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will grow in international relations.

In accordance with the instructions you received previously and taking into account the specifics of your post country, continue your work to reveal the dangerous character of the developing rapprochement between aggressive circles in the West, above all the USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling attention to the following aspects.

1. In developing military cooperation with China, the ruling circles in the USA count on the possibility of influencing China to act in a "desirable" way, of channeling its policies in an acceptable direction. Frequently the foreign policy activity of the PRC is presented as a “stabilizing” factor in the international arena. The Chinese leaders themselves are not adverse to playing up to such a discussion and, to this end, without withdrawing the thesis of the "inevitability of war," have begun to use a more flexible terminology. However, with the help of a sham "peaceful nature," invoked to add greater "respectability" to the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing is simply counting on gaining time to accomplish the forced arming of the country. Actually, more and more, the Chinese leadership is resorting to a policy of diktat and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, and assumes on itself the improper functions of "teaching lessons" and "punishing" the unruly with the force of arms.

2. As before, the PRC government declines to make any international legal commitments to disarmament, tries to diminish the importance of results achieved in this area, and refuses to take part in measures to limit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set about to manufacture and experiment with intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and is working on the creation of neutron weapons. All this drives the global arms race forward and directly contradicts the interests of detente. This policy of Beijing's seriously threatens everyone, even the USA and Japan, and not just the Soviet Union and other socialist

states.

3. There is absolutely no basis for concluding, as some do, that Beijing's alleged adoption of a "modernization program" represents a new political course to overcome China's economic backwardness. In fact this course was taken above all to contribute to the realization of pre-existing plans to speed up the process of transform

ing China into a military "superpower," and the resolution of the most serious problems, such as increasing the extremely low material and cultural level of the Chinese people, has been relegated to an indefinite future. In China they don't hide the fact that "modernization" is the best means of preparing for war. In practice, unrestrained militarization accelerates economic collapse and increased instability in China. Thus, those countries who actively take part in the Chinese program of "modernization,” actually contribute to the growth of its military potential and ute to the growth of its military potential and render a disservice to the Chinese people.

On the other hand, the policy of militarizing the country will inevitably engender unpredictable turns and zigzags and future evidence of foreign policy adventurism, leading to the dangerous destabilization of the international situation and the inflammation of international tension. Any injection of aid, particularly by the USA, either directly or indirectly contributing to China's militarization and to the development of the Chinese military potential, would enable China to find the striking power necessary for the realization of its hegemonic schemes. Under conditions when Beijing not only opder conditions when Beijing not only opposes all constructive proposals to strengthen poses all constructive proposals to strengthen peace and detente, but also directly provokes international conflict, this [aid] would mean an increased danger of war breaking out and the growth of threats to all humanity, including the Chinese and American peoples.

The fact that what is proposed for delivery to China is “non-lethal” equipment and technology, "defensive," and "dual-use," etc., does not change the situation. The issue is not that such distinctions are extremely is not that such distinctions are extremely relative, but that cooperation with military relative, but that cooperation with military modernization will free up the forces within China and the means necessary for building up its principal strike force - its nuclear capability.

4. The plans Beijing has been developing for a long time to change the global correlation of forces and the entire structure of contemporary international relations elicit serious alarm. The transfer to China of any technology or equipment whatsoever this would be a step in the direction of the erosion of the established military-balance in the world and of a new cycle in the arms race. The destruction of the balance of military The destruction of the balance of military forces would erode the basis for the arms limitation negotiations insofar as equal security is the main principle which the USSR

and USA have agreed to follow.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has every opportunity to defend its interests and repel the presumptions of other countries, including the PRC. The calculations of those who try to direct AmericanChinese relations in such as way as to use China as a means of pressure and as a military counterweight to the Soviet Union are short-sighted. Those who hope to redirect Chinese expansion to the north risk major miscalculation. Encouraging the expansion of China's military potential increases the danger that certain countries would be inveigled into Beijing's orbit, and in the longterm, could lead to a situation in which these very countries could become the victims of Chinese expansion. Therefore, thinking realistically, it would follow to recognize that a "strong" China would chose a different direction for its expansionist plans: in all likelihood it would swallow up neighboring countries, grab hold of all the vitally important regions of the world, and would certainly not serve as an instrument in the hands of the USA or any other country.

5. The development of military-political cooperation between China and the USA, which elicits concern among many states, has led already to a noticeable worsening of the international situation and complicated the search for real paths to strengthening peace and security in various regions of the world. In an effort to create favorable conditions for the realization of its hegemonic aims, the Beijing leadership counts on aggravating relations between countries, setting some states against others, and provoking military conflicts. Beijing does not hide the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the USA, and, from its ashes, assume world domination.

