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information needed to build nuclear weapons. But unbeknownst to Chinese officials, Soviet leaders had decided in early 1958 not to transfer a prototype nuclear bomb to China, despite having made a pledge to that effect in the October 1957 agreement. Mao raised this matter during the talks with Khrushchev, but got a noncommittal response. Information here is derived from: (1) an interview with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader during this trip to China, in Cambridge, Massachusetts on 6 October 1995; (2) Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, 14-15; and (3) Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 76-78.

102. Khrushchev declared that "an attack against the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, would be an attack against the USSR itself. True to its duty, our country will do everything necessary, in conjunction with People's China, to defend the security of both states." This statement was repeated, in more or less identical phrasing, in numerous high-level Soviet statements. See, e.g., "Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidentu SSHA D. Eizenkhaueru po voprosu o polozhenii v raione Taivanya," 7 September 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 411. According to Khrushchev's memoirs, as soon as this statement was issued, Mao expressed doubt that the Soviet Union had any intention of fulfilling it; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part F ("Mao Tsze-dun"), pp. 4-5. This assertion is problematic, but there is not yet (and perhaps cannot be) any direct evidence to contravene it.

103. The clearest statement to this effect came in a letter Khrushchev sent to President Eisenhower during the Quemoy crisis, warning that "those who are concocting plans for an atomic attack against the PRC should not forget that it is not only the USA, but the other side as well that possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and the means of delivering them, and that if such an attack is carried out against the PRC, the aggressor will be dealt a swift and automatic rebuff in kind." See "Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidentu SSHA D. Eizenkhaueru o polozhenii v raione Taivanya," 19 September 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetskokitaiskie otnosheniya, 417. At the time, the Chinese authorities warmly praised Khrushchev's statement, describing it as "a lofty expression of our fraternal relations." See "Sotsialisticheskii lager v sovremennoi mezhdunarodnoi obstanovke," Pravda (Moscow), 10 November 1958, 3. Mao himself said he was "deeply touched by [the Soviet Union's] boundless devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism" and wanted to "convey heartfelt gratitude" to Khrushchev for his support during the Taiwan Straits crisis. Several years later, however, Chinese leaders shifted their view (in accordance with the polemics of the time) and expressed contempt for Khrushchev's pledge, arguing that "Soviet leaders declared their support for China only when they were certain there was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out and there was no longer any need for the Soviet Union to support China with its nuclear weapons." See "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of 21 August," 1 September 1963, in Peking Review 6:36 (6 September 1963), 9. New evidence suggests that these accusations were unfounded, and that Khrushchev's pledge was far more meaningful than the Chinese authorities later claimed; see Lewis and Xue, China's

Strategic Seapower, 15-17 and Whiting, "The SinoSoviet Split," 499-500. For an earlier study reaching the same conclusion, see Halperin and Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," 265-303.

104. "Vneocherednoi XXI S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O kontrol'nykh tsifrakh razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistvo SSSR na 1959-1965 gody-Doklad tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva," Pravda (Moscow), 28 January 1959, 2-10; and "Vneocherednoi XXI S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Zaklyuchitel'noe slovo tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva," Pravda (Moscow), 6 February 1959, 13. These speeches and other materials from the Congress were republished in XXII S❞ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962).

105. Zimyanin's characterization of the Chinese response to Khrushchev's report (especially the section on "The New Stage in Communist Construction and Certain Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory") is accurate. Beijing's tepid initial response appeared in the main daily Renmin Ribao on 5 February 1959, and a much more extended commentary was published in the theoretical journal Hongqi on 16 February.

