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Sino-Soviet cooperation to a “fundamental change in 1818. [Mao's own] domestic political priorities,” which el

9. See, e.g., “The Origin and Development of the Differ

, evated "national” over "internationalist" concerns. ences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and OurAlthough Goldstein does not dismiss factional politics selves: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central altogether, he argues that “Mao was able to set the tone Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of and the agenda of Chinese politics” himself, and that People's Daily and Red Flag,6 September 1963, in China's relations with the Soviet Union were therefore Peking Review 6:37 (13 September 1963), 6-23. “decisively altered” when “Mao's thought about 10. Among countless studies citing 1956 as the start of China's domestic condition underwent a sea change in the conflict are Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict; Wilthe years 1956-9” (emphasis added). For an opposing liam E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, MA: view, see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922- The MIT Press, 1964); Francois Fejto, Chine-URSS, de 1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Unlike l'alliance au conflit, 1950-1972 (Paris: Editions due Zagoria and Goldstein (and many others), Gittings Seuil, 1973); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: avers that changes in the external climate led to shifts Unity and Conflict, rev. and enlarged ed. (Cambridge, in Chinese domestic politics, rather than the other way MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), esp. 271-308 and around. For a similar, though more qualified, assessa

357-432; Jean Baby, La grande controverse sinoment, see Michael B. Yahuda, China's Role in World sovietique, 1956-66 (Paris: Grasset, 1966); G.F.Hudson, Affairs (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), esp. 11- "Introduction," in G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, 42 and 102-129. Curiously, very few Western scholars and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dishave attempted to connect shifts in Soviet domestic pute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 1-8; and politics with changes in Soviet policy toward China (or Thomas G. Hart, Sino-Soviet Relations: Re-Examining vice versa). Alexander Dallin outlineda general frame- the Prospects for Normalization (Aldershot: Gower, work in “The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign 1987). For a variant of this point, see Goldstein, “NaPolicy,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context tionalism and Internationalism,"224-242, which claims of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Col.: Westview that Mao's rethinking of Chinese domestic priorities, Press, 1981), 335-408, but he made no specific appli- rather than Khrushchev's secret speech, was the watercation to Soviet ties with China. Carl A. Linden offered shed event in 1956. Among those who cite 1958 as the a few comments about the effect of Soviet leadership beginning of the dispute are Yahuda, China's Role in politics on Khrushchev's stance vis-a-vis China in World Affairs, esp. 102-129; Allen S. Whiting, “The Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 Sino-Soviet Split," in Roderick MacFarquhar and John (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, and Victor Baras discussed the impact of China on Vol. 14: The People's Republic, Part I: The Emergence Soviet leadership politics (1953-1956) in a brief re- of Revolutionary China 1949-1965 (New York: Camsearch note, “China and the Rise of Khrushchev," bridge University Press, 1987), 478-538; and Roderick Studies in Comparative Communism 8:1-2 (Spring- MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Summer 1975), 183-191; but most of Baras's and Vol. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960 (New Linden's observations are speculative and (particu- York: Columbia University Press, 1983), esp. 36-40 larly in Linden's case) not wholly convincing. Even the and 255-292. illuminating book by James G. Richter, Khrushchev's 11. For documentation and analysis of these territorial Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic issues, see Dennis J. Doolin, comp., Territorial Claims Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer- in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis sity Press, 1994), which focuses on the connection (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1965); George between Soviet domestic politics and foreign relations, Ginsburg and Carl F. Pinkeles, The Sino-Soviet Territobarely mentions Soviet policy toward China. It may rial Dispute, 1949-64 (New York: Praeger, 1978); W. well be that domestic-external linkages in Sino-Soviet A. Douglas Jackson, Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone relations, to the extent they existed for either China or of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict?, rev. ed. the USSR, were weaker in the Soviet case, but that (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1968); Tai Sung An, The remains a fitting topic for study.

Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute (Philadelphia: 5. The phrase "reluctant and suspicious ally” comes Westminster Press, 1973), 13-73; and Luke T. Chang, from two recent essays by Steven M. Goldstein which China's Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes (New debunk the notion that China was "forced" into an York: Oceana Publications, 1982), 9-38 and 107-197. alliance with the Soviet Union in 1949-50 because of For an intriguing argument that territorial issues were hostility on the part of the United States. See Goldstein's not at the heart of the Sino-Soviet rift, see Klaus Mehnert, "Nationalism and Internationalism," 231 ff. and "The China nach dem Sturm: Bericht und Kommentar Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937 to 1962: Ideology and (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971), esp. 228Unity," forthcoming in Harry Harding, ed., Patterns of 234. Although Mehnert's case is generally persuasive, Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of China. Zimyanin's report as well as other new evidence (see 6. For further comments by Khrushchev on Stalin's below) suggests that China's territorial claims were a treatment of the PRC, see Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part more serious irritant (at least from the Soviet perspecG, pp. 5-13. See also Andrei Gromyko's remarks on tive) than Mehnert implied. the same subject in A. A. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, 2 vols. 12. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 6(Moscow: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988), 7. Vol. 2, pp. 127-130.

13. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, pp. 128-129. 7. Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Acheson 14. Shi Zhe, "Soprovozhdaya Predsedatelya Mao?," to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 11 February 1950, in U.S. and N. Fedorenko, “Stalin i Mao: besedy v Moskve,” Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United Problemy Dal'nego vostoka 2 (1989), 139-148 and 149States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 6/China (Washington, D.C.: 164, respectively. A slightly abridged version of U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 309. Fedorenko's article appeared as “Nochnye besedy: 8. Memorandum of Eisenhower-Churchill-Bidault Stranitsy istorii,” Pravda (Moscow), 23 October 1988, meeting, 7 December 1953 (Secret), in U.S. Depart- 4. ment of State, FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. 5/China, pp. 1808- 15. “Zapis' besedy tovarishcha Stalina I. V. s

Predsedatelem Tsentral'nogo Narodnogo Pravitel'stva
Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Mao Tsze-dunom 16
dekabrya 1949 g.," Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi
Federatsii (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, 11. 9-17; and
“Zapis' besedy I. V. Stalina s Predsedatelem
Tsentral'nogo Narodnogo Pravitel’stva Kitaiskoi
Narodnoi Respubliki Mao-Tsze-Dunom, 22 yanvarya
1950 g.,” APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, 11. 29-38.
16. Among many examples of gaps in official tran-
scripts are the exchanges deleted from the Polish record
of the five-power meeting in Warsaw in July 1968
(“Protokol ze spotkania przywodcow partii i rzadow
krajow socjalistycznych: Bulgarii, NRD, Polski,
Wegier, i ZSRR,” in Archiwum Akt Nowych, Arch. KC
PZPR, Paczka 193, Tom 24, Dokument 4) and the
Czechoslovak account of the Soviet-Czechoslovak
meeting in Cierna nad Tisou in July-August 1968
(“Zaznam jednani predsednictva UV KSC a UV KSSS
v Cierna n. T., 29.7.-1.8.1968,” in Archiv Ustredniho
Vyboru Komunisticke Strany Ceskoslovenska, Prague,
F. 07/15, Archivna jednotka 274.). In the former case,
discussions held during a formal recess in the talks (as
recorded verbatim in the diaries of a key participant,
Pyotr Shelest') were not included in the final transcript.
This omission was important because the discussions
pertained to military options vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia.
In the latter case, Shelest's anti-Semitic slurs about a
Czechoslovak official, Frantisek Kriegel, were omitted
from the transcript. Fortunately, these derogatory com-
ments were recorded by several participants, including
(fittingly enough) Shelest himself in his diaries.
17. On the need for caution in using memoirs, see Mark
Kramer, “Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis:
Should We Swallow Oral History?" International Se-
curity 15:1 (Summer 1990), 212-218; and Mark Kramer,
“Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,”
Cold War International History Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993),
1, 14-37.
18. The transcripts reveal that, in addition to Stalin, the
Soviet participants in the talks included Vyacheslav
Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, and Andrei Vyshinskii,
plus Anastas Mikoyan and Nikolai Bulganin at some of
the meetings.
19. F. Chuev, ed., Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: Iz
dnevnika F. Chueva (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 114.
20. “Istoriya i sovremennost’: Dialog Stalina s Mao
Tszedunom," Problemy Dal'nego vostoka (Moscow)
1/2 (1992), 109. This comes from the second part of a
fascinating interview with Kovalev by the historian
Sergei N. Goncharov. For the first part of the interview,
as well as background on Kovalev’s career, see Problemy ·
Dal’nego vostoka 6 (1991), 77-91.
21. "Istoriya i sovremennost'," 110.
22. “Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta
1956 g.,” Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F.
Yudin, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in
TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 163, LI. 93-94. Fedorenko's
article referred to the meeting that he and Kovalev had
with Mao, but Fedorenko gave no intimation that Mao
had found anything "unpleasant” about it.
23. Mao's three speeches at the Chengdu conference
were first published in 1969 in a CCP collection, Mao
Zedong sixiang wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong
Thought”), pp. 159-172, the text of which was later
spirited to the West. The speech cited here is the one
delivered on 10 March 1958. An English translation of
the speech first appeared as “Address on March 10," in
Issues & Studies (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95-
98.
24. Mao also discussed this point at length in his March
1956 meeting with Yudin, remarking that Dongbei and

