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them, it would be a bewildering thing if remains the most fearsome [for the imperial- ten to twenty years and even more dangerous socialism could be built in China! Look out, ists] whereas China is merely the second. in forty to fifty years. [they warn]. China might become an impe- What they are afraid of is our politics and that My comrades, let me advise you that rialist country—to follow America, Britain, we may have an enormous impact in Asia. you should also watch out for this potential. and France to become the fourth imperialist That is why they keep spreading the words Your industry is much modernized and has country! At present China has little indus- that China will be out of control and will experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin try, thus is in no position [to be an imperial- invade others, so on and so forth.
made you suffer and hence, justice is on your ist country]; but [China] will become formi- We have been very cautious and mod- side. All of this, though, may become your dable in one hundred years! Chinggis Khan11 est, trying to overcome arrogance but adher- [mental] burden. might be brought to life; consequently Eu- ing to the “Five Principles.”:14 We know we The above-mentioned four mistakes rope would suffer again, and Yugoslavia have been bullied in the past; we understand Stalin committed [concerning China] may might be conquered! The “Yellow Peril” how it feels to be bullied. You would have also become our burden. When China bemust be prevented!
had the same feeling, wouldn't you? comes industrialized in later years, it will be There is absolutely no ground for this to China's future hinges upon socialism. It more likely that we get cocky. Upon your happen! The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist will take fifty or even one hundred years to return to your country, please tell your youngParty. The Chinese people are peace-loving turn China into a wealthy and powerful coun- sters that, should China stick her tail up in people. We believe that aggression is a try. Now no [formidable] blocking force the future, even if the tail becomes ten thoucrime, therefore, we will never seize an inch stands in China's way. China is a huge sand meters high, still they must criticize of territory or a piece of grass
from others. country with a population of one fourth of China. [You] must keep an eye on China, We love peace and we are Marxists.
that of the world. Nevertheless, her contribu- and the entire world must keep an eye on We oppose great power politics in in- tion to the world is yet to be compatible with China. At that time, I definitely will not be ternational relations. Although our industry her population size, and this situation will here: I will already be attending a conference is small, all things considered, we can be have to change, although my generation and together with Marx. regarded as a big power. Hence some people even my son's generation may not see the We are sorry that we hurt you before, [in China] begin to be cocky. We then warn change taking place. How it will change in thus owing you a good deal. Killing must be them: “Lower your heads and act with your the future depends on how (China) develops. compensated by life and debts must be paid
[ tails tucked between your legs.” When I China may make mistakes or become cor- in cash. We have criticized you before, but was little, my mother often taught me to rupt; the current good situation may take a why do we still keep quiet? Before behave “with tails tucked between legs.” bad turn and, then, the bad situation bad turn and, then, the bad situation may take [Khrushchev’s] criticism of Stalin, we were
, This is a correct teaching and now I often a good turn. There can be little doubt, though, not in a position to be as explicit about some mention it to my comrades.
that even if (China's) situation takes a bad issues as we are now. In my previous conDomestically, we oppose Pan- turn, it may not become as decadent a society versations with [Ambassador] Bobkoveshi, Hanism, 12 because this tendency is harmful as that of Jiang Jieshi's. This anticipation is I could only say that as long as the Soviet to the unity of all ethnic groups. based on dialectics. Affirmation, negation, Union did not criticize Stalin, we would be Hegemonism and Pan-Hanism both are sec- and, then, negation of negation. The path in in no position to do so; as long as the Soviet tarianism. Those who have hegemonious the future is bound to be tortuous.
