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People's Congress, completely refutes such year plan only includes the main part of amount—of technical experts and aides; an assertion. In discussing [China's] price economic and cultural Centertaining and edu- (5) invite and dispatch on a reciprocal problem, the draft paper deliberately dis- cational] construction, whereas the total of basis experts and delegations for the purpose torts and obliterates our basic achievements [China's] capital construction during 1953- of on-site inspection, participation in conwhich are clearly presented in Li 1956 covers much wider grounds.

ferences, delivery of research reports, and Xiannian’s50 report [to the People's Con- 4. The session on “Development Plans” short-term internships; gress), and instead, exaggerates our isolated notes that the Second Five-Year Plan origi- (6) establish frequent contacts on scienweakness and mistakes. Given this fact, nally set 98.3% as the [overall] increase tific research and production conditions in therefore, the paper could not help but draw objective, but Premier Zhou [Enlai] in his

objective, but Premier Zhou [Enlai] in his [each side's] national defense industry; erroneous conclusions (page 20).

report on the Second Five-Year Plan reduces (7) discuss the exchange and provision (2) The draft paper has also made errors this objective to 90.3% (page 23). There is of teaching guides, textbooks, or other matemerely by comparing our published statis- indeed no reduction of the original increase rials on national defense industry training, tics which are, indeed, to serve different objective. Because the former (figure] ex- or materials necessary to enhance national purposes. There are several such errors: cludes the outputs of individual production defense industry personnel's techniques and

1. The section titled “Speedy Advance whereas the latter includes the outputs of skills; toward Socialism” mentions that “[China] individual production, thus becoming 90.3%. (8) exchange lessons and experiences plans to raise the percentage of handicrafts Since there are detailed explanations and of employing new machinery, new facili[as an industry) in the nation's GNP up to illustrations as to exactly what the above ties, and new technology as well as new 15.3 % in 1956, whereas the First Five-Year mentioned figures cover when these reports applications of research results to weaponry Plan has originally planned to have [the are publicized, there exists no excuse why production; handicrafts] reach 9.4% in 1957” (page 4). such errors have been committed. Other than (9) study the issue of warranties for In actuality, the former (figure] refers to a the above listed mistakes, [the draft paper] technical materiel [one side) provides [the combined output of “handicrafts factories” still contains minor errors which are of no other side) for production; and “handicrafts individuals” while the later significant concern [of ours).

(10) discuss other issues concerning [figure] only reflects the percentage of

national defense industry that both sides “handicrafts individuals' outputs” in GNP. 9. Memo, Embassy of the PRC in Moscow deem necessary.

2. The section on “National Income and to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 Decem- During the period when the joint comCapital Accumulation” asserts that “[China] ber 1957

mission adjourns, the Chinese Government in one way or another exaggerates its [per Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, will authorize the Second Machinery Miniscapita) increase, given the [Chinese] statis- delo 3, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, try and the Commercial Office of the PRC tics on the nation's per capita increase from Moscow

embassy [in Moscow] to take charge of 1953 to 1956, that is, 1953, 127 yuan, 1954,

communications and contacts regarding rou137 yuan, 1955, 141 yuan, 1956, 154 yuan. In order to strengthen Sino-Soviet coop- tine affairs and issues of national defense This is because, according to Liu Shaoqi's eration and close links regarding national

eration and close links regarding national industry. Whichever agency [of the Soviet report, the increase of industrial production defense industry, the Chinese Government side] will be in charge [during this period] is during 1953-1956 is no higher than 90.3%, proposes that a joint Sino-Soviet commis- left to the Soviet Government to decide. whereas the above listed figures seem to sion in charge of national defense industry be Before every meeting of the joint comassume that the increase would be 104%" established which, consisting of several del- mission, each side is to provide the other side (page 5). The 90.3% increase mentioned in egates from each side, is to meet once or with a memorandum containing the agenda Liu Shaoqi's report covers all industrial twice annually.

