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central leadership discusses it. This issue obtain [them] simply by sending a cable [to tion. You [Russians] have often stated that must be settled through an agreement be- Moscow).
the Europeans looked down upon the Rustween the two governments.
Well, your navy's nuclear submarines sians. I believe that some Russians look Peng (Dehuai] ought to pay attention to are of a [top] secret advanced technology. down upon the Chinese people. the section about the conversation where The Chinese people are careless in handling At the most critical juncture [of the Mao has added some comments.
things. If we are provided with them, we Chinese revolution], Stalin did not allow us II might put you to trouble.
to carry out our revolution and opposed our China must shoulder the responsibility The Soviet comrades have won victory carrying out the revolution. He made a huge of capital investment for this radio station; for forty years, and are thus rich in experi- mistake on this issue. So did [Grigory Y.] China is duty-bound in this case. (We] may ence. It has only been eight years since our Zinoviev. have to ask for Soviet comrades' help with victory and we have little experience. You Neither were we pleased with [Anastas] regard to construction and equipment, but therefore raised the question of joint owner- Mikoyan. He flaunted his seniority and all the costs must be priced and paid in cash ship and operation. The issue of ownership treated us as if [we were] his sons. He put on by us. [We] may share its use after it is has long before been dealt with: Lenin
pro- airs and looked very arrogant. He assumed constructed, which ought to be determined posed the system of rent and lease which, the greatest airs when he first visited Xibaipo by an agreement between the two govern- however, was targeted at the capitalists. in 194938 and has been like that every time ments. 33 This is China's position, not purely China has some remnant capitalists, but he came to China. Every time he came, he the position of mine. 34
the state is under the leadership of the Com- would urge me to visit Moscow. I asked him
munist Party. You never trust the Chinese! what for. He would then say that there was 6. Minutes, Conversation between Mao You only trust the Russians! [To you] the always something for you to do there. NevZedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July Russians are the first-class [people] whereas ertheless, only until later when Comrade 195835
the Chinese are among the inferior who are Khrushchev proposed to hold a conference Source: Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 322- dumb and careless. Therefore [you] came to work out a resolution [concerning the 333
up with the joint ownership and operation relationship among all the communist par
proposition. Well, if [you] want joint own- ties and socialist states] did [I go to Mosyou left yesterday I could not fall ership and operation, how about have them cow].39 asleep, nor did I have dinner. Today I invite all—let us turn into joint ownership and It was our common duty to commemoyou over to talk a bit more so that you can be operation our army, navy, air force, indus- rate the fortieth anniversary of the October [my] doctor: [after talking with you], I might try, agriculture, culture, education. Can we Revolution. Up to that time, as I often be able to eat and sleep this afternoon. You do this? Or, [you] may have all of China's pointed out, there had existed no such thing are fortunate to have little difficulty in eating more than ten thousand kilometers of coast- as brotherly relations among all the parties and sleeping.
line and let us only maintain a guerrilla because, [your leaders] merely paid lip serLet us return to the main subject and force. With a few atomic bombs,
think vice and never meant it; as a result, the chat about the issues we discussed yester- you are in a position to control us through relations between [the brotherly) parties can day. We will only talk about these issues asking for the right of rent and lease. Other be described as between father and son or here in this room! There exists no crisis than this, what else [do you have] to justify between cats and mice. I have raised this situation between you and me. Our relation- [your request]?
issue in my private meetings with ship can be described as: nine out of ten Lüshun [Port Arthur) and Dalian Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades. fingers of yours and ours are quite the same [Darinse) were under your control before. They all admitted that such a father-son with only one finger differing. I have re- You departed from these places later. Why relationship was not of European but Asian peated this point two or three times. You [were these places] under your control? It is style. Present were Bulganin, Mikoyan, and haven't forgotten, have you?
because then China was under the [M. A.] Suslov. Were you also at the meetI've thought over and again of the issues Guomindang's rule. Why did you volunteer ing? From the Chinese side, I and Deng that were discussed yesterday. It is likely to leave? It is because the Communist Party Xiaoping were present. that I might have misunderstood you, but it had taken control of China.