Union did not restore [diplomatic] relations tendencies only care about their own inter- Corruption, bureaucracy, hegemonism, with Yugoslavia, we could not establish ests but ignore others’, whereas those Pan- and arrogance all may take effect in China. relations with you.15 Now these issues can Hanists only care about the Han people and However, the Chinese people are inclined to be openly discussed. I have already talked to regard the Han people as superior to others, be modest and willing to learn from others. the Soviet comrades about the four mistakes thus damaging [the interests of] all the mi- One explanation is that we have little “capi- that Stalin had committed [to China]; I talked norities.
tal” at our disposal: first, we did not invent to [Soviet Ambassador Pavel] Yudin 16 about Some people have asserted in the past Marxism which we learned from others; sec- it, and I shall talk to Khrushchev about it that China has no intention to be friends ond, we did not experience the October Revo- next time when we meet. I talk to you about with other countries, but wants to split with lution and our revolution did not achieve it because you are our comrades. However, the Soviet Union, thus becoming a trouble- victory until 1949, some thirty-two years we still cannot publish this in the newspamaker. Now, however, this kind of people after the October Revolution; third, we were pers, because the imperialists should not be shrinks to only a handful in the socialist only a branch army, not a main force, during allowed to know about it. We may openly countries; their number has been reduced the Second World War; fourth, with little talk about one or two mistakes of Stalin's in since the War to Resist America and Assist modern industry, we merely have agriculture the future. Our situation is quite different Korea.13 It is, however, a totally different and some shabby, tattered handicrafts. Al- from yours: Tito's autobiography mentions thing for the imperialists: the stronger China though there are some people among us who Stalin because you have already broken up becomes, the more scared they will be. appear to be cocky, they are in no position to with the Soviet Union. They also understand that China is not that be cocky; at most, [they can merely show] Stalin advocated dialectical materialterrifying as long as China has no advanced their tails one or two meters high. But we ism, but sometimes he lacked materialism industry, and as long as China continues to must prevent this from happening in the and, instead, practiced metaphysics; he wrote rely on human power. The Soviet Union future: it may become dangerous (for us] in about historical materialism, but very often suffered from historical idealism. Some of sugar plant while discussing Stalin's mis- have such a ruler [in your history] who might his behavior, such as going to extremes, takes concerning us, we feel it inappropriate take it well even when people cursed him fostering personal myth, and embarrassing to make them public. There are other issues right in his face. The capitalist society has others, are by no means [forms] of material- involving conflicts and controversies. taken a step ahead of the feudalist society. ism.
Generally speaking, the Soviet Union is The Republican and Democratic Parties in Before I met with Stalin, I did not have good. It is good because of four factors: the United States are allowed to quarrel with much good feeling about him. I disliked Marxism-Leninism, the October Revolution, each other. reading his works, and I have read only “On the main force [of the socialist camp), and We socialist countries must find [betthe Basis of Leninism,” a long article criti- industrialization. They have their negative ter] solutions. Certainly, we need concencizing Trotsky, and “Be Carried Away by side, and have made some mistakes. How- tration and unification; otherwise, uniforSuccess,” etc. I disliked even more his ever, their achievements constitute the ma- mity cannot be maintained. The uniformity articles on the Chinese revolution. He was jor part [of their past] while their shortcom
jor part [of their past] while their shortcom- of people's minds is in our favor, enabling us very different from Lenin: Lenin shared his ings are of secondary significance. Now that to achieve industrialization in a short period heart with others and treated others as equals the enemy is taking advantage of the criti- and to deal with the imperialists. It, howwhereas Stalin liked to stand above every cism of Stalin to take the offensive on a ever, embodies some shortcomings, that is, one else and order others around. This style world-wide scale, we ought to support the
world-wide scale, we ought to support the people are made afraid of speaking out. can be detected from his works. After I met Soviet Union. They will certainly correct Therefore, we must find some ways to enwith him, I became even more disgusted: I their mistakes. Khrushchev already cor- courage people to speak out. Our Politburo's quarreled a lot with him in Moscow. Stalin rected the mistake concerning Yugoslavia. comrades have recently been considering was excitable by temperament. When he They are already aware of Wang Ming's these issues. became agitated, he would spell out nasty mistakes, although in the past they were Few people in China have ever openly things.
unhappy with our criticism of Wang Ming. criticized me. The Chinese] people are I have written altogether three pieces They have also removed the "half-hearted tolerant of my shortcomings and mistakes. praising Stalin. The first was written in Tito”[label from me), thus, eliminating alto- It is because we always want to serve the Yanan to celebrate his sixtieth birthday [21 gether (the labels on) one and a half Titos.