106. Zimyanin is referring here to the momentous Second Session of the CPC's 8th Congress, which adopted a "General Line" of drastically accelerated economic development and ideological fervor. The

hallmarks of the new line, as it evolved over the next few months, were: (1) the Great Leap Forward, a crash program of industrialization relying primarily on China's own resources; (2) the establishment of huge "people's communes" (the "basic social units of a Communist society"), which were intended to replace collective farms and to combine agriculture with industry (including "backyard" steel furnaces) all around the country; (3) the elimination of virtually all remaining forms of private property; (4) the further leveling of social classes and systematic deprecation of expertise; (5) the abandonment of earlier birth control efforts; and (6) the conversion of the army into a full-fledged people's militia (via the communes) and the establishment of an "Everyone a Soldier" campaign requiring Chinese military officers to spend at least one month a year performing the duties of a common soldier. Chinese leaders' hopes of achieving immediate, rapid growth via the Great Leap Forward were evident from the goals they set for steel output (to cite a typical case). In 1957 steel production in China had been 5.9 million tons, whereas the target for 1958 was nearly twice that, at 10.7 million tons, and the targets for subsequent years were even more ambitious. Not surprisingly, these goals proved unattainable, and the whole effort turned out to be a debilitating failure. The communes (which became smaller but more numerous after 1958) produced equally disastrous results, causing widespread food shortages and starvation in the early 1960s. The Chinese armed forces also suffered immense damage from both the demoralization of the officer corps and the disarray within the military-industrial complex. Of the many Western analyses of Chinese politics and society during this period, see in particular MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward.

107. This was indeed the thrust of China's campaign against "blind faith in foreigners" (quoted by Zimyanin in the previous sentence), as formulated in the spring and summer of 1958. Although Chinese officials and military commanders at this point were still hoping for an increase in Soviet military-technical aid, they wanted to limit the political and doctrinal effects of Soviet

assistance. (In other words, they wanted to receive Soviet weaponry and sensitive technology, but to use these in accordance with China's own doctrine, strategy, and political goals.) At Mao's behest, Chinese officials began speaking against the "mechanical imitation of foreign technology" and "excessive reliance on assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries," and warned that "there is no possibility for us to make wholesale use of the existing experiences of other countries." They emphasized that China "must carry out advanced research itself" instead of "simply hoping for outside aid." For more on this point, see Ford, “The Eruption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Military Problems, 1957-60," esp. 102-104; Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, 3-4, and MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 36-40, passim. For a good example of Mao's own thoughts on the topic, see his secret "Address on March 10" at the Chengdu Conference, published in Issues & Studies 10:2 (November 1973), 95-98.

108. For Soviet officials' views of these ideological disputes, see the voluminous files in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, Dd. 247, 301, 398, and 399.

Mark Kramer, a scholar at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, contributes frequently to the Bulletin.

New Evidence on

The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71

EAST GERMAN DOCUMENTS ON THE BORDER CONFLICT, 1969

by Christian F. Ostermann1

The Sino-Soviet border crisis of MarchSeptember 1969 is one of the most intriguing crises of the Cold War. For several months, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) stood on the brink of war which-on the Soviet side-involved the threat of nuclear strikes. It resulted in a sharp increase in Soviet military strength in Central Asia and a fierce SovietChinese arms race. Like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1969 border conflict also reinforced the trend toward a fundamental realignment in the Cold War international system: polycentrism within world communism, Sino-Soviet tensions, U.S.-Chinese rapprochement and "triangular diplomacy".2 Unlike in the case of Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, however, the documentary evidence on the crisis is extremely sparse. Both Moscow and Beijing have published their mutual recriminations, but beyond official notes and journalistic accounts, few sources have become available on either side, nor, for that matter, in the United States.3

Numerous questions remain unanswered: What was the motivation on both sides behind the 1969 border incidents? How likely was the outbreak of a major war? How serious was the Soviet nuclear threat? Were there divisions within the Chinese leadership over the Zhen Bao/ Damansky Island Incident? What was the debate in Moscow? How much did the United States know about the conflict? What was the U.S. role in the dispute? How was the crisis resolved? Even with the opening of the former Soviet archives, little new evidence on the crisis has emerged. The following three documents, obtained by the author in the "Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv" (SAPMO), the archives which house the records of the former East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in Berlin, are among the first authentic, previously secret documents on the crisis that