I was unhappy with Mikoyan's conis also possible that I was right. We may Because of Stalin's pressure, the North- gratulation speech which he delivered at our work out a solution after discussion or de- east and Xinjiang became [a Soviet] sphere Eighth National Congress and I deliberately bate. It appears that [we) will have to with- of influence, and four jointly owned and refused to attend that day's meeting as a draw [our] navy's request for [obtaining] operated enterprises were established. 37 protest. You did not know that many of our nuclear-powered submarines [from the So- Comrade Khrushchev later proposed to have deputies were not happy with [Mikoyan's viet Union]. Barely remembering this mat- these [settlements] eliminated, and we were speech). Acting as if he was the father, he ter, I have acquired some information about grateful for that.
regarded China as Russia's son. it only after asking others.36 There are some You [Russians] have never had faith in China has her own revolutionary tradiwarmhearted people at our navy's head- the Chinese people, and Stalin was among tions, although China's revolution could not quarters, namely, the Soviet advisers. They the worst. The Chinese [Communists] were have succeeded without the October Revoasserted that, now that the Soviet nuclear regarded as Tito the Second; [the Chinese lution, nor without Marxism-Leninism. submarines have been developed, we can people) were considered as a backward na- We must learn from the Soviet experiences. We will comply with the commonly but it was mainly Stalin's responsibility. For God's sake, we fought wars for twentyaccepted principles, especially the nine prin- [We] have had three grievances [against two years; we fought in Korea for three ciples stated in the “Moscow Manifesto.”:40 Stalin]. The first concerns the two Wang years! Let [me ask] the Central Military We ought to learn from all the experiences Ming lines. Wang Ming was Stalin's fol- Commission to prepare some materials conwhether they are correct or erroneous. The lower. The second was [Stalin's] discour- cerning (our war experiences] and give them erroneous lessons included Stalin's meta- agement of and opposition to our revolution. to Comrade Yudin, of course, if he is interphysics and dogmatism. He was not totally Even after the dissolution of the Third Inter- ested. metaphysical because he had acquired some national, he still issued orders claiming that, We did not speak out on some (controdialectics in thinking; but a large part of his if we did not strike a peace deal with Jiang versial] issues because we did not want to [thoughts] focused on metaphysics. What Jieshi, China would risk a grave danger of cause problems in the Sino-Soviet relations. you termed as the cult of personality was national elimination.42 Well, for whatever This was particularly true when the Polish one [example of his metaphysics). Stalin reason, we are not eliminated. The third was Incident broke out. When Poland demanded loved to assume the greatest airs.
during my first visit to Moscow during which that all of your specialists go home, ComAlthough we support the Soviet Union, Stalin, [V.M.]Molotov, and [Lavrenti] Beria rade Liu Shaoqi suggested in Moscow that we won't endorse its mistakes. As for [the personally attacked me.
you withdraw some. You accepted [Liu's] differences over] the issue of peaceful evo- Why did I ask Stalin to send a scholar [to suggestion which made the Polish people lution, we have never openly discussed [these China) to read my works?43 Was it because happy because they then tasted some freedifferences), nor have we published [them) I so lacked confidence that I would even have dom. At that time we did not raise our in the newspapers. Cautious as we have to have you read my works? Or was it problems with your specialists [in China] been, we choose to exchange different opin- because I had nothing to do myself? Not a because, we believe, it would have caused ions internally. I had discussed them with chance! [My real intention] was to get you you to be suspicious that we took the advanyou
before I went to Moscow. While in over to China to see with your own eyes tage [of your crisis situation] to send all the Moscow, [we assigned] Deng Xiaoping to whether China was truly practicing Marxism specialists home. We will not send your raise five [controversial] issues. We won't or only half-hearted toward Marxism. specialists home; we will not do so even if openly talk about them even in the future, Upon your return [to Moscow]you spoke Poland does so ten more times. We need because our doing so would hurt Comrade highly of us. Your first comment to Stalin Soviet aid. Khrushchev's (political position). In order was “the Chinese (comrades) are truly Marx- Once I have persuaded the Polish people to help consolidate his [Khrushchev’s] lead- ists.” Nevertheless Stalin remained doubt- that (we all] should learn from the Soviet ership, we decided not to talk about these ful. Only when [we entered] the Korean War Union, and that after putting the anti-dog[controversies), although it does not mean did he change his view [about us], and so did matism campaign at rest, [they] ought to that the justice is not on our side.