Those who insist on the necessity of "strengthening" China base their calculations on the assumption that Beijing would coordinate in a confrontation with the USSR and in its conflicts in Asia, and therefore would not be dangerous for the West. But taking into account the continuing domestic political struggle in China, no one can guarantee that in 5-10 years China would not bring into play an anti-American card or anti-Japanese card and use its ICBM force against those countries which irresponsibly connived and assisted with the PRC's rearmament.

The experience of history attests to the fact that the extent of China's expansion will be proportional to the military might of the Chinese army. Even today China's neighbors, above all the countries of Southeast Asia which the Chinese leaders consider to be their traditional sphere of influence, experience an immediate threat. It would be easy to imagine how China will behave in relation to its neighbors once the USA and its neighbors assist China to acquire more modern weapons. Above all, China is trying to institute its control over Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Malacca and the straits of Singapore.

Under these conditions, attempts to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policy and to remain neutral will only encourage Beijing to undertake new adventures and to extend its expansion. Collective efforts by Asian states could, on the contrary, impede China's path to increased military might, which is directed above all against countries of this region.

(For New Delhi only. The connivance and outright support of the USA for military preparations in China can only contradict India's interests. Although the Chinese leadership is holding talks about normalizing relations with India, there is an entire array of means of pressure against it in China's arsenal of strategies. In AmericanChinese plans, the role which is allotted to Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India and as a base of support for the aggressive actions of the USA and China in Southeast Asia is expanding more and more. In cooperation with the USA, Beijing is flooding India's neighbors with arms and, by creating an atmosphere of war psychosis, is attempting to maintain in power unpopular regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. Beijing is speeding up its military preparations along the Chinese-Indian border, constructing missile bases and strategic roads in Tibet, and activating its support for separatist movements in northeast India, where it is practically waging an "undeclared war" against this country.)

There is no doubt that as China strengthens its military-industrial potential, it will advance further along the path to the realization of Chinese leadership's openly declared territorial pretensions against neighboring countries in Southeast, South, and West Asia. This will not only lead to a serious destabilization of the situation in

Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present a direct threat to other regions.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not only do we carefully monitor the direction of American-Chinese cooperation in the military sphere, but also we must take the necessary steps to strengthen the security of our borders. We cannot tolerate change in the military-strategic balance in favor of forces hostile to the cause of peace.

(Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul.

The post countries should inform MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Soviet ambassadors were sent instructions about carrying out work to counter the negative counsequences for the causes of socialism, peace, and detente, of the establishment of an American-Chinese military alliance. Familiarize the recipient with the content of the

aforementioned instructions.

Carry out your work in coordination with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Laotian People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), the Polish People's Republic (PPR), and the Czechoslovak People's Republic (CPR).)

It is necessary to attentively follow all foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans for the expansion of American-Chinese military cooperation, to regularly and effectively inform the Center about them, and to take the measures required to neutralize the tendencies that are undesirable for our interests.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 34, Dok. 10; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Modern History, Academica Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with China: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy, 1969-95.

COLD WAR IN ASIA continued from page 191

RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC: PAST AND PRESENT (Khabarovsk, 26-29 August 1995)

26 August 1995: Multiethnic Demographics

Morning: Russians Abroad in the Far East

Maria Krotova (Herzen Institute, Petersburg): "Russo-Chinese Daily Relations in pre1917 Harbin"

Lena Aurilena (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Youth Politics in Russian Emigre Organizations in Manchukuo, 1930s-40s"

Nadezhda Solov'eva (Khabarovsk Provincial Archive): "Khabarovsk's Archival Holdings on Russo-Chinese Relations"

David Wolff (Princeton U.): "Interlocking Diasporas: The Jews of Harbin, 1903-1914”

Shuxiao LI (Heilongjiang Trade Corporation): "The Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin's Rise as an Economic Center"

Alexander Toropov (Central Archive of the Far East, Vladivostok): "Russia's Far Eastern Neighbors"

Iurii Tsipkin (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): "The Social Composition of the Harbin Emigration, 1920s-30s"

Afternoon: "Foreigners" in the Russian Far East (RFE): Settlement and Resettlement

Tatiana Ikonnikova (Ped. Institute,

Khabarovsk): "German Intelligence in the RFE during WWI: Suspicions and Realities”