gether (the labels on] one and a half Titos. people and do good things for the people. December 1939—ed.], the second was the We are pleased to see that Tito's tag was Although we sometimes also suffer from congratulatory speech [I delivered) in Mos- removed.
bossism and bureaucracy, the people believe cow [in December 1949—ed.], and the third Some of our people are still unhappy that we have done more good things than bad was an article requested by Pravda after his with the criticism of Stalin. However, such ones and, as a result, they praise us more than death [March 1953—ed.]. I always dislike criticism has positive effects because it de- criticize us. Consequently, an idol is crecongratulating others as well as being con- stroys mythologies, and opens [black] boxes. ated: when some people criticize me, others gratulated by others. When I was in Moscow This entails liberation, indeed, a “war of would oppose them and accuse them of to celebrate his birthday, what else could I liberation.” With it, people are becoming so disrespecting the leader. Everyday I and have done if I had chosen not to congratulate courageous that they will speak their minds, other comrades of the central leadership him? Could I have cursed him instead? as well as be able to think about issues. receive some three hundred letters, some of After his death the Soviet Union needed our Liberty, equality, and fraternity are slo- which are critical of us. These letters, howsupport and we also wanted to support the gans of the bourgeoisie, but now we have to ever, are either not signed or signed with a Soviet Union. Consequently, I wrote that fight for them. Is [our relationship with false name. The authors are not afraid that piece to praise his virtues and achievements. Moscow] a father-and-son relationship or we would suppress them, but they are afraid That piece was not for Stalin; it was for the one between brothers? It was between father that others around them would make them Soviet Communist Party. As for the piece I and son in the past; now it more or less suffer. did in Yanan, I had to ignore my personal resembles a brotherly relationship, but the You mentioned “On Ten Relationfeelings and treat him as the leader of a shadow of the father-and-son relationship is ships.”17 This resulted from one-and-a-halfsocialist country. Therefore, that piece was not completely removed. This is under- months of discussions between me and thirtyrather vigorous whereas the other two came standable, because changes can never be four ministers [of the government]. What out of (political] need, not my heart, nor at completed in one day. With certain open- opinions could I myself have put forward my will. Human life is just as contradictory ness, people are now able to think freely and without them? All I did was to put together as this: your emotion tells you not to write independently. Now there is, in a sense, the their suggestions, and I did not create anythese pieces, but your rationality compels atmosphere of anti-feudalism: a father-and- thing. Any creation requires materials and you to do so.
son relationship is giving way to a brotherly factories. However, I am no longer a good Now that Moscow has criticized Stalin, relationship, and a patriarchal system is be- factory. All my equipment is out-of-date, I we are free to talk about these issues. Today ing toppled. During [Stalin's] time people's
ing toppled. During [Stalin's] time people's need to be improved and re-equipped as I tell you about the four mistakes committed minds were so tightly controlled that even much as do the factories in Britain. I am by Stalin, but, in order to maintain relations the feudalist control had been surpassed. getting old and can no longer play the major with the Soviet Union, [we) cannot publish While some enlightened feudal lords or role but had to assume a minor part. As you them in our newspapers. Since Khrushchev's emperors would accept criticism, [Stalin] can see, I merely played a minor role during report only mentioned the conflict over the would tolerate none. Yugoslavia might also this Party's National Congress whereas Liu ary 195719
Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping18 and fuses to establish diplomatic relation with us. At present there exist some controversies others assumed the primary functions. The longer you drag on [these issues), the between China and the Soviet Union. Their
more debts you will owe us. The longer the ways of thinking, behavior, and historical 2. Speech, Mao Zedong, “On Sino-Ameri- issues linger there, the more unreasonable traditions differ from ours. Therefore, we can and Sino-Soviet Relations,” 27 Janu- you will appear, and the more isolated you must try to persuade them. Persuasion is
will become both domestically and in face of what I have always advocated as a way to Source: Mao Zedong Waijaio Wenxuan, international public opinion. I once told an deal with our own comrades. Some may 280-283
American in Yanan that even if you United argue that since we are comrades, we must
