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Mao Zedong, 3 volumes).11 Published in December 1993, the 100th anniversary of Mao's birth, it offers a quite detailed day-today account of Mao's activities up to 1949. It releases many previously unknown important documents, going beyond the coverage of other Mao collections. For example, it publishes for the first time Mao Zedong's telegram to the CCP's Nanjing Municipal Committee dated 10 May 1949, in which Mao established the principles for Huang Hua to meet with John Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador to China who remained after the Communist takeover of Nanjing, 12

13

7. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai).1 This is a collection of minutes of internal talks, instructions, statements, and speeches related to Zhou Enlai's diplomatic activities. This collection includes some interesting documents, such as the Chinese minutes of Zhou Enlai's talk with K.M. Pannikar, Indian Ambassador to China, early in the morning of 3 October 1950. During this meeting Zhou Enlai issued the warning that if the American forces crossed the 38th parallel in Korea, China would "intervene" in the conflict. 14

8. Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai). 15 This chronicle, like Mao Zedong nianpu, covers the period up to 1949. It offers a day-to-day account of Zhou Enlai's activities, from his early years to the time of the nationwide victory of the Chinese revolution. The Collection includes complete texts of several important documents relating to Zhou Enlai.

9. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3 volumes). 16 As China's most important leader after Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping played a central role in China's "reform and opening to the outside world" period. This collection offers researchers, as well as the general public, a window through which to study Deng Xiaoping's thoughts. The most important volume of this collection is the third volume, which covers the period from 1982 to 1992, when Deng was indisputably China's paramount leader (although he never assumed that title). Among the documents published in the volume is the talk Deng gave after the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, in which Deng explained his reasoning for opening fire on the demonstrators on Beijing's streets.

10. Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Peng Dehuai).17 As the PRC's defense minister in the 1950s and the commander of the Chinese Volunteers in Korea, Peng Dehuai played an important role in developing China's military and security strategies. This volume publishes some of Peng's most important military papers, including his correspondences with Mao during the early stages of the Korean War.

In addition to the above listed collections, other "selected works" that have been published since the 1980s include ones by Chen Yun, Hu Qiaomu, Liu Shaoqi, Nie Rongzhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, and Zhu De.18

III

Compared with the "selected works" published earlier, the above list of "selected works" published in the 1980s and 1990s have several distinctive features. First, contrary to the earlier practice of making extensive excisions from, or even revisions in, the original documents for the sake of publicaoriginal documents for the sake of publication, the compilation and editing of most of the volumes published in the past decade are more faithful to the original text of the documents. For example, Zhonggong zhongyang wenjianxuanji and Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao clearly indicate at the end of most documents that they are printed according to the original texts of the documents. In some cases, photocopies of original documents are provided. This practice significantly increases the reliability and historical value of these publications.

Second, in the pre-1980 period, the editing and publication of "selected works" were generally controlled and conducted by party cadres who always put the party's interests over everything else and who had had, at best, only inadequate knowledge of China's modern history. In the past decade, increasing numbers of professional historians, many of whom have B.A., M.A., or even Ph.D. degrees in modern history, the history of the Chinese revolution, and modern Chinese politics, have joined the editorial teams responsible for compiling and editing the "selected works." Although these scholars still must follow the general directions of the Party in conducting their work, their professional training makes them less willing than their predecessors to alter the documents. As a result, the documents selected are of better "quality" and the annota

tions are more useful to researchers. Indeed, the footnotes of several important collections, such as Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, and Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, contain much important documentary information.

Third, some of the collections, especially those for "internal circulation only," have broken many "forbidden zones” in the writing of the CCP history. For example, scholars who are interested in the CCP's management of the Xian Incident will find that the information offered by the documents in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, Mao Zedong nianpu, Zhou Enlai nianpu, and Mao Zedong wenji differ from the Party's propaganda in the past, indicating that the CCP leadership's attitude toward Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) had been strongly influenced, or even defined, by the Comintern. Also, the documents offered by Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao reveal that, different from the description of the official Party history, one of the considerations behind Mao Zedong's decision to shell the Nationalist-controlled Jinmen Islands in August 1958 was to assist the people in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, in their struggles against the U.S. imperialists.19

However, one should not exaggerate the utility and significance of the historical documents released in "selected works." The documents that have been included in the "selected works" of the 1980s and 1990s are only a small portion of the entire body of original documents, and the criteria used in their selection remain highly dubious. In reality, through other sources, we know for certain that many documents, which in the eyes of the editors have the potential of harming the image of the CCP and its leaders being "generally correct," have been intentionally excluded from the selections.