Xinjiang had become a mere zone of Soviet influence." See “Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.," L. 93. 25. For a useful list of collections of Mao's secret speeches, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward, Harvard Contemporary China Series No.6(Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989), 78-81. 26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more nuanced appraisal of Stalin's policy. Among many items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection of documents being compiled under the auspices of the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents from Recent History (RTSKLIDNI): Kommunisticheskaya partiya (Bolsheviki), Komintern, i Narodno-revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae. The first volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been published in several recent issues of the journal Problemy Dalnego vostoka. Perhaps the most intriguing of these is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in JanuaryFebruary 1949, which is presented along with supporting documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan's report, were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei Tikhvinskii and published as “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I. V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g.,” Novaya i noveisha istoriya (Mos

g, cow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, Ll. 95-118. 27. "Address on March 10," 98. For Mao's extended comments on this point during his March 1956 meeting, see “Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.," Ll. 88-92. 28. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part C ("O Vengrii”), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev’s version of events is borne out by a close reading of the Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chinese media spoke positively about the events in Hungary until November 2, the day after Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers suddenly began condemning the "counterrevolution" in Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chinese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht uber die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, IV 2/20, No. 212/02. Other evidence, including the memoir by the then-Yugoslav ambassador in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev's account. (Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev's version is not inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 September 1963 (cited in note 9 supra), despite the way that statement has often been interpreted. Khrushchev's

account and the Chinese statement both indicate that the Soviet leadership hesitated about what to do vis-a-vis Hungary. The Chinese statement does not mention that Chinese officials, too, were initially hesitant, but that omission is hardly surprising and in no way contradicts Khrushchev's account. The September 1963 statement goes on to claim that Chinese leaders "insisted on the adoption of all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of socialist Hungary.” This assertion, too, is compatible with Khrushchev's claim that Mao strongly supported the invasion after the Soviet Presidium had arrived at its final decision on October 31. (Because the Chinese statement omits any chronology, it creates the impression that Mao's backing for an invasion preceded the Soviet decision, but the statement would hold up equally well if, as appears likely, Mao's support for an invasion followed rather than preceded the Soviet decision.) In short, even if the Chinese statement is accurate in all respects, it does not necessarily contravene anything in Khrushchev's account. 29. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsKot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/VI (STRICTLY SECRET), 31 October 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41. 30. Of the myriad Western analyses of this topic, see in particular Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). 31. Far too many Western analysts have overstated the supposed contrast between Soviet and Chinese approaches to the Third World in the 1950s, mistaking rhetorical flourishes for actual policy. 32. See Mark Kramer, "Soviet Arms Transfers and Military Aid to the Third World,” in S. Neil MacFarlane and Kurt M. Campbell, eds., Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas (London: Routledge, 1989), 66-110, esp. 68-70. 33. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi propagandy i kulturnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SECRET) of a speech by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the PRC's Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, 24 April 1959, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, L. 26. 34. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 6(“Otnosheniya s kapitalisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisya stranami”), Part H ("Otnosheniya s arabskimi stranami"), pp. 5758. 35. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze-duna,Pravda (Moscow), 4 August 1958, 1-2. This point was confirmed in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, former Soviet ambassador in China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev during the 1958 trip. 36. In Peking und Moskau (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1962), 388-392, Klaus Mehnert argues that Sino-Soviet differences during the Middle Eastern crisis were negligible, but his analysis applies only to the period after July 23 (i.e., some ten days after the crisis began). Mehnert's comments have no bearing on the initial stage of the crisis, when, as the discussion here has shown, Soviet and Chinese leaders genuinely differed in their views about how to respond. 37. See Allen S. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations,The China Quarterly 62 (June 1975), 263-270. The various post-hoc rationalizations that Mao offered (so that he could avoid admitting what a failure the whole venture had been) should not be

allowed to obscure the real purpose of the operation, as revealed in Mao's secret speeches in September 1958. 38. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 7273. The present author confirmed this point in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador to China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev who accompanied the Soviet leader during this trip to Beijing. 39. Ibid., 73. 40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 293-294, 691-693. 41. Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power (New York: Praeger, 1968), 54-55. 42. See, e.g., Mao's speech on 9 November 1958 at the First Zhengzhou Conference, translated in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, esp. 460-461. 43. For a cogent assessment of Sino-Soviet dynamics during the crisis, see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, “The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,” in Morton H. Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 265-303. Halperin's and Tsou's conclusions differ markedly from standard Western interpretations of the crisis, which posited it as a case of Chinese aggressiveness and Soviet timidity. For a typical example of this view (which, unlike Halperin's and Tsou's analysis, does not fare well in light of new evidence), see John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958,” Orbis 6:1 (Spring 1962), 38-64. John Lewis Gaddis has noted that U.S. officials at the time "interpreted [the bombardment of Quemoy] as a joint Sino-Soviet probe intended to test Western resolve." See “Dividing Adversaries: The United States and International Communism, 1945-1958,” in The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 186-187. Gaddis seems to believe that this perception was not quite accurate, but in fact the evidence amply bears out the views of President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. 44. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 233. Mao's reference to "a few rounds of artillery” is disingenuous to say the least, since the Chinese leader himself acknowledged in a secret speech in April 1959 (ibid., 290) that some 19,000 shells had been fired at Quemoy on 23 August 1958 alone. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the number of shells fired on the first day was closer to 41,000, but whichever figure may be correct, it is clear that far more than “a few rounds of artillery” were fired. 45. As Allen Whiting points out (“Quemoy 1958,” 266267), there is little evidence that Mao intended at this point to attack Taiwan. Instead, he was hoping merely to destabilize the Guomintang government. 46. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 255. See also Whiting, “Quemoy 1958,” 266-267. 47. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, p. 132-133. 48. Full citations for Khrushchev's two major statements, as mentioned here and in the next sentence, are provided below in my annotations to Zimyanin's report. 49. On this point, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 16. 50. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 7374. 51. This also was a theme in official Chinese polemics beginning in 1963. Reliable documentation from 1958 undercuts these post-hoc Chinese accusations.