have become available.4

Border disputes between Russia and China had a long historical tradition.5 Competing territorial claims and differences over borderlines reached back to the seventeenth century. In 1860, the conclusion of the Treaty of Beijing provided for a temporary settlement of the dispute. Nevertheless, Chinese and Russian cultures and territorial ambitions continued to clash in the border areas. Following the Communists' victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and Mao Zedong's option for an alliance with Moscow (1950), the Chinese Communists apparently accepted the territorial status quo along the 4,150 mile-long border with Russia.6 Largely dependent on the Soviet protection and support, the Chinese signed the 1951 Border Rivers Navigation Agreement which implied their consent to the existing border regime. This included acceptance of armed Soviet control of the Amur and Ussuri border rivers and of more than 600 of the 700 islands located in these strategically important waterways in the extreme northeastern border region. The agreement also required the Chinese to obtain Soviet permission before using the rivers and the islands. Similar procedures had been established for the use of Soviet-claimed pastures by Chinese herdsmen in the northwestern Xinjiang border province. Disagreements over the border never ceased to exist but local authorities kept them at a low level.7

With the emerging Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and the open collision of Soviet and Chinese leaders at the International Conference of Communist Parties in Bucharest in 1960, the dormant border issue resurfaced again. It now seems evident that the border issue was a symptom rather than a cause of heightening tensions between both countries. Both sides, however, found the issue extremely useful as an instrument in their ideological and power-political rivalry. For the Chinese, the border incidents were a way to underline their ideological challenge by quasi-military means and to put the Soviets on the defensive. Claiming that the borderline had been “dictated” by the Russian Empire in "unequal treaties" with a weak and

divided China, the Chinese leadership used the conflict over the border to draw attention to Czarist imperial legacies in Soviet foreign policy and serve as proof for what was later labeled Soviet "social imperialism." Moreover, Beijing hoped that the incidents would serve notice to the USSR that the PRC would no longer put up with Soviet subversion in the volatile border regions. Chinese border violations had occurred in Xinjiang in 1959, and continued in the early 1960s.8

Moscow had initially refused to accept the Chinese notion of "unequal treaties" and enter into negotiations which Beijing had demanded possibly as early as 1957 and again in 1960. Negotiations, Moscow must have felt, would call into question the legitimacy of the border arrangement and open a Pandora's box of questions. As SovietChinese polemics and Chinese border intrusions mounted in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and as Beijing demonstrated its readiness to employ its growing military power in several military campaigns against India in 1962, Moscow finally agreed to consultations on the border. Following a letter by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to CCP Chairman Mao Zedong in November 1963, secret negotiations began in February 1964 but soon stalemated over Chinese claims to large territories in Siberia and demands for recognition of the “unequal” nature of the historical border arrangement. Disagreement also existed regarding the exact borderline. While Moscow was ready to concede that the thalway-a line following the deepest point of a valley or river— constituted the borderline in the northeastern border rivers, the Soviets were unwilling to relinquish control over most of the 700 islands in the frontier rivers. When Mao publicized the controversy and accused the Soviets of "imperialism," Khrushchev decided to suspend the talks (October 1964).9

The onset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution led to a further decline in Sino-Soviet relations. Following an abortive meeting with Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin in February 1965, Mao broke party relations with the CPSU in 1966 and reduced communications with Moscow to low

level contacts. Concurrently, the situation on the borders worsened. In the spring, Beijing unilaterally announced stricter navigation regulations governing “foreign” (thus Soviet) vessels on the border rivers. Later that year small-scale skirmishes occurred along the Sino-Soviet and Chinese-Mongolian borders. Ever more aggressively, the Chinese asserted their claims to the islands within their half of the border rivers along the Chinese Northeast. Groups of Chinese soldiers and fishermen were now sent on the border islands instructed to fight if their normal patrol routes were blocked by Soviet guards. Later, Beijing claimed that a total of 4,189 border incidents had occurred between 1964 and 1969 alone. 10