An example of this practice is a telegram Mao Zedong sent to Peng Dehuai on 28 January 1951. Let me first give some background introduction. After Chinese troops entered the Korean War in October 1950, they waged three offensive campaigns from late October 1950 to early January 1951, driving the American/UN troops from areas close to the Chinese-Korean border to areas south of the 38th parallel. However, the Chinese forces exhausted their offensive potential because of heavy casualties, lack of air support, and the overextension of

supply lines. Therefore, when the American troops started a counteroffensive on 25 January 1951, Peng Dehuai, the Chinese commander, proposed a temporary retreat in a telegram to Mao on January 27. Mao, however, overestimated China's strength. In a telegram to Peng the next day, he ordered Peng to use a Chinese/North Korean offensive to counter the American offensive. He even argued that the Chinese troops possessed the capacity to advance to the 36th parallel.20 Mao's instructions contributed to the military defeat of the Chinese troops on the Korean battlefield in spring 1951. This telegram is certainly important because it revealed Mao's strategic thinking at a crucial point of the Korean War, and reflected the goals he hoped to achieve in Korea-driving the Americans out of the Korean peninsula, thus promoting China's reputation and influence in East Asia while at the same time enhancing the Chinese revolution at home. However, this telegram also makes it clear that sometimes Mao's judgment of the situation could be very poor. Although a few Chinese authors with access to classified documents have cited the telegram in its entirety, this important telegram is excluded from Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao and Mao Zedong junshi wenji.21 This, of course, is only one of many, many such cases.

The end of the Cold War makes it possible for scholars to gain access to documents from the former Soviet Union. Many of the Russian documents that have recently become available display discrepancies compared to what has been revealed by Chinese documents. In some cases these discrepancies expose the limit to which truth is revealed in the documents published in "selected works" in China. Here is another example. All the Chinese documents about the Korean War published in the first volume of Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao indicate that the Beijing leadership made the decision to enter Korean War in early October 1950. In a telegram dated October 2, Mao formally informed Stalin that the CCP leadership had made the decision to send troops to Korea. 22 However, Russian documents on the Korean War (which Russian President Yeltsin gave to South Korean President Kim Young-sam in June 1994) tell a different story. According to these documents, Mao Zedong informed Stalin on 3 October 1950 that China would not

send troops to Korea, and it would take great efforts from Stalin to persuade the Chinese that it was in China's basic interest to prevent the war from reaching China's northeast border. (See the article by Alexandre Mansourov in this issue of the Bulletin.) Why does this discrepancy exist? What really happened between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950?

To answer these questions (and many other similar questions) scholars need full access to Beijing's archives. archives. "Selected works" are useful, but only in a highly limited sense. This is particularly true because even in the age of "reform and opening to the outside world," the writing of Party history in China remains a business primarily designed to enhance the legitimacy of the Party's reign in China. This means that materials released through "selected works" are often driven by intentions other than having the truth known, and, as a result, can be misleading.

Therefore, while it is wrong for China scholars to refuse to recognize the historical value of materials contained in "selected works," it is dangerous and unwise for them to rely completely or uncritically on "selected work" sources. While using them, scholars must double check "selected works" materials against other sources, including information obtained from interviews. In the long run, scholars must be given full and equal access to Chinese archives to tell the story of the Chinese Communist revolution and China's relationship with the outside world.

1. An earlier draft of this article was presented to an international symposium on "Local Chinese Archives and the Historiography of Modern China" at the University of Maryland, College Park, 5-7 October 1995. 2. Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee, internal edition, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 19831987, 14 vols.; open edition, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1989-1993, 18 vols.).

3. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987-1994, 8 vols.).

4. For English translations of these previously released documents, see Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).

