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will grow in international relations.
ing China into a military “superpower,” and and USA have agreed to follow. In accordance with the instructions you the resolution of the most serious problems, As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, received previously and taking into account such as increasing the extremely low mate- it has every opportunity to defend its interthe specifics of your post country, continue rial and cultural level of the Chinese people, ests and repel the presumptions of other your work to reveal the dangerous character has been relegated to an indefinite future. In countries, including the PRC. The calculaof the developing rapprochement between China they don't hide the fact that “modern- tions of those who try to direct Americanaggressive circles in the West, above all the ization” is the best means of preparing for Chinese relations in such as way as to use USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling war. In practice, unrestrained militarization China as a means of pressure and as a miliattention to the following aspects.
accelerates economic collapse and increased tary counterweight to the Soviet Union are 1. In developing military cooperation instability in China. Thus, those countries short-sighted. Those who hope to redirect with China, the ruling circles in the USA who actively take part in the Chinese pro- Chinese expansion to the north risk major count on the possibility of influencing China gram of “modernization,” actually contrib- miscalculation. Encouraging the expansion to act in a “desirable” way, of channeling its ute to the growth of its military potential and of China's military potential increases the policies in an acceptable direction. Fre- render a disservice to the Chinese people. danger that certain countries would be inquently the foreign policy activity of the On the other hand, the policy of milita- veigled into Beijing's orbit, and in the longPRC is presented as a “stabilizing” factor in rizing the country will inevitably engender term, could lead to a situation in which these the international arena. The Chinese leaders unpredictable turns and zigzags and future very countries could become the victims of themselves are not adverse to playing up to evidence of foreign policy adventurism, lead- Chinese expansion. Therefore, thinking resuch a discussion and, to this end, without ing to the dangerous destabilization of the alistically, it would follow to recognize that withdrawing the thesis of the “inevitability international situation and the inflammation a “strong” China would chose a different of war," have begun to use a more flexible of international tension. Any injection of direction for its expansionist plans: in all terminology. However, with the help of a aid, particularly by the USA, either directly likelihood it would swallow up neighboring sham "peaceful nature,” invoked to add or indirectly contributing to China's milita- countries, grab hold of all the vitally imporgreater “respectability” to the PRC's foreign rization and to the development of the Chi- tant regions of the world, and would cerpolicy, Beijing is simply counting on gain- nese military potential, would enable China tainly not serve as an instrument in the hands ing time to accomplish the forced arming of to find the striking power necessary for the of the USA or any other country. the country. Actually, more and more, the realization of its hegemonic schemes. Un- 5. The development of military-politiChinese leadership is resorting to a policy of der conditions when Beijing not only op- cal cooperation between China and the USA, diktat and interference in the domestic af- poses all constructive proposals to strengthen which elicits concern among many states, fairs of other countries, and assumes on peace and detente, but also directly pro- has led already to a noticeable worsening of itself the improper functions of “teaching vokes international conflict, this said] would the international situation and complicated lessons” and “punishing” the unruly with mean an increased danger of war breaking the search for real paths to strengthening the force of arms.
out and the growth of threats to all humanity, peace and security in various regions of the 2. As before, the PRC government including the Chinese and American peoples. ,
world. In an effort to create favorable condideclines to make any international legal com- The fact that what is proposed for deliv- tions for the realization of its hegemonic mitments to disarmament, tries to diminish ery to China is “non-lethal” equipment and aims, the Beijing leadership counts on agthe importance of results achieved in this technology, “defensive,” and “dual-use," gravating relations between countries, setarea, and refuses to take part in measures to etc., does not change the situation. The issue ting some states against others, and provoklimit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set is not that such distinctions are extremely ing military conflicts. Beijing does not hide about to manufacture and experiment with relative, but that cooperation with military the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear conintercontinental ballistic missiles, capable modernization will free up the forces within flict between the Soviet Union and the USA, of carrying nuclear warheads, and is work- China and the means necessary for building and, from its ashes, assume world dominaing on the creation of neutron weapons. All up its principal strike force
strike force - its nuclear tion. this drives the global arms race forward and capability.
