduin Strait"), three heavy cruisers ("Rochester," "Toledo," "Helena"), three cruisers ("Wooster," "Juno," "Ceylon"), twelve destroyers, the third

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Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/14/50 at 7:10 a.m.

Deciphered by Morozov on 10/14/50 at 7:45 a.m.

Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2, Molotov-1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin 1.

FYN SI [STALIN]

In accordance with your directive dated 13.10.50I had a meeting with KIM IL SUNG.

PAK HÓN-YÓNG was present at the meeting. I read the text of your telegram to them. The content of the telegram caught KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YÓNG by surprise.

KIM IL SUNG stated that it was very hard for them [to accept Stalin's recommendation - AM], but since there is such advice they will fulfill it.

KIM IL SUNG asked me to read practical recommendations and ordered PAK HÓN-YÓNG to write them down. He also asked us to help him develop a plan for measures related to this question.

No. 1476/sh

14 October 1950

SHTYKOV

Typed by Bantsekina on 10/14/50 at 13:30

Document 19: Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin), 14 October 1950, re Meeting with Mao Zedong

Ciphered Telegram # 25629

FROM: BEIJING

Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 01:38

a.m.

Deciphered by Yelezov on 10/14/50 at 02:00 a.m.

Typed by Rubleva on 10/14/50 at 03:20

a.m.

Cabled by VTCH to the South for Stalin
Distribution list - 9 copies: Stalin - 2,
Molotov -1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1,
Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin -
1, 8MDGS-1.
PRIORITYT

To FILIPPOV [STALIN]

In addition to my No. 2406 (incoming No. 25612), Mao Zedong went on to say:

Our leading comrades believe that if the U.S. troops advance up to the border of China, then Korea will become a dark spot for us [the Chinese - AM] and the Northeast will be faced with constant menace.

Past hesitations by our comrades occurred because questions about the international situation, questions about the Soviet assistance to us, and questions about air cover were not clear to them. At present, all these questions have been clarified.

Mao Zedong pointed out that now it is advantageous for them to dispatch the Chinese troops into Korea. The Chinese have the absolute obligation to send troops to Korea.

At this point, they are sending the first echelon composed of nine divisions. Although it is poorly armed, it will be able to fight against the troops of Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chinese comrades will have to prepare the second echelon.

The main thing that we need, says Mao Zedong, is air power which shall provide us with air cover. We hope to see its arrival as soon as possible, but not later than in two

months.

Furthermore, Comrade Mao Zedong noted that at present the government of the People's Republic of China cannot pay in cash for the armaments delivered. They hope to receive arms on credit.

Thus, the 1951 budget will not be affected, and it will be easier for them to explain it to the democrats.

In conclusion, Mao Zedong stated that the leading comrades in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party believe that the Chinese must come to the assistance of the Korean comrades in their difficult struggle. To discuss this matter, Zhou Enlai will have to meet comrade Filippov again.

tions.

13 Oct 1950 [typed:] Sent on 13.X.50

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 74-75]

Document 21: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 14 October 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 4829

To PYONGYANG-SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Transmit to KIM IL SUNG the follow

Zhou Enlai is being sent new instruc- ing message:

No. 2408

13.10 [13 October]

ROSHCHIN

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, listy 1-2]

Document 20: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 13 October 1950

Ciphered Telegram # 75525/4/6759

(incoming #3735/shs)
(Stalin's hand-written note)

PYONGYANG

To SHTYKOV for Comrade Kim Il Sung

I have just received a telegram from Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] discussed the situation [in Korea - AM] again and decided after all to render military assistance to the Korean comrades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao Zedong. In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I ask You to postpone temporarily the implementation of the telegram sent to You yesterday about the evacuation of North Korea and the retreat of the Korean troops to the north.

FYN SI[STALIN]

"After vacillations [kolebaniy] and a series of temporary [provisional] decisions the Chinese comrades at last made a final decision to render assistance to Korea with troops.

I am glad [rad] that the final and favorable decision for Korea has been made at last.

In this connection, you should consider the recommendations of the meeting of the Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which You were told of earlier, annulled. You will have to resolve concrete questions regarding the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with the Chinese comrades.

The armaments required for the Chinese troops will be delivered from the USSR. I wish You success."

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1. Although on the front page of the telegram it says that it was sent from Pyongyang at 8:10 a.m. on September 26, I believe that the date was indicated incorrectly because of a typo. It should be dated as of September 27 because at the end of the telegram it says that it was dispatched from Pyongyang at 12:35 p.m. on 27 September 1950 (local time) which is 6:35 a.m. of the same date Moscow time.

2. 8th MDGS stands for the Eighth Main Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

CWIHP ACTIVITIES AT V WORLD CONGRESS OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, POLAND, AUGUST 1995

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) organized several activities in connection with the V World Congress of Central and East European Studies, held at Warsaw University on 6-11 August 1995.

CWIHP, in cooperation with the National Security Archive (a non-governmental repository for declassified documents and research institute located at George Washington University), co-organized three panels at the Warsaw meeting. Two were chaired by CWIHP Director Jim Hershberg: "New Evidence on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981," with presentations by Mark Kramer (Russian Research Center, Harvard University), Michael Kubina (Free University, Berlin), and Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive); and "Cold War Flashpoints," with Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive), Johanna Granville (Carnegie-Mellon University), Byrne, and Kramer. Malcolm Byrne chaired a session on "New Opportunities for Research and the Issue of Openness in Cold War Studies," with presentations by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College), Sven Holtsmark (Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies), Hershberg, and Zubok.

During the conference, CWIHP, the National Security Archive, and the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, conducted a day-long workshop on current scholarship and research on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis. CWIHP presented a collection of newlyreleased Soviet documents on the crisis, included Politburo minutes, selected, translated, annotated, and introduced by Mark Kramer, while the Archive assembled declassified U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Plans were discussed to hold an oral history conference on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis, gathering key Polish, Russian, and Americans involved in the events, in the spring of 1997 in Poland. Meetings were also held with German and Hungarian colleagues regarding, respectively, meetings for scholars to present new East-bloc evidence on the 1953 East German uprising and the 1956 Hungarian crisis which are planned in connection with the National Security Archive's "Cold War Flashpoints" project and will be co-sponsored by CWIHP.

In conjunction with the Warsaw gathering, Hershberg and Byrne gave presentations regarding CWIHP's and the Archive's activities at the International Librarians' Conference on Libraries in Europe's Post-Communist Countries, held near Krakow, Poland, at Jagellonian University's Polonia Institute (Przegorzaly) on 3-5 August 1995.

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