5. For English translations of these documents, see Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1995), Part II.

6. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Mao Zedong, Beijing: Soldier's Press, 1981).

7. Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993, 6 vols.)

8. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong, Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994).

9. Ibid., 322-333.

10. Mao Zedong wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Papers, Beijing: People's Press, 1993, 2 vols.). 11. Mao Zedong nianpu (A Chronicle of Mao Zedong, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents and People's Press, 1993, 3 vols.).

12. Ibid., 3:499-500.

13. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1990).

14. See ibid., 25-27.

15. Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1989).

16. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng

Xiaoping, Beijing: People's Press, 1993, 3 vols).

17. Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Peng Dehuai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1989).

18. Chen Yun wenxuan (Selected Works of Chen Yun, Beijing: People's Press, 1984, 2 vols.); Hu Qiaomu wenji (A Collection of Hu Qiaomu's Works, Beijing: People's Press, 1993-94, 3 vols.); Liu Shaoqi xuanji (Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, Beijing: People's Press, 1982, 2 vols.); Nie Rongzhen junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Nie Rongzhen, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1992); Wang Jiaxiang xuanji (Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang, Beijing: People's Press, 1984); Zhang Wentian xuanji (A Collection of Zhang Wentian, Beijing: People's Press, 1993-94, 3 vols); Zhu De xuanji (Selected Works of Zhu De, Beijing: People's Press, 1984).

19. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7: 391-392. 20. For a more detailed description of the contents of Mao's telegram, see Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950-1951," The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1:1 (Spring 1992), 31-33.

21. My interviews with researchers at Beijing's Academy of Military Science, who were responsible for editing Mao Zedong junshi wenji, in summer 1991 confirmed that this telegram would not be included because of its "improper" content.

22. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 2 October 1950, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1:549-552.

[merged small][graphic][subsumed][subsumed]

THE SECOND HISTORICAL

ARCHIVES OF CHINA:

A Treasure House for Republican China Research

by Gao Hua

translated by Scott Kennedy

After arriving at Nanjing's 309 Zhongshan East Road, passing the police stationed at their post and going through a routine check-in, researchers face a classical Chinese edifice-the famous Second Historical Archives of China (SHAC).1

Established in February 1951, SHAC has one of the largest historical collections in China. The former tenant at the archive's address was the "Committee for Compiling GMT [Guomindang] Party Historical Records." After the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over management of the Committee as well as the archives from the original "National History House." Soon after, large quantities of documents concerning the GMT regime housed in Guangzhou (Canton), Chongqing (Chungking), Chengdu, Kunming, Shanghai and Beijing, as well as the archival records stored in Beijing on the Northern Warlords Government, were all moved to Nanjing, and together make up the foundation of SHAC's collection.

At the heart of SHAC's collection are the original records of the central organs of the various regimes in existence during the Republican era (1912-1949), namely: 1) the Nanjing Provisional Government (JanuaryApril 1912); 2) the Northern Warlords Government (April 1912 - June 1928); 3) the various GMT regimes, first centered in Guangzhou and Wuhan, and then as a national government in Nanjing (1927-1949); and 4) the various puppet regimes of the Japanese (e.g., Wang Jingwei's Nanjing regime). The archives provide a detailed account of policy and actual conditions-at the central and local levels-on foreign policy, military matters, commerce and finance, culture and education, and even social customs. However, the materials of greatest number and value collected at SHAC are those archives concerning the GMT rule in Nanjing from 1927-1949.

From 1951 to 1979, SHAC's doors remained closed to the public. During those years, the only significant work done was

the compiling of a collection of archival documents, Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhishi ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Materials on Chinese Modern Political History]. The project, launched in 1956 with a directive from the CCP Central Committee Political Research Office, consumed SHAC's entire energies for three years. Only 100 sets of the 244 volume, 21 million character collection were printed. They were then distributed to central party and political organs as well as some universities to be used as a research reference. At present, this important collection is the largest and richest set of materials concerning China's domestic situation during the Republican era.

Since 1979, SHAC has made public a large number of documents one after another and published three major archival document sets: Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Republican China History Archival Records], Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an ziliao conkan [A Series of Republican China History Archives], and Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an ziliao congshu [A Collection of Republican China History Archives]. Finally, in 1985, SHAC launched the quarterly, Minguo dang'an [Republican Archives].