[and] schedule as well as supplementary increase including modern [heavy) and fac- The joint commission's major responsi- materials. tory industries, and individual production, bilities include:

All minutes and records of the joint while Bo Yibo’s51 reported 104% increase (1)exchange published and unpublished commission's meetings are to be prepared only refers to the increase of production by books, journals, handbooks, directories, tech- respectively in Chinese and Russian lanmodern [heavy] and factory [machinery] nical criteria, or other materials both sides guages and co-signed by the representatives industries. deem appropriate;

of each side's delegation to the joint com3. The section on “National Income and (2) discuss such issues as standardiza- mission. Capital Accumulation" also points out that tion of weaponry, technical conditions, speci- All results of the joint commission's the total of [China's] capital construction fications, and national criteria, and com- discussions are to be references for each during 1953-1956 exceeds the five-year monly acceptable differences of weaponry Government which, if deemed necessary, budget's 42.74 billion yuan by 1%, but State production;

will authorize certain agencies for their implePlanning Commission Chairman Li (3) discuss standardization of [techni- mentation. Fuchun’s52 report [to the People's Con- cal] specifications, and provide seach other] [


All costs of organizing the joint gress] only states that [China] will by 1956 with standard products and measuring appa- commission's meetings will be charged to complete up to 87.6% of the planned capital ratus;

the Government where the meeting is held, construction (page 7). In fact, the amount of (4) discuss invitation and engagement

whereas each Government will be responcapital construction as designed by the five- including procedures, terms limits, and sible for expenditures of its own delegation during the meeting.

to their advantage. Therefore, China will nals of the United Nations and its special Please consider our above-stated propo- from now on refuse to participate in any organizations. sitions. The Chinese side wishes to know the international organizations or conferences 3. With regard to those international Soviet Government's response.

involving such a situation. China will also conferences already having certain relations

consider withdrawing from those interna- with the United Nations or its special orga10. Memo, [PRC] Ministry of Foreign tional organizations, such as the Interna- nizations which China considers participatAffairs to the Soviet Embassy in China, 4 tional Law Association, at an appropriate ing, our policy is as follows: September 1958 moment.

a. China will support any resolutions of Source: fond 100 (1958), op. 51, papka 531, For those overseas Chinese individuals the conferences which only generally mendelo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, who participate in the international organi- tion the United Nations Charter. China will Moscow

zations or conferences which have already not comply with any resolutions of the con

invited Chinese delegates, [we) will decide ferences which have a good deal to do with (1) As China's influence in the interna- by looking at these (overseas Chinese indi- the United Nations or its special organizational community rises day by day, the US viduals') attitude toward politics. If they do tions. However, if these resolutions are imperialists' policy of disregarding the Chi- not act in the name of the Jiang Clique but favorable to world peace and friendly coopnese people and not recognizing but shutting represent their [residential] countries, [we) eration (among all the nations), China will out the Chinese [Government] from interna- will not treat them as complicating the "two

not oppose. tional life is getting increasingly difficult China” issue. However, [we) must not relax . b. China will not attend any sessions (of and losing support of the peoples [all over our vigilance because they might disguise the conferences] which are designated to the world]. In order to extricate itself from their appearance but in effect carry out con- discuss the United Nations or its special such a difficult position as well as to assure spiratorial activities (related to the creation organizations. continuous control of Taiwan, [the US Gov- of “two Chinas”).

c. China will refuse to attend any sesernment] has stepped up the realization of its 3. With regard to the situation in which sions where United Nations representatives “two-China” conspiracy.

an international organization which has al- speak in the name of conference advisers or (2) The following is the Chinese ready had the Jiang representatives, or its as key-note speakers; neither will Chinese Government's counter-measure against the branch organization, invites us to attend [delegates) listen to United Nations repre[US] “two-China” plot:

conferences even if Jiang Clique's delegates sentatives' report or presentation. However, 1. With regard to the situation in which are not invited. Such a situation definitely Chinese delegates will be allowed to particiChina's delegation and Jiang [Jieshi] constitutes a "two-China” reality. More