East European and other brotherly parties advocate a “learn from the Soviet Union” With regard to inter-governmental re- drop their doubts [about us].
slogan. Who will benefit in learning from lations, we remain united and unified up to It appears that there are reasons for us to the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union or this date which even our adversaries have be suspect: “First, you opposed Wang Ming; Poland? Of course, it will benefit Poland conceded. We are opposed to any [act] that second, you simply insisted on carrying out is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have your revolution regardless of sour] opposi- Although we shall learn from the Soviet objected to all the major criticism that the tion; third, you looked so smart when you Union, we must first of all take into account revisionists and imperialists have massed went all the way to Moscow desiring Stalin our own experiences and mainly rely on our against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union to sign an agreement so that [China] would own experiences. has so far done the same thing (for us]. regain authority over the [Manchurian) rail- There should be some agreed limits on
When did the Soviets begin to trust us road." In Moscow it was [I. V.] Kovalev who the terms of [Soviet] specialists. For inChinese? At the time when [we) entered the took care of me with [N. T.]Fedorenko as my stance, there have never been restrictions on Korean War. From then on, the two coun- interpreter. I got so angry that I once your chief advisers in [our] military and tries got closer to one another (than before] pounded on the table. I only had three tasks public security branches, who can come and and as a result, the 156 aid projects came here [in Moscow], I said to them, the first was go without even notifying or consulting with about. When Stalin was alive, the [Soviet] to eat, the second was to sleep, and the third us in advance. Presumably, if you leave aid consisted of 141 projects. Comrade was to shit.
your post, is it all right that another ambasKhrushchev later added a few more.41
There was a [Soviet] adviser in [our] sador be sent (to China] without discussing We have held no secrets from you. military academy who, in discussing war it with us? No, absolutely not! How much Because more than one thousand of your cases, would only allow [the Chinese train- information could your advisers to our minexperts are working in our country, you are ees] to talk about those of the Soviet Union, istry of public security obtain if they merely fully aware of the state of our military, not China's, would only allow them to talk sit there totally uninformed by their Chinese political, economic, and cultural affairs. We about the ten offensives of the Soviet Army colleagues? trust your people, because you are from a not [ours) in the Korean War.
Let me advise you [and your specialsocialist country, and you are sons and Please allow us to talk about these cases! ists) to pay more visits to each of our provdaughters of Lenin.
[Can you imagine] he wouldn't even allow inces so as to get in touch with the people and Problems have existed in our relations, us to talk about [our own war experiences)! obtain first-hand information. This have I
MAO ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: viet treaty of 1950—the very text on which printed below) is as difficult to interpret for Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador the relationship between the two Commu- historians today as it must have been for nist states was built.
Moscow Center 35 years ago. 1960 was the Introduction by Odd Arne Westad
To Mao, more than to most CCP lead- year when the Sino-Soviet split broke into
ers, Khrushchev's speech was a golden op- the open, first with newspaper polemics in Soviet Ambassador to the People's Re- portunity not only to restate China's past and the spring, and then the recall of all Soviet public of China Pavel Yudin's two conver- present relationship with the Soviet Union, advisory personnel from China in July. sations with Mao on 31 March (printed be- but also to sanction his and the party's turn Meetings between the two sides had been low) and 2 May 19561, form some of the best to more radical policies since the start of increasingly frosty, even if the compromises evidence we have on the Chairman's reac- 1955. These policies, including the sweep- reached on some issues during the meeting tion to Khrushchev's secret speech at the ing collectivization of agriculture which had of Communist parties in Moscow in the fall February 1956 CPSU 20th Congress. The just been completed (of which the Soviets momentarily reduced the intensity of the conversations provide a fascinating insight had been rather critical) and the further steps confrontation. into how Mao Zedong manipulated history in speeding up the revolutionary process Mao had not met Chervonenko earlier and the myth of his own role in the Chinese which Mao contemplated (fueled in part by in the year, but in this meeting he seemed to Communist Party (CCP). They also show a nascent concern about the lack of revolu- be eager to depreciate his own role in Chithat Mao's concrete views on the “Stalin tionary fervor within the CCP), could now nese policymaking, and thereby in the reissue” in the spring of 1956 were much be advanced without too much interference sponsibility for the split. Granted, Mao's different from those to which the Chinese from Moscow. Since the CPSU had, in description of his political status is not toparty later subscribed.
effect, repudiated much of its own past, it tally inaccurate; in the wake of his disastrous In his long monologues to Yudin—with could no longer insist on having a monopoly economic experiments in the late 1950s, he whom he was on personally friendly terms— on theoretical guidance. Mao could—in a had—not of his own free will—taken less Mao gave vent to three decades of frustra- dual sense—liberate himself from Stalin's part in day-to-day governance than before. tions with Stalin's China policy-frustra- ghost.