SHAC has been a resource on issues where historical questions influence current policy questions. Since 1986, Minguo dang'an has published a large number of documents concerning relations between Tibet and central government authorities. SHAC has also cooperated with Beijing's "China Tibetan Studies Research Center" to publish three volumes of historical materials on Tibet. The journal has also published materials concerning China's claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. SHAC provided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with materials concerning China's Republican-era relationship with Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. They recently allowed Taiwanese scholars to view documents concerning the 2-28 Incident (a massacre of Taiwanese by the GMT on 28 February 1947). Finally, geologists and policymakers involved in the planning of the controversial proposed Three Gorges dam have relied on SHAC for materials on relevant Republican-era research.

SHAC has formally been open to scholars for the past 14 years. Apart from the dossiers of various individuals, some judi

cial archives, and those which "involve national interest," scholars are free to utilize all of SHAC's files. Procedures for foreign scholars have also been dramatically simplified. However, due to the effects of economic reform, SHAC has also increased its fees for those scholars who have yet to use its services. SHAC is also planning to install an air-conditioned reading room as another service to foreigners, but, of course, you'll have to pay.

A Chinese-language reference book which is helpful to users of the Second Archives is Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan jianming zhinan [A Brief Guide to the Second Historical Archives of China], (Archives Publishing House, 1987), a well-organized introduction to each of the categories under which all of SHAC's documents are stored. Also useful are Dangdai zhongguode dang'an shiye [China Today: Archival Undertakings] dertakings] (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House, 1988); and Minguoshi yu minguo dang'an lunwenji [Republican History and Collected Essays on Republican Archives] (Archives Publishing House, 1991).

1. Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan.

Gao Hua, a specialist on Republican era history and modern intellectual history, teaches in the history department at Nanjing University and the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for American and Chinese Studies. He is currently a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and is working on a study of the origins of the Yanan Rectification Campaign and its influence on the development of Maoism. Scott Kennedy is a research assistant in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings

Institution and a doctoral candidate in the

political science department of George Washington University.

RUSSIAN HISTORIANS TO PUBLISH STUDY Two Russian historians who have conducted extensive research in Russian and U.S. sources have completed a study of Soviet leaders and the early Cold War: Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders From Stalin to Khrushchev, is scheduled for publication by Harvard University Press in March 1996.

THE EMERGING DISPUTES BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW: TEN NEWLY AVAILABLE CHINESE DOCUMENTS, 1956-1958

Translators' Notes: In February 1950, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the Sino-Soviet alliance, made between two "brotherly" Communist countries, would last forever. However, serious problems soon emerged between the Chinese and Soviet parties and governments. Starting in 1960, the two parties became engaged in an increasingly heated polemical debate over the nature of true communism and which party represented it. By the late 1960s, the relationship between the two countries had deteriorated to such an extent that a major border war erupted between them in March 1969. Why did China and the Soviet Union change from allies to enemies? What problems caused the decline and final collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance? In order to answer these questions, scholars need access to contemporary documentary sources, and these translations of the newly available Chinese documents provide a basis for beginning to answer these questions.

The documents are divided into three groups. The first group includes two speeches by Mao Zedong and one report by Zhou Enlai in 1956-1957. They reflect the Chinese Communist view on such important questions as Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin, the general principles underlying the relations among "brotherly parties and states," " and their perception of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Chinese revolution. Particularly interesting is Mao Zedong's repeated reference to the "unequal" relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet Union during Stalin's era. Through these documents one is able to sense some of the deep-rooted causes leading to the decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The second group includes three documents reflecting the CCP leadership's response to the Soviet proposals in 1958 to establish a long-wave radio station in China and a joint Sino-Soviet submarine flotilla in 1958. In his long

Translated and Annotated by
Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian

conversation with the Soviet Ambassador
P.F. Yudin on 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong
related the joint Sino-Soviet flotilla issue to
a series of more general questions concern-
ing the overall relationship between the two
countries, revealing comprehensively (often
in cynical tones) his understanding of the
historical, philosophical, and political ori-
gins of the problems existing between Beijing
and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again
emphasized the issue of "equality," empha-
empha-
sizing that Beijing could not accept Moscow's
treatment of the CCP as a junior partner.
The third group includes four Chinese docu-
ments from Russian Foreign Ministry ar-
chives, which demonstrate the extent to which
China had been dependent upon the military
and other material support of the Soviet
Union in the 1950s. These documents make
it possible to observe the Sino-Soviet rela-
tions from another perspective.

