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this will provoke an open conflict between peaceful construction will be completely ru- our preliminary telegram, we wish to conthe USA and China, as a consequence of ined, and many people in the country will be

ined, and many people in the country will be sult with you. If you agree, then we are ready which the Soviet Union can also be dragged dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the immediately to send by plane Comrades into war, and the question would thus be- people by the war have not yet healed, we ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacacome extremely large [kraine bol’shim]. need peace).

tion place, to talk over this matter with you Many comrades in the CC CPC (Cen- Therefore it is better to show patience and to report the situation in China and tral Committee of the Communist Party of now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] Korea.

,

[ China] judge that it is necessary to show actively prepare our forces, which will be We await your reply. caution here.

more advantageous at the time of war with Of course, not to send out troops to

MAO ZEDONG

2.10.50" render assistance is very bad for the Korean Korea, while temporarily suffering decomrades, who are presently in such diffi- feat, will change the form of the struggle to 1. In our view MAO ZEDONG's anculty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but partisan war.

swer is indicative of a change in the original if we advance several divisions and the We will convene a meeting of the CC, at position of the Chinese leadership on the enemy forces us to retreat; and this more- which will be present the main comrades of Korean question. It contradicts the earlier over provokes an open conflict between the various bureaus of the CC. A final decision appraisal, which was repeatedly expressed USA and China, then our entire plan for has not been taken on this question. This is in conversations of MAO ZEDONG with

the enemy.

MAO TO STALIN, 2 OCTOBER 1950: THE RUSSIAN VERSION

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YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU ber, I sent a letter to Mao Zedong, inquiring ous struggle and an imposing display of SHAOQI with me, which were reported at whether he could dispatch to Korea immedi- force not only would China fail to obtain all the time. In these conversations, it was ately at least five or six divisions under the these concessions but it would not be able to noted by them that the people and the PLA cover of which our Korean comrades could get back even Taiwan which at present the [People's Liberation Army] are ready to form reserve troops. Mao Zedong replied United States clings to as its springboard not help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of with a refusal, saying that he did not want to for Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek), who has the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese no chance to succeed, but for themselves or defeat the American troops, regarding them army was weak in technical terms, and that for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow. as weaker than the Japanese.

the war could cause great dissatisfaction Of course, I took into account also [the 2. The Chinese government undoubt- (nedovol'stvo] in China. I replied to him by possibility] that the USA, despite its edly could send to Korea not only five-six the following letter:

unreadiness for a big war, could still be battle ready divisions, but even more. It

drawn into a big war out of [considerations goes without saying that these Chinese troops “I considered it possible to turn to You of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China are in need of some technical equipping in with the question of five-six Chinese volun- into the war, and along with this draw into antitank weapons and to some extent in teer divisions because I was well aware of a the war the USSR, which is bound with artillery.

number of statements made by the leading China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should The reasons for the changes in the posi- Chinese comrades regarding their readiness we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, tion of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It to move several armies in support of the because together we will be stronger than the is possible to suppose that it has been influ- Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross USA and England, while the other European enced by the international situation, the wors- the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness capitalist states (with the exception of Gerening of the position in Korea, [and] the of the Chinese comrades to send troops to many which is unable to provide any assisintrigues of the Anglo-American bloc Korea by the fact that China was interested tance to the United States now) do not present through (Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] in preventing the danger of the transforma[

serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward tion of Korea into a USA springboard or a then let it be waged now, and not in a few patience and abstention [from intervention] bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan years when Japanese militarism will be rein order to avoid catastrophe. against China.

stored as an ally of the USA and when the ROSHCHIN

While raising before You the question USA and Japan will have a ready-made

of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered bridgehead on the continent in a form of the No. 2270 3.10

5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.
and I was proceeding from the following Such were the considerations and pros-

considerations of an international character: pects of an international nature that I proDec[iphered by] Araushkin 12.50 3.10

1) the USA, as the Korean events ceeded from when I was requesting a mini[12.50 p.m. 3 October]

showed, is not ready at present for a big war mum of five-six divisions from You.” Typ[ed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10 [k bol’shoi voine];

In response to this [letter], on October 7, [1.20 p.m. 3 October] 3

2) Japan, whose militaristic potential I received letter from Mao on 7 September Typ[ed in] 10 copies [copies no.] 9-10 -(to has not yet been restored, is not capable of [sic-October), in which he expresses solifile)

rendering military assistance to the Ameri- darity with the fundamental positions discans;

cussed in my letter and declares that he will (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, 3) the USA will be compelled to yield in dispatch to Korea nine, not six, divisions. listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn the Korean question to China behind which But she said) that he will send them not now, Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov.] stands its ally, the USSR, and will have to but after some time. He also requested that

agree to such terms of the settlement of the I receive his representatives and discuss

