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accident that the ambush on the Soviet bor- nese border and raised territorial claims campaign assumed a military coloration, der unit was staged by the Chinese agencies against the Soviet Union about an area of

against the Soviet Union about an area of that an atmosphere of chauvinistic frenzy at a time when Bonn started its provocation altogether 1,575,000 square kilometer. On has been created throughout the country. of holding the election of the Federal Presi- July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong declared in a Faced with this situation the CC of the dent in West Berlin.

conversation with Japanese members of par- CPSU and the Soviet government are underThe provocation in the area of the Is- liament with regard to the Chinese territorial

liament with regard to the Chinese territorial taking the necessary steps to prevent further land of Damansky is part of the Maoists' demands against the Soviet Union that “we border violations. They will do everything policy which aims at forcing a radical rever- have not yet presented the bill for this terri- necessary in order to frustrate the criminal sal in the foreign and domestic policies of tory.”

intentions of the Mao Zedong group which the PR [People's Republic) of China and at On August 22, 1964, the consultations are to create hostility between the Soviet transforming the country de facto into a were interrupted. Despite our repeated pro- people and the Chinese people. power hostile toward the socialist countries. posals the Chinese did not resume the con- The Soviet Government is led in its

The Mao Zedong group has prepared versations and did not react even when the relations with the Chinese people by feelthe organization of armed provocations along question was mentioned in the Soviet foreign ings of friendship and is intent on pursuing the Soviet-Chinese border for a long time. ministry note of August 31, 1967.

this policy in the future. Ill-considered proThe Chinese authorities have been creating Meanwhile the Chinese authorities con- vocative actions of the Chinese authorities artificial tensions at the Soviet-Chinese bor- tinued to violate grossly the Soviet-Chinese will, however, be decisively repudiated on der since 1960. Since this time the Chinese agreement of 1951 on the regulation of the our part and brought to an end with determihave undertaken several thousand border navigation in the border rivers. In 1967 and nation. violations with provocative goals.

1968 they blew up the consultations of the At the beginning of 1967, the number mixed Soviet-Chinese navigation commis- [Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; of border violations by Chinese authorities sion which had been established on the basis translation from German by Christian F. increased sharply. In some districts they of the agreement of 1951.

Ostermann.] tried to install demonstratively border pa- In the Chinese border areas large militrols on the islands and those parts of the tary preparations set in (construction of airrivers belonging to the USSR. In December ports, access routes, barracks and depots, 1967 and in January 1968, the Chinese training of militia, etc.).

Document No. 2: Telegram to East undertook large provocative actions on the The Chinese authorities consciously German Foreign Ministry from GDR island of Kirkinsi on the Ussuri [River) and conjure up situations of conflict along the Ambassador to PRC, 2 April 1969 in the area of the Kasakevich Canal. On border and stage provocations there. On our January 23, 1969, the Chinese staged an part, all measures have been taken to avoid Council of Ministers of the armed attack on the Island of Damansky. an escalation of the situation and to prevent German Democratic Republic

The border in the area of the Island of incidents and conflicts. The Soviet border The Minister for Foreign Affairs Damansky was established according to the troops have been instructed not to use their Treaty of Beijing of 1860 and the enclosed arms and, if possible, to avoid armed colli- Berlin, April 2, 1969 map which the representatives of Russia sions. The instruction on the non-use of arms and China signed in June 1863. According was strictly enforced, although the Chinese Comrade Walter Ulbricht to the then drawn-up demarcation line the acted extremely provocatively in many cases,

Willi Stoph Island of Damansky is located on the terri- employed the most deceitful tricks, picked Erich Honecker tory of the USSR. This line has always been fights, and attacked our border guards with Hermann Axen protected by Soviet border guards. stabbing weapons, with steel rod and other Confronted with the Chinese provocasuch things.

