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THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY'S APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959

by Mark Kramer

In early September 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed the head of the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to prepare a detailed background report on China for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of September and early October to take part in ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of the Communist victory in China. The Soviet leader's trip, as Gromyko was well aware, was also intended to alleviate a growing rift between Moscow and Beijing-a rift that had not yet flared up in public. Initially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to travel to China because he had numerous other commitments at around the same time; but after discussing the matter with his colleagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided that face-to-face negotiations with Mao Zedong and other top Chinese officials would be the only way to "clear the atmosphere" and restore a "sense of friendship between our peoples."1

Zimyanin completed a top-secret, 30page survey of "The Political, Economic, and International Standing of the PRC" (Report No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the same day that Khrushchev began a highly publicized visit to the United States. The Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 September, just a day before he was due to leave for China. On his way back from the United States, he was given a copy of Zimyanin's report. That copy is now housed in the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD).2 The final section of Zimyanin's report, which focuses on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the most interesting portion of the document, is translated here in full except for a few extraneous passages at the beginning and end.3

Zimyanin's appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations is intriguing not only because of its substance, but also because of the light it sheds on Soviet policy-making at the time. Both points will be briefly taken up in this introduction, which is divided into two main

parts. The first part will discuss the content of the Foreign Ministry's report, highlighting items of particular interest as well as several important lacunae. The second part will consider how Zimyanin's assessment contributed to, and was affected by, changes under way in Soviet policy-making toward China. Those changes, as explained below, temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Ministry and therefore gave increased prominence to Zimyanin's report.

Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations

In both substance and tone, Zimyanin's analysis of Soviet relations with China reflected the burgeoning unease among Soviet officials. Although his view of the relationship was still distinctly favorable overall, he was quick to point out many areas of incipient conflict between the two countries. His report suggested that a full-fledged rift could be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent differences were bound to cause growing acrimony and recriminations unless appropriate steps were taken. In citing a litany of disagreements about key ideological and practical questions, the report drew a causal link between internal political conditions in China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, a theme emphasized by many Western analysts as well.4 Although Zimyanin concluded the document on an upbeat noteclaiming that "relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year" his analysis left little doubt that existing tensions between Moscow and Beijing could eventually take a sharp turn for the worse.

Four specific points about the document are worth highlighting.

First, the report acknowledged that friction between the two Communist states had been present, to some degree, since the very start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin did not imply that China had been merely a "reluctant and suspicious ally" of Moscow in the early 1950s, he emphasized that the Soviet Union under Stalin had "violated the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic" and had "kept the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR."5 No doubt, these criticisms were motivated in part by the then-prevailing line of deStalinization, but Zimyanin provided concrete examples of "negative" actions on

Moscow's part between 1950 and 1953 that had "impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust."6

His views on this matter, interestingly enough, were very similar to conclusions reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and Beijing to project an image of monolithic unity (an image, incidentally, that was not far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time could sense that negotiations leading to the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February 1950 had generated a modicum of ill will between the two countries. According to a secret background report, Mao was "highly dissatisfied with [Moscow's] attempted exactions on China," and Zhou Enlai said he "would rather resign than accede to [Soviet] demands as presented." Although Soviet and Chinese officials did their best to conceal any further hints of bilateral discord over the next few years, word continued to filter into Washington about "strain and difficulties between Communist China and Russia"--the same strain and difficulties that Zimyanin noted.8

By tracing the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict back to the Stalin period, Zimyanin's report was quite different from the public statements made later on by officials in both Moscow and Beijing, who averred that the split had begun when the two sides disagreed about Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in February 1956.9 Until recently, the large majority of Western (and Russian) scholars had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in which to pinpoint the origins of the dispute. 10 It is now clear, both from Zimyanin's report and from other new evidence (see below), that tensions actually had begun emerging much earlier.

This is not to say that the whole SinoSoviet rift, especially the bitter confrontation of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, but the reality is usually more complex. Far from being a "reluctant and suspicious ally" of the Soviet Union during the first half of the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet experience and to forge close, comprehensive ties with Moscow in the name of socialist internationalism. Even so, the latest memoirs and archival revelations, including Zimyanin's report, leave little doubt that the seeds of a conflict between Moscow and

Beijing were present, at least in some fash- omissions in Zimyanin's assessment, which ion, as early as 1950-53.

Second, while giving due emphasis to problems that arose during the Stalin era, Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th Soviet Party Congress and by the "Hundred Flowers" campaign in China. Zimyanin claimed that the Chinese leadership had "fully supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences” after the 20th Party Congress, but he conceded that Beijing's assessment of Stalin was considerably "different from our own" and that the Congress had prompted "the Chinese friends. . . to express critical comments about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations." Even more damaging, according to Zimyanin, was the effect of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He cited a wide range of "hostile statements" and "denunciations of the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship" that had surfaced in China. "The airing of these types of statements," he wrote, "can in no way be justified." The report expressed particular concern about a number of territorial demands that had been raised against the Soviet Union. 11

Third, as one might expect, Zimyanin devoted considerable attention to the SinoSoviet ideological quarrels that began to surface during the Great Leap Forward. In 1958 and 1959 the emerging rift between Moscow and Beijing had primarily taken the form of disagreements about the establishment of "people's communes," the role of material versus ideological incentives, the nature of the transition to socialism and Communism, and other aspects of Marxism-Leninism. In subsequent years, bitter disputes erupted over territorial demands and questions of global strategy (not to mention a clash of personalities between Khrushchev and Mao), but those issues had not yet come to dominate the relationship in September 1959. Hence, it is not surprising that Zimyanin would concentrate on ideological differences that were particularly salient at the time. His report provides further evidence that ideological aspects of the conflict must be taken seriously on their own merits, rather than being seen as a mere smokescreen for geopolitical or other con

are worth briefly explicating here because
they provide a better context for understand-
ing the document:

• Stalin's relationship with Mao. Al-
though Zimyanin discussed problems in
Sino-Soviet relations that arose during the
Stalin era, he did not explicitly refer to the
way Stalin behaved when Mao visited the
Soviet Union for nearly two-and-a-half
months beginning in December 1949. This
omission is unfortunate because even a few
brief comments might have helped clarify
what has been a matter of great confusion.
First-hand accounts of the Stalin-Mao rela-
tionship by former Soviet and Chinese offi-
cials offer sharply conflicting interpreta-
tions. One of the most jaundiced descrip-
tions of the way Stalin treated Mao can be
found in Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs:

Stalin would sometimes not lay eyes
on [the Chinese leader] for days at a
time

and since Stalin neither saw
Mao nor ordered anyone else to
entertain him, no one dared to go
see him. We began hearing rumors
that Mao was very unhappy be-
cause he was being kept under lock
and key and everyone was ignoring
him. Mao let it be known that if the
situation continued, he would leave.

In this way, Stalin sowed the seeds of hostility and anti-Soviet, anti-Russian sentiment in China. 12

A similar appraisal of Stalin's demeanor
was offered by Andrei Gromyko, who
claimed in his memoirs that when Stalin
hosted a special dinner for Mao in February
1950, the atmosphere was "oppressive" and
the two leaders "seemed personally to have
nothing in common that would enable them
to establish the necessary rapport."13 Be-
cause Khrushchev's and Gromyko's obser-
vations fit so well with everything that is
known about Stalin's general behavior, their
accounts have been widely accepted in the
West.

More recently, though, a very different picture of the Stalin-Mao relationship has emerged from testimony by Nikolai Fedorenko, a former diplomat at the Soviet embassy in China who served as an interpreter for Stalin, and by Shi Zhe, a former official in the Chinese foreign ministry who Finally, there are a few conspicuous interpreted for Mao. Both men were present

cerns.

during all the high-level Sino-Soviet meetings in 1949-1950.14 Although Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that several points of contention had surfaced between Stalin and Mao, they both emphasized that the relationship overall was amicable. Fedorenko specifically took issue with Khrushchev's ac

count:

Later on it was claimed that Stalin had not received Mao Zedong for nearly a month, and in general had not displayed appropriate courtesy toward the Chinese leader. These reports created a false impression of the host and his guest. In actual fact, everything happened quite differently. Judging from what I saw first-hand, the behavior of the two leaders and the overall atmosphere were totally different from subsequent depictions.... From the very first meeting, Stalin invariably displayed the utmost courtesy toward his Chinese counterpart. Throughout the talks with Mao Zedong, Stalin was equable, restrained, and attentive to his guest. His thoughts never wandered and were always completely focused on the conversation.

Likewise, Shi Zhe noted that "Stalin was visibly moved [when he met the Chinese leader] and continuously dispensed compliments to Chairman Mao." Shi dismissed rumors in the West that "Stalin had put Chairman Mao under house arrest” during a particularly tense stage in the negotiations leading up to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alli

ance.

Even with the benefit of new evidence, it is difficult to sort out the discrepancies between these accounts. So far, transcripts of only the first two private meetings between Mao and Stalin-on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950—are available. 15 Both transcripts shed a good deal of light on the Stalin-Mao relationship (not least by confirming how long the interval was between meetings), but they do not, and indeed cannot, convey a full sense of Stalin's behavior toward Mao. Gestures, facial expressions, and even some unflattering comments are apt to be omitted from these stenographic reports either deliberately or inadvertently, just as there are crucial gaps in numerous

other East-bloc documents. 16 The two transcripts also do not reveal anything about unpleasant incidents that may have occurred outside the formal talks. Although retrospective accounts by aides to Stalin and Mao who took part in the meetings can be helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs must be used with extreme caution, especially when they are published long after the events they describe. Khrushchev's recollections were compiled more than 15 years after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko's, Fedorenko's, and Shi's accounts were written nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the memoir-writers relied on notes and documents from the period they were discussing and depicted events as faithfully as they could, the passage of so many years is bound to cause certain failings of memory.I'

17

Two important factors might lead one to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko's version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than to Khrushchev's. First, Fedorenko and Shi participated in all the private talks between Stalin and Mao, whereas Khrushchev and Gromyko were present at only the public meetings.18 Second, it is conceivable that Khrushchev was inclined to depict Stalin's behavior in an unduly negative light. (Khrushchev may have done this sub-consciously, or he may have been seeking to lay the "blame" on Stalin for the subsequent rupture with China.) By contrast, Fedorenko had no obvious reason by 1989 (the height of the Gorbachev era) to want to defend Stalin. One could therefore make a prima facie case on behalf of Fedorenko's ac

count.

On the other hand, most of the latest evidence tends to support Khrushchev's and Gromyko's versions, rather than Fedorenko's. One of the most trusted aides to Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, who remained a staunch defender of the Soviet dictator even after being ousted by Khrushchev in June 1957, later recalled that when the Chinese delegation came to Moscow in December 1949, Mao had to wait many days or even weeks after his initial perfunctory meeting with Stalin until the Soviet leader finally agreed to receive him again. 19 This corresponds precisely to what Khrushchev said, and it is confirmed by the sequence of the transcripts, as noted above. Khrushchev's account is further strengthened by the recollections of General Ivan

Kovalev, a distinguished Soviet military officer who served as Stalin's personal envoy to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In a lengthy interview in 1992, Kovalev recounted the tribulations and rudeness that Mao had experienced during his visit:

Mao was met [on 16 December] by Bulganin and Molotov, who brusquely turned down his invitation to join him for a meal, saying that it would be contrary to protocol. For the same reason, they declined Mao's invitation to ride with him to his assigned dacha. . . . Mao was clearly upset by the cool reception. That same day, Stalin received Mao Zedong, but they held no confidential talks of the sort that Mao had wanted. After that, Mao spent numerous boring days at the dacha. Molotov, Bulganin, and Mikoyan stopped by to see him, but had only very brief official conversations. I was in touch with Mao and saw him every day, and I was aware that he was upset and apprehensive.20

Kovalev also noted that in late December, Mao asked him to convey a formal request to Stalin for another private meeting, indicating that "the resolution of all matters, including the question of [Mao's] spare time and medical treatment, [would] be left entirely to your [i.e., Stalin's] discretion."21 According to Kovalev, this appeal went unheeded, and "as before, Mao remained practically in isolation." Even when Mao "retaliated by refusing to meet with Roshchin, our ambassador to China," it had no effect on Stalin. Kovalev emphasized that it was "not until Zhou Enlai emphasized that it was "not until Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow at the end of January 1950 that the talks finally proceeded more successfully." All this amply corroborates what Khrushchev wrote.

Khrushchev's depiction of the StalinMao relationship is also borne out by newly declassified testimony from another key source, namely Mao himself. In a private meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China in late March 1956, Mao spoke bitterly about the "ugly atmosphere" he had confronted in Moscow in 1950 and about the "profound distrust and suspicion" that Stalin had shown toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Mao also recalled the "insulting" treatment he had suffered after his prelimi

nary discussions with Stalin:

From then on, Stalin sought to avoid me. I tried, for my part, to phone Stalin's apartment, but was told that he was not home and that I should meet with Mikoyan instead. I was offended by all this, and so I decided that I would not do anything more and would simply spend my time resting at the dacha. Then I had an unpleasant conversation with Kovalev and Fedorenko, who suggested that I go for a trip around the country. I flatly rejected this proposal and said that I might as well just "go on sleeping at my dacha."22

Mao revealed these "problems and difficulties" to his Chinese colleagues as well, albeit somewhat more discreetly. In a secret speech at the CCP's Chengdu conference in March 1958, Mao averred that he had been forced into humiliating concessions by Stalin eight years earlier:

In 1950, Stalin and I argued with each other in Moscow for two months about our mutual defense treaty, about the Chungchang railroad, about joint economic ventures, and about our boundary lines. Our attitudes were such that when he offered a proposal which was unacceptable to me, I would resist it; but when he insisted on it, I would give in. I did so for the sake of socialism.23

Mao noted with particular distaste that he had allowed Stalin to get away with treating Manchuria and Xinjiang as mere "colonies" of the Soviet Union-a point mentioned by Zimyanin as well.24 At Chengdu and in numerous other speeches before closed CCP gatherings, Mao repeatedly condemned Stalin's "serious mistakes" and "shortcomings," a practice that suggests long pent-up feelings of animosity toward the late Soviet dictator.25

Furthermore, even some of the comments in Fedorenko's and Shi's own articles imply-if only inadvertently—that the relationship between Stalin and Mao was not really so cordial after all. Both Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that a residue of tension still plagued Sino-Soviet relations in

the early 1950s because of Stalin's refusal during the Chinese civil war to provide greater support for the Communist rebels.26 This tension inevitably caused personal strains between the two leaders, as Mao himself observed during his March 1956 meeting with the Soviet ambassador and in one of his secret speeches two years later at the Chengdu conference:

The victory of the Chinese revolution was against Stalin's wishes.... When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake. We made no protest.27

Shi also recalled how Stalin would lapse into a “sullen” mood during the 1949-50 meetings whenever Mao was being deliberately “evasive." This was particularly evident, according to Shi, when negotiations on the treaty of alliance bogged down and Stalin repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to "gauge Chairman Mao's intentions." Shi added that the testy exchanges between the two leaders prompted Mao at one point to remark sarcastically that Stalin was wont to “blame the Chinese for all the mistakes" in bilateral relations. Similarly, Fedorenko alluded to Stalin's extreme suspiciousness during the talks, as reflected in the Soviet dictator's incessant complaints about “conspiracies," "plots," and "illegal murmurs." This behavior, too, suggests that Stalin may not have been quite as hospitable as Fedorenko initially implied.

Despite the wealth of new evidence, there are still many unresolved questions about the nature of Stalin's relationship with Mao. Further scrutiny of the emerging documentation and first-hand accounts will be essential to set the record straight. Khrushchev's and Gromyko's recollections seem to be corroborated by the latest disclosures, but Fedorenko's and Shi's accounts must be taken seriously, at least for now. Zimyanin's analysis, with its strong criticism of Soviet policy during the early 1950s, is more compatible with Khrushchev's version than with Fedorenko's, but the report provides no conclusive evidence one way or the other.

• The crises in Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956. During the standoff between the Soviet Union and Poland in October 1956, Chinese officials generally supported the defiant Polish leader,

Wladyslaw Gomulka, and urged the Soviet Union to forgo military intervention in Poland. Ultimately, Khrushchev did accept a peaceful settlement with Gomulka. Senior Chinese officials also initially counseled against an invasion of Hungary when they traveled to Moscow on October 30 for emergency consultations. By that point, Khrushchev and his colleagues were no longer confident that "the Hungarian working class" could "regain control of the situation and suppress the uprising on its own," but they agreed for the time being to desist from further intervention in Hungary. 28 Less than 24 hours later, however, the Soviet authorities reversed their decision and voted in favor of a large-scale invasion.29 When Mao Zedong was informed of this last-minute change, he immediately and strongly endorsed the Soviet decision, not least because Imre Nagy had announced on November 1 (the day after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade) that Hungary was pulling out of the Warsaw Pact and establishing itself as a neutral state.

China subsequently became the most vocal supporter of the invasion and even publicly welcomed the execution of Imre Nagy in June 1958, but the whole episode, as Chinese officials later confirmed, had a jarring effect in Beijing. Zimyanin prominently cited the Soviet declaration of 30 October 1956 in his report, but he made no mention of the turmoil that had given rise to the declaration or of the actions that followed.

•Sino-Soviet policies in the Third World. In the late 1950s, Chinese leaders began vigorously championing and, where possible, actively promoting-"wars of national liberation" and “anti-imperialist struggles" in the developing world.30 This strategy mirrored the growing radicalization of China's domestic politics at the time. It also flowed naturally from Mao's view, first enunciated in November 1957, that "the East Wind is now stronger than the West Wind." Recent Soviet breakthroughs with long-range nuclear missiles, according to Mao, would deter Western countries from responding to Communist-backed guerrilla movements. Soviet leaders tended to be more cautious at least rhetorically-than their Chinese counterparts, not least because they were aware that the East-West military balance had not improved as much as most Chinese officials assumed. Soviet leaders periodi

cally warned that local Third World conflicts could escalate to a highly destructive global war if the superpowers directly intervened on opposing sides.

In terms of actual policy, however, the difference between Soviet and Chinese approaches was relatively small.31 If only for logistical reasons, it was the Soviet Union, not China, that had been the primary arms supplier to Communist insurgents in numerous Third World countries (e.g., Indonesia, Malaya, South Vietnam, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Cuba).32 Moreover, Chinese leaders, for all their seeming belligerence, were often hesitant about translating rhetoric into concrete policy. In private discussions with Soviet officials, senior Chinese representatives argued that "reasonable caution" was needed even when "conditions were ripe for the spread of progressive ideas in certain [Third World] countries."33

Despite the underlying similarities between Chinese and Soviet policies, the two Communist states were bound to disagree at times. This was evident in July 1958 when a leftist coup against Iraq's pro-Western government sparked a brief but intense crisis in the Middle East, leading to U.S. and British troop landings in Lebanon and Jordan. Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials urged the Soviet Union to take a firm stand against "American imperialist aggression" in the Middle East, a task that China itself could not perform because of its lack of power-projection capabilities. Contrary to Beijing's wishes, however, Soviet leaders quickly decided there was little to be gained by risking a direct East-West confrontation.34 Rather than sending "volunteers" to the Middle East or extending an overt military guarantee to the new Iraqi regime (as urged by Beijing), the Soviet Union relied mainly on diplomacy and called for a special UN-sponsored meeting to resolve the situation. Although the peak of the crisis had subsided (and Sino-Soviet differences on this score had seemingly waned) by the time Khrushchev arrived in China at the end of July 1958, the ongoing tensions in the Middle East were a prominent topic of discussion during his visit.35 The resulting exchanges may have been partly responsible for the bolder stance that the Soviet Union took during the Quemoy Islands crisis a few weeks later (see below).

Judging from numerous documents prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far

Eastern department in 1958 and early 1959, there is no doubt Zimyanin was aware that Chinese leaders had been disappointed by Soviet policy during the first ten days of the 1958 Middle Eastern crisis, when it still appeared that U.S. and British forces might try to restore a pro-Western government in Iraq. The initial phase of the crisis marked one of the first times that Soviet and Chinese policies in the Third World had diverged, albeit only temporarily.36 It is odd, therefore, that Zimyanin's briefing report for Khrushchev barely mentioned the crisis and gave no intimation that Beijing and Moscow had been at odds about the best way to handle it.

• Lessons derived from the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. Shortly before Khrushchev's trip to Beijing in July-August 1958, the Chinese Communist Party's Military Affairs Committee (which had been meeting in an extraordinary two-month session since 27 May 1958) approved Mao's plans for a major operation in late August to recapture China's small offshore islands. The aim of the operation was to weaken or even undermine the Guomintang (Chinese Nationalist) government in Taiwan by exposing its inability to defend against an attack from the mainland.37 Khrushchev was not explicitly informed of the proposed undertaking during his visit to Beijing, but he was told in general terms that a military operation was being planned to “bring Taiwan back under China's jurisdiction."38 The Soviet leader welcomed the news and offered both political and military backing for China's efforts. In the first few weeks of August the Soviet Union transferred longrange artillery, amphibious equipment, airto-air missiles, and combat aircraft to China in the expectation that those weapons would facilitate a "decisive move against the Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] regime.”39 Soviet military advisers also were sent to China to help supervise—and, if necessary, take part in the upcoming operation.

Although Chinese and Soviet leaders assumed (or at least hoped) that the action would not provoke a direct military response from the United States, this assumption proved erroneous from the very start. After the Chinese army launched a heavy artillery bombardment of the Quemoy Islands on August 23 and Chinese patrol boats were sent to blockade Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts,

the United States responded by deploying a huge naval contingent to the Taiwan Straits. Simultaneously, top U.S. officials, including President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, publicly reaffirmed their commitment to protect Taiwan against Chicommitment to protect Taiwan against Chinese incursions and to counter any naval threats in the Taiwan Straits.40 The strongest warning to this effect came on September 4, three days before heavily armed U.S. ships began escorting Taiwanese vessels on resupply missions to Quemoy. U.S. naval aircraft also were called into action to support the Taiwanese air force as it established control of the region's airspace. In a rapid series of air battles, Taiwanese pilots flying U.S.made fighters routed their Chinese opponents, casting serious doubt on the quality of China's air crews and Soviet-made MiGs.41 These humiliating defeats forced Mao and several of his top military commanders onto the defensive during subsequent intra-party debates.42

The unexpectedly forceful U.S. response posed a dilemma for Chinese and Soviet leaders.43 On September 5, Mao privately acknowledged to the PRC's Supreme State Conference that he "simply had not anticipated how roiled and turbulent the world would become" if China "fired a few rounds of artillery at Quemoy and Matsu."44 Confronted by the threat of U.S. military retaliation, Mao abandoned any hopes he may have had at the time of seizing the offshore islands or, perhaps, attacking Taiwan.45 Although Chinese artillery units continued in September and early October to shell U.S.-escorted convoys as they landed with resupplies in Quemoy, these actions were coupled with efforts to defuse the crisis by diplomatic means. Most notably, on September 6, Zhou Enlai proposed a resumption of Sino-American ambassadorial talks, and on October 6 the Chinese government announced a provithe Chinese government announced a provisional cease-fire, effectively bringing the crisis to an end. The continued bombardment of Quemoy had posed some risk that wider hostilities would break out, but Chinese leaders were careful throughout the crisis to avoid a direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Mao's retreat came as a disappointment to some of his colleagues because of his earlier claims that the United States was merely a "paper tiger." At a meeting of senior Chinese officials in late November (several weeks after the crisis had been defused), Mao even found it necessary to re

buke the "many people both inside and outside the Party who do not understand the paper tiger problem.”46

Soviet leaders, for their part, were convinced until late September that the PRC's effort to get rid of Jiang Jieshi was still on track. When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko flew secretly to Beijing shortly after the crisis began, he found that Mao was still expressing hope of "responding with force against force."47 After hearing back from Gromyko, Khrushchev followed up on his earlier pledge to support the Chinese operation. On September 7, while U.S. ships were embarking on their first escort missions, the Soviet leader issued a public warning that any attack against mainland China would be deemed an attack against the Soviet Union as well.48 This warning was followed two weeks later by a declaration that any use of nuclear weapons against China would be grounds for a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States. Many Western analysts have claimed that these two Soviet statements were largely cosmetic, and that Khrushchev toughened his rhetoric only when he believed there was no longer any danger of war. New evidence does not bear out this long-standing view. A week after Khrushchev issued his initial warning, he met secretly with the Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, and gave every indication that he still expected and hoped that China would proceed with its “decisive” military action against Taiwan.49 Although Khrushchev clearly wanted to avoid a war with the United States, the failure of U.S. aircraft carriers to attack mainland China after Chinese artillery units resumed their bombardment of Quemoy gave the Soviet leader reason to believe (or at least hope) that U.S. forces would not follow through on their commitment to defend Taiwan. Later on, Khrushchev acknowledged that he had felt betrayed when he finally realized in late September/early October that Mao had decided to bail out of the operation.50

To that extent, the Quemoy crisis ended up sparking discord between Soviet and Chinese officials, but for a much different reason from what has usually been suggested. Most Western analysts have argued that Chinese leaders were dismayed when the Soviet Union allegedly provided only lukewarm military backing for the probe against Taiwan.51 New evidence suggests that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union did

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