52. For a slightly different interpretation, see Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” 499-500. 53. Ibid. and “Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Pekine 2 oktyabrya 1959 g.,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SECRET), APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 12-15. 54. For a brief but reliable overview of Sino-Soviet nuclear weapons cooperation, see the highly acclaimed book by John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 39-46, 60-65, 71-72, and 221-222. Additional valuable details, especially about cooperation in delivery vehicle technology, are provided by Lewis and Xue in their subsequent study, China's Strategic Seapower, 2-4, 10-18, 47-49, and 130-134. See also Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W.Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 324-356. For a sample of earlier accounts, see Harold P. Ford, “The Eruption of SinoSoviet Politico-Military Problems, 1957-60,” in Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Praeger, 1966), 100-113; Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 216224; Alice Langley Hsieh, “The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963,Journal of Conflict Resolution 8:2 (June 1964), 99-115 (Hsieh uses the Sino-Soviet exchanges of 1963 to look back at the earlier period of nuclear cooperation as well as the subsequent disputes); Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1962), 70-109; Morton H. Halperin, “Sino-Soviet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960," in Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, 117-143; and Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Praeger, 1965), 78-82. 55. The information here was first revealed by the former head of the Soviet “missile group” in China, Major-General Aleksandr Savel'ev, in Aleksandr Dolinin, "Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1995, 6. 56. Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, 131132. For more on the R-11FM, see Mikhail Turetsky, The Introduction of Missile Systems Into the Soviet Navy (1945-1962), Monograph Series on Soviet Union No. 8 (Falls Church, VA: Delphic Associates, February 1983), 65-72. 57. This is discussed by Khrushchev in Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 98-99. 58. Ibid., p. 98. Details of the NDTA and the June 1959 letter were first publicly revealed in a Chinese broadcaston 15 August 1963, which claimed that Khrushchev had reneged on the agreement so that he would have a gift to take to Eisenhower when visiting the USA in September.” A very similar formulation was used in the official Chinese statement cited in note 9 supra. 59. “Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SECRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F.45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 12-15. For an assessment of the Chinese leadership's perspective on this matter, see Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, 17-18, 133. 60. Khrushchev deals with this point at length in his memoirs; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 7176. See also Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, vol. 2, pp. 133134. 61. On this point, see Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 64-65 and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Nuclear Test Ban and Sino-Soviet Relations," in Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, 146-147. See

also three official Chinese statements released in 1963: "Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons,Peking Review 6:31 (2 August 1963), 7-8; “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of 3 August," Peking Review 6:33 (16 August 1963), 7-15, esp. 8-10; and “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of 21 August,Peking Review 6:36 (6 September 1963), 7-16. These formed the basis of a booklet published in late 1963 by the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing, People of the World, Unite for the Complete, Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons! 62. On 21 January 1960 the Chinese National People's Congress adopted a resolution stipulating that China would not be bound by any arms control agreement unless it had participated in the negotiations and had given its express consent. 63. For background and widely differing perspectives on these matters, see Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 9-74; Wilhelm von Pochhammer, Die Auseinandersetzung um Tibets Grenzen (Frankfurt am Main: A. Metzner, 1962); Alastair Lamb, The ChinaIndia Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Alastair Lamb, The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1975); W. F. Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967); Neville Maxwell, India's China War (New York: Pantheon, 1970), esp. 47-134; Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 1-41; R. K. Jain, ed., China-South Asian Relations, 19471980, 2 vols. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), Vol. 1: India, pp. 97-151; Chang, China's Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes, esp. 61-78; Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh (New York: Praeger, 1963); G. V. Ambekar and V.D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) (New York: Paragon, 1964), 111-186, esp. 111-151; and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 19591962 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). 64. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi propagandy v kul'turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SECRET), 24 April 1959, by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the PRC's Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, Ll. 18, 27. 65. “Zayavlenie TASS," Pravda (Moscow), 10 September 1959, 3. 66. MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 258-260. 67. Cited in O. B. Borisov (pseud.) and B. T. Koloskov, Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii ocherk (Moscow: Mysl', 1972), 155. 68. A more serious incident occurred in late October, two-and-a-half weeks after Khrushchev's visit to China. Nine Indian policemen were killed or wounded and ten were taken prisoner after they clashed with Chinese troops near Kongka Pass in Ladakh (northeastern Kashmir, along the Tibetan border). The Soviet authorities again maintained a policy of strict neutrality in their coverage of this incident, further antagonizing the Chinese.