Those who insist on the necessity of directly contradicts the interests of detente. 4. The plans Beijing has been develop- “strengthening” China base their calculaThis policy of Beijing's seriously threatens ing for a long time to change the global tions on the assumption that Beijing would everyone, even the USA and Japan, and not correlation of forces and the entire structure coordinate in a confrontation with the USSR just the Soviet Union and other socialist of contemporary international relations elicit and in its conflicts in Asia, and therefore states.
serious alarm. The transfer to China of any would not be dangerous for the West. But 3. There is absolutely no basis for technology or equipment whatsoever—this taking into account the continuing domestic concluding, as some do, that Beijing's al- would be a step in the direction of the erosion political struggle in China, no one can guarleged adoption of a “modernization pro- of the established military-balance in the antee that in 5-10 years China would not gram” represents a new political course to world and of a new cycle in the arms race. bring into play an anti-American card or overcome China's economic backwardness. The destruction of the balance of military anti-Japanese card and use its ICBM force In fact this course was taken above all to forces would erode the basis for the arms against those countries which irresponsibly contribute to the realization of pre-existing limitation negotiations insofar as equal se- connived and assisted with the PRC's replans to speed up the process of transform- curity is the main principle which the USSR armament.
The experience of history attests to the Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present
COLD WAR IN ASIA fact that the extent of China's expansion a direct threat to other regions.
continued from page 191 will be proportional to the military might of Under these conditions, the Soviet Union
RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC: the Chinese army. Even today China's can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not
PAST AND PRESENT neighbors, above all the countries of South- only do we carefully monitor the direction of east Asia which the Chinese leaders con- American-Chinese cooperation in the mili
(Khabarovsk, 26-29 August 1995) sider to be their traditional sphere of influ- tary sphere, but also we must take the necesence, experience an immediate threat. It
26 August 1995: Multiethnic Demographics sary steps to strengthen the security of our would be easy to imagine how China will borders. We cannot tolerate change in the behave in relation to its neighbors once the military-strategic balance in favor of forces Morning: Russians Abroad in the Far East USA and its neighbors assist China to ac- hostile to the cause of peace. quire more modern weapons. Above all, (Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw,
Maria Krotova (Herzen Institute, PetersChina is trying to institute its control over Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, burg): “Russo-Chinese Daily Relations in preSoutheast Asia all the way to the coast of
1917 Harbin” Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul. Malacca and the straits of Singapore.
Lena Aurilena (Institute of History, The post countries should inform MID Under these conditions, attempts to ig- [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Soviet
Vladivostok): “Youth Politics in Russian Emigre nore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese ambassadors were sent instructions about Organizations in Manchukuo, 1930s-40s” policy and to remain neutral will only en- carrying out work to counter the negative
Nadezhda Solov’eva (Khabarovsk Provincourage Beijing to undertake new advencounsequences for the causes of socialism,
cial Archive): “Khabarovsk’s Archival Holdings
on Russo-Chinese Relations" tures and to extend its expansion. Collec- peace, and detente, of the establishment of an tive efforts by Asian states could, on the
David Wolff (Princeton U.): “Interlocking American-Chinese military alliance. Familcontrary, impede China's path to increased iarize the recipient with the content of the Diasporas: The Jews of Harbin, 1903-1914” military might, which is directed above all aforementioned instructions.
Shuxiao LI (Heilongjiang Trade Corporaagainst countries of this region.
Carry out your work in coordination
tion): “The Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin's (For New Delhi only. The connivance with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the
Rise as an Economic Center” and outright support of the USA for military Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the
Alexander Toropov (Central Archive of the preparations in China can only contradict People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the
Far East, Vladivostok): “Russia's Far Eastern India's interests. Although the Chinese Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), the Ger
Neighbors” leadership is holding talks about normaliz- man Democratic Republic (GDR), the Lao
Iurii Tsipkin (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): ing relations with India, there is an entire tian People's Democratic Republic (LPDR),
“The Social Composition of the Harbin Emigra
tion, 1920s 30s” array of means of pressure against it in the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), China's arsenal of strategies. In American- the Polish People's Republic (PPR), and the Chinese plans, the role which is allotted to Czechoslovak People's Republic (CPR).)
Afternoon : “Foreigners” in the Russian Far East Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India
(RFE): Settlement and Resettlement
It is necessary to attentively follow all and as a base of support for the aggressive foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans actions of the USA and China in Southeast for the expansion of American-Chinese mili
Tatiana Ikonnikova (Ped. Institute, Asia is expanding more and more. In coop- tary cooperation, to regularly and effectively Khabarovsk): “German Intelligence in the RFE eration with the USA, Beijing is flooding inform the Center about them, and to take the during WWI: Suspicions and Realities”
Vladimir Mukhachev (Institute of History, India's neighbors with arms and, by creat- measures required to neutralize the tendening an atmosphere of war psychosis, is at- cies that are undesirable for our interests.