But here he overstated his case and he did so tions which up to 1956 he could neither It was not until, first, half a year later, to the Soviet ambassador. In addition, when present fully to the Soviets nor share openly after the Polish and Hungarian events in it came to the Sino-Soviet conflict, we know with his Chinese colleagues. In terms of October-November 1956, that Mao's con- that Mao had been fully in charge, even CCP history, Mao's spring 1956 version cern with the political effects of de- during this period. was not radically different from what had Stalinization came to the fore. The disinte- So what was Mao's purpose? To bebeen dogmatically accepted in the party since gration of Communist authority in Eastern have civilly to a well-wisher bringing birth1945, with the major exception that Stalin's Europe frightened the Chinese leaders and day greetings? To give away as little as role had been filled in. In this version, the compelled them to adopt a much more cau- possible about how he really felt about Sinomajor “mistakes” which almost destroyed tious attitude to the “Stalin issue,” including Soviet relations? Or to position himself so the party before Mao took the helm were an indirect criticism of the Soviets for hav- that in case his game with real or perceived ascribed not only to the CCP leaders who ing gone too far in their revision of the enemies within his own party went against implemented the policies (Li Lisan, Wang Communist past. (For revealing insights him, he could still play the “Soviet card” to Ming and others), but to Stalin, who had into the causes of Mao's change of heart, see strengthen his hand? As of yet, we still do inspired and abetted “the mistakes.” Like- Bo Yibo's and Wu Lengxi's recent mem- not know. wise, the resistance to Mao's "correct” lead- oirs.)
Translations of the two documents folership since the late 1930s could again be Mao's conversation with the somewhat low below: traced back to Stalin's errors, which even startled Soviet ambassador S.V.
continued on page 164 influenced the negotiating of the Sino-So- Chervonenko on 26 December 1960 (also
It was Comrade Khrushchev who had military codes were basically to guide opera- encounter considerable problems; the same eliminated the four joint enterprises. Before tions on flatlands, and as Fujian (province] is true with us: if you undermine our (politihis death, Stalin demanded the right to build had nothing but mountains, the Soviet codes cal] positions, we will be in trouble. a plant to manufacture canned food in our were not entirely applicable [to Fujian's re- In wartime, you can utilize all our naval country. My response was that (we] would ality]. Very upset at hearing this, ports, military bases, and other [facilities). accept (the demand) as long as you provide Petroshevskii immediately responded: “You [In return] our (military] can operate in your us equipment, help us build it, and import all have insulted the great military science in- places including your port or bases at the products [from us]. Comrade vented by the great Stalin!” His remarks Vladivostok and shall return home when Khrushchev praised me for giving (Stalin]a made everyone at the meeting very nervous.) war is over. We may sign an agreement on good answer. But why in the world do (you Some of the above-mentioned (contro- wartime cooperation in advance which does Russians) want to build a naval “coopera- versial] issues have been raised [by us] be- not have to wait until war breaks out. Such tive” now? How would you explain to the fore, some have not. You have greatly aided an agreement must contain a stipulation that rest of the world that you propose to build a us but now we are downplaying your [role]; our [forces] can operate on your territory; naval “cooperative"? How would you ex- you may feel very bad about it. Our relation- even if we might not do so, such a stipulation plain to the Chinese people? For the sake of ship, however, resembles that between pro- is required, because it involves the issue of struggling against the imperialists, you may, fessor and student: the professor may make equality. In peacetime, however, such an as advisers, train the Chinese people. Oth- mistakes, do not you agree that the student arrangement cannot be accepted. In peaceerwise, you would have to lease Lüshun and has to point them out? Pointing out mistakes time, you are only to help us construct [miliother sports] for ninety-nine years; but your does not mean that the (student] will drive tary] bases and build armed forces. "cooperative” proposal involves the ques- the professor out. After all the professor is a We would not have accepted (your] tion of ownership, as you propose that each good one.