Vladimir Mukhachev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Intervention and Civil War: New Documents and Approaches"

Teruyuki HARA (Slavic Research Center, Sapporo, Japan): "The Japanese in Vladivostok, 1906-1922"

Elena Chernolutskaia (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Forced Migrations in the Far East from the 1920s till mid-1950s"

Natsuko OKA (Institute of Developing Economies): "Koreans in the Russian Far East: Collectivization and Deportation"

Viktoriia Romanova (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): "The Jewish Diaspora in the making of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast"

Chizuko TAKAO (Waseda U., Tokyo, Japan): "Reevaluating the 'Birobidzhan Project': The Regional Context"

27 August 1995: Civilian and Military in the Borderland: Options and Tensions

Morning: Regional Political-Economy

Pavel Minakir and Nadezhda Mikheeva (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): "The Economy of the Russian Far East : Between Centralization and Regionalization"

Vladimir Syrkin (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): "Economic Regionalism: Conditions, Factors and Tendencies"

Katherine Burns (Massachusetts Inst. of Technology): "The Russian Far Eastern Initiative: Autonomous Decision-Making and Cooperation in Northeast Asia."

Cristina Sarykova (Univ. of Calif. at San Diego): "Politics and the Reform of the Primorsk Fuel and Energy Complex"

Afternoon: The RFE as "Outpost"

Oleg Sergeev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "The Cossack Revival in the Far East: From Borderguards to Émigrés to Interest Group"

Vladimir Sokolov (Primor'e Provincial Museum): "Russian Nationalism and the Cossacks of the Far East"

Jun NIU (Institute of American Studies, CASS): "Soviet Policy towards Northeast China, 1945-49"

Ping BU (Institute of Modern History, Heilongjiang Province Academy of Social Sciences): "Sino-Soviet Disposal of Japanese Chemical Weapons after 1945"

Evgeniia Gudkova (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): "Military Conversion in the Russian Far East"

James Hershberg (Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center, Washington, DC): "Northeast Asia and the Cold War"

Tamara Troyakova (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "The Maritime Province on the Road to Openness: Khrushchev in Vladivostok"

Late Afternoon: International Economic Considerations (I)

Natal'ia Troitskaia (Far Eastern State U.): "The Effect of Changing Border Regimes on Large-scale Trade between late-Imperial Russia and China"

Mikhail Koval'chuk (Institute of Transport, Khabarovsk): "Foreign Trade and Transport in the Russian Far East, 1860-1930s"

Anatolii Mandrik (Institute of History,

Vladivostok): "Foreign Investment in the Russian Fishing Industry 1920s-1930s"

Lidiia Varaksina (Khabarovsk Provincial Archive): "Foreign Concessions in the Russian Far East, 1920s-1930s"

Igor Sanachev (Far Eastern State U.): "Foreign Capital in the Far East in the 1920s"

Takeshi HAMASHITA (Tokyo U.): “Japanese Currency and Banking in Northeast Asia"

28 August 1995: The Crossborder Learning Process: Perceptions, Research and Compari

sons

Morning: International Economic Considerations (II)

Elizabeth Wishnick (Independent Scholar): "Current Issues in Russo-Chinese Border Trade" Weixian MA (Institute of E. Europe and Central Asia, CASS): "Sino-Russian Border Trade"

Natal'ia Bezliudnaia (Far Eastern State U.): "Geopolitical' Projects in the Southern Part of the Maritime Province"

Jingxue XU (Institute of Siberia, Harbin): "Sino-Russian Border Trade"

Andrei Admidin and E. Devaeva (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): "Economic Relations of the Russian Far East in the AsianPacific Region"

Douglas Barry (U. of Alaska - Anchorage): "Alaska and the Russian Far East: Finding Friends, Making Partners"

Afternoon: Perceptions, Images & Area-Studies

Viktor Larin (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Putting the Brakes on Regional Integration: Chinese Migration and the Russian Far East in Two Periods, 1907-14 and 19881995"

Zhengyun NAN (Beijing Normal U.): "The Roots of Russian Studies in China: Harbin, 1950s-60s"

Stephen Kotkin (Princeton U.): "Frank Golder, Robert Kerner and the Northeast Asian Seminar, 1920s-1950s"

Evgenii Plaksen (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Public Opinion in the Russian Far East: Accentuations and Priorities"

Thomas Lahusen (Duke University) : "Azhaev's Far East"

Tatsuo NAKAMI (Tokyo Foreign Languages U.), "Japanese Conceptions of Northeast Asia in the 20th century"