States refused to recognize us for one hun- be of the same good quality, and why in the [Let me] talk about U.S.-China rela- dred years, I simply did not believe that you world is persuasion needed among comtions. At this conference we have circulated United States could refuse to recognize us in rades? Moreover, persuasion is often ema copy of the letter from [Dwight D.) the one hundred and first year. Sooner or ployed for building a common front and Eisenhower to Jiang Jieshi. This letter, in later the U.S. will establish diplomatic rela- always targeted at the democratic figures22 my view, aims largely at dampening the tions with us. When the United States does and, why is it employed toward communist enthusiasm of Jiang Jieshi and, then, cheer- so and when Americans finally come to visit party members? This reasoning is wrong. ing him up a bit. The letter urges (Jiang] to China, they will feel deep regret. It is be- Different opinions and views do exist even keep calm, not to be impetuous, that is, to cause by then, China will become completely within a communist party. Some have joined resolve the problems through the United different [from what it is now]: the house has the party, but have not changed their mindset. Nations, but not through a war. This is to been thoroughly swept and cleaned, “the Some old cadres do not share the same pour cold water [on Jiang]. It is easy for four pests”21 have altogether been elimi- language with us. Therefore, [we) have to Jiang Jieshi to get excited. To cheer [Jiang] nated; and they can hardly find any of their engage in heart-to-heart talks with them: up is to continue the hard, uncompromising “friends.” Even if they spread some germs sometimes individually, sometimes in policy toward the [Chinese] Communist [in China), it will have no use at all. groups. In one meeting after another we will Party, and to hope that internal unrest would Since the end of the Second World War, be able to persuade them. disable us. In his [Eisenhower's] calcula- every capitalist country has suffered from As far as I can see, circumstances are tion, internal unrest has already occurred instability which has led to disturbance and beyond what persons, even those occupying and it is hard for the Communist Party to disorder. Every country in the world is high positions, can control. Under the pressuppress it. Well, different people observe disturbed, and China is no exception. How- sure of circumstance, those in the Soviet things differently!
ever, we are much less disturbed than they Union who still want to practice big-power I still believe that it is much better to are. I want you to think about this issue: chauvinism will invariably encounter diffiestablish diplomatic relations with the United between the socialist countries and the impe- culties. To persuade them remains our curStates several years later than sooner. This rialist countries, especially the United States, rent policy and requires us to engage in is in our favor. The Soviet Union did not which side is more afraid of the other after direct dialogue with them. The last time our form diplomatic relations with the United all? In my opinion, both are afraid [of the delegation visited the Soviet Union, [we] States until seventeen years after the Octo- other], but the issue is who is afraid more. I openly talked about some [controversial] ber Revolution. The global economic crisis am inclined to accept such an assessment: the issues.23 I told Comrade Zhou Enlai over the erupted in 1929 and lasted until 1933. In imperialists are more afraid of us. However, phone that, as those people are blinded by that
year Hitler came to power in Germany such an assessment entails a danger, that is, lust for gain, the best way to deal with them whereas Roosevelt took office in the United it could put us into a three-day-long sleep. is to give them a tongue-lashing. What is States. Only then was the Soviet-American Therefore, [we] always have to stress two
(their) asset? It involves nothing more than diplomatic relationship established. [As far possibilities. Putting the positive possibility 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of as I can anticipate), it will probably wait aside, the negative potential is that the impe- coal, and 80 million tons of oil. How much
, until when we have completed the Third rialists may become crazy. Imperialists al- does this count? It does not count for a thing. Five-Year Plan 20 that we should consider ways harbor malicious intentions and con- With this asset, however, their heads have forming diplomatic relations with the United stantly want to make trouble. Nevertheless, gotten really big. How can they be commuStates. In other words, it will take eighteen it will not be that easy for the imperialists to nists [by being so cocky]? How can they be or even more years [before we do so]. We start a world war; they have to consider the Marxists? Let me stress, even ten times or a are not anxious to enter the United Nations consequences once war starts.