proposition for building a naval “cooperaside will own fifty percent of it. Yesterday You are assisting us to build a navy! tive” even it had been during Stalin's time. I you made me so enraged that I could not Your (people) can serve as advisers. Why quarreled with him in Moscow! sleep at all last night. They (pointing at would you have to have fifty percent of the Comrade Khrushchev has established other CCP leaders present) are not angry. ownership? This is a political issue. We plan his credibility by having the [previous] “coOnly me alone! If this is wrong, it will be my to build two or three hundred submarines of operative” projects eliminated. Now that sole responsibility. this kind.
such an issue involving ownership is raised (Zhou Enlai: Our Politburo has unani- If you insist on attaching political condi- again, we are reminded of Stalin's positions. mously agreed upon these points.) tions [to our submarine request], we will not I might be mistaken, but I must express my
If we fail to get our messages through satisfy you at all, not even give you a tiny opinion. this time, we may have to arrange another [piece of our] finger. You may inform Com- You explained [to me) yesterday that meeting; if not, we may have to meet every rade Khrushchev that, if [he] still [insists on] [your proposition] was based on the considday. Still, I can go to Moscow to speak to these conditions, there is no point for us to eration that [Russia's coastal] conditions Comrade Khrushchev;or we can invite Com- talk about this issue. If he accepts our re- were not as good for nuclear submarines to rade Khrushchev to come to Beijing so as to quirement, he may come [to Beijing]; if not,
come [to Beijing]; if not, function fully as China's, thus hamstringing clarify every issue.
he does not have to come, because there is future development of nuclear submarines. (Peng Dehuai: This year Soviet De- nothing for us to talk about. Even one tiny You can reach [the Pacific] Ocean from fense Minister Malinovsky cabled me re- condition is unacceptable [for us]!
Vladivostok through the Kurile Islands. The questing to build a long-wave radio station When this issue is involved, we will condition is very good! along China's coast to direct the [Soviet] refuse to accept your aid for ten thousand What you said [yesterday] made me submarine flotilla in the Pacific Ocean. As years. However, it is still possible for us to very uneasy and displeased. Please report the project will cost a total of 110 million cooperate on many other affairs; it is unlikely all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: rubles, the Soviet Union will cover 70 mil- that we would break up. We will, from you must tell him exactly what I have said lion and China will pay 40 million.)45 beginning to the end, support the Soviet without any polishing so as to make him
This request is of the same nature as the Union, although we may quarrel with each uneasy. He has criticized Stalin's (policy] naval “cooperative” proposal which [we] other inside the house.
lines but now adopts the same policies as cannot explain to the people. [We] will be While I was in Moscow, I once made it Stalin did. put in a politically disadvantageous position clear to Comrade Khrushchev that you did We will still have controversies. You if [we) reveal these requests to the world. not have to satisfy every one of our requests. do not endorse some of our positions; we (Peng Dehuai: Petroshevskii [a Soviet Because if you hold back your aid from us,
cannot accept some of your policies. For military adviser] also has a rude attitude and [you] in effect would compel us to work instance, your [leadership) is not pleased at rough style. He is not very pleased because harder [to be self-reliant]; should we get our policy regarding “internal contradicsome of our principles for army building do everything from you, we will end up in an tions among the people,” and the policy of not completely follow the Soviet military disadvantageous position.
“letting a hundred flowers bloom and a huncodes. Once at an enlarged CMC meeting, It is, however, extremely important for dred schools of thought contend.” when Comrade Ye Fei from the Fujian Mili- us to cooperate politically. Because, if we Stalin endorsed the Wang Ming line, tary District46 pointed out that, as the Soviet undermine your political positions, you will causing the losses of our revolutionary
strength up to more than ninety percent. At him try his method! As a result, his trial fered severe flood this year thus encounterthe critical junctures [of our revolution], he achieved a remarkable success which has ing a shortage of material supplies, however, wanted to hold us back and opposed our become a first-rate, world-class scientific [we) have to reallocate materials that have revolution. Even after [we] achieved vic- invention.