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

WORKING PAPERS

CWIHP Working Papers are available free upon request. Requests can be sent to Jim Hershberg, Director, CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Castle, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560; faxed to (202) 3574439; or e-mailed to wwcem 123@sivm.si.edu

#1. Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War"

#2. P.J. Simmons, "Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw"

#3. James Richter, "Reexamining Soviet Policy Toward Germany during the Beria Interregnum"

#4. Vladislav M. Zubok, "Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The 'Small' Committee of Information, 1952-52"

#5. Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961"

#6. Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)"

#7. Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, "Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two Reports"

#8. Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives"

#9. Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, "New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports"

#10. Norman M. Naimark, "To Know Everything and To Report Everything Worth Knowing': Building the East German Police State, 1945-1949"

#11. Christian F. Ostermann, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback"

#12. Brian Murray, "Stalin, the Cold War, and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery"

#13. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with the United States and Great Britain"

MAO ZEDONG'S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958: CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Translated and Annotated

by Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson

Translators' Note: On 23 August 1958, Chinese Communist forces in the Fujian area along the People's Republic of China's Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled Jinmen Island. In the following two months, several hundred thousand artillery shells exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around it. At one point, a Chinese Communist invasion of the Nationalist-controlled offshore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In response to the rapidly escalating Communist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the Eisenhower Administration, in accordance with its obligations under the 1954 American-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. naval vessels to help the Nationalists protect Jinmen's supply lines. Even the leaders of the Soviet Union, then Beijing's close ally, feared the possible consequences of Beijing's actions, and sent Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to inquire about China's reasons for shelling Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed on October 6, when Beijing issued a "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it was speculated by many at that time, and later confirmed, that this message was drafted by Mao Zedong). The message called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan the Taiwan problem, arguing that all Chinese should unite to confront the "American plot" to divide China permanently. From this day on, the Communist forces dramatically relaxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the Taiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war between China and the United States.

In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in Cold War history, it is particularly important to understand Beijing's motives. Why did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the shelling relate to China's overall domestic and international policies? Why did the Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis

as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, scholars have been forced to resort to "educated guesses" to answer these questions.

The materials in the following pages, translated from Chinese, provide new insights for understanding Beijing's handling of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu Lengxi, then the director of the New China News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin ribao (People's Daily). Wu was personally involved in the decision-making process in Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and attended several Politburo Standing Committee meetings discussing the events. His memoir provides both a chronology and an insider's narrative of how Beijing's leaders, Mao Zedong in particular, handled the crisis. The second part comprises 18 documents, including two internal speeches delivered by Mao explaining the Party's external policies in general and its Taiwan policy in particular. The two parts together provide a foundation to build a scholarly understanding of some of the key calculations underlying the Beijing leadership's management of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly interesting is the revelation that Mao decided to shell Jinmen to distract American attention from, and counter American moves in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his extensive explanation of how China should use a "noose strategy" to fight the "U.S. imperialists." Equally important is his emphasis on the connection between the tense situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass mobilization in China leading to the Great Leap Forward. It should also be noted that despite the aggressive appearance of Beijing's Taiwan policy, Mao paid special attention to avoiding a direct military confrontation with American forces present in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. Although these materials are not directly from Chinese archives, they create a new basis for scholars to deepen their understanding of the 1958 events. [Ed. note: For recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using newly available Chinese sources, see Shu

Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: ChineseBritish-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by Thomas Christensen to be published by Princeton University Press.]

Rendering Chinese- or English-language materials into the other language is difficult because the two languages have no common linguistic roots. Thus, the materials provided below are sometimes free rather than literal translations from Chinese to English. Great care has been taken to avoid altering the substantive meaning intended by the author of the documents. Material appearing in the text in brackets has been supplied to clarify meaning or to provide missing words or information not in the original text. Additional problems with individual documents are discussed in the notes. The notes also include explanatory information to place key individual and events in context or to provide further information on the material being discussed.

Part I. Memoir, "Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen❞

By Wu Lengxi1

[Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]]

In August 1958, the members of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Politburo met at Beidaihe2 for a regular top leaders' working conference. The meeting originally planned to focus on the nation's industrial problems, and later the issue of the people's commune was added to the discussion.

The Politburo convened its summit meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend the meeting several days later. On the 20th,

however, the General Office of the Central Committee called, urging me to go to Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 August on a scheduled flight arranged by the Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed with Hu Qiaomu3 in a villa in Beidaihe's central district. This seaside resort area was used only for the leading members of the Central Committee during summers. All of the villas in the resort area were built before the liberation4 for high officials, noble lords, and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman Mao's large, one-story house was newly constructed.