hundred times bigger, these things do not either. This is based on exactly the same [Let me) also talk about Sino-Soviet count for a thing. They have achieved nothreasoning as why we are not anxious to relations. In my view, wrangling [between ing but digging a few things out of the earth, establish diplomatic relations with the United us] will continue. [We shall] never pretend turning them into steel, thereby manufacturStates. The objective of this policy is to that the Communist parties will not wrangle. ing some airplanes and automobiles. This is deprive the U.S. of its political assets as Is there a place in the world where wrangling nothing to be proud of! They, however, turn much as possible, so that the U.S. will be does not exist? Marxism itself is a wran- these [achievements) into huge burdens on placed in an unreasonable and isolated posi- gling-ism, and is about contradiction and their back and hardly care about revolutiontion. It is therefore all right if [the U.S.] struggle. Contradictions are everywhere, ary principles. If this cannot be described as blocks us from the United Nations and re- and contradictions invariably lead to struggle. being blinded by lust for gain, what else
could this be? Taking the office of the first (1) In my view, the mistakes of the to encourage him. However, in open talks, secretary can also become a source for being Soviet Communist leadership arise from er- they refused to admit this. blinded by lust for gain, making it easy for roneous thinking. They often set the inter- Khrushchev and Bulganin claimed that one to be out of one's mind. Whenever one ests of the Soviet Communist Party ahead of as members of the third generation [of Sois out of his mind, there must be a way to their brotherly parties; they often set their viet] leadership, they could not do anything bring him back to his senses. This time own interests as the leaders ahead of those of to persuade Stalin or prevent his mistakes. Comrade [Zhou] Enlai no longer maintained the party. As a result, they often fail to During (my visit] this time, however, I a modest attitude but quarreled with them overcome subjectivity, narrow-mindedness, stressed the ideological and social roots of and, of course, they argued back. This is a and emotion when they think about and Stalin's mistakes, pointing out that the other correct attitude, because it is always better to resolve problems; they often fail to link leaders had to assume some responsibility make every (controversial] issue clear face together the interests of the above-stated for the gradual development of Stalin's misto face. As much as they intend to influence sides in an objective, far-sighted, and calm takes. I also expressed our Chinese Party's us, we want to influence them too. However, fashion. Although they may correct one conviction that open self-criticism will do we did not unveil everything this time, be- mistake, they are not free of making others. no harm to, but will enhance, the Party's cause we must save some magic weapons (in Sometimes they admit that they made mis- credibility and prestige. Before getting out reserve]. Conflict will always exist. All we takes; but it does not mean that they fully of the car at the [Moscow] airport, hope for at present is to avoid major clashes come to grips with their mistakes for they Khrushchev explained to me that they could so as to seek common ground while reserv- merely take a perfunctory attitude toward not conduct the same kind of self-criticism ing differences. Let these differences be these mistakes.
as we do; should they do so, their current dealt with in the future. Should they stick to For instance, the dispatch of their troops leadership would be in trouble. the current path, one day, we will have to to Warsaw was clearly interference with the About the Poland question.26 It is crysexpose everything.
internal affairs of a brotherly party by armed tal-clear that the Poland incident was a result As for us, our external propaganda must forces, but not an action to suppress counter- of the historical antagonism between the not contain any exaggeration. In the future, revolutionaries. They admitted that they Russian and Polish nations. Since the end of we shall always remain cautious and mod- had committed a serious mistake, and they (the Second World] War, many [outstanding
[ est, and shall tightly tuck our tails between even stated in our meetings this time that no and potential] conflicts have yet to be approour legs. We still need to learn from the one should be allowed to interfere with other priately resolved. The recent [Soviet] disSoviet Union. However, we shall learn from brotherly parties’ internal affairs; but in the
brotherly parties’ internal affairs; but in the patch of troops to Warsaw caused an even them rather selectively: only accept the good meantime, they denied that [their interven- worse impact [in Poland). Under these cirstuff, while at the same avoiding picking up tion in Poland] was a mistake.