constitutes a "two-China” reality. More- pate in sessions where United Nations repreClique's “delegation” join the same interna- over, it will leave others with a wrong im- sentatives participate in or give speeches as tional organization or attend the same inter- pression that China is anxious to participate ordinary participants. If UN representatives national conference. Facing this situation, in the activities of those international orga- deliver speeches or remarks to insult or the Chinese side will resolutely demand to nizations. Therefore, China will not be part slander China, Chinese delegates will have have the Jiang Clique elements driven out. If of these organizations or conferences. to refute them right on the spot and then [our request is) rejected, China will not co- (3) Controlled by the United States, the leave. If some Jiang Clique elements are operate with such an organization or confer- United Nations and its Special Organiza- included in the UN delegation, Chinese delence and, thus, will have to withdraw with tions have generally retained Jiang's repre- egates must point out that this ignored China's no hesitation. In the past year China has sentatives and kept rejecting the restoration interests and then, protest and refuse to paralready done this many times, including of China's legitimate positions [in these ticipate. withdrawing from the Nineteenth World international organizations]. The following d. No Chinese delegate is authorized to Convention of the Red Cross. [China] has are our counter-measures.

express any opinion on whether China will recently decided not to recognize the Inter- 1. China will not dispatch any represen

establish, in some fashion, a consultative national Olympic Committee. From now tatives (either of the Chinese Government or relationship with the United Nations or its on, China will resolutely refuse to partici- of other organizations) to participate in any special organizations. If any international pate in any international organizations or conferences organized by the United Na- conference is to vote on this issue, Chinese conferences which invite or tolerate the par- tions and its Special Organizations. No delegates cannot but abstain from the votticipation of the Jiang Clique's representa- individual of Chinese citizenship, either as a ing. tives.

representative or a staff member of other (4) China asserts that fits] participation 2. With regard to the situation in which international organizations, is permitted to in international conferences and organizaChina's delegation or individual and Jiang contact or conduct negotiations with the tions is only one way to establish contacts Clique's individuals participate in the same United Nations and its special organiza- and relations in the international commuinternational organization or international tions.

nity, which may bring about some results in conference. Such a situation, although in 2. China will not provide the United terms of enhancing China's visibility and formality constituting no “two-China,” will Nations or its special organizations with any obtaining some information on how certain in effect impress upon the [international] materials or statistics, nor will China en- specific [international] projects progress. community that “two Chinas” co-exist, and dorse that sour] brother countries publish However, no or minimum participation in is very likely to be used by (our) adversaries any materials concerning China in the jour- the international conferences or organiza

tions will not keep China from developing 10. Bobkoveshi was Yugoslavia's first ambassador to to visit the Soviet Union from 7 to 11 and 17-19 January vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese

the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time 1957 (the delegation visited Poland and Hungary from on 30 June 1955.

January 11 to 17). During the visit, Zhou had five people from getting acquainted or making

11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was formal meetings with Soviet leaders, including Nikolai friends with other nations; no or minimum born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes Bulganin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Anastas Mikoyan. participation in some international confer- still lacked a common name. He became their great After returning to Beijing, Zhou Enlai prepared this ences or organizations does not mean that

organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227, Chinggis report for Mao Zedong and CCP central leadership,

established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by summarizing the discrepancies between the Chinese China adopts a negative or protective atti

conquering its inner zone across Central Asia. The and Soviet parties. tude toward [international] cultural exchange Mongols are remembered for their wanton aggressive- 25. Liu Xiao was Chinese ambassador to the Soviet activities. [In regard to these activities), ness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was Union from February 1955 to October 1962. China may take part in other fashions. On certainly present in Chinggis.

26. On 11-16 January 1957, Zhou Enlai visited Poland. 12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in This trip was arranged after Zhou had decided to visit the other hand, China's non-participation

China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong personally approved may put so much pressure on these conferpopulation.

Zhou's Poland trip. Mao Zedong sent a telegram to ences or organizations that they will have 13. The “War to Resist America and Assist Korea" Zhou on 4 December 1956 (Zhou was then making a difficulties in organizing activities thus mak

describes China's participation in the Korean War from formal state visit in India): "The Polish ambassador October 1950 to July 1953.

visited us, mentioning that their congress election is ing them discontented with the United States.