69. For the effect on Khrushchev's trip, see his Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 78-82. For the official Chinese perspective, see The Truth About How the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with India Against China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1963). 70. CPSU CC General Department, “Otdel TsK KPSS po svyazyam s inostrannymi kompartiyami, mart 1953fevral 1957 g.," 1958 (Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 28, “Predislovie,” L. 2. 71. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, pp. 132-135. According to Gromyko, the talks focused almost exclusively on recent developments in the Taiwan Straits, and were largely unproductive. He said he was “astounded” when Mao nonchalantly proposed that American troops be allowed to penetrate deep into China so that they could be wiped out by a Soviet nuclear strike (p. 133). Gromyko’s retrospective assertions about this particular matter have been controversial from the time they appeared in 1988. A leading Western expert on political-military affairs in China, John Wilson Lewis, has discounted Gromyko's report (see Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, 16 and 258), but has adduced no specific evidence to contradict it. What is known about China's cautious policy during the Quemoy crisis (see above) does raise doubts about Gromyko's claim, but it seems likely that Mao said something reasonably close, and that Gromyko may have somewhat misinterpreted it. After all, on 5 September 1958 Mao told a closed gathering of the PRC's Supreme State Conference that China should be ready, if necessary, for a "war in which hydrogen bombs” would be used: “If we must fight, we will fight. If half the people die, there is still nothing to fear.” (See Mao Zedong sixiang wansui, 1969, p. 237.) Assuming that Mao said roughly the same thing to Gromyko, it is plausible that the Chinese leader also made comments similar to what Gromyko alleged. This is the view of Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader during his trip to China in 1958, a few weeks before Gromyko's visit. In an interview in Cambridge, Massachusetts on 6 October 1995, Troyanovskii said, “I recall hearing something about this at the time, after the crisis began. It fits in with what Mao said during the Moscow conference in November 1957, which shocked us all." 72. For background, see A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya diplomata, sovetnika A. A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L. I. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Andropova, K. U. Chernenko i M. S. Gorbacheva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), 71-72; and O. Grinevskii, “Na Smolenskoi Ploshchadi v 1950-kh godakh,” Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' (Moscow) 11 (November 1994), 120-126, esp. 124. 73. “Pribytie N. S. Khrushcheva v kitaiskuyu stolitsu: Vstrecha na aerodrome Shoudu,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 October 1959, 1. 74. A very useful account of Khrushchev's interactions with Gromyko during the trip is in Khrushchev's Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part E ("O poezdke v SSLA"), pp. 7-25. Khrushchev notes that he “greatly respected Gromyko as foreign minister both during this time and afterwards” (p. 8). 75. A cover note on Zimyanin's report alludes to a onepage update, but the text has not yet been located. No doubt, the update cited the announcement on 17 September 1959 that the Chinese defense minister, Marshal Peng Dehuai, was being replaced by Marshal Lin Biao. Numerous other top military officials also were removed at this time: the chief of the Chinese General Staff, General Huang Kecheng (who was replaced by the public security minister, General Luo Ruiching); two other deputy defense ministers, General Xiao Ke and General Li Da; and a half dozen lower-ranking generals. These officers and two deputy foreign ministers were all removed because of their purported links with Peng Dehuai, who was accused in mid-1959 of "rightist opportunism” and forming an “anti-Party clique." These charges, approved by the CCP Central Committee at its plenum in Lushan in the first half of August, stemmed from a secret “letter of opinion” that Peng sent to Mao in mid-July, which strongly criticized the "confusion," "shortcomings," "extravagance," and “waste” of Mao's economic policies. The letter was disclosed to other senior officials at an expanded session of the CCP Politburo in Lushan in the latter half of July. Mao regarded the document as a grave threat to his authority, and he responded with a furious counterattack, forcing members of the Politburo to side either with him or with Peng. Although several top officials undoubtedly shared Peng's misgivings about recent policies, they were unwilling to take a stand against Mao. By the time the enlarged Politburo session in Lushan adjourned at the end of July and the Central Committee plenum convened a few days later, Peng's fate was sealed. For solid analyses of the Peng Dehuai affair, see Jurgen Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), esp. 77-106; MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 187-237; J. D. Simmonds, “P'eng Teh-huai: A Chronological Re-Examination,The China Quarterly 37 (January-March 1969), 120-138; and Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and Decline of Party Norms 1950-1965 (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979), ch. 9. Another invaluable source on the affair is the memoir" by Peng Dehuai himself, which was compiled posthumously on the basis of autobiographical notes Peng wrote in response to interrogators during the Cultural Revolution. An English version is now available: Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898-1974), trans. by Zheng Longpu (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984). The book includes a whole chapter on the Lushan plenum (pp. 485-509) and an appendix with the full text of the letter that Peng sent to Mao in July 1959. For additional documentation, see The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1968 (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1968). Contrary to much speculation in the West, there is no reason to believe that Peng's challenge to Mao revolved around military issues per se or had anything to do with the Soviet Union. Peng undoubtedly was troubled by the growing frictions with Moscow because he knew how dependent China still was on the USSR for military technology, but he never raised this issue in his confrontation with Mao. Nor is there any evidence to substantiate claims about a “Soviet connection” made in David A. Charles (pseud.), “The Dismissal of Marshal P’eng Teh-Huai,” The China Quarterly 8 (October-December 1961), 63-76. Charles's article alleges that Peng's letter to Mao was prepared with Moscow's knowledge, and that “Khrushchev's refusal to apologize for this intervention in Chinese domestic affairs perhaps precipitated the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute.” These assertions are no more than dubious speculation. 76. On the role of senior MFA officials during the trip, see. inter alia, "Uzhin u Mao Tsze-duna" and “Prebyvanie v Pekine sovetskoi partiinopravitel'stvennoi delegatsii,” both in Pravda (Moscow), 3 October 1959, 1; and “Kitai teplo provozhaet