Part I. Criticism of Stalin and the Emergence of Sino-Soviet Differences

1. Minutes, Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, [undated] September 19561 Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1993), 251-262

We welcome you to China. We are very pleased at your visit. We have been suppleased at your visit. We have been supported by you, as well as by other brotherly [Communist] parties. We are invariably [Communist] parties. We are invariably supporting you as much as all the other brotherly parties. In today's world, the Marxist and Communist front remains united, whether in places where success [of Communist revolution] is achieved or not yet achieved. However, there were times when achieved. However, there were times when we were not so united; there were times when we let you down. We listened to the opinions of the Information Bureau2 in the past. Although we did not take part in the Bureau's though we did not take part in the Bureau's

[business], we found it difficult not to sup[business], we found it difficult not to sup

port it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you port it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you

as butchers and Hitler-style fascists, and we kept silent on the resolution [condemning you], although we published articles to criticize you in 1948. In retrospect, we should not have done that; we should have discussed [this issue] with you: if some of your viewpoints were incorrect, [we should have let] you conduct self-criticism, and there was no need to hurry [into the controversy] as [we] did. The same thing is true to us: should you disagree with us, you should do the same thing, that is, the adoption of a method of persuasion and consultation. There have not been that many successful cases in which one criticizes foreign parties in newspapers. [Your] case offers a profound historical lesson for the international communist movement. Although you have suffered from it, the international communist movement has learned a lesson from this mistake. [The international communist movement] must fully understand [the seriousness of] this mistake.

When you offered to recognize new China, we did not respond, nor did we decline it. Undoubtedly, we should not have rejected it, because there was no reason for us to do so. When Britain recognized us, we did not say no to it. How could we find any excuse to reject the recognition of a socialist country?

There was, however, another factor which prevented us from responding to you: the Soviet friends did not want us to form diplomatic relations with you. If so, was China an independent state? Of course, yes. If an independent state, why, then, did we follow their instructions? [My] comrades, when the Soviet Union requested us to follow their suit at that time, it was difficult for us to oppose it. It was because at that time some people claimed that there were two Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the other in China, even if no one passed a resolution that Mao Zedong was Tito. I have once pointed out to the Soviet comrades that [they] suspected that I was a half-hearted Tito, but they refuse to recognize it. When did they remove the tag of half-hearted Tito

from my head? The tag was removed after [China] decided to resist America [in Korea] and came to [North] Korea's aid and when [we] dealt the US imperialists a blow.

The Wang Ming line3 was in fact Stalin's line. It ended up destroying ninety percent of our strength in our bases, and one hundred percent of [our strength] in the white areas.4 Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi5 pointed this out in his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress.6 Why, then, did he not openly attribute [the losses] to the [impact of] Stalin's line? There is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself could criticize Stalin; but it would be inappropriate for us to criticize him. We should maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union. Maybe [we] could make our criticism public sometime in the future. It has to be that way in today's world, because facts are facts. The Comintern made numerous mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages were not so bad, but its middle stage was not so good: it was all right when Lenin was alive and when [Georgii] Dimitrov was in charge. The first Wang Ming line dominated [our party] for four years, and the Chinese revolution suffered the biggest losses. Wang Ming is now in Moscow taking a sick leave, but still we are going to elect him to be a member of the party's Central Committee. He indeed is an instructor for our party; he is a professor, an invaluable one who could not be purchased by money. He has taught the whole party, so that it would not follow his line.

That was the first time when we got the worst of Stalin.