Berlin tions at the border, the Soviet side, for years, The armed provocation in the area of the has taken active steps towards a regulation Island of Damansky is a logical consequence Dear Comrades! of the situation.

of this course of the Chinese authorities and The question of the borderline was dis- is part of a far-reaching plan by Beijing The following is the text of a telegram cussed in the bilateral Soviet-Chinese Con- aiming at increasing the Maoists' anti-Soviet from Comrade Hertzfeld, Peking, for your sultations on the Determination of the Bor- campaign.

information: derline in Certain Controversial Areas of Since March 3, 1969, the Soviet Em1964. The Soviet side made a number bassy in Beijing has been exposed again to an “Soviet Chargé stated that there is talk proposals regarding the examination of the organized siege by specially trained groups

in Hanoi that Ho Chi Minh wants to go to controversial border question. The Chinese of Maoists. Brutal acts of force and rowdylike Beijing soon to negotiate at the highest level leadership, however, was determined to let excesses against the representatives of So- with the Chinese side since the Vietnamese these consultations fail. The Chinese del viet institutions are occurring throughout side is very concerned about the aggravation egation put up the completely untenable China every day. All over the country, an of Chinese-Soviet relations. demand to recognize the unequal character unbridled anti-Soviet campaign has been The Ambassador of the Hungarian of the treaties delineating the Soviet-Chi- kindled. It is characteristic that this whole People's Republic reported that the PR China

and the DRV [Democratic Republic of Viet- advantageous. nam] (earlier] this year signed an agreement If the Soviet government had to comon Chinese aid for Vietnam in the sum of 800 municate anything to the PR China, it is The CC CPSU considers it necessary to million Yen. [...]

asked to do so via diplomatic channels. inform You about A.N. Kosygin's converThe Chargé was called on the evening Allegedly conference in Hongkong on sation with Premier of the State Council of of March 21 by Kosygin on direct line from questions of China policy organized by the the PRC Zhou Enlai which took place on Moscow. Com. Kosygin informed him that US State Department. Dutch Chargé and September 11 of this year in Beijing. he had attempted to contact Mao Zedong Finnish Ambassador here are to attend.”

As is well known, relations between the through the existing direct telephone line.

USSR and China, and the leadership of the He was not put through by the Chinese side. With Socialist Greetings

PRC is to blame for this, are extremely If need be the conversation could also be Oskar Fischer

aggravated. The Chinese authorities are held with Zhou Enlai. (Com. Kosygin was

exacerbating tension on the border with the acting at the request of the politburo of the [Source: SAPMO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; Soviet Union. In the PRC, appeals to preCPSU.) translation from German by Christian F.

pare for war against the USSR are openly After various attempts by the Soviet Ostermann.)

made. Trade relations have been reduced to Embassy to contact the Foreign Ministry in

a minimum, scientific-technological and this matter, a conversation between Kosygin

cultural exchanges have ceased, contacts and Mao Zedong was refused [by the Chi

along diplomatic lines are limited. For more nese] under rude abuse of the CPSU. Desire Document No. 3: Soviet Report on 11 than three years ambassadors have been for talks with Zhou was to be communicated September 1969 Kosygin-Zhou Meeting

absent from Moscow and Beijing. The anti[to the Chinese].

Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership is

Secret being used by the imperialist powers in the 3/22 Aide-mémoire by the deputy head of

Only Copy struggle against world socialism and the department in the foreign ministry; it stated

Information

Communist movement. that, because of the currently existing rela- About A.N. Kosygin's Conversation With

In the report of CC CPSU General Sections between the Soviet Union and the PR

Zhou Enlai on

retary L.I. Brezhnev to the Moscow meeting China, a direct telephone line was no longer

11 September 1969

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The Cold War in Asia:

2) Russo-Chinese, Russo-Japanese, cial Archive and Russian State Archive of Khabarovsk Conference Highlights Russo-Korean and Russo-American diplo- the Far East in Vladivostok. These sites hold Role of Russian Far East

matic, economic and cultural relations in materials on such Cold War related topics as Northeast Asia;

border disputes and clashes, mobilizations, by David L. Wolff

3) the special role of the military as a the draft, voluntary organizations to aid the

social and economic force in the borderland; Army, civil defense, military education, the On 26-29 August 1995 an international, 4) the great importance of migration in military-industrial complex and cross-borinterdisciplinary conference focusing on the this region, whether as colonization, intra- der contacts (trade, tourism, intergovernborderland nature of the Russian Far East regional mobility or expulsion, and mental negotiations, etc.). Two interesting took place in Khabarovsk, Russia. Brought 5) diaspora communities of the Russian documents from the Khabarovsk archive together by funds from the Center for Global Far East: Chinese, Germans, Japanese, Jews, concerning Sino-Soviet border-tensions apPartnership (Abe kikin), the Cold War Inter- Koreans and Russians;

pear in translation by Elizabeth Wishnick in national History Project (CWIHP), and the The working language of the confer- this issue of the Bulletin. Russian particiInternational Research and Exchanges Board ence was Russian, although several talks pants have also made declassification re(IREX), 40 scholars made 38 presentations were delivered in English with interpreta- quests in the course of preparing conference about their papers and responded to ques

tion into Russian. There were a surprising papers. tions from the other participants.

number of people at the table (actually a big Significantly, a large group of the A number of papers focused directly on square of tables) fluent in three or more region's archivally active scholars, AmeriCold War issues, as can be seen in the full languages and I think everyone met and cans, Chinese, Japanese and Russians beschedule printed below. There was an ap- talked with just about everyone else. came aware of the Cold War International proximately equal number of papers cover- Representatives from local archives pre- History Project's past accomplishments, ing events prior to the Cold War and those sented papers on specific areas of strength present activities and future plans. Several more contemporary. General themes touched and exhibited lists of holdings, covering are now undertaking research on the Cold on in discussions included:

such themes as Russo-Chinese relations, War and plan to attend the January 1996 1) the special nature of the Russian Far Chinese and Koreans in the Russian Far CWIHP conference at the University of Hong East as a borderland, historically much more East, Russians in China and Birobidzhan. Kong on the Cold War in Asia to present in contact with neighbors than most of Rus- Additionally, aside from myself, six other findings. sia: scholars worked in the Khabarovsk Provin

continued on page 206

of Communist and Workers' Parties the nese relations. In this regard, Zhou Enlai's and the PRC. An initiative was revealed by course of our policy in relation to China was various attempts to introduce into the con- us regarding an expansion of trade, the fulclearly set forth. The CPSU and the Soviet versation polemics on issues of ideological fillment of contracts which had been congovernment, proceeding from its unchang- disagreements were decisively deflected. The cluded, the signing of trade protocols for the ing policy oriented towards an improve- Soviet side firmly declared the immutability current and next year, the working out of ment in relations between the USSR and the ofour principled positions and political course measures on trade and economic cooperaPRC, has repeatedly appealed to the Chi- in the area of domestic and foreign policy. tion during the present five-year plan. Zhou nese leadership with concrete proposals A consideration of the situation on the Enlai promised to present these proposals to about ways to normalize relations. The Soviet-Chinese border occupied the central the Politburo of the CC CPC, and expressed pronouncements of the government of the place in the conversation. The sides recog- his agreement to exchange supplemental USSR of March 29 and June 13 of this year nized the abnormality of the existing situa- lists of products for 1969. are very well known. The message of the tion and exchanged opinions regarding the We proposed to the Chinese side to Council of Ministers of the USSR to the search for paths to the settlement of the normalize railroad and aviation connections State Council of the PRC sent in July of this border issues. Zhou Enlai declared that between the two countries, and to reestabyear, in which concrete proposals regarding “China has no territorial pretensions toward lish the high-frequency link which had been the improvement of contacts between the the Soviet Union.” At the same time he interrupted by the Chinese authorities in Soviet Union and China along government repeated his previous assertions about the March of this year. lines were put forth, including the organiza- unfair nature of the agreements which define From the Soviet side there also was tion of a bilateral summit meeting, also the border, although he said that the Chinese raised the issue of mutually sending Ambasserved the aims of putting to rights Soviet- side does not demand that they be annulled sadors and the creation of conditions for the Chinese inter-governmental relations. and “recognizes the border which exists in normal activity of diplomatic representa

Undertaking these actions, the CC accord with these treaties.” From the Soviet tives. CPSU and the Soviet government proceeded side a proposal was introduced to move to- Zhou Enlai stated that these proposals from and proceeds from a principled course ward the practical preparation for negotia- will be submitted to Mao Zedong. in Soviet-Chinese relations. According to tions on border issues. Vis-a-vis these goals, During the consideration of issues of our deep conviction, a softening of tensions we proposed to organize over the next week Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations in relations between the USSR and the PRC ortwo a meeting between delegations headed

ortwo a meeting between delegations headed Zhou Enlai stressed that the leadership of the would correspond to the interests of our two by the deputy ministers of foreign affairs of CPC does not intend to curtail its political countries, and also of the whole Socialist the two countries. In this regard it was noted and ideological speeches against the CPSU commonwealth overall, would facilitate the by us that the place where these negotiations and the other fraternal parties. He justified activation of the struggle against imperial- will be held has no particular significance for the current forms of “polemics” which are ism, would be an essential support to heroic us. Zhou Enlai responded to our proposal being used by the Beijing leaders as having Vietnam and to the peoples of other coun- about negotiations and expressed a wish that nothing in common with theoretical discustries which are leading the struggle for so- the negotiations would be held in Beijing. sions, and referred to the statement of Mao cial and national liberation.

As the bases for normalization of the Zedong to the effect that “polemics will Guided by these considerations, the CC situation on the border during the period continue for 10 thousand more years. CPSU decided to undertake one more initia- before a final settlement which could be The Soviet side stressed that the CPSU tive aimed at a softening of the situation in achieved as the result of negotiations be- believes that polemics on controversial isrelations between the USSR and the PRC. tween the delegations of the USSR and the sues are permissible; however, it is impor

The Chinese side responded pretty PRC, the following principles were put forth: tant that they be conducted in an appropriate quickly to our proposal to hold a meeting of observance of the existing border, the inad- tone, and argued on a scientific basis. Lies A.N. Kosygin, who was present in Hanoi at missibility of armed confrontations, the with- and curses do not add persuasiveness and Ho Chi Minh's funeral, with Zhou Enlai. drawal of troops of both sides from direct authority to a polemic, and only humiliate However, the Chinese response arrived in contact in controversial sectors. It was agreed the feelings of the other people and aggraHanoi an hour after the departure of the that issues which arise in relation to the vate the relations. Soviet Party-State delegation to Moscow economic activity of citizens of both coun- From our side it was also underlined via Calcutta, and therefore A.N. Kosygin tries in the controversial sectors will be de- that disagreements between the USSR and set off for Beijing already from the territory cided according to the agreement between the PRC play into the hands of the world of the Soviet Union.

representatives of the border authorities. Both imperialism, weaken the Socialist system The meeting of the Soviet delegation sides agreed to give an instruction to the and the ranks of fighters for national and headed by Comrade A.N. Kosygin with appropriate border organizations to resolve social liberation. It was noted that over the Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi misunderstandings which arise in the spirit whole history of the struggle with Commucontinued for about four hours. From the of benevolence via the path of consultation. nism, imperialism has never received a Soviet side efforts were applied to assure Guided by the instructions of the CC greater gain than that which it has as a result that the conversation took place in the spirit CPSU, the Soviet side put forth concrete of the deepening, which is not our fault, of of a concrete consideration of the knotty proposals on the establishment and develop- the PRC's differences with the Soviet Union issues of inter-governmental Soviet-Chi- mentof economic contacts between the USSR and other Socialist countries.

We declared the provocative nature of demonstrate a sober and serious approach to the contrived imperialist propaganda to the the proposals which were put forth by us, effect that the Soviet Union allegedly is that this will frustrate the designs of the preparing a preventive strike on China. It imperialist circles to intensify the Sovietwas stressed that in the Soviet Union neither Chinese disagreements, to provoke a conthe Party nor the government has ever spo- flict between our countries and in this way to ken about the unavoidability of war and has weaken the common front of the anti-impenot summoned the people to war. All of our rialist struggle. documents, party decisions summon the The normalization of relations between

to peace. We never have said to the the USSR and the PRC, if they will demonpeople that it is necessary to “pull the belt strate a desire to do this in Beijing, undoubttighter,” that war is unavoidable. Zhou edly will facilitate the growth of the power Enlai, in his turn, said that “China has no of the camp of Socialism and peace, will intentions to attack the Soviet Union.” He correspond to the interests of a strengthenstressed that from the Chinese side measures ing of unit of the anti-imperialist forces and will be undertaken not to allow armed con- to the successful resolution of the tasks which frontations with the USSR.

were posed by the International Meeting of The conversation took place overall in a Communist and Workers' Parties. constructive, calm atmosphere, despite the sharp posing of a range of issues.

[Source: SAMPO-BArch I IV 2/202/359; We evaluate the meeting which has translation from Russian by Mark H. taken place with representatives of the Chi- Doctoroff, National Security Archive.] nese leadership as useful. The CC CPSU and the Soviet government made a decision 1. I would like to thank Malcolm Byrne and Jim about the members of the delegation and

Hershberg for their support and advice. Translations of

documents nos. 1 and 2 are mine; translation of docutime frames for their meetings with the Chi

ment No.3 from Russian was provided by Mark nese representatives for the realization of the Doctoroff (The National Security Archive). concrete proposals which were put forth in 2. On the changing international system see Raymond the course of the conversation.

L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American

Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (WashIt goes without saying that for the time

ington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 228-242; being it is still early to make conclusions Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, about the results which this meeting will 1945-1991 (Cambridge History of American Foreign bring. The anti-Soviet campaign which is

Relations, vol. IV), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer

sity Press, 1993), 186-187. continuing in the PRC and also the fact that

3. The best study of the crisis based mainly on published the agreed text of the communiqué about the U.S., Soviet and Chinese sources is Thomas W. meeting was changed, put us on our guard.

Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” in DiUpon its publication in the Chinese press it

plomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as an Political

Instrument (Washington, DC: The Brookings Instituhad been omitted that both sides conducted

tion, 1981), 265-313. See also Thomas W. Robinson, “a constructive conversation.” Time will

“The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Develtell whether Beijing's intention to move opment and the March 1969 Clashes," American Politi

cal Science Review 66 (December 1972), 1178-1182; along the path of normalization will be seri

and his The Sino-Soviet Border Situation, 1969-1975: ous or if this is only a tactical move dictated

Military, Diplomatic, and Political Maneuvering, HIby the circumstances of the aggravated do- 2364-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, mestic struggle in the PRC and also of that November 1975). Other accounts of the crisis include

Arthur A. Cohen, "The Sino-Soviet Border Crisis of isolation in which the Chinese leadership

1969," in Avoiding War: Problems in Crisis Managehas found itself as a result of the consistent

ment, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview, and firm policy of the Socialist countries, 1984), 269-296; and Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Communist parties, and all forces who have Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communicacondemned the peculiar positions of the

tion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980). On U.S.

policy see National Security Archive, ed., Presidential Chinese leadership. We believe it necessary

Directives on National Security From Truman to Clinton to follow attentively and vigilantly the fur- (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), 286. ther development of the situation in China 4. On research in the SED Archives see my “New itself, the activity of the Beijing leadership

Research on the GDR," Cold War International His

tory Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 34, 39-44. in the sphere of Soviet-Chinese relations,

5. Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute and also the international arena overall. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973). The CC CPSU and the Soviet govern

6. Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis." 270. ment believe that if the Chinese leaders

7. Harvey W. Nelson, Power and Insecurity: Beijing,

Moscow & Washington, 1949-1988 (Boulder: Lynne
Riener, 1989), chap. 1; Oleg B. Borisov/B.T. Koloskov,
Soviet Chinese Relations, 1945-1970 (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), 327.
8. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis," 271; Wich,
Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 27-28; Robinson, “Sino-
Soviet Border Conflict," 266.
9. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 68.
10. Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 275; Nelson,
Power and Insecurity, 70; Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Bor-
der Conflict," 268.
11. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 72.
12. Richard Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The
Soviet Far East Military Buildup, (Dover, MA: Auburn
House, 1986), 26-27; Avigdor Haselkorn, The Evolu-
tion of Soviet Security Strategy 1965-1975 (New York:
Crane & Russak, 1978), 39-42; Nelson, Power and
Insecurity, 70.
13. Cited in Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 68.
14. Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis," 270-276.
15. On foreign minister Zhou En-lai's role see Han
Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of
Modern China (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 359.
16. Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese Account of the
1969 Fighting at Chenpao,The China Quarterly 56
(October/December 1973), 730-739; Cohen, "Sino-
Soviet Border Crisis,” 278.
17. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow
(New York: Knopf, 1985), 164-165.
18. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 73.
19. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its
International Implications, 1945-1990 (Seattle: Uni-
versity of Washington Press, 1992), 191-193.
20. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 179.
21. According to Han Suyin, Eldest Son, 369-70,
Kosygin was “more alert to the changing situation than
Brezhnev," and tried to reach Zhou Enlai but failed
“because the young telephone operator in Beijing, full
of Cultural Revolution spirit, told Kosygin, “We do not
speak to revisionists." See also Dick Wilson, The Story
of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1976 (London: Hutchinson, 1984),
270.
22. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 178.
23. Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” 280. See
also O. Edmund Clubb, China & Russia: The "Great
Game" (New York: Columbia UP, 1971), 501-506.
24. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 200.
25. The Kosygin-Zhou Enlai meeting is not mentioned
in Suyin, Eldest Son. But see Wilson, Zhou Enlai, 359.
Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese Account, 270; Seymor
Topping, Journey between Two Chinas (New York:
Harper, 1972), 356.
26. Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” 295-313.

Christian F. Ostermann, a doctoral candidate at the University of Hamburg based at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., contributes frequently to the Bulletin and authored CWIHP Working Paper 11, The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback.This article was adapted from a longer analysis of SED archival documents on the Sino-Soviet border conflict to be presented at the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia at the University of Hong Kong in January 1996.

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IN THE REGION AND

ganda in Beijing had not been abated. Bokan The new opportunities to examine the holdIN THE CENTER:

urged his comrades to be prepared for any ings of regional party archives will further SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE provocation on the border, while his col- expand our knowledge of regional concerns BORDER RIFT

league in the military district, comrade and center-regional relations in the Soviet

Popov, noted that Chinese ideological posi- period. by Elizabeth Wishnick

tions were dangerous for the international

communist movement "and cannot but evoke How did Soviet Communist Party offi- alarmamong the Soviet people. Comrade cials and activists in the regions bordering N.V. Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk Document I: Stenographic Record of the People's Republic of China respond to Pedagogical Institute, called attention to the Meeting of Khabarovsk regional and the news of Aleksei Kosygin's 11 September fact that Zhou had told Kosygin that China's city party officials, 22 September 1969 1969 meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing? ideological struggle with the CPSU would The two documents below, from the State continue for another 10,000 years. Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray (territory) in In its report, the Khabarovskiy Kray STENOGRAPHIC RECORD the Russian Far East, I show the reactions committee expressed the region's support of several leading party members in the for the Center's policy toward China. In so of the meeting of the Khabarovsk regional frontier region to Central Committee and doing, the regional committee at times in

and city party aktiv Soviet government efforts to defuse the rup- serted comments which were not in the stenoture with China. graphic record, for example, praising the

22 September 1969 One document is the stenographic Kosygin-Zhou meeting for being mutually record of a 22 September 1969 meeting of beneficial.

First Secretary of the Khabarovsk rethe regional and city party aktiv convened Because the region's reporting function gional committee of the CPSU, comr. A.P. to discuss the Central Committee's account had the result of legitimating the Center's Shitikov, opened the meeting: of Kosygin's discussion of the border con- policies, comments by the regional aktiv Comrades, we brought you together to flict with Zhou. The second document is the which raised uncomfortable questions for familiarize you with the information of the Khabarovskiy Kray party committee's re- the party leadership were omitted. For ex- Central Committee of the Communist party port of the same meeting to the CPSU CC in ample, the secretary of the Komsomolsk-na- of the Soviet Union about the question of the Moscow.

Amure city committee of the CPSU, Com- visit by the Soviet party-governmental delIn comparing the two documents, it is rade Shul’ga, restated the standard line that egation to Hanoi and the discussion between particularly interesting to note their differ- Soviet efforts to improve relations with China comr. A.N Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Today ences in emphasis. The Khabarovskiy Kray would resonate with the healthy forces2 in I will acquaint you with the information. report to the CPSU CC accentuates the Chinese society (i.e., among communists) (Reads the information aloud). positive, stressing that Kosygin's meeting and then noted that in Czechoslovakia the with Zhou represented a step toward resolv- Soviet Union had correctly intervened in Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to coming Soviet-Chinese differences through support of communists when the revolution's rade Pasternak, secretary of the Khabarovsk peaceful means. According to the steno- gains were endangered. Comrade city committee of the CPSU. graphic record, however, many of the speak- Kadochnikov, a Khabarovsk worker, com

Comr. PASTERNAK ers described the problems in the border mented that he had trouble reconciling Chi- Comrades, the communists of the region in much greater detail than was nese anti-Soviet propaganda with the PRC's Khabarovsk city party organization and all reported to Moscow. Although they all claim to be a socialist state. Comrade the workers of the city of Khabarovsk diapplauded Kosygin's meeting with Zhou, Sverdlov stated that in the past polemics had rected particular attention to the report of the some speakers noted that little change in the some value for the international communist meeting in Beijing between the President of border situation had been observed since movement, and then cited the polemics with the Council of Ministers of the USSR and their encounter eleven days before. Com- Palmiro Togliatti, the long-time leader of the the President of the State Council of the PRC rade I.K. Bokan, for example, the head of Italian Communist Party, as an example. Zhou Enlai. It explains the increasingly the political department of a military dis- Still, he concluded that Chinese policies were tense situation between the PRC and the trict in the region, noting that there had so unrestrained that they went beyond the Soviet Union, which is the fault of the Chibeen over 300 incidents of incursions by definition of useful polemics.

nese leaders. Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory in his These two documents are valuable for Khabarovsk residents are well aware of district in 1969 alone, commented that no showing the reluctance of the Khabarovskiy the bandit-like character of the armed provosubstantive changes were observed follow- Kray committee to address substantive prob- cations, and therefore the mendacity of the ing the Kosygin-Zhou meeting. The Secre- lems in their reports to the Central Commit- Maoists' propaganda, the malicious attacks tary of the Khabarovsk City committee of tee in Moscow: the Center only found out on the policy of our party and government, the CPSU, comrade V.S. Pasternak, made a what it wanted to hear. However, the docu- the kindling of hatred towards the Soviet similar remark, describing Sino-Soviet re- ments also demonstrate that as far back as Union, and the direct call for war with the lations as increasingly tense" and observ- 1969 regional views on China policy did not Soviet Union, were particularly clear to us. ing that the anti-Soviet hysteria and propa- always run exactly in step with Moscow's. All this requires our government to pur

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