14. The five principles were first introduced by Zhou scheduled for 20 January, which will come very soon. As a result, more and more criticism and

Enlai while meeting a delegation from India on 31 There exists the danger that the United Workers' Party condemnation of the “two-China” policy December 1953. These principles—(1) mutual respect might lose the majority support. He hoped that China may be aroused. In short, China remains

for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non- would offer help by inviting a Chinese leader to visit

aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international Poland before the election. They hoped to invite Comwilling to cooperate with those international

affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful rade Mao Zedong. When we told the ambassador why conferences and organizations which are in coexistence—were later repeatedly claimed by the Chi- it is impossible for Comrade Mao Zedong to make the China's interests [and] have no intention to nese government as the foundation of the PRC's foreign trip at this time, and that the Soviet Union had already impair China's sovereignty. policy.

invited you to Moscow, we mentioned that if time 15. China did not establish diplomatic relations with allows and if you agree, perhaps you can make the trip. [We are certain] that, as long as we

Yugoslavia until January 1955, although the Yugosla- Now the struggle in Poland has changed into one have the Soviet-led socialist countries' sup- vian government recognized the PRC as early as 5 between the United Workers' Party and other parties port, our just cause of smashing America's October 1949, four days after the PRC's establishment. (with bourgeoisie character) over attracting votes from "two-China” conspiracy will achieve a com

16. P. F. Yudin (1899-1968), a prominent philosopher the workers and peasants. This is a good phenomenon.

and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet But if the United Workers' Party loses control, it would plete success.

Communist Party from 1952 to 1961, was Soviet am- be disadvantageous [to the socialist camp]. Therefore, bassador to China from 1953 to 1959.

we believe that it is necessary for you to make a trip to 17. “On Ten Relationships” was one of Mao's major Poland (the Polish ambassador also believes that this is 1. The content of this conversation suggests that it

works in the 1950s. He discussed the relationship be- a good idea). What is your opinion? If you are going, the

tween industry and agriculture and heavy industry and trip should be made between 15 and 20 January, and it occurred between 15 and 28 September 1956, when the

light industry, between coastal industry and industry in is better to make it before 15 January. If so, you should CCP's Eighth National Congress was in session.

the interior, between economic construction and na- visit Moscow between 5 and 10 January, which will 2. This refers to the Information Bureau of Communist

tional defense, between the state, the unit of production, and Workers' Parties (Cominform), which was estab

allow you to have four to five days to have the Sinoand individual producers, between the center and the Soviet meetings, issuing a communiqué. Then you can lished in September 1947 by the parties of the Soviet

regions, between the Han nationality and the minority travel to Poland to hold Sino-Polish meeting and also Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France,

nationalities, between party and non-party, between issue a communiqué, thus offering them some help.” Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The Bureau

revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, between right (Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de zhuoyeu fengxian, 299announced that it was ending its activities in April

and wrong, and between China and other countries. For 300). 1956.

an English translation of one version of the article, see 27. Wladyslaw Gomulka was the leader of the Polish 3. Wang Ming (1904-1974), also known as Chen

Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People Communist regime. Shaoyu, was a returnee from the Soviet Union and a a (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 61-83.

28. This refers to the “Declaration on Developing and leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s. Official Chinese Communist view claims that

18. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were all Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation

leading members of the Chinese Communist Party. At between the Soviet Union and other Socialist CounWang Ming committed "ultra-leftist" mistakes in the

the Party's Eighth Congress in September 1956, Liu and tries” issued by the Soviet government on the evening early 1930s and "ultra-rightist" mistakes in the late

Zhou were elected the Party's vice chairmen, and Deng of 30 October 1956. As a response to the Hungarian 1930s. the Party's general secretary.

crisis, the Soviet Union reviewed in the declaration its 4. The white areas were Guomindang-controlled areas.

19. This was part of Mao Zedong's speech to a confer- relations with other communist countries and promised 5. Liu Shaoqi was vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee

ence attended by CC provincial, regional, and municipal that it would adopt a pattern of more equal exchanges secretaries.

with them in the future. of the People's National Congress. He was China's

20. China adopted the first five-year plan in 1953. So, 29. This article was based on the discussions of the CCP second most important leader.

the year of completing the third five-year plan would be Politburo and published in the name of the editorial 6. The Chinese Communist party's eighth national 1968.

board of Renmin ribao (People's Daily) on 29 Decemcongress was held in Beijing on 15-27 September

21. The elimination of the “four pests” (rats, bedbugs, ber 1956. 1956.

flies, and mosquitoes) became the main goal of a na- 30. Peng Dehuai, China's minister of defense, submit7. Georgii Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian commu

tional hygiene campaign in China during the mid- and ted this report in the context of the emerging dispute nist, was the Comintern's secretary general from 1935 late 1950s.

between Beijing and Moscow over the issue of estabto 1943.