cumstances the Polish comrades have good the bad stuff. There is a way to deal with the When we had a general assessment of reason not to accept the policy of “following bad stuff, that is, we shall not learn from it. Stalin, analyzing the ideological and social the Soviet leadership.” The Polish comAs long as we are aware of their mistakes, roots of his (mistakes], they kept avoiding rades, however, admitted that they had yet to [we) can avoid committing the same mis- any real discussion. Although they seem- build a whole-hearted trusting relationship take. We, however, must learn from any ingly have changed [their view] in measur- with the Soviet Comrades. For that purpose, thing that is useful to us and, at the same ing Stalin's achievements and mistakes, to [Wladyslaw] Gomulka27 is trying his best to time, we must grasp useful things all over the me, such an alteration was to meet their retrieve the losses and reorient the Polishworld. One ought to seek knowledge in all temporary needs, not the result of profound Soviet relations by resolutely suppressing
, parts of the world. It would be monotonous contemplation.
any anti-Soviet acts [in Poland). Regardif one only sticks to one place to receive We immediately sensed this shortly af- less, however, the Soviet comrades remain education.
ter our arrival in Moscow. At the dinner unwilling to accept the criticism that [they]
party hosted by Liu Xiao25 on the 17th [of practiced big-power politics [in resolving 3. Report, “My Observations on the So- January], Khrushchev again raised the Stalin the Polish crisis]. This kind of attitude does viet Union,” Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong issue. Spelling out a good deal of inappro- not help at all to convince the Polish comand the Central Leadership, 24 January priate words, however, he made no self- rades. 1957 (Excerpt)24
criticism. We then pushed him by pointing It is safe to say that although every Source: Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de out that, given the development of Stalin's public communiqué [between the Soviet zhuoyue fengxian [Remarkable Achieve- authoritarianism, ossified way of thinking, Union and] other brotherly states has repeatments and Contributions of Zhou Enlai] and arrogant and conceited attitude over edly mentioned what the 30 October (1956) (Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, twenty years, how can those comrades, es- declaration28 has announced as the prin1993), 302-305
pecially those [Soviet] Politburo members, ciples to guide the relationship among broth
who had worked with Stalin, decline to as- erly parties and governments, [the Soviets] Having already spoken considerably sume any responsibility? They then admit- seem to recoil in fear when dealing with about the achievements of the Soviet Com- ted that Stalin's errors came about gradu- specific issues and tend to be inured to munist leadership in public, now let [me] ally; had they not been afraid of getting patronizing others and interfering with other illustrate again the major mistakes it has killed, they could have at least done more to brotherly parties' and governments’ internal made:
restrict the growth of Stalin's mistakes than affairs.
(2) About Sino-Soviet relations. Fac- the union among the Soviet Union, China forus not to persuade them [to make changes); ing a [common) grave enemy, the Soviet and India, as well as [about] possible Sino- it is, however, equally inadvisable for us to comrades have ardent expectations about Soviet collaboration on the production of be impatient in changing them. Therefore, Sino-Soviet unity. However, in my opin- atomic and hydrogen bombs. We regarded changes on their part can only be achieved ion, the Soviet leaders have not been truly these statements as swashbuckling, which is through a well-planned, step-by-step, perconvinced by our argument; nor have the not good, and they were finally deleted from sistent, patient, long-term persuasion. differences between us disappeared com- the communiqué. As a result, we did not use pletely. For instance, many leaders of the the Soviet draft. The published communiqué Part II. Disputes over Long-wave Radio Soviet Communist Party toasted and praised was largely based on our draft.