sovetskikh gostei: Ot"ezd iz Pekina partiinopravitelstvennoi delegatsii SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), 5 October 1959, 1. The MFA Collegium was a group of 12-15 of the most senior officials in the ministry, including the minister, all the first deputy and deputy ministers, and about a half dozen others, among them Zimyanin. 77. See “Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SECRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, L. 1; and “Beseda N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tszeduna,Pravda (Moscow), 1 October 1959, 1. 78. This is documented in Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, trans, by (Beijing: New World Press, 1988), 572-573. Nie Rongzhen was the long-time head of China's strategic weapons program; his memoirs were first published in Chinese (Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu) in 1984. 79. “Long Live Leninism!” was first published in Hongqi 8 (16 April 1960), and then republished in translation in Peking Review 3:17 (April 1960), 14-22. This statement and many others from 1959 and 1960 are available in well-annotated translation in Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dispute and as appendices in John Gittings, ed., Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963-1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 287-394. The Gittings book also includes key statements from 1963-1967 organized thematically to shed light on events from the 1950s and early 1960s. 80. See, e.g., Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali," 6. 81. For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which includes details omitted from the official transcript, see Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), 97-110. 82. For a useful account of this process by a participant, see Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Red China (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives, 1964), esp. 164-188. See also Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali," 6. 83. For a good indication of Rakhmanin's views at the time, see his pseudonymously written book, O. B. Borisov, Iz istorii sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii v 50kh godakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981). Although the book was written much later, his views were remarkably constant over the years. Rakhmanin wrote numerous other books about China (also under the pseudonym of O. B. Borisov), which are also worth consulting. See in particular O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Sovetskokitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii ocherk (Moscow: Mysl', 1972). 84. For background on Kapitsa and his dealings with Rakhmanin, see Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 51-53. 85. All other Southeast Asian countries came within the purview of the MFA's Southeast Asian Department, which remained a unified entity. 86. The provisions excluding foreigners from Manchuria and Xinjiang were not made public in February 1950 and indeed had not been publicly disclosed at the time Zimyanin was drafting his report. The existence of these agreements first came to light in 1969 when a secret speech delivered by Mao in March 1958 was published in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought”), 159-172. An English translation of the speech was published in Issues & Studies (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 9598. Mao emphasized that these provisions relegated Manchuria and Xinjiang to the status of “colonies.” For

other documents cited here by Zimyanin, see “Soglashenie mezhdu Soyuzom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi o Kitaiskoi Chanchun’skoi zheleznoi doroge, Port-Arture i Dalnem,” 14 February 1950; “Soobshchenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii dvukh Sovetsko-kitaiskikh aktsionernikh obshchestv," 29 March 1950; and “Soobshchenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii Sovetsko-kitaiskogo aktsionernogo obshchestva grazhdanskoi aviatsii,” 2 April 1950, all in I. F. Kurdyukov, V. N. Nikiforov, and A.S. Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 1917-1957: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi literatury, 1959), 221-222, 227-228 and 228-229, respectively. For further commentary on these agreements, see Chang, China's Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes, 9-38, and for a detailed contemporary assessment of the inequitable nature of the joint stock companies, see the top-secret memorandum “O nedostatkakh deyatel'nosti Sovetsko-kitaiskikh obshchestv Sovkitmetall i Sovkitneft' v Sintszyane," from N.V. Vazhnov, secretary of the CPSU branch at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, 25 February 1954, in TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 9, D. 1933, Ll. 18-38. 87. For Khrushchev's version of these efforts, see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 25-31. 88. “Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitelstva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respubliki pravitelstva Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki,” 12 October 1954, and “Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitel’stva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i pravitelstva Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki ob otnosheniyakhs Yaponiei,” 12 October 1954, both in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 299-301 and 301-302, respectively 89. “Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o peredache Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike sovetskoi doli uchastiya v smeshannykh obshchestvakh," 12 October 1954, "Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o stroitel’stve zheleznoi dorogi Lan’chzhou-Urumchi-Alma Alta," 12 October 1954, “Sovmestnoe kommyunike pravitel'sty Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki i Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki o stroitelstve zheleznoi dorogi ot Tsenina do Ulan-Batora i organizatsii pryamogo soobshcheniya v 1955 g.,”12 October 1955, ibid., 303304, 305, and 305-306, respectively. 90. Zimyanin's chronology here is slightly amiss. In private discussions with Soviet officials as early as March 1956 (a few weeks after Khrushchev's secret speech), Mao began condemning the great and serious mistakes committed by Stalin,” including his “erroneous and ill-considered" actions vis-a-vis China. See “Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.," Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. Yudin, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in TsKhSD, F.5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 88-99. Only after the upheavals in Eastern Europe in October-November 1956 did Chinese leaders express strong reservations about the deStalinization campaign. Zimyanin is right, however, that Mao had been uneasy about Khrushchev's secret speech from the very start. For reasons discussed above, it is unlikely that Mao's aversion to the reassessment of Stalin stemmed from any great feeling of personal warmth toward the late Soviet dictator. The more probable reasons for Mao's hostility toward the de-Stalinization campaign were threefold: (1) his irritation that Khrushchev had not consulted with him before delivering the secret speech; (2) his concern that