Korean question that would be favorable to some details of the mission with them. Of Document 13: Letter, Fyn Si [Stalin) to Korea and that would not give the enemies a course, I agreed to receive his representaKim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 8 [7] Octo- possibility to transform Korea into their tives and to discuss with them a detailed plan ber 1950 springboard;

of military assistance to Korea. 4) for the same reasons, the USA will It is obvious from the above mentioned

not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to that You must stand firm and fight for every PYONGYANG, TO SHTYKOV

reject the idea of a separate peace with the tiny piece of your land, that you have to for KIM IL SUNG

Japanese reactionaries, as well as to aban- strengthen resistance to the American occudon their plans of revitalizing Japanese im- piers of Korea and prepare reserves, using

perialism and of converting Japan into their for this purpose the military cadres of the Comrade Kim Il Sung! springboard in the Far East.

Korean People's Army coming out from the

In this regard, I proceeded from the encirclement. Also, this shows that you are My reply has been delayed because of assumption that China could not extract these absolutely right in your proposal that we my consultations with the Chinese com- concessions if it were to adopt a passive transfer all Korean comrades studying in the rades, which took several days. On 1 Octo- wait-and-see policy, and that without seri- USSR into the pilot training program.

a

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nizations and their families, follow the instructions laid out in our telegram # 18909.

Second. You must decide the question of the evacuation of families of Soviet citizens of Korean nationality from the territory of Korea on the spot, bearing in mind changes in the situation on the ground.

Third. All the Soviet personnel of the air commandants' offices and families of Soviet military advisers must be evacuated from the territory of Korea.

Fourth. We agree with your proposal that, in case of emergency, all the Soviet citizens, including Soviet citizens of Korean nationality, be evacuated to the territory of the USSR and China.

[APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy
121-122]

[Handwritten: This letter was delivered to
Comrade Bulganin on October 7, 1950 at
22:15 pm.]
[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347,
listy 65-67]

Document 15: Gromyko and
Vasilevsky to Stalin, 6 October 1950,
attaching draft cable to Shtykov

Document 14: Telegram from
Gromyko to Shtykov Approved by
Soviet Communist Party Central
Committee Politburo, 5 October 1950

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VKP(b) CC
# P78/168
05/10/50
To: Cmrds Bulganin, Gromyko

Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC

VKP(b)

Decision dated October 5, 1950

168. The Question of Shtykov.

a.m.

Ministry of Defense of the USSR

(A. Vasilevsky)

(A. Gromyko) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

(Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827,

listy 126-127]
Distribution list:
Stalin - 1, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1,
Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Document 16: Ciphered Telegram,
Bulganin - 1, Khrushchev - 1.

Kim Il Sung to Stalin (via Shtykov), 9

October 1950
Comrade STALIN I.V.:

Ciphered Telegram # 600382/sh
In connection with Comrade Shtykov's
telegram #1405/sh dated 5 October in which

To Comrade STALIN I.V. he pressed the question of the evacuation FROM: PYONGYANG from Korea of Soviet specialists working in Korea, personnel of Soviet organizations in Sent by wire on 10/09/50 at 7:05 a.m. Korea, families of Soviet citizens of Korean Received in Moscow on 10/09/50 at 9:38 nationality, staff of the Soviet air comman- a.m. dants' offices, and, in case of emergency, all

Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/09/50 at 9:45 Soviet citizens, we consider it necessary to reply in accordance with the attached draft. Deciphered by Morozov on 10/09/50 at

10:45 a.m.
We request your consideration thereof. Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2,

Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1,
A. VASILEVSKY A. GROMYKO Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin -

[signature]

1.
6 October 1950
No. 201-gi

I herewith transmit a letter of the fol

lowing content addressed to Your name from [Attachment]

comrade KIM IL SUNG: PRIORITY CABLE

"Comrade STALIN Iosif To PYONGYANG

Vissarionovich,
SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

Let ask You, dear Iosif
RE: 1405/sh

Vissarionovich, for assistance and advice.

Now it is evident to everybody that First. Regarding the question of the having made significant achievements in evacuation of Soviet specialists and their recent military operations, the American families, as well as personnel of Soviet orga- aggressor will not stop at anything short of

The attached draft of a telegram addressed to the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Com. Shtykov, regarding the question of the evacuation of Soviet specialists and personnel of Soviet organizations from Korea to the USSR, has been approved.

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SECRETARY OF THE CC

4ak

[Attachment to the Decision of the

Politburo #78 regarding #168]

me

PYONGYANG

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

1304/sh. We agree with your proposals concerning the temporary evacuation of

a.m.

the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its squadron of mine-sweepers, the first and the p.m. conversion into its military-strategic spring

third assault landing groups. board for further aggression in the Far East. Ch'óngjin was heavily bombarded from (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, In my opinion, the struggle of our people the air and the sea.

list 3] for its independence, freedom and state sovereignty will be protracted and very hard.

[signature] GOLOVKO For a successful struggle against a strong

[signature] FOKIN Document 19: Ciphered Telegram, enemy armed with the latest achievements No. 244cc

Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin), 14 of military science and technology we will 13 October 1950

October 1950, re Meeting with Mao have to train pilots, tankists, radio operators,

Zedong and engineering officers urgently.

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, It is very difficult to train them inside list 139]

Ciphered Telegram # 25629 our country. Therefore, we turn to You, comrade STALIN, with the following re

FROM: BEIJING quest:

Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 01:38 1. To permit the training of 200-300 Document 18: Ciphered Telegram, a.m. pilots from among Korean students studying Shtykov to Fyn Si (Stalin), 14 October Deciphered by Yelezov on 10/14/50 at in the Soviet Union. 1950

02:00 a.m. 2. To permit the training of 1,000

Typed by Rubleva on 10/14/50 at 03:20 tankists, 2,000 pilots, 500 radio operators, Ciphered Telegram #600428/sh and 500 engineering officers from among FROM: PYONGYANG

Cabled by VTCH to the South for Stalin Soviet Koreans residing in the Soviet Union.

Distribution list - 9 copies: Stalin - 2, I ask You, comrade STALIN, to render Sent by wire on 10/14/50 at 03:15 a.m. Molotov -1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, us assistance in this regard.

Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 6:36 Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin a.m.

1, 8MDGS - 1. Respectfully, KIM IL SUNG”

Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/14/50 at 7:10 PRIORITY T

a.m.
I support KIM IL SUNG’S request.
Deciphered by Morozov on 10/14/50 at

To FILIPPOV [STALIN]
7:45 a.m.
SHTYKOV Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2,

In addition to my No. 2406 (incoming
Molotov-1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1,

No. 25612), Mao Zedong went on to say: No. 1447/sh

Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - Our leading comrades believe that if the 1.

U.S. troops advance up to the border of 9 October 1950

China, then Korea will become a dark spot FYN SI [STALIN]

for us [the Chinese - AM) and the Northeast Typed by Kravchuk on 10/09/50 at 11:20

will be faced with constant menace. a.m.

In accordance with your directive dated Past hesitations by our comrades oc

13.10.50 I had a meeting with KIM IL SUNG. curred because questions about the interna(Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347,

PAK HÓN-YONG was present at the tional situation, questions about the Soviet listy 72-73]

meeting. I read the text of your telegram to assistance to us, and questions about air

them. The content of the telegram caught cover were not clear to them. At present, all Document 17: Memorandum, Golovko KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YONG by these questions have been clarified. and Fokin to Stalin, 13 October 1950 surprise.

Mao Zedong pointed out that now it is KIM IL SUNG stated that it was very advantageous for them to dispatch the ChiComrade STALIN

hard for them [to accept Stalin's recommen- nese troops into Korea. The Chinese have

dation - AM), but since there is such advice the absolute obligation to send troops to According to electronic intelligence data they will fulfill it.

Korea. gathered by the Seventh Fleet, as of 8:00 KIM IL SUNG asked me to read prac- At this point, they are sending the first a.m., 13 October, the following U.S. battle- tical recommendations and ordered PAK echelon composed of nine divisions. Alships were noticed in the vicinity of HÓN-YÓNG to write them down. He also though it is poorly armed, it will be able to Ch’óngjin: USS “Missouri,” three heavy asked us to help him develop a plan for fight against the troops of Syngman Rhee. In aircraft carriers (“Valley Forge,” “Leyte,' measures related to this question.

the meantime, the Chinese comrades will “The Philippine Sea”), two escort aircraft

have to prepare the second echelon. carriers (“Sicily,” “Beduin Strait"), three

SHTYKOV The main thing that we need, says Mao heavy cruisers (“Rochester," "Toledo,” “Hel- No. 1476/sh

Zedong, is air power which shall provide us ena”), three cruisers (“Wooster,” “Juno,” 14 October 1950

with air cover. We hope to see its arrival as “Ceylon”), twelve destroyers, the third Typed by Bantsekina on 10/14/50 at 13:30 soon as possible, but not later than in two

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months.

Furthermore, Comrade Mao Zedong noted that at present the government of the People's Republic of China cannot pay in cash for the armaments delivered. They hope to receive arms on credit.

Thus, the 1951 budget will not be affected, and it will be easier for them to explain it to the democrats.

In conclusion, Mao Zedong stated that the leading comrades in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party believe that the Chinese must come to the assistance of the Korean comrades in their difficult struggle. To discuss this matter, Zhou Enlai will have to meet comrade Filippov again.

Zhou Enlai is being sent new instructions.

Document 21: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 14 October 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 4829

To PYONGYANG-SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Transmit to KIM IL SUNG the following message:

ROSHCHIN

No. 2408 13.10 [13 October]

(Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, listy 1-2]

Document 20: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 13 October 1950

“After vacillations [kolebaniy) and a series of temporary (provisional] decisions the Chinese comrades at last made a final decision to render assistance to Korea with troops.

I am glad (rad] that the final and favorable decision for Korea has been made at last.

In this connection, you should consider the recommendations of the meeting of the Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which You were told of earlier, annulled. You will have to resolve concrete questions regarding the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with the Chinese comrades.

The armaments required for the Chinese troops will be delivered from the USSR.

I wish You success.”

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) organized several activities in connection with the V World Congress of Central and East European Studies, held at Warsaw University on 6-11 August 1995.

CWIHP, in cooperation with the National Security Archive (a non-governmental repository for declassified documents and research institute located at George Washington University), co-organized three panels at the Warsaw meeting. Two were chaired by CWIHP Director Jim Hershberg: “New Evidence on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981,” with presentations by Mark Kramer (Russian Research Center, Harvard University), Michael Kubina (Free University, Berlin), and Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive); and “Cold War Flashpoints,” with Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive), Johanna Granville (Carnegie-Mellon University), Byrne, and Kramer. Malcolm Byrne chaired a session on “New Opportunities for Research and the Issue of Openness in Cold War Studies,” with presentations by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College), Sven Holtsmark (Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies), Hershberg, and Zubok.

During the conference, CWIHP, the National Security Archive, and the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, conducted a day-long workshop on current scholarship and research on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis. CWIHP presented a collection of newlyreleased Soviet documents on the crisis, included Politburo minutes, selected, translated, annotated, and introduced by Mark Kramer, while the Archive assembled declassified U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Plans were discussed to hold an oral history conference on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis, gathering key Polish, Russian, and Americans involved in the events, in the spring of 1997 in Poland. Meetings were also held with German and Hungarian colleagues regarding, respectively, meetings for scholars to present new East-bloc evidence on the 1953 East German uprising and the 1956 Hungarian crisis which are planned in connection with the National Security Archive's “Cold War Flashpoints” project and will be co-sponsored by CWIHP.

In conjunction with the Warsaw gathering, Hershberg and Byrne gave presentations regarding CWIHP's and the Archive's activities at the International Librarians' Conference on Libraries in Europe's Post-Communist Countries, held near Krakow, Poland, at Jagellonian University's Polonia Institute (Przegorzaly) on 3-5 August 1995.

Ciphered Telegram # 75525/4/6759

(incoming #3735/shs)
(Stalin's hand-written note)

PYONGYANG

To SHTYKOV for Comrade Kim Il Sung

FYNSI [STALIN]

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I have just received a telegram from 14.10.50 Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CC Typed by Doronchenkova #8865 CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Made 2 copies: Stalin - 1, 8MDGS - 1. Party of China] discussed the situation sin Korea - AM) again and decided after all to (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, render military assistance to the Korean com- list 77] rades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao

1. Although on the front page of the telegram it says that Zedong. In connection with this new deci- it was sent from Pyongyang at 8:10 a.m. on September sion of the Chinese comrades, I ask You to

26, I believe that the date was indicated incorrectly

because of a typo. It should be dated as of September 27 postpone temporarily the implementation of

because at the end of the telegram it says that it was the telegram sent to You yesterday about the dispatched from Pyongyang at 12:35 p.m. on 27 Sepevacuation of North Korea and the retreat of tember 1950 (local time) which is 6:35 a.m. of the same

date Moscow time. the Korean troops to the north.

2.8th MDGS stands for the Eighth Main Department of

the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. FYN SI [STALIN]

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