The second time was during the antiJapanese war. Speaking Russian and good at flattering Stalin, Wang Ming could directly communicate with Stalin. Sent back to China by Stalin, he tried to set [us] toward right deviation this time, instead of following the leftist line he had previously advocated. Advocating [CCP] collaboration with the Guomindang [the Nationalist Party or GMD], he can be described as "decking himself out and self-inviting [to the GMD];" he wanted [us] to obey the GMD wholeheartedly. The Six-Principle Program he put forward was to overturn our Party's TenPrinciple Policy. [His program] opposed establishing anti-Japanese bases, advocated giving up our Party's own armed force, and preached that as long as Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] was in power, there would be peace [in China]. We redressed this devia

tion. [Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us correct this mistake: while Wang Ming "decked himself out and fawned on [Jiang]," Jiang Jieshi “slapped his face and kicked him out." Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China's best instructor: he had educated the people of the whole nation as well as all of our Party members. Jiang lectured with his machine guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with his own words.

The third time was after Japan's surrender and the end of the Second World War. Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give the whole of China to America and Jiang Jieshi. In terms of material and moral support, especially moral support, Stalin hardly gave any to us, the Communist Party, but supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later told Tito [this decision] who mentioned his conversation [with Stalin on this decision] in his autobiography.

Only after the dissolution of the Comintern did we start to enjoy more freedom. We had already begun to criticize opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and unfolded the rectification movement. The rectification, in fact, was aimed at denouncrectification, in fact, was aimed at denouncing the mistakes that Stalin and the Comintern had committed in directing the Chinese revolution; however, we did not openly mention lution; however, we did not openly mention a word about Stalin and the Comintern. Sometime in the near future, [we] may openly do so. There are two explanations of why we did not openly criticize [Stalin and the Comintern]: first, as we followed their instructions, we have to take some responsibility ourselves. Nobody compelled us to bility ourselves. Nobody compelled us to follow their instructions! Nobody forced us to be wrongfully deviated to right and left directions! There are two kinds of Chinese: one kind is a dogmatist who completely accepts Stalin's line; the other opposes dogmatism, thus refusing to obey [Stalin's] instructions. Second, we do not want to displease [the Soviets], to disrupt our relations with the Soviet Union. The Comintern has never made self-criticism on these mistakes; nor has the Soviet Union ever mentioned these mistakes. We would have fallen out with them had we raised our criticism.

The fourth time was when [Moscow] regarded me as a half-hearted Tito or semiTitoist. Not only in the Soviet Union but also in other socialist countries and some non-socialist countries were there some

people who had suspected whether China's was a real revolution.

You might wonder why [we] still pay a tribute to Stalin in China by hanging his portrait on the wall. Comrades from Moscow have informed us that they no longer hang Stalin's portraits and only display Lenin's and current leaders' portraits in public parade. They, however, did not ask us to follow their suit. We find it very difficult to cope. The four mistakes committed by Stalin are yet to be made known to the Chinese people as well as to our whole party. Our situation is quite different from yours: your [suffering inflicted by Stalin] is known to the people and to the whole world. Within our party, the mistakes of the two Wang Ming lines are well known; but our people do not know that these mistakes originated in Stalin. Only our Central Committee was aware that Stalin blocked our revolution and regarded me as a half-hearted Tito.

We had no objection that the Soviet Union functions as a center [of the world revolution] because it benefits the socialist movement. You may disagree [with us] on this point. You wholeheartedly support Khrushchev's campaign to criticize Stalin, but we cannot do the same because our people would dislike it. In the previous parades [in China], we held up portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as those of a few Chinese [leaders]—Mao, Liu [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], and Zhu [De]9 — and other brotherly parties' leaders. Now we adopt a measure of "overthrowing all": no one's portrait is handed out. For this year's "First of May" celebration, Ambassador Bobkoveshi10 already saw in Beijing that no one's portrait was held in parade. However, the portraits of five dead persons-Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin and Sun [Yat-sen]—and a not yet dead person— Mao Zedong-are still hanging [on the wall]. Let them hang on the wall! You Yugoslavians may comment that the Soviet Union no longer hangs Stalin's portrait, but the Chinese still do.

As of this date some people remain suspicious of whether our socialism can be successfully constructed and stick to the assertion that our Communist Party is a phony one. What can we do? These people eat and sleep every day and then propagate that the Chinese Communist Party is not really a communist party, and that China's socialist construction is bound to fail. To

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