a

a

a

attacks on the “cult of personality” could affect his own debt was not fully repaid until 1965. During the “anti-
status as the supreme, all-wise leader of China; and (3) rightist” crackdown after the Hundred Flowers cam-
his belief that the chief features of Stalinism, especially paign, Lung was punished for his remarks, but he
the crash industrialization program of the 1930s, were managed to regain his spot on the National Defense
still relevant, indeed essential, for China. Later on, Council in December 1958. See MacFarquhar, The
after the Sino-Soviet split emerged, Chinese support Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellec-
for Stalin was largely rekindled, no doubt to retaliate tuals, 50. See also Mineo Nakajima, “Foreign Rela-
against Khrushchev. For a lengthy Chinese statement tions: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line,” in
from 1963 defending Stalin (while acknowledging that MacFarquhar and Fairbank, eds., The People's Repub-
he made a few “mistakes”), see “On the Question of lic, Part I, 270, 277.
Stalin: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central 94. See “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i
Committee of the CPSU (2) by the Editorial Depart- dal'neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva
ments of People's Daily and Red Flag," 13 September mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,”
1963, in Peking Review 6:38 (20 September 1963), 8- Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1. For the CPSU
15.

Presidium decision to issue the declaration, see “Vypiska 91. The reference here is to Mao's trip in November iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 1957, his first visit to Moscow (and indeed his first trip oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/ outside China) since early 1950. On the point dis- 1 (STRICTLY SECRET), 30 October 1956, in APRF, cussed in the next sentence, see Khrushchev, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30. Zimyanin's description Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, p. 105.

of Chinese policy is accurate. The Chinese authorities 92. In May 1956 the Chinese authorities promulgated immediately hailed the Soviet statement and cited it the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a approvingly on many occasions later on. During a trip Hundred Schools of Thought Contend"; and in the to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in January 1957, for spring of 1957, after the CCP Central Committee example, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai repeatedly published a directive inviting public criticism, many praised the October 30 statement as evidence of Chinese intellectuals took advantage of the opportu- Moscow's "determination to eliminate certain abnornity to express remarkably bold and pointed critiques mal features of its relations with other socialist states." of the Communist regime, far exceeding what Mao had 95. “Sovmestnoe Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie,” 18 anticipated. After six weeks of growing ferment, the January 1957, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, authorities launched a vehement crackdown under the eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 330-335. new slogan “the extermination of poisonous weeds.” Zimyanin's characterization of this declaration (see Hundreds of thousands of “rightists” and “counter- next sentence) is accurate. revolutionaries” were arrested, and more than 300,000 96. The reference here is to a two-part conference in eventually were sentenced to forced labor or other Moscow on 14-19 November 1957 marking the 40th punitive conditions. For a valuable overview of this anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of episode, see Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Hundred all 13 ruling Communist parties were invited to the first Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New session on 14-16 November, but at the outset YugoslaYork: Praeger, 1960), which includes extensive docu- via declined to take any further part. As Zimyanin mentation as well a lengthy narrative and critical com- accurately observes below, China joined the other parmentaries. For a perceptive analysis of the fundamen- ticipants in issuing a statement that reaffirmed the tal differences between the Hundred Flowers cam- CPSU's preeminent role in the world Communist movepaign in China and the post-Stalin “Thaw” in the Soviet ment. See “Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei Union, see S. H. Chen, “Artificial Flowers During a kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii Natural ‘Thaw,” in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostoyavshegosya v Moskve and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differ- 14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 22 ences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), November 1957, 1-2. Yugoslav officials refused to 220-254. Useful insights into Mao's own goals for the endorse the 12-party statement, but they agreed to Hundred Flowers campaign can be gained from 14 participate in the second phase of the conference, which secret speeches he delivered between mid-February was held immediately afterwards, on 16-19 November. and late April 1957, collected in MacFarquhar, Cheek, A total of 64 Communist parties from around the world and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, took part in that session, which culminated in the adop113-372.

