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"shelling." Mao agreed with him by suggesting that we should announce an oddnumbered-day shelling, with no shelling on even-numbered days. For the odd-numbered-day shelling, our targets might be limited only to the harbors and airport, not the defense works and residential buildings on the island. From now on, our shelling would be limited in scope, and, moreover, the light shelling might not be on a regular basis. Militarily it sounded like a joke, since such policy was unknown in the history of Chinese or world warfare. However, we were engaged in a political battle, which was supposed to be fought this way. Chairman Mao said that we only had "hand grenades" right now, but no atomic bombs. "Hand grenades" could be successful for us to use in beating Jiang's troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], but not a good idea to use in fighting against Americans, who had nuclear weapons. Later, when everybody had nuclear weapons, very likely nobody would use them.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meeting whether we should issue a formal statement announcing future shelling on odd days only but not on even days. Chairman Mao believed it necessary. He also required me to understand that the editorial mentioned early in the meeting should not be published until our formal statement was issued.

On 25 October, the "Second Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" drafted by Chairman Mao was issued in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analysis of Dulles's speech published by the U.S. State Department on 23 October, the message pointed out that on the one hand Dulles finally saw a "Communist China" and was willing to make contact with it. On the other hand, however, this American bureaucrat still considered the so-called "Republic of China" in Taiwan as a "political unit which was factually existing." The American plan was first to separate Taiwan from the mainland, and second to mandate Taiwan's special status. The message read, "China's affairs must be handled by the Chinese themselves. For any problem unable to be solved at once, we can give it further thought and discuss it later between us. . . . We are not advising you to break up with Americans right now. These sort of ideas are not practical. We simply hope that you should not yield to the pressure from Americans. If you live under somebody's thumb and lose your

sovereignty, you will eventually have no place to call your home and be thrown out into the sea." The message announced that we had already ordered PLA batteries on the Fujian front not to fire on the airport, harbors, ships, and beaches of Jinmen on even days. On odd days, we might not bomb either, as long as there were no ships or airplanes coming to Jinmen.

The same day the statement was issued, Chairman Mao sent for Tian Jiaying20 and me for a conversation. Besides asking us to make a survey of the current condition of people's communes in Henan Province, Mao talked about the bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu. He said that during this event and Mazu. He said that during this event both we and the Americans adopted a brinkmanship policy. America concentrated many warships which invaded our territorial waters and escorted Jiang's transportation fleets, but never fired on us. We fired 10,000 or 20,000 shells a day, or even more whenever there were American escort ships. Our shells, however, fell only on Jiang's ships not on American ships. Some shells fell near American ships, which frightened them and caused them to turn around. While confronting each other in the Taiwan Straits, both sides continued talks in Warsaw. Americans were on one side of the brink, and we on the other. Even though both were at the brink of war, no one ever crossed the line. We used our brinkmanship policy to deal with American brinkmanship. Mao continued that there were many stories written in Liaozhai Zhiyi (The Chinese Ghost Stories)21 about people without fear of ghosts. One of the stories was titled "Qing Feng," which talked about a bohemian scholar named Geng Qