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everything it had promised to do in support submarine-launched ballistic missiles Differences about Soviet efforts to of the Chinese operation, and that it was (SLBMS), the naval version of the SS-1B.56 seek improved ties with the United States. China, not the USSR, that was unwilling to Although the R-11FM had a maximum range Starting in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union follow through.52 This outcome explains of just 162 kilometers and could be fired pursued a line of “peaceful coexistence” why Khrushchev, feeling he had been burned only from the surface, it was the most ad- with the United States. Chinese leaders, by once, was determined not to let it happen vanced Soviet SLBM at the time.

contrast, wanted to step up the confrontation again. From then on he emphasized the need Despite the initial success of these ef- between the Communist world and the capifor a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan prob- forts, Soviet leaders decided by early 1958 talist world and to avoid any hint of comprolem, a lesson that Mao was unwilling to that it would be inadvisable, in light of mise. Chinese leaders even claimed that draw, for fear it would expose the magnitude Beijing's territorial claims against the So- they were willing, in extremis, to risk a of his failure in the Quemoy crisis. These viet Union, to fulfill the pledge undertaken global nuclear war in the “struggle against different views became a sore point in Sino- in the NDTA to supply a prototype nuclear imperialism.” To be sure, the connection Soviet relations, as was evident during bomb to the PRC.57 Chinese officials were between rhetoric and concrete policy was Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in the autumn not informed of this decision until nearly a often tenuous; in 1958, China quickly backed of 1959.53 Zimyanin's brief discussion of year and a half later, and in the meantime down when confronted by a massive U.S. Soviet policy during the Quemoy crisis does mutual recriminations occurred behind the naval force in the Taiwan Straits. Neverthenot mention the frustration that Soviet lead- scenes when the promised shipment repeat- less, even after that humiliating retreat, offiers felt and the lasting impact this had on edly failed to materialize. Khrushchev tried cials in Beijing continued to insist that “if the Khrushchev’s approach to the Taiwan issue. to alleviate the burgeoning tension when he imperialists launch an all-out war," it inevi

Soviet assistance to China's nuclear traveled to Beijing at the end of July 1958, tably would result in “victory” for the Comweapons program. When Chinese leaders but his trip proved of little avail in this munist states and “inspire hundreds of milformally decided in January 1955 to pursue respect and tensions continued to increase. lions of people to turn to socialism.” Mao's an independent nuclear weapons program, Finally, in a secret letter dated 20 June 1959, seeming indifference to the potential consethey did so in the expectation that they Soviet leaders formally notified their Chi- quences of nuclear war chastened Soviet would receive elaborate advice and backing nese counterparts that no prototype bombs leaders, who were concerned that the Soviet from Moscow. Between January 1955 and or detailed technical blueprints would be Union might be drawn into a large-scale December 1956 the Soviet Union and China provided. The letter infuriated the Chinese, conflict against its will.60 Soviet officials concluded four preliminary agreements on

but Khrushchev and his colleagues were like Zimyanin were fully cognizant of these bilateral cooperation in uranium mining, willing to pay that price at a time when, in divergent outlooks (and the high-level connuclear research, and uranium enrichment, their view, Sino-Soviet “relations were cern they had provoked in Moscow), so it is and these were followed in October 1957 by steadily deteriorating” and the NDTA was odd that he made no more than an oblique the signing of a New Defense Technology “already coming unraveled.”58 Curiously, reference to the matter. Agreement (NDTA), which provided for the letter did not yet cause officials in Beijing Nor did Zimyanin mention the disagreebroad Soviet assistance to China in the de- to give up all hope of obtaining further ments between Moscow and Beijing about velopment of nuclear warheads and delivery assistance from Moscow on nuclear arms. the value of East-West arms control. Chivehicles. 54 Soon thereafter, Soviet nuclear At the summit in October 1959, Chinese nese officials were deeply suspicious of the weapons scientists and engineers were dis- prime minister Zhou Enlai formally requested U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the late 1950s patched to China, sensitive information was Soviet aid in the development and produc- aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear transferred, equipment was sold for uranium tion of nuclear-powered strategic subma- test ban. Chinese leaders feared that their processing and enrichment, and prepara- rines and longer-range, solid-fueled SLBMs. country, too, would come under pressure to

, tions were made to ship a prototype nuclear Khrushchev immediately turned down both sign a test ban treaty (even though they had bomb to the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Re- proposals, thus dashing any lingering ex- taken no part in the negotiations), and that search Institute for training and instruction pectations that Mao and Zhou still had of this would effectively end China's hopes of purposes. In addition, a group of high- pursuing new forms of nuclear-weapons co- becoming a nuclear power.61 The inception ranking Soviet military specialists were sent operation or of at least reviving the NDTA.59 of a U.S.-Soviet test moratorium in the spring to help the Chinese establish new regiments The Soviet Foreign Ministry had not of 1958, coupled with the Soviet letter of 20 for nuclear-capable SS-1 (8A11) and SS-2 been involved in the implementation of the June 1959 (which explicitly cited the test (8Zh38) tactical missiles,55 The Soviet of- NDTA, but senior ministry officials most ban negotiations as a reason not to supply a ficers not only gave detailed advice on the likely were aware that nuclear assistance prototype nuclear bomb to China), intensitechnology and operational uses of the mis- was being provided to China. (After all, the fied Beijing's concerns that arms control siles, but also helped find suitable locations Foreign Ministry had been the initial contact talks were antithetical to China's nuclear for SS-1/SS-2 test ranges and deployment point for Chinese leaders in mid-1957 when ambitions.62 Zimyanin was well aware of fields. Similar cooperative arrangements they sought to open negotiations for the these differences, but chose not to bring were established for naval delivery vehicles. agreement.) Hence, it is surprising that The Soviet Union provided China with tech- Zimyanin did not bring up this matter at all, China's deepening confrontation with nical data, designs, components, and pro- apart from two oblique references to “ques- India. Sino-Indian relations had been harduction equipment for liquid-fueled R-11FM tions of defense cooperation.”

monious for several years after the Commu

them up.

nists took power in Beijing, but the relation- provided for subsidized credits to India of to China was quite different. The MFA ship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as some $385 million over five years.

ended up with a dominant role in the prepaa result of differences over Tibet and the These events were still under way—and rations for the trip, thanks in part to a delibdisputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the tensions along the Sino-Indian border were erate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater Himalayas.63 In the spring of 1959 China still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his say for the Foreign Ministry in policy tocrushed a popular revolt in Tibet and de- report, so it was probably too early for him to ward China.72 When Gromyko first asked ployed many thousands of extra troops on gauge the significance of Moscow's deci- Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with sion to remain neutral. 68 Even so, it is odd China, the foreign minister knew that he great apprehension in neighboring India. that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian would soon be accompanying Khrushchev Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up on a two-week visit to the United States, a border dispute heated up, leading to a seri- having such a deleterious effect on task that would enable him to bolster the ous incident in late August 1959, when Khrushchev's visit.69

Foreign Ministry's standing (as well as his Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a

own influence) on other issues, especially contested border post at Longju. Although

Zimyanin's Report and

Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in each side blamed the other for the incident,

Soviet Policy-Making

between Khrushchev's two visits in late the clash apparently was motivated in part

September was so limited, briefings for the by the Chinese authorities' desire to take a The submission of Zimyanin's report to China trip had to occur almost entirely on the firm stand against India before Khrushchev Khrushchev was one of several indicators of plane. Gromyko was aware that the other arrived in Beijing.

a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy- senior members of the Soviet “party-govAs recriminations between India and making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the ernment delegation,” led by Mikhail Suslov, China escalated, Chinese officials secretly 1950s the Soviet Union's dealings with the were scheduled to depart for China on Sepurged “the Soviet Union and other fraternal PRC, as with other Communist states, had tember 26-27, while Khrushchev and socialist countries to exploit all possible been handled mainly along party-to-party Gromyko were still in the United States. opportunities” to“conduct propaganda mea- lines. A special CPSU Central Committee Hence, the foreign minister knew he would sures against India” and “expose the subver- department, known after February 1957 as be the only top official accompanying sive role of imperialist and reactionary Ti- the Department for Ties with Communist Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the betan forces” armed and supported by In- and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, 29th and 30th.73 (Gromyko, of course, also dia. 64 These pleas were of no avail. Instead was responsible for keeping track of devel- intended to make good use of his privileged of rallying to China's defense, the Soviet opments in East-bloc countries and for man- access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and Union scrupulously avoided taking sides aging relations with those countries on a day- flight back from, the United States. 74) during the skirmishes, and released a state- to-day basis.70 (Matters requiring high-level Under those circumstances, the Foreign ment on 9 September 1959 expressing hope decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium Ministry's report on China, prepared by that China and India would soon resolve the or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Zimyanin, became the main briefing matematter “in the spirit of their traditional friend- Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded rial for Khrushchev, along with a short upship.”65 Chinese officials were shown the from Soviet policy-making toward China. date (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent TASS statement before it went out, and they On some issues, such as the effort to gain a personnel changes in the Chinese military did their best to persuade Moscow not to seat for Communist China in the United High Command. 75 What is more, Zimyanin release it; but far from helping matters, Nations, the MFA was the only important (who was a member of the MFA Collegium Beijing's latest remonstrations merely in- actor involved. Also, the foreign minister as well as head of the ministry's Far Eastern duced Soviet leaders to issue the statement himself at times played a key role, notably in department) and a number of other senior a day earlier than planned, without any the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing amendments.66 Mao and his colleagues authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold to provide on-site advice and support, somewere so dismayed by the Soviet Union's secret negotiations with Mao about “issues thing that had not happened during refusal to back its chief Communist ally in of war and peace, the international situation, Khrushchev's earlier visits to China.76 Ala dispute with a non-Communist state that and the policy of American imperialism.”71 though the head of the CPSU CC department they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign forintra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and on September 13 claiming that “the TASS Ministry's input was limited. Apart from a few other CC department heads also travstatement has revealed to the whole world standard diplomatic support, the MFA had eled to China as advisers, the Foreign the divergence of views between China and contributed relatively little during Ministry's role during the visit was far more the Soviet Union regarding the incident on Khrushchev's two previous visits to China salient than in the past. (This was reflected the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as in Gromyko’s own role as well; among other has literally brought joy and jubilation to the well as his visits to most other Communist things, he was the only Soviet official beIndian bourgeoisie and to American and states. The bulk of the preparations had been sides Suslov who took part in all of British imperialism.”67 The irritation and handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Khrushchev's talks with Mao and Zhou sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two Central Committee departments and by Enlai.77) Hence, Zimyanin’s report proved days later when Soviet and Indian leaders Khrushchev's own staff.

highly influential. signed a much-publicized agreement that In that respect, the September 1959 trip As things worked out, however, the




MFA's expanded role had little effect one nior ideological officials from the CPSU, months after he took over the Far Eastern way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. especially Leonid Ilyichev and Mikhail

especially Leonid Ilyichev and Mikhail department and a month after Khrushchev’s The trip in September-October 1959 left Suslov, ended up handling most of the So- ouster.) During the rest of the 1960s the crucial differences unresolved, and the two viet Union's polemical exchanges and other Foreign Ministry's role in policy-making sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to dealings with China. Throughout the late toward China remained well short of what it take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after 1950s (and even well into 1960) Suslov had had been in September 1959. Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet been the chief proponent within the Soviet The MFA's diminished impact on SinoUnion quietly began pulling some of its key leadership of a conciliatory posture toward Soviet relations was largely unchanged until military technicians out of China.78 Ten- China; but as attitudes on both sides steadily mid-1970, when the Far Eastern department sions increased rapidly over the next several hardened and the split became irreparable, was bifurcated, and the ministry's senior months, culminating in the publication of a Suslov embraced the anti-Chinese line with expert on China, Mikhail Kapitsa, was placed lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April a vengeance, in part to compensate for his in charge of the new “First Far Eastern" 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anni- earlier, more accommodating stance. Oleg department. That department, under versary of Lenin's birthday.79 The state- Rakhmanin, a senior official and expert on Kapitsa's highly visible direction for well ment, entitled “Long Live Leninism!” re- China in the CPSU CC Department for Ties over a decade (until he was promoted to be moved any doubts that Soviet officials and with Communist and Workers' Parties of a deputy foreign minister in December 1982), diplomats still had about the magnitude of Socialist Countries, also gained an increas- was responsible for China, Korea, and the rift between the two countries. 80 Soon ing role in policy toward the PRC.83 Mongolia, while the “Second Far Eastern” thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East Rakhmanin's expertise and aggressive anti- department handled Indonesia, Japan, and European governments became aware of the Maoist stance gave Soviet leaders precisely the Philippines.85 Even after separate deconflict when Chinese officials voiced strong what they needed as the split widened, and partments were established, however, the criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in the result was an even more confrontational continued hostility between China and the Beijing of the World Federation of Trade policy toward Beijing.


Soviet Union left the MFA's First Far EastUnions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a Foreign Ministry employees were not ern department with a relatively modest role few weeks later at the Third Congress of the necessarily any more favorably disposed in policy-making, in part because the departRomanian Communist Party in Bucharest, toward China than senior party officials were, ment overlapped so much with the sections where Khrushchev sought to rebut the com- but the demand for input from the MFA on China, North Korea, and Mongolia in the ments expressed at the WFTU meeting and tended to decline as bilateral tensions grew. CPSU CC Department for Ties with Comto retaliate for China's decision to provide Although Soviet diplomats in China still had munist and Workers' Parties of Socialist other delegates with copies of a confidential important liaison and information-gathering Countries. Not until the 1980s, when relaletter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP roles, the expertise of the MFA's Far Eastern tions between Moscow and Beijing finally leadership. The top Chinese official in department was largely eclipsed during the began to improve, did the Foreign Ministry Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind. 81 1960s. Zimyanin left the department as regain extensive influence over policy to

Amidst growing rancor, the Soviet early as February 1960, having been ap- ward China. That trend was under way as Union withdrew all its remaining military pointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Sub- early as 1982, but it gathered much greater technicians and advisers from China in July sequently (under Brezhnev), Zimyanin momentum after 1986, as Eduard and August 1960, and simultaneously began served briefly as a deputy foreign minister Shevardnadze consolidated his authority as recalling its thousands of non-military per- and then gained prominence within the CPSU Soviet foreign minister. By the time Mikhail sonnel, causing disarray in many of China's in various capacities: as the editor-in-chief Gorbachev traveled to Beijing in May 1989, largest economic and technical projects and of Pravda (from 1965 to 1976), as a full the MFA had acquired a dominant role in scientific research programs.82 Although Central Committee member (from 1966 on), policy-making toward China. Soviet and Chinese officials managed to and, most important of all, as a CPSU CC The status of the Foreign Ministry on gloss over the dispute at a "world confer- Secretary, beginning in 1976.

this issue was never quite as prominent durence” of 81 Communist parties in Moscow Like Zimyanin, the new head of the ing Andrei Gromyko’s long tenure as forin November 1960, the polemics and re- Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, eign minister (1957-1985), but the MFA's criminations soon resumed, with ever greater I.I. Tugarinov, was already a member of the influence did temporarily expand in 1959 on stridency. Subsequently, as news of the MFA Collegium at the time of his appoint- the eve of the Sino-Soviet split. Zimyanin's conflict spread throughout the world, ment, but aside from that one distinction, report thus symbolized a high point for the Khrushchev and Mao made a few additional Tugarinov was an obscure official whose ministry vis-a-vis China in the preattempts to reconcile their differences; but tenure at the department lasted only until

Gorbachev era. the split, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes August 1963. His successor, N. G. The translation of Zimyanin's report of restoring a semblance of unity in the Sudarikov, was not yet even a member of the follows below: international Communist movement were MFA Collegium when he became head of dashed.

the Far Eastern department, a telling sign of The downward spiral of Sino-Soviet the department's waning influence. relations after Khrushchev's visit in 1959 (Sudarikov was not appointed to the tended to rigidify Soviet policy-making. Se- Collegium until November 1964, some 15




Soviet-Chinese Relations

tions. It created an atmosphere conducive to ing the rightist elements, did not offer any

a more frequent and more amicable exchange open condemnation of statements expressed The victory of the people's revolution

of candid views. The Chinese friends began by them about so-called “territorial claims in China and the establishment of the Chi

to speak more openly about their plans and on the USSR.”

difficulties and, at the same time, to express nese People's Republic marked the start of

The Soviet government's declaration of a qualitatively new stage in relations be

critical comments (from a friendly position) 30 October 1956 [endorsing the principle of tween the peoples of the Soviet Union and

about Soviet organizations, the work of So- equality in relations between the Soviet

viet specialists, and other issues in Soviet- Union and other communist countries—ed.] China, based on a commonality of interests

Chinese relations. The CPC CC [Commu- was received with great satisfaction in and a unity of goals in constructing a social

nist Party of China Central Committee) fully China. 94 In January 1957 a government ist and Communist society in both coun

supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the tries.

the cult of personality and its consequences. Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a

It is worth noting, however, that the CPCCC, joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration.95 The When discussing the overall success of

while not speaking about this directly, took a Declaration emphasized the complete unity the development of Soviet-Chinese rela

position different from ours when evaluating of the USSR and PRC as an important factor tions during the first three years after the position different from ours when evaluating

the activity of J. V. Stalin. 90 A bit later the in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it formation of the PRC, we must not overlook

Chinese comrades reexamined their evalua- exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched several negative features of these relations

tion of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in claims about a “struggle between the CPSU connected with the violation of the sover

Mao Zedong's pronouncements when he was and CPC for the right to leadership of world eign rights and interests of the Chinese

visiting Moscow.91 For example, he said: “. Communism.” In accordance with the DecPeople's Republic, as reflected in bilateral

.. Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now laration, the Soviet Union devised and impleagreements signed between the Soviet Union

have the same view as the CPSU.” In a mented concrete measures aimed at the furand PRC, including, for example, agree

number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a ther development of Soviet-Chinese friendments to prohibit foreigners from entering

critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. ship and cooperation on the basis of equalManchuria and Xinjiang(14 February 1950), Stalin.

ity, mutual interest, and complete trust. to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock com

Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a In 1957 a series of consultations took panies, and to set the rate of exchange for the

campaign was launched in China to combat place between the CPSU CC and the CPC ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents. 86

dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to CC on common, concrete matters pertaining “let a hundred flowers bloom."-92 In connec

to the international situation and the ComBeginning in 1953, the Soviet side took

tion with this the Chinese press began, with munist movement. The Chinese friends measures to eliminate everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position increasing frequency, to express criticism of actively participated in the preparations and

, vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the suc

specific conditions and of works by Soviet conduct of the Moscow conference of offi

authors in the fields of philosophy, natural cials from Communist and workers' parties cessful development of Soviet-Chinese re

history, literature, and art. This inevitably in November 1957.96 While the Chinese lations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.87 Over time, the above

gave strong impetus to hostile statements by delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong mentioned agreements were annulled or re

rightist forces who denounced the Soviet spoke approvingly about the positive expe

Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rience of such consultations and the constant vised if they did not accord with the spirit of

rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing readiness of the Chinese comrades to underfraternal friendship. The trip to China by a

to uphold principles of equality and mutual- take a joint review of these and other matSoviet party and state delegation headed by C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October ity, and they alleged that Soviet assistance

was self-interested and of inferior quality. The steps to reorganize the manage1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting rela

They also asserted that the Soviet Union had ment of the national economy in the USSR

not provided compensation for equipment were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The tions. As a result of this visit, joint declara

taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that tions were signed on Soviet-Chinese rela

CPC CC fully supported the decisions of the the Soviet Union was extracting money from tions and the international situation and on

June [1957] and other plenary sessions of China in return for weapons supplied to the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press relations with Japan.88 In addition, a com

Korea, which were already paid for with the did not feature an official commentary munique and additional agreements were

blood of Chinese volunteers. 93 In addition, reactions to the decisions of these sessions. signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the

After details about the activity of the AntiSoviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock they lodged a number of territorial demands companies responsible for scientific-tech- against the USSR. The airing of these types Party faction had been explained to the CPC

of statements during the struggle against CC, the friends began to speak more resonical cooperation, the construction of a

rightists can in no way be justified, even if lutely about these matters. “If Molotov’s Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the

one takes account of the tactical aims of our line had prevailed within the CPSU,” Mao construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator rail

friends, who were seeking to unmask the declared in Moscow, “that would have been road, and so forth.89 The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against dangerous not only for the USSR, but for

them for all their statements. It is also worth other socialist countries as well.":98 exceptionally great importance for the fur

noting that the Chinese friends, despite crush- Taking account of the divisive activity ther improvement of Soviet-Chinese rela

ters. 97

USSR. 105

of revisionists and the surge of imperialist The letter from Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, began to display a more proper understand


a propaganda, which tried to use several ideo- and a variety of reports from the CPSU ing of matters considered by the 21st Conlogical campaigns in China in 1957—and, in CC—about the provision of assistance to the gress, such as the question of the signifiparticular, the campaign to “let a hundred PRC to continue strengthening its defense cance of creating a material-technical base flowers bloom” as well as the publication of capability, about a reduction in the number and increasing the productivity of labor for a work by Mao Zedong “On the Question of of Soviet specialists in the PRC and the the construction of socialism, the question Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among elimination of the network of Soviet “ad- of the role of the principle of material incenthe People”—to provoke a schism in rela- viser-consultants,” about the CPSU CC's tives and labor distribution under socialism, tions between the Soviet Union and PRC, views of the Yugoslav Communist League's and other questions. the leadership of the CPC CC and the gov- draft program, and about other matters- The CPSU's position in offering a prinernment of the PRC emphasized the close had important political benefits.

cipled explanation of a number of Marxistunity of the socialist camp and the leading The results of the CPSU's 21st Con- Leninist precepts and laws of the building of role of the CPSU among Communist and gress provided a great boost to the practical socialism and Communism, which were igworkers' parties. Mao Zedong stated this activity of the CPC in overseeing socialist nored in China during the implementation of very definitively in his speech to Chinese construction in the country. 104 It is worth the “Great Leap Forward” and the establishstudents attending Moscow State University noting that after the publication of the theses ment of communes (see the report and speech (November 1957), and he spoke about it at of the report by Cde. N.S. Khrushchev at the by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Conlength with officials from Yugoslavia and CPSU's 21st Congress and during the pro- gress and the speeches that followed), helped also during meetings that PRC government ceedings of the Congress, the Chinese friends, the Chinese comrades to evaluate the situadelegations had with delegations from Po- while giving a generally positive evaluation tion correctly and to begin rectifying the land and other countries of the socialist of the achievements of socialist construction mistakes and shortcomings that had arisen. camp. 99 In 1959 the CPC CC, having reex- in the USSR, made almost no mention of the The statement by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev amined the proposal of the CPSU CC to theoretical portions of the report by Cde. about the permanent foundations of Sovietclarify its formula about the leading role of N.S. Khrushchev and said that those por- Chinese friendship swept the rug out from the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, again tions related only to the practice of socialist under imperialist and Yugoslav revisionist affirmed that this formula must be preserved and Communist construction in the propaganda, which was intended to sow in the future.

mistrust between our countries and provoke The durability of Soviet-Chinese rela- In a similar vein, the provisions adopted a deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. tions and the role of Soviet-Chinese friend- at the Second Session of the CPC's 8th ship gained new strength as the international Congress (May 1958) regarding a struggle An analysis of Soviet-Chinese relations situation deteriorated in the Middle East and against “blind faith” and regarding the need over the past decade confirms that relations also in connection with the provocations by to foster sentiments of national pride among of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation the USA around the Taiwan Straits in the the people, as well as some preliminary have been established on a lasting basis and summer of 1958. The most important politi- success in implementing the “Great Leap are growing wider and stronger with every cal event that year in Soviet-Chinese rela- Forward,” caused a number of cadre work- passing year. These relations are a decisive tions, which had an enormously positive ers in the PRC to take on airs. 106 They factor in the further growth of the might and influence on the development of the whole began excessively emphasizing China's cohesion of the world socialist camp and in international situation, was the July-August uniqueness and displaying a guarded atti- the consolidation of world peace and the meeting in Beijing between Comrades N. S. tude toward Soviet experience and the rec- security of nations. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. 100 During ommendations of Soviet specialists. 107 an exchange of views they considered a Some began declaring that the Soviet Union

1. N. S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, 6 vols. (Moscow: number of matters pertaining to Soviet-Chi- had stayed too long at the socialist stage of typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. 5 (“Vzaimootnosheniya s

sotsialisticheskimi nese relations and, in particular, questions of development, while China was moving val

stranami"), Part military cooperation.101 The speech by iantly ahead toward Communism. The Chi

(“Vzaimootnosheniya s Kitaem”), pp. 77-78.

2. “Vnutripoliticheskoe, ekonomicheskoe i Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, including his state- nese press quite actively featured criticism

mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie KNR,” Fond (F.)5, Opis’ ment that an attack on the PRC would be of the socialist principles implemented in (Op.) 30, Delo (D.) 307, Listy (Ll.) 49-79, TsKhSD. regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union the USSR for the distribution of material

3. The section, entitled "Sovetsko-kitaiskie

otnosheniya," is on Ll. 71-79. itself, was fervently greeted with expres- goods in accordance with one's labor, for the

4. For two quite different versions of this theme, see sions of gratitude and approval in China. 102 compensation of labor on a job-by-job basis, Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956The government of the PRC displayed great and so forth. Some authors essentially ar- 1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962);

and Steven M. Goldstein, "Nationalism and Internasatisfaction at our assurance about our readi- gued that communes were incompatible with

tionalism: Sino-Soviet Relations," in Thomas W. ness to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation kolkhozes. 108

Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Forfor a nuclear strike against China. 103 In Later on, after studying materials from eign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon turn, the Chinese government declared that the Congress and after numerous mistakes Press, 1994), 224-265, esp. 224-248. Zagoria argues the PRC will come to the assistance of the arose during the establishment of the peas

that China's policy vis-a-vis other countries (including

the Soviet Union) was largely determined by the shiftUSSR in any part of the globe if an attack is ant communes and during the implementa- ing fortunes of “left” and “right” factions within the carried out against it.

tion of the “Great Leap Forward,” the CPC Chinese leadership. Goldstein attributes the collapse of


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