The new Soviet leadership under Leonid I. Brezhnev (which overthrew Khrushchev in October 1964) had responded to Beijing's confrontational posture by increased economic and military pressure. Early on in the confrontation, the Soviets had withdrawn vital economic support and advisers from the PRC. Moscow had also initiated a major long-term build-up of its military power in the Soviet Far East. Soviet conventional force levels rose dramatically after 1965, from approximately 17 divisions to 27 divisions by 1969 (and about 48 divisions in the mid-1970s).11 Moscow also decided to deploy SS-4 MRBMS as well as short-range rockets (SCUD and FROG). Other initiatives aimed at strengthening border controls along the frontier with the PRC. Increasing the geostrategic pressure on Beijing, Moscow also concluded a twentyyear treaty of friendship with Mongolia. The treaty provided for joint Soviet-Mongolian defense efforts and led to the stationing of two to three Soviet divisions in the Mongolian People's Republic. 12

Most importantly, Moscow did not shy away from thinly veiled nuclear threats. As early as September 1964, Khrushchev had announced that the Soviet Union would use all necessary measures including "up-todate weapons of annihilation" to defend its borders.13 Repeatedly throughout the border crisis, Moscow secretly and publicly aired the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear installations. Faced with the PRC's growing military capabilities and Mao's apparent “mad" "opportunism", Moscow increased its nuclear strength in Asia and, by 1969, had installed an anti-ballistic missile system directed

against China.

Despite heightened Chinese aggressiveness and Soviet nuclear sabre-rattling, the border conflict did not immediately or inevitably develop into shooting engagements. tably develop into shooting engagements. Chinese fishermen and soldiers continued to enter border islands on the Ussuri and Amur which they claimed as their own, thus encroaching on territory controlled by Soviets border guards. In each case, the Soviets border guards. In each case, the Soviets dispatched border guard units which expelled the Chinese from the islands. Fightpelled the Chinese from the islands. Fighting was usually avoided. Over the years, Soviets and Chinese came to adopt a pattern of almost ritualistic practices and unwritten rules to resolve border violations in a nonshooting fashion. Even after Mao turned toward a more aggressive policy of "forceful forward patrolling” (which implied fighting forward patrolling" (which implied fighting if necessary) during the Cultural Revolution, shooting engagements were avoided by both sides. Neither Beijing nor Moscow by both sides. Neither Beijing nor Moscow was apparently interested in starting major fighting.14

The Sino-Soviet "cold war" on the border turned hot in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968) and the Soviet enunciation of the "Brezhnev doctrine.” It is likely that the Chinese leadership perceived the Soviet claim to intervene in any socialist state where socialism was considered "in danger"—and the potential application of the Brezhnev doctrine to Asia-as a threat and challenge to Chinese security interests. PRC Defense Minister Lin Biao, Mao's heir apparent, allegedly warned the CCP Politburo and the Military Affairs Commission that China would be attacked by the the Soviet Union. In October 1968, he issued Directive No. 1 which put the People's Republic on war footing. Others within the Politburo-including Premier Zhou Enlai and probably Mao Zedongapparently doubted Moscow's readiness for apparently doubted Moscow's readiness for war with China. 15 These differences notwithstanding, the Chinese leadership opted for a more forceful attitude towards Russia. Chinese border guards were now instructed to carry uniforms and weapons and to confront the Soviets and shoot if necessary. Incidents of growing violence (though still non-shooting) occurred in late 1968 and in January and February of 1969. But it was not until 2 March 1969 that the transition from non-shooting confrontations to firefighting was made. On this day, Chinese fighting was made. On this day, Chinese

soldiers ambushed and opened fire on a

Soviet border patrol unit on the Zhen Bao/ Damansky Island in the Ussuri, killing the Soviet officer and 30 soldiers. Document No. 1 (printed below), an informational note given to the East German leadership and circulated in the SED Politburo, provides the first internal Soviet account of this crucial incident.

The document accords with the publicized Soviet version of the incident, considered by scholars as closer to the truth than the opposing Chinese account which claimed that the Soviets started the gunfire and thus broke the most significant tacit principle of confrontation.16 According to the document, Soviet observations posts noted the presence of thirty armed Chinese soldiers on the island around 9 a.m. on March 2, causing the Soviets to send a unit of border guards to the island to expel the Chinese intruders. When, according to the long-established practice, the Soviet post commander and a small advance contingent of border guards confronted the Chinese and protested the border violation, demanding that the Chinese leave the island, the Chinese opened fire. In the ensuing fight, the Soviet commander and thirty Soviet soldiers were killed. Artillery fire was also opened on the unit from larger and well-equipped Chinese forces hidden on the island and from the Chinese shore. Only after Soviet reinforcements arrived were the Chinese expelled from the island.