originally been designated for export so as to tory, he remained doubtful about us. At the I have never met with Comrade Xining, meet the needs of our domestic supply and, same time, he boasted that it was because of but I have talked to many cadres who partici- therefore, to reduce our export for next year. the direction of his theories that China's pated in the construction of the Yangtze In order to maintain the balance between our [revolution] succeeded. [We) must do away Bridge. They all told me that Comrade import and export for the year of 1957, we with any superstition about him. Before I Xining was a very good comrade because he have no other alternatives but to reduce die, I am prepared to write an article on what took part
in every part of the work, adopted purchases of foreign goods. As we have Stalin had done to China, which is to be a very pleasant working style, and worked calculated, however, we cannot afford to cut published in one thousand years.
very closely with the Chinese comrades. down such items as complete sets of equip(Yudin: The Soviet central leadership’s When the bridge was built, the Chinese ment and general trade items so as to avoid attitude toward the policies of the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from casting an adverse effect on the ongoing central leadership is: it is completely up to him]. Any of you who knows him person- capital construction. Therefore, we have the Chinese comrades how to resolve the ally please convey my regards to him. decided that our original order worth 890 Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese Please do not create any tensions among million rubles of materials from the USSR comrades who understand the situation best. the specialists regarding the relations be- for 1957 be reduced to that of 426 million Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and tween our two parties and two countries. I rubles. arrogant to judge and assess whether or not never advocate that. Our cooperation has We understand that our reduction of the CCP's policies are correct, for the CCP covered a large ground and is by far very purchase orders of Soviet military materials is a great party.)
satisfactory. You ought to make this point will cause the Soviet Government some probWell, [we] can only say that we have clear to your embassy staff members and lems. But [our request for the change] is an been basically correct. I myself have com- your experts so that they will not panic when act against our will. [We] wish that the mitted errors before. Because of
mis- they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criti- Soviet Government will accept our request. takes, [we] had suffered setbacks, of which cized (Soviet leaders).
Provided that you accept our request, we examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and I have long before wanted to talk about will dispatch Tang Tianji,49 our representatwo other campaigns.47 I will be very con- some of these issues. However, it has not tive with full authority in military material tent if I am refuted as being basically correct, been appropriate to talk about them because orders, to Moscow for the purpose of conbecause such an assessment is close to real- the incidents in Poland and Hungary put ducting negotiations with the Soviet Minisity.
your [leadership) in political trouble. For try of Foreign Trade. We will also submit a Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will instance, we then did not feel it right to talk detailed list of orders which are reduced and be built is a policy issue: only China is in a about the problem concerning the experts [in verified to the Soviet Economic Office to position to decide whether we should build China).
China soon. We look forward to hearing it with your assistance or it should be “jointly Even Stalin did improve himself: he let owned.” Comrade Khrushchev ought to China and the Soviet Union sign the [allicome to China [to discuss this issue] because ance) treaty, supported [us] during the Ko- 8. Memo, PRC Foreign Ministry to the I have already visited him (in Moscow). rean War, and provided [us] with a total of USSR Embassy to Beijing, 13 March 1957
[We] should by no means have blind 141 aid projects. Certainly these achieve- Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, faith in [authorities). For instance, one of ments did not belong to him but to the entire delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, your specialists asserted on the basis of a Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we Moscow book written by one [of your] academy schol- do not want to exaggerate Stalin's mistakes. ars that our coal from Shanxi (province]
The Chinese Government asserts that, cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an Part III. China's Request for Soviet although generally acceptable, the draft paassertion has despaired us: we therefore Military and Material Support48 per on a review of Far Eastern economic would have no coal which can be turned into
development, compiled by the [Soviet] Far coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit! 7. Memorandum, Chen Yun to N. A. East Economic Committee has made sevComrade Xining (transliteration), a So- Bulganin, 12 December 1956
eral errors on China's economic developviet specialist who helped us build the Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, ment. Yangtze River Bridge [in Wuhan), is a very delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, (1) The sentence that “[China's] agrargood comrade. His bridge-building method Moscow
ian collectivization has encountered peashas never been utilized in your country:
ants' opposition,” under the section of [you] never allowed him to try his method, On 30 April 1956, our government pro- “Speedy Advance toward Socialism” (page either to build a big or medium or even small posed to the USSR that [China] would order 1), does not correspond with reality. The sized bridge. When he came here, however, a total of 890 million rubles worth of mili- speed of our country's agricultural collechis explanation of his method sounded all tary supplies [from the USSR] for the year of tivization, which has been fully explained right. Since we knew little about it, [we) let 1957. As large areas (of China] have suf- by Liu Shaoqi in his report to the [National]