Stations and the Joint Submarine our article “Another Comment on the His- (4) In spite of all of the above, however,
Flotilla torical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictator- Sino-Soviet relations are far better now than ship.”29 Their three top leaders (Khrushchev, during Stalin's era. First of all, facing the 4. Report, Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong Bulganin, and Mikoyan), however, have [common) grave enemy, both sides have and the CCP Central Committee, 5 June never mentioned a word of it. Moreover, realized and accepted the necessity of pro
1958 (Excerpt)30 when we discussed with them the part of the moting Sino-Soviet unity and mutual sup- Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 634 article concerning criticism of Stalin, they port, which had been taken as the most imsaid that this was what made them dis- portant principle. Second, now the Soviet With regard to Soviet Union's request for pleased (or put them in a difficult position, Union and China can sit down to discuss establishing long-wave radio stations in our I can't remember the exact words). ... issues equally. Even if they have different country, the Soviet side insists on the origiTherefore, I believe that some of the Soviet ideas on certain issues, they must consult nal idea that the construction should be jointly leaders have revealed a utilitarian attitude with us. The articles by the Chinese Party are invested by the two sides. They also propose toward Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, having some impact on the cadres and people to dispatch experts to China in early June to at the last day's meeting, I decided not to in the Soviet Union, and even on some [So- conduct such activities as selecting the proper raise our requests concerning the abolition viet] leaders. Third, the previous dull situa- location, making investigations and preparof the long-term supply and purchase con- tion in which the brotherly parties and states ing for the design work, and drafting an tracts for the Five-Year Plan, the [Soviet] could hardly discuss or argue with one an- agreement. It seems that the Soviet side will experts, and [Soviet] aid and [Sino-Soviet] other no longer exists. Now, different opin- not quickly accept the opinion of our side. In collaboration on nuclear energy and missile ions can be freely exchanged so that unity order not to hinder the investigation and development. About these issues I didn't and progress are thereby promoted. Fourth, design work, [we) may permit the Soviet say a word. It was not because there wasn't the majority of the Soviet people love China experts to come to China to conduct some enough time to do so, but because [I wanted and feel happy for the Chinese people's technical work, leaving the question conto] avoid impressing upon them that we achievements and growth in strength. Their cerning investment and operation to be solved were taking advantage of their precarious admiration and friendship with the Chinese as the next step. position by raising these issues. These people are being enhanced on a daily basis. issues can be raised later or simply dropped. However, while [Russian] arrogance and self- 5. Remarks, Mao Zedong, concerning the
(3) In assessing the international situa- importance have not been completely elimi- Soviet Request on Establishing a Special tion, I am convinced that they spend more nated, an atmosphere lacking discipline and Long-wave Radio Station in China, 7 June time and effort on coping with specific and order is spreading. This time the [Soviet 195831 isolated events than on evaluating and an- leadership) gave us a splendid and grand Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 316ticipating the situations thoroughly from reception which indicated its intention to 317 different angles. They explicitly demon- build a good image in front of its own people strate weakness in considering and discuss- and the peoples all over the world. Fifth, on For the eyes of Liu [Shaoqi), Lin Biao, ing strategic and long-term issues. As far as the one hand, extremely conceited, blinded [Deng] Xiaoping, Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], tactics are concerned, on the other hand, by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and Chen [Yun], Peng Zhen, and Chen Yionly;32 lacking clearly defined principles, they tend knowing little the ways of the world, some of return to Comrade Peng Dehuai for file: to be on such a loose ground in handling their leaders have hardly improved them
I specific affairs that they will fail to reach selves even with the several rebuffs they This can be implemented as [you have] satisfactorily the strategic goals through re- have met in the past year. On the other hand, planned. China must come up with the solving each specific conflict. As a result, it however, they appear to lack confidence and money to pay for [the financial cost] which is very likely that some worrisome events suffer from inner fears and thus tend to cannot be covered by the Soviet side. may occur in international affairs. For in- employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in stance, this time they conceded to our con- handling foreign affairs or relations with Mao Zedong viction that in today's world there existed other brotherly parties. Although they did two camps and three forces (socialist, impe- sometimes speak from the bottom of their 7 June rialist, and nationalist) and agreed to our hearts while talking with us, they neverthe- If they try to put heavy pressure on us, analysis. But the communiqué drafted by less could not get down from their high [we] shall not respond and shall let it dragon them included only vague statements about horse. In short, it is absolutely inadvisable for a while, or [we) may respond after the