Despite the assertion that the incident was the "logical consequence" of previous border provocations, the memorandum to the East German leadership, communicated a few days after the event took place, reflects Soviet anxiety over the new level of preparation, violence and weaponry exhibited by the Chinese in carrying out the ambush. The document reveals that the Soviet were nothing less than stunned over the fact that the Chinese had departed from the long-established practice of resolving border violations short of firefights. Was this a prelude to a full-fledged war? To some extent, the document thus corroborates evidence by high-level Soviet defector Arkady N. Shevchenko who has argued that "the events on Damansky had the effect of an electric shock in Moscow. The Politburo was terrified that the Chinese might make a largescale intrusion into Soviet territory. ... A nightmare vision of invasion by millions of Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost fran

tic. Despite our overwhelming superiority in weaponry, it would not be easy for the USSR to cope with an assault of such magnitude."17

Soviet concerns that the border conflict would spin out of control were central to the Soviet response to the Chinese challenge. Yet so was the specter of an even more radical shift in Chinese foreign policy evident in the offensive posture displayed in the ambush and atrocities. For Moscow, the March 2 incident also carried geostrategic meaning: it revealed "Beijing's intention to activate its opportunistic political flirtation with the imperialist countries-above all with the United States and West Germany."

The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership adopted a carrot-and-stick approach in response to the crisis: First, Moscow sought to isolate Beijing further and increase military pressure on the PRC. The March 2 clash had initially provoked a heated debate within the Soviet leadership. Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko reportedly advocated a "nuclear blockbuster" against China's industrial centers, while others called for surgical strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities.18 Brezhnev eventually decided to opt for a more vigorous build-up of Soviet conventional forces in the East (including relocation of Soviet bomber fleets from the West), not necessarily precluding, however, the use of tactical nuclear weapons. 19 Demonstrating their determination to retaliate with superior force, the Soviets, after a 12day stand-off, attacked Chinese positions on the island with heavy artillery and overwhelming force, foregoing, however, the use of air or nuclear strikes.20

East German Embassy in Beijing in early April 1969, documents one of the early Soviet peace feelers. The telegram reports Soviet peace feelers. The telegram reports information provided by the Soviet chargé d'affairs in Beijing according to which Kosygin, acting on behalf of the CPSU politburo, tried to contact Mao on March 21 through the existing hotline between Moscow and Beijing. The Chinese, however, refused to put Kosygin through. Reflecting Moscow's concern over the crisis, Kosygin reportedly indicated that, "if necessary,” he would agree to meet even with Zhou Enlai. When the Soviet Embassy communicated the Soviet desire for talks to the Chinese Foreign Ministry the following day, the Soviets were informed that a direct line between the CPSU Politburo and the CCP was no longer "advantageous." Mao's intransigence may well have stemmed from the realization that Moscow had only limited military leverage. Moreover, by publicly degrading Moscow, Mao probably sought to strengthen his position at the Chinese Communist Party conference in April 1969.21

Soviet overtures for border discussions continued, however. On March 29, Moscow publicly called for negotiations on the border issue. Two weeks later, on April 11, a Soviet Foreign Ministry note to the PRC again proposed the immediate resumption of the border talks, to no avail. Major Chinese intrusions occurred, according to these informational notes given by theSoviets to the East Germans, throughout May, climaxing in incursions on May 2, 9, 13, and 14 in the western border regions as well as along the controversial border rivers in the east.