At noon on 23 August, the third day after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People's Liberation Army's artillery forces in Fujian employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces and heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy], Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding offshore islands occupied by the Nationalist army.

In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I learned the reason [for the bombardment]. In mid-July, American troops invaded Lebanon and British troops invaded Jordan in order to put down the Iraqi people's armed rebellion. Thereafter, the Central Committee decided to conduct certain military operations in the Taiwan Straits to support the Arabs' anti-imperialist struggle as well as to crack down on the Nationalist army's frequent and reckless harassment along the Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] announced on 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu [Pescadores], Jinmen, and Mazu were all "to be on emergency alert." It showed that Jiang's army was going to make some moves soon. We therefore deployed our air force in Fujian Province at the end of July.5 Our fighters had been fighting the Nationalist air force and had already taken over control of the air space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, our artillery reinforcement units arrived at the front one after another. And mass rallies and parades were organized all over the country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples and to protest against the American and British imperialists' invasions of the Middle East.

Chairman Mao talked first at the meeting of August 23. He said that the day's bombardment was perfectly scheduled. Three days earlier, the UN General Assem

bly had passed a resolution requesting American and British troops to withdraw from both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American occupation of Taiwan became even more unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was that American armed forces should withdraw from Taiwan, and Jiang's army should withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bombardment would certainly shock the international community, not only the Americans, but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab world would be delighted, and African and Asian peoples would take our side.

Then Chairman Mao turned to me and said that [the reason for] rushing me to attend the meeting was to let me know about attend the meeting was to let me know about this sudden event. He directed me to instruct the New China News Agency (NCNA) to collect international responses to the bombardment. Important responses should be immediately reported to Beidaihe by telephone. Mao asked me not to publish our own reports and articles on the bombardment at present. We needed to wait and see for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao also asked me to instruct editorial departments of the NCNA, the People's Daily, and national radio stations that they must obey these orders and instructions in all their reports. Our military troops must follow the orders, as well as our media and propaganda units, Mao emphasized.

Chairman Mao continued his talk. Several days earlier, at the beginning of the summit meeting, he addressed eight international issues. He had been thinking of these issues for many years. His thinking had gradually formulated some points and opinions, and his mind thereby became clear. Those viewpoints, however, could not be all brought forth without considering time, place, and circumstance in our public propaganda, Mao said to me. We had to use a different tone in our media work. What he used as the first example was that at the meeting a couple days earlier he predicted that world war would not break out. But our military should still be prepared for a total war. And our media should still talk about the danger of world war and call for opposing the imperialists' aggressive and warprovoking policies to maintain world peace. The next example in his explanations was which side feared the other a bit more. Al

though Mao believed that the imperialists were more afraid of us, he told me that our media and propaganda should state that first we were not afraid of war, and second we opposed war. Another point he made was that international tension had a favorable aspect for the people of the world. Our propaganda, however, should declare that we must prevent the imperialists from making any international tension, and work on relaxing such tension. These were only some examples, he continued. There were so many bad things happening in our world. If we were too distracted with worries by everyday anxieties, we would soon collapse psychologically under pressure. We should learn how to use a dichotomous method to analyze the dual nature of bad things. Though international tension was certainly a bad thing, we should see the good side of it. The tension had made many people awaken and decide to fight the imperialists to the end. Employing such an analytical method could help us achieve a liberation in our mind and get rid of a heavy millstone round our necks. Chairman Mao said that the bombardment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our turn to create international tension for a purpose. We intended to teach the Americans a lesson. America had bullied us for many years, so now that we had a chance, why not give it a hard time? For the present we should first wait and see what international responses, especially American responses, there were to our shelling, and then we could decide on our next move. Americans started a fire in the Middle East, and we started another in the Far East. We would see what they would do with it. In our propaganda, however, we still need to condemn the Americans for causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We did not put them in the wrong. The United States has several thousand troops stationed on Taiwan, plus two air force bases there. Their largest fleet, the Seventh Fleet, often cruises in the Taiwan Straits. They also have a large naval base in Manila. The chief of staff of the American navy had stated not long ago (around 6 August) that the American armed forces were ready anytime for a landing campaign in the Taiwan Straits just as they did in Lebanon. That was eloquent proof [of America's ambition], Mao said.

Two days later, during the afternoon of 25 August, Chairman Mao held another Politburo Standing Committee meeting in the

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