Vladivostok): "Intervention and Civil War: New tempting to maintain in power unpopular
Documents and Approaches” regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 34, Dok. 10;
Teruyuki HARA (Slavic Research Center, Beijing is speeding up its military prepara- translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]
Sapporo, Japan): “The Japanese in Vladivostok,
1906-1922" tions along the Chinese-Indian border, con
Elena Chernolutskaia (Institute of History, structing missile bases and strategic roads in Tibet, and activating its support for separat
Vladivostok): “Forced Migrations in the Far East Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the
from the 1920s till mid-1950s" ist movements in northeast India, where it is Institute of Modern History, Academica
Natsuko OKA (Institute of Developing practically waging an “undeclared war”
Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on against this country.)
Economies): “Koreans in the Russian Far East: a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with There is no doubt that as China strength- China: The Evolution of Moscow's China
Collectivization and Deportation” ens its military-industrial potential, it will
Viktoriia Romanova (Ped. Institute, Policy, 1969-95. advance further along the path to the real
Khabarovsk): “The Jewish Diaspora in the makization of Chinese leadership’s openly de
ing of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast” clared territorial pretensions against neigh
Chizuko TAKAO (Waseda U., Tokyo, Jaboring countries in Southeast, South, and
pan): “Reevaluating the ‘Birobidzhan Project: West Asia. This will not only lead to a
The Regional Context” serious destabilization of the situation in
27 August 1995: Civilian and Military in the Borderland: Options and Tensions
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL
Morning: Regional Political-Economy
Vladivostok): “Foreign Investment in the Rus-
Lidiia Varaksina (Khabarovsk Provincial
Igor Sanachev (Far Eastern State U.): “For-
Takeshi HAMASHITA (Tokyo U.): “Japanese Currency and Banking in Northeast Asia"
CWIHP Working Papers are available free upon request. Requests can be sent to Jim Hershberg, Director, CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Castle, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560; faxed to (202) 3574439; or e-mailed to email@example.com
28 August 1995: The Crossborder Learning
Pavel Minakir and Nadezhda Mikheeva (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “The Economy of the Russian Far East : Between Centralization and Regionalization”
Vladimir Syrkin (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Economic Regionalism: Conditions, Factors and Tendencies"
Katherine Burns (Massachusetts Inst. of Technology): “The Russian Far Eastern Initiative: Autonomous Decision-Making and Cooperation in Northeast Asia.”
Cristina Sarykova (Univ. of Calif. at San Diego): “Politics and the Reform of the Primorsk Fuel and Energy Complex”
#1. Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War"
Morning: International Economic Considerations
#2. P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw
#3. James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Toward Germany during the Beria Interregnum”
Afternoon: The RFE as “Outpost"
#4. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Information, 1952-52"
Elizabeth Wishnick (Independent Scholar):
Weixian MA (Institute of E. Europe and
Natal'ia Bezliudnaia (Far Eastern State U.):
Jingxue XU (Institute of Siberia, Harbin):
Andrei Admidin and E. Devaeva (Institute
Douglas Barry (U. of Alaska - Anchorage):
#5. Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961"
#6. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)"
Oleg Sergeev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "The Cossack Revival in the Far East: From Borderguards to Émigrés to Interest Group"
Vladimir Sokolov (Primor'e Provincial Museum): “Russian Nationalism and the Cossacks of the Far East”
Jun NIU (Institute of American Studies, CASS): “Soviet Policy towards Northeast China, 1945-49"
Ping BU (Institute of Modern History, Heilongjiang Province Academy of Social Sciences): “Sino-Soviet Disposal of Japanese Chemical Weapons after 1945"
Evgeniia Gudkova (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Military Conversion in the Russian Far East”
James Hershberg (Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center, Washington, DC): “Northeast Asia and the Cold War"
Tamara Troyakova (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "The Maritime Province on the Road to Openness: Khrushchev in Vladivostok”
#7. Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, “Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two Reports"
Afternoon: Perceptions, Images & Area-Studies
#8. Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea
New Evidence from Russian Archives"
#9. Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, Integration: Chinese Migration and the Russian
“New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Far East in Two Periods, 1907-14 and 1988- Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports” 1995”
Zhengyun NAN (Beijing Normal U.): “The #10. Norman M. Naimark, “To Know EveryRoots of Russian Studies in China : Harbin, thing and To Report Everything Worth Know1950s-60s"
ing': Building the East German Police State,
#11. Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, Seminar, 1920s-1950s."
the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits Evgenii Plaksen (Institute of History,
#12. Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, and the
#13. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three
After World War II: New Documents on Soviet
Thinking about Post War Relations with the United
Late Afternoon: International Economic Considerations (I)
Natal'ia Troitskaia (Far Eastern State U.): “The Effect of Changing Border Regimes on Large-scale Trade between late-Imperial Russia and China"
Mikhail Koval'chuk (Institute of Transport, Khabarovsk): “Foreign Trade and Transport in the Russian Far East, 1860-1930s”
Anatolii Mandrik (Institute of History,
MAO ZEDONG’S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958:
CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS
Translated and Annotated
Translators’Note: On 23 August 1958, as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic CulChinese Communist forces in the Fujian scholars have been forced to resort to “edu- ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, area along the People's Republic of China's cated guesses” to answer these questions. 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery The materials in the following pages, Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled translated from Chinese, provide new in- Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: ChineseJinmen Island. In the following two months, sights for understanding Beijing's handling British-American Relations, 1949-1958 several hundred thousand artillery shells of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by it. At one point, a Chinese Communist Lengxi, then the director of the New China Thomas Christensen to be published by invasion of the Nationalist-controlled off- News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin Princeton University Press.] shore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) ribao (People's Daily). Wu was personally Rendering Chinese- or English-lanand Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In involved in the decision-making process in guage materials into the other language is response to the rapidly escalating Commu- Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and difficult because the two languages have no nist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the attended several Politburo Standing Com- common linguistic roots. Thus, the materiEisenhower Administration, in accordance mittee meetings discussing the events. His als provided below are sometimes free rather with its obligations under the 1954 Ameri- memoir provides both a chronology and an than literal translations from Chinese to can-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. insider's narrative of how Beijing's leaders, English. Great care has been taken to avoid naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. Mao Zedong in particular, handled the cri- altering the substantive meaning intended naval vessels to help the Nationalists pro- sis. The second part comprises 18 docu- by the author of the documents. Material tect Jinmen's supply lines. Even the leaders ments, including two internal speeches de- appearing in the text in brackets has been of the Soviet Union, then Beijing's close livered by Mao explaining the Party's exter- supplied to clarify meaning or to provide ally, feared the possible consequences of nal policies in general and its Taiwan policy missing words or information not in the
, Beijing's actions, and sent Foreign Minis- in particular. The two parts together provide original text. Additional problems with inter Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to in- a foundation to build a scholarly under- dividual documents are discussed in the quire about China's reasons for shelling standing of some of the key calculations notes. The notes also include explanatory Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the underlying the Beijing leadership’s man- information to place key individual and Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed agement of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly events in context or to provide further inforon October 6, when Beijing issued a “Mes- interesting is the revelation that Mao de- mation on the material being discussed. sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the cided to shell Jinmen to distract American name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it attention from, and counter American moves Part I. Memoir, “Inside Story of the was speculated by many at that time, and in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his Decision Making during the Shelling of later confirmed, that this message was extensive explanation of how China should Jinmen” drafted by Mao Zedong). The message use a “noose strategy” to fight the “U.S. By Wu Lengxil called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan imperialists.” Equally important is his em- [Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Litproblem, arguing that all Chinese should phasis on the connection between the tense erature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]] unite to confront the "American plot” to situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass divide China permanently. From this day mobilization in China leading to the Great In August 1958, the members of the on, the Communist forces dramatically re- Leap Forward. It should also be noted that Standing Committee of the Chinese Comlaxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the despite the aggressive appearance of munist Party (CCP) Central Committee PoTaiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war Beijing's Taiwan policy, Mao paid special litburo met at Beidaihe2 for a regular top between China and the United States. attention to avoiding a direct military con- leaders' working conference. The meeting
In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of frontation with American forces present in originally planned to focus on the nation's the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. industrial problems, and later the issue of the Cold War history, it is particularly impor- Although these materials are not directly people's commune was added to the discustant to understand Beijing's motives. Why from Chinese archives, they create a new sion. did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the basis for scholars to deepen their under- The Politburo convened its summit shelling relate to China's overall domestic standing of the 1958 events. [Ed. note: For meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in and international policies? Why did the recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis newly available Chinese sources, see Shu the meeting several days later. On the 20th, however, the General Office of the Central bly had passed a resolution requesting Ameri- though Mao believed that the imperialists Committee called, urging me to go to can and British troops to withdraw from were more afraid of us, he told me that our Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American media and propaganda should state that first August on a scheduled flight arranged by the occupation of Taiwan became even more we were not afraid of war, and second we Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was opposed war. Another point he made was with Hu Qiaomu3 in a villa in Beidaihe's that American armed forces should with- that international tension had a favorable central district. This seaside resort area was draw from Taiwan, and Jiang's army should aspect for the people of the world. Our used only for the leading members of the withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they propaganda, however, should declare that Central Committee during summers. All of did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far we must prevent the imperialists from makthe villas in the resort area were built before away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen ing any international tension, and work on the liberation4 for high officials, noble lords, and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bom- relaxing such tension. These were only and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman bardment would certainly shock the interna- some examples, he continued. There were Mao's large, one-story house was newly tional community, not only the Americans, so many bad things happening in our world. constructed.
but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab If we were too distracted with worries by At noon on 23 August, the third day world would be delighted, and African and everyday anxieties, we would soon collapse
, after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People's Lib- Asian peoples would take our side. psychologically under pressure. We should eration Army's artillery forces in Fujian Then Chairman Mao turned to me and learn how to use a dichotomous method to employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces said that [the reason for] rushing me to analyze the dual nature of bad things. Though and heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy], attend the meeting was to let me know about international tension was certainly a bad Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding off- this sudden event. He directed me to instruct thing, we should see the good side of it. The shore islands occupied by the Nationalist the New China News Agency (NCNA) to tension had made many people awaken and army.
collect international responses to the bom- decide to fight the imperialists to the end. In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the bardment. Important responses should be Employing such an analytical method could Politburo's Standing Committee meeting immediately reported to Beidaihe by tele- help us achieve a liberation in our mind and chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I phone. Mao asked me not to publish our get rid of a heavy millstone round our necks. learned the reason [for the bombardment). own reports and articles on the bombard- Chairman Mao said that the bombardIn mid-July, American troops invaded Leba- ment at present. We needed to wait and see ment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our non and British troops invaded Jordan in for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao turn to create international tension for a order to put down the Iraqi people's armed also asked me to instruct editorial depart- purpose. We intended to teach the Amerirebellion. Thereafter, the Central Commit- ments of the NCNA, the People's Daily, and cans a lesson. America had bullied us for tee decided to conduct certain military op- national radio stations that they must obey many years, so now that we had a chance, erations in the Taiwan Straits to support the these orders and instructions in all their why not give it a hard time? For the present Arabs' anti-imperialist struggle as well as to reports. Our military troops must follow the we should first wait and see what internacrack down on the Nationalist army's fre- orders, as well as our media and propaganda tional responses, especially American requent and reckless harassment along the units, Mao emphasized.
sponses, there were to our shelling, and then Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Chairman Mao continued his talk. Sev- we could decide on our next move. AmeriJiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] announced eral days earlier, at the beginning of the cans started a fire in the Middle East, and we on 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu [Pescadores], summit meeting, he addressed eight interna- started another in the Far East. We would Jinmen, and Mazu were all “to be on emer- tional issues. He had been thinking of these see what they would do with it. In our gency alert.” It showed that Jiang's army issues for many years. His thinking had propaganda, however, we still need to con
, was going to make some moves soon. We gradually formulated some points and opin- demn the Americans for causing tension in therefore deployed our air force in Fujian ions, and his mind thereby became clear. the Taiwan Straits. We did not put them in Province at the end of July.5 Our fighters Those viewpoints, however, could not be all the wrong. The United States has several had been fighting the Nationalist air force brought forth without considering time, thousand troops stationed on Taiwan, plus and had already taken over control of the air place, and circumstance in our public propa- two air force bases there. Their largest fleet, space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, ganda, Mao said to me. We had to use a the Seventh Fleet, often cruises in the Taiour artillery reinforcement units arrived at different tone in our media work. What he wan Straits. They also have a large nava the front one after another. And mass rallies used as the first example was that at the base in Manila. The chief of staff of the and parades were organized all over the meeting a couple days earlier he predicted American navy had stated not long ago country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples that world war would not break out. But our (around 6 August) that the American armed and to protest against the American and military should still be prepared for a total forces were ready anytime for a landing British imperialists' invasions of the Middle war. And our media should still talk about campaign in the Taiwan Straits just as they East.
the danger of world war and call for oppos- did in Lebanon. That was eloquent proof [of Chairman Mao talked first at the meet- ing the imperialists' aggressive and war- America's ambition), Mao said. ing of August 23. He said that the day's provoking policies to maintain world peace. Two days later, during the afternoon of bombardment was perfectly scheduled. The next example in his explanations was 25 August, Chairman Mao held another PoThree days earlier, the UN General Assem
which side feared the other a bit more. Al- litburo Standing Committee meeting in the