Facing Chinese intransigence, Moscow To some extent, the Kremlin's forceful continued its "coercive diplomacy” throughbut limited military response was influ- out the summer of 1969, launching a further enced by heightened concern over the mili- military build-up to ensure complete superitarization of the crisis among Moscow's ority in strategic and conventional weapons. European and Asian allies. Moscow, how- Indeed there is every reason to believe that ever, had no interest in escalating the crisis following the March 2 engagement, the Sobeyond control for other reasons as well. viets were largely responsible for incidents Added pressure on the PRC would not in- along the Sino-Soviet border, the most imduce Mao to forego his "political flirtation" portant of which occurred on August 13 with the West-in fact, it might reinforce along the Central Asian border in Xinjiang, such a move, which would run counter to six miles east of Zhalanashkol.22 Taking Soviet geostrategic interests. Thus, advantage of their superiority in armor and Brezhnev also sought to defuse the crisis by weaponry, the Soviets sought to demonstrate resuming negotiations with the Chinese. to the Chinese their determination through Within a week of the March 15 incident, repeated border infringements. Apparently Moscow sought to re-establish contact with more anxious about Soviet policy, the ChiBeijing. nese, by September, were charging the RusDocument No. 2, a telegram from the sians with 488 "deliberate” border violations

between June and August alone. Considering the concurrent hints of potential nuclear attack, the summer of 1969 can be seen, as the Thomas Robinson has put it, "as a textbook case of the use by Moscow of combined political, military, and propaganda means to force Peking to take an action— renew the talks—it otherwise resisted...."23

Soviet strategy in the border conflict proved successful with regard to the resumption of border talks. In May, the Chinese Government signaled its readiness for talks through an official government note. Contrary to their refusal in previous year, the Chinese, in June, agreed to hold a meeting of the Commission on Border Rivers Navigation which had been created by the 1951 Agreement. After an abortive Chinese walkout, negotiations resulted in the signing of a new protocol in August. More significantly, the Chinese finally agreed to a high-level meeting: on 11 September 1969, a meeting between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai took place in Beijing which laid the foundations for the eventual resolution of the border crisis.24

Document No. 3, an informational memorandum handed by the Soviets to the East German leadership, is a record of the meeting which took place between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Few details of this crucial meeting have become known. According to the memorandum, the meeting was the result of “one more initiative” on the part of the CPSU Central Committee to effect a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The Chinese responded "pretty quickly" to the Soviet proposal to take advantage of Kosygin's presence in Hanoi on the occasion of Ho Chi Minh's funeral. The Soviet delegation under Kosygin, however, learned of Chinese readiness to talk only one hour after its departure from Hanoi. Indicative of Moscow's strong interest in de-escalation, Kosygin, who had already reached Soviet Central Asia, turned around and flew to Beijing, there he was met by Chinese leaders Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi.25

The four-hour talk apparently centered on the border issue. According to the Soviet account, Zhou Enlai declared that "China has no territorial pretensions toward the Soviet Union" and despite his assertions about the unequal nature of the treaties— "recognizes that border which exists in accord with these treaties." While Zhou stated that China had no intentions of attacking the Soviet Union, Kosygin denied assertions of

"contrived imperialist propaganda" that Moscow was "preparing a preventive strike" against the PRC. Preparatory to further negotiations on border issues in Beijing, both sides were reported to have agreed to three principles: (1) the observance of the existing border; (2) the inadmissibility of armed confrontations; and (3) military disengagement from disputed border areas. Kosygin also proposed the expansion of trade relations and economic cooperation as well as the normalizing of railroad and aviation connections. Significantly, the Soviet premier also acquiesced when Zhou declared that Beijing would not curtail its political and ideological criticism of the Soviet Union. Letting the Chinese save face, Kosygin conceded that, while Sino-Soviet disagreements “played into the hands of world imperialism," Moscow considered polemics on controversial issues as "permissible" if conducted in a "fitting tone."

Moscow was successful in forcing the Chinese to accept the status quo along the Sino-Soviet border. But this victory came at price in ideological and geostrategic terms. Not only did the Soviets concede the validity of a direct challenge to its leadership within the Communist bloc in ideological terms, a development long evident but rarely formulated as explicitly as in the Beijing meeting. In the long run, Moscow's coercive diplomacy worsened relations with the United States and helped drive China into a rapprochement with the West, thus altering the balance of power in Asia to Soviet disadvantage. 26

* * *

Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR
Leadership on 2 March 1969
Sino-Soviet Border Clashes

5 Copies 3/8/69

On March 2, 1969, at 11 o'clock local time, the Chinese organized a provocation on the Island Damansky which is located on the river Ussuri south of Khabarovsk, between the points Bikin and Iman (Primorsky Region).

The ascertained facts are that this action had been prepared by the Chinese government for a long time. In December 1968 and in January/February 1969, groups of armed

Chinese soldiers violated the border at the Damansky Island several times, operating from Hunzy. After protests by the Soviet border guards, the Chinese military returned to their border posts or marched along the line which constitutes the border between China and the USSR.

In the events of March 2, 1969, the border control forces at Hunzy played only a secondary role. An especially trained unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army with a force of more than 200 men was used for the staging of this provocation. Secretly, this unit was brought on the Island Damanskiy during the night of March 2. The men in this unit had special gear and wore camouflage clothes. A telephone line to the unit was installed from the Chinese shore. Prior to this, reserves and munitions, among others PAC batteries, mines and armored artillery and heavy fire guns, had been pulled together near the Chinese shore. The stabilizers, shelling, mines and grenade splinters, and the kind of crates left in the tanks that were hit, found later provided the proof that these weapons had indeed been used.

liquor bottles (which had obviously been used by the Chinese provocateurs and the participants in this adventure beforehand to gain courage) were found.

There are no settlements on the Island of Damansky and it is of no economic importance at all; there are no villages in the vicinity for dozens of miles. One can obviously draw the conclusion that it [the island] was chosen as the site for the provocation because such an endeavor could be prepared there secretly and then presented to the world in a version advantageous to the organizers.

During the provocation, the Chinese military committed incredibly brutal and cruel acts against the wounded Soviet border guards. Based on the on-site inspection and the expert knowledge of the medical commission which examined the bodies of the dead Soviet border guards, it can be stated that the wounded were shot by the Chinese from close range [and/or] stabbed with bayonets and knifes. The faces of some of the casualties were distorted beyond recognition, others had their uniforms and boots taken off by the Chinese. The cruelties committed by the Chinese toward the Soviet border guards can only be compared with the worst brutalities of the Chinese militarists and Chiang Kai-shek's [Jiang Jieshi's] men during the '20s and '30s.

The crime by the Mao Zedong group which caused loss of lives has far-reaching objectives.

The Maoists exacerbate the anti-Soviet hysteria and produce a chauvinist frenzy in the country, creating an atmosphere which enables them to establish Mao Zedong's anti-Soviet and chauvinist-great power course as the general line of Chinese policy at the IX Party Convention of the CPC.

Around 2 o'clock Moscow time (9 o'clock local time), our observation posts noted the advance of 30 armed Chinese military men on the Island of Damansky. military men on the Island of Damansky. Consequently, a group of Soviet border guards was dispatched to the location where the Chinese had violated the border. The officer in charge of the unit and a small contingent approached the border violators with the intention of registering protests and demanding (without using force) that they leave Soviet territory, as had been done repeatedly in the past. But within the first minutes of the exchange, our border guards came under crossfire and were insidiously shot without any warning. At the same time, It is also obvious that the Mao group has fire on the remaining parts of our force was the intention of using the anti-Soviet psyopened from an ambush on the island and chosis it created for its subversive and divifrom the Chinese shore. The guards then sive policy in the international Communist assumed combat order, and, reinforced by movement. The Maoists apparently strive to the approaching reserve from the nearby make an all-out effort to complicate and border post, threw back the Chinese surprise prevent the convention of the International attack, and expelled them through decisive Consultation of Communist and Workers' action from Soviet territory. Parties in order to create distrust in the There were casualties and wounded men Soviet Union and the CCPU among the on both sides. fraternal parties.

When the location on the island where the incident had happened was inspected, military equipment, telephones, and phone military equipment, telephones, and phone lines connecting to the Chinese mainland, as well as large numbers of scattered empty

The new dangerous provocations of the Maoists reveal Beijing's intention to activate the opportunistic political flirtation with the imperialist countries - above all with the United States and West Germany. It is no

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