tion of a so-called Peace Manifesto. 93. These particular complaints were expressed by a 97. "Rech' rukovoditelya delegatsii Kitaiskoi Narodnoi high-ranking Chinese military officer, General Lung Respubliki Mao Tsze-duna na yubileinoi sessii Yun, the vice chairman of the PRC National Defense Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), 7 NoCouncil, in the newspaper Xinhua on 18 June 1957, at vember 1957,2. See also Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, the very end of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 42-46. declared that it was "totally unfair that the People's 98. This is a paraphrase of what Mao said in a speech at Republic of China had to bear all the expenses of the the 64-party conference on 18 November 1957, the only Korean War,” noting (accurately) that China had been time he is known to have offered direct support for forced to pay for all the military equipment it received Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group. Excerpts from the Soviet Union. Lung contrasted Moscow's from the speech were later published in Renmin Ribao, position with the “more suitable” policy of the United but all references to Khrushchev and the “Molotov States during World War I and World War II, when clique" were omitted. As a result, until the mid-1980s Allied debts were written off. He also emphasized that Western scholars assumed that Mao had never spoken China's debt to the Soviet Union should be reduced in out against the Anti-Party Group. Fortunately, in 1985 any case as compensation for the large amount of the full text of Mao's 18 November 1957 speech was industry that the Soviet Union extracted from Manchu- published, along with the texts of two other other unpubria in 1945-46. Lung's appeals went unheeded, and the lished speeches he gave during the November 1957 Chinese government continued to pay off the bills it conference, in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang had accumulated, equivalent to nearly $2 billion. The wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,” the same

title used foreight earlier compilations of secret speeches
by Mao). All three speeches were translated into
English, introduced, and annotated by Michael
Schoenhals in “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957
‘Moscow Conference,The Journal of Communist
Studies 2:2 (June 1986), 109-126. Mao's comments
about the Anti-Party Group were as follows: “I endorse
the CPSU Central Committee's resolution of the
Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites.
The facts show that unity could not be achieved and that
the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov
clique took the opportunity to attack when Comrade
Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However,
even though they launched a surprise attack, our Com-
rade Khrushchev is no fool; he is a smart man who
immediately mobilized his forces and launched a victo-
rious counterattack. That struggle was one between
two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In
the four or five years since Stalin's death the situation
in the Soviet Union has improved considerably in the
sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This
shows that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev
is more correct and that opposition to this line is
incorrect. Comrade Molotov is an old comrade with a
long fighting history, but this time he made a mistake.
The struggle between the two lines within the CPSU
was of an antagonistic variety because the two sides
could not accommodate each other and each side ex-
cluded the other. When this is the case, there need not
be any trouble if everything is handled well, but there is
the danger of trouble if things are not handled well.”
99. “Vstrecha Predsedatelya Mao Tsze-dunas kitaiskimi
studentami i praktikantami v Moskve,” Pravda (Mos-
cow), 22 November 1957, 3.
100. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i
Mao Tsze-duna,” 3 August 1958, in Kurdyukov,
Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie
otnosheniya, 403-406.
101. The “questions of military cooperation” discussed
at this meeting were essentially fivefold. First, China
sought new weapons and broader military backing from
Moscow for a possible operation against Taiwan (see
above). Second, Khrushchev sought, once again, to
persuade China to permit a long-wave military commu-
nications center to be established on Chinese territory
by 1962 for Soviet submarines operating in the Pacific.
This idea was first broached to the Chinese by Soviet
defense minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii in April
1958, and over the next few months the two sides
haggled over the funding and operation rights. At the
summit, Khrushchev and Mao concurred that China
would build and operate the station with Soviet funding
and technical assistance, and a formal agreement to that
effect was signed. (The withdrawal of Soviet personnel
from China in mid-1960 left the communications center
only half-completed, but the Chinese eventually com-
pleted it on their own.) Third, Chinese prime minister
Zhou Enlai requested Soviet aid in the development of
nuclear-powered submarines, a proposal that
Khrushchev quickly brushed aside, as he had in the
past. Fourth, Khrushchev renewed an earlier proposal
for a joint submarine flotilla, which effectively would
have been a reciprocal basing arrangement for Soviet
submarines at Chinese ports and Chinese submarines at
Soviet Arctic ports. Mao summarily rejected this idea,
just as he did when it was first raised via the Soviet
ambassador in China, Pavel Yudin, ten days before
Khrushchev's visit. Fifth, the question of nuclear
weapons cooperation came up. In accordance with the
NDTA, the Soviet Union at the time was training
Chinese nuclear weapons scientists and was providing

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