22. “Democratic figures” is a term used by Mao and the 8. Mao here pointed to the period from 1931 to 1935,

lishing a special long-wave radio station in China. On Chinese Communists to point to non-communists or 18 April 1958, Radion Malinovsky, the Soviet Union's during which the “international section," of which communist sympathizers in China.

defense minister, wrote a letter to Peng Dehuai: Wang Ming was a leading member, controlled the

23. This refers to Zhou Enlai's visit to the Soviet Union, In order to command the Soviet Union's subcentral leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Poland, and Hungary on 7-19 January 1957. For Zhou marines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high 9. Zhu De was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Enlai's report on the visit, see the next document.

command urgently hopes that between 1958 Committee and vice chairman of the PRC. 24. Zhou Enlai led a Chinese governmental delegation

and 1962 China and the Soviet Union will

jointly construct a high-power long-wave radio transmission center and a long-wave radio receiving station specially designed for long distance communication. In terms of the fund that is needed for the construction of the two stations, the Soviet Union will cover the larger portion (70%), and China will cover the smaller

portion (30%). The leaders in Beijing immediately considered this a matter related to China's sovereignty and integrity. Therefore, they wanted to pay all the expenses and to have exclusive ownership over the stations. (Source: Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 112-113.) 31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai's report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document. 32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and China's vice premier; Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and China's vice premier in charge of financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a member of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi was a member of the CCP Politburo, China's vice premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting in February 1958). 33. Words in italics were added by Mao. 34. Following Mao Zedong's instructions, Peng Dehuai sent to Malinovsky the following response on 12 June 1958: “The Chinese government agrees to the construction of high-power long-wave radio stations, and welcomes the technological assistance from the Soviet Union. However, China will cover all expenses, and the stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union after the completion of their construction. Therefore, it is necessary for the governments of the two countries to sign an agreement on the project.” On 11 July 1958, the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement to construct long-wave radio stations. The Soviets did not understand the nature of Beijing's concern over having exclusive ownership of the station, and the draft insisted that the stations should be constructed and jointly managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese responded with several suggestions for revision: China would take the responsibility for constructing the station and its ownership belongs to China; China will purchase the equipment it cannot produce from the Soviet Union, and will invite Soviet experts to help construct the station; after the station's completion, it will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union. 35. Mao Zedong held this conversation with Yudin in the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing and Moscow on establishing a Chinese-Soviet joint submarine flotilla. Allegedly, in 1957-1958, Soviet military and naval advisors in China repeatedly made suggestions to the Chinese that they should purchase new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On 28 June 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance for China's naval buildup, especially the designs for new-type submarines. On 21 July 1958, Yudin called on Mao Zedong. Invoking Khrushchev's name, Yudin told Mao that the geography of the Soviet Union made it difficult for it to take full advantage of the new-type submarines. Because China had a long coastline and good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flotilla. Mao Zedong made the following response: “First, we should make clear the guiding principle. [Do you mean that] we should create [the flotilla] with your

assistance? Or [do you mean] that we should jointly 52. Li Fuchun was then a member of CCP Politburo and
create [the flotilla), otherwise you will not offer any China's vice premier, chairman of State Planning Com-
assistance?” Mao emphasized that he was not interested mission.
in creating a Sino-Soviet “military cooperative.”
(Source: Han Nianlong et al. Dangdai zhongguo waijiao,
113-114.) The next day, Mao discussed the proposal
with Yudin at length.

Zhang Shu Guang is associate professor at 36. Mao referred to Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai who the University of Maryland at College Park were present during this discussion.

and author, most recently, of Mao's Military 37. In March 1950 and July 1951, the Chinese and

Romanticism: China and the Korean War, Soviet government signed four agreements, establishing a civil aviation company, an oil company, a non

1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press ferrous and rare metal company, and a shipbuilding of Kansas, 1995); Chen Jian is associate company jointly owned by the two countries.

professor of history at Southern Illinois 38. Xibaipo was tiny village in Hebei Province where

University at Carbondale and author of the Chinese Communist Party maintained headquarters from mid 1948 to early 1949. Dispatched by Stalin,

China's Road to the Korean War: The MakMikoyan secretly visited Xibaipo from 31 January to 7 ing of the Sino-American Confrontation February 1949 and held extensive meetings with Mao (New York: Columbia University Press, Zedong and other CCP leaders. For a Chinese account

1994). of Mikoyan's visit, see Shi Zhe (trans. Chen Jian), "With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of a Chinese Interpreter,Chinese Historians 5:1 (Spring 1992), 4556. For a Russian account of the visit, see Andrei Ledovsky, “Mikoyan's Secret Mission to China in January and February 1949," Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow) 2 (1995) 72-94. It is interesting and important to note that the Chinese and Russian accounts of this visit are in accord. 39. Mao Zedong attended the Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workers' parties from socialist countries in November 1957, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. 40. The “Moscow Manifesto” was adopted by the Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workers' parties from socialist countries in November 1957. 41. The 156 aid projects were mainly designed for China's first five-year plan, focusing on energy development, heavy industry and defense industry. 42. Here Mao referred to two of Stalin's telegrams to the CCP leadership around 20-22 August 1945, in which Stalin urged the CCP to negotiate a peace with the Guomindang, warning that failing to do so could cause “the danger of national elimination." 43. Mao referred to his request to Stalin in 1950 to dispatch a philosopher to China to help edit Mao's works. Stalin then sent Yudin to China, who, before becoming Soviet ambassador to China, was in China from July 1950 to January 1951 and July to October 1951, participating in the editing and translation of Mao Zedong's works. 44. I. V. Kovalev, Stalin's representative to China from 1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the Soviet Union in December 1949-February 1950; N. T. Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy in Beijing. 45. See note 30. 46. Ye Fei commanded the Fujian Military District. 47. Mao commanded these military operations during the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934. 48. Documents in this group are found in Russian Foreign Ministry archives. The originals are in Chi


49. Tang Tianji was deputy director of the People's
Liberation Army's General Logistics Department.
50. Li Xiannian was a member of CCP Politburo and
China's vice premier and finance minister.
51. Bo Yibo was then alternate member of CCP Polit-
buro and China's vice premier, chairman of National
Economic Commission.

MAO'S CONVERSATIONS the orientation to the Guomintang, having ample, a deviation, that in the Soviet regions continued from page 157

viewed it as a united front of the revolution- of China which were blockaded by the

ary forces of China. Stalin said that it is Guomintang even the petty trading bourDocument I:

necessary to depend on the Guomintang, to geoisie was liquidated and all kinds of interMao's Conversation with Yudin,

follow after that party, i.e. he spoke directly nal trade was stopped. As a result of this 31 March 1956

about the subordination of the Communist policy the Chinese Red Army, which in

Party of China to the Guomintang. This was 1929 was comprised of 300,000 fighters, From the Journal of

Top Secret

a great mistake which had held back the was reduced by 1934-35 to 25,000, and the P.F. Yudin

Copy No. 1

independent work of the Communist Party of territory which made up the Soviet regions “5” April 1956

China on the mobilization of the masses and of China was reduced by 99%. CPC organiNo. 289

on attracting them to the side of the Commu- zations in the cities were routed by the nist Party.

Guomintang and the number of Commu

Through the Comintern, Mao Zedong nists was reduced from 300,000 to 26,000 RECORD OF CONVERSATION

continued, Stalin, having become after the people. The Soviet regions were totally with Comrade Mao Zedong

death of V.I. Lenin the de facto leader of the isolated from the remaining part of the coun

Comintern, gave to the CC CPC a great try and remained without any products, even 31 March 1956

number of incorrect directives. These mis- without salt. All this caused serious discontaken and incorrect directives resulted from

tent among the population of the Soviet Today I visited Mao Zedong and gave

the fact that Stalin did not take into account regions. him Comrade Khrushchev's letter about the

the opinion of the CPC. At that time Van As a result of the ultra-leftist policy of assistance which the Soviet Union will pro- Minh, being a Comintern worker, met fre- Van Minh, the more or less large regions vide: 1) in the construction of 51 enterprises quently with Stalin and tendentiously had

which remained under CPC leadership were and 3 scientific research institutes for mili

informed him about the situation in the CPC. mostly in North China (the provinces of tary industry, 2) in the construction of a

Stalin, evidently, considered Van Minh the Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia), to which Van railroad line from Urumqi to the Soviet

single exponent of the opinion of the CC Minh's power did not extend. Van Minh, Chinese border. Mao Zedong asked me to СРС.

backed by the Comintern, essentially mansend his deep gratitude to the CC CPSU and

Van Minh and Li Lisan, who repre- aged it so that the 8th and 4th armies rethe Soviet government.

sented the CPC in the Comintern, tried to moved themselves from subordination to Further I said that I had wanted to visit

concentrate the whole leadership of the CPC the CC CPC. him (Mao Zedong) in the very first days in their own hands. They tried to present all

Van Minh and his successors saw the following my return to Beijing and to tell

the Communists who criticized the mistakes Guomintang as the “young power,” which about the work of the 20th Congress of the

of Van Minh and Li Lisan as opportunists

. absorbs all the best and will be able to gain CPSU and, in particular, about Comrade

Mao Zedong said, they called me a right a victory over Japan. They spoke against the Khrushchev's speech at the closed session

opportunist and a narrow empiricist. As an independent and autonomous policy of the regarding the cult of personality. Mao

example of how the Comintern acted incor- Communist Party in the united front, and Zedong responded that because of his ill. rectly in relation to the Communist Party of against the strengthening of the armed forces ness he had found it necessary to put off the

China, Mao Zedong introduced the follow- of the CPC and revolutionary bases, against meeting with me. Mao Zedong said that the ing

the unification of all strata of the population members of the CPC delegation who had

Under the pretext that the Third Plenum around the policy of the CPC. Van Minh's attended the 20th Congress had told him

of the CC CPC, while considering the coup- supporters tried to replace the genuinely something about the work of the Congress plotting errors of Li Lisan, had not carried the revolutionary program of the CPC, which and had brought one copy of Comrade

successive criticism of these mistakes to its consisted of 10 points, with their own sixKhrushchev's speech regarding the cult of conclusion and allegedly so as to correct the

conclusion and allegedly so as to correct the point program, the author of which was Van personality. That speech has already been

mistakes of the Third Plenum of the CCCPC, Minh, although this was, in the essence of translated into Chinese and he had managed the Comintern after 3-4 months had sent to the matter, a capitulationist program. In to become acquainted with it.

China two of its own workers - [Pavel] Mif conducting this whole program Van Minh, During a conversation about I.V.

and Van Minh - charged with the task of backed by the Comintern and in Stalin's Stalin's mistakes Mao Zedong noted that

conducting the Fouth Plenum of the CPC. name, spoke as the main authority. Stalin's line on the China question, though Nonetheless the decisions of the Fourth Ple- Van Minh's supporters, taking advanit had basically been correct, in certain peri

num of the CC CPC made under the pressure tage of the fact that they had captured a ods he, Stalin, had made serious mistakes. of Mif and Van Minh, were in fact more ,

majority in the Southern bureau of the CC In his speeches in 1926 Stalin had exagger

ultra-leftist that Li Lisan's line. In them it CPC in Wuhan, gave incorrect directives to ated the revolutionary capabilities of the

was stated that it is necessary to move into the army and to the local authorities. So, for Guomintang, had spoken about the

the large cities, to take control of them, and example, once, to our surprise, said Mao Guomintang as the main revolutionary force

not to conduct the struggle in rural regions. Zedong, even in Yanan the slogans of the in China. In 1926 Stalin had given the

In the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CPC which were posted on the walls of the Chinese Communists an instruction about

CC CPC there was permitted such, for ex- houses were replaced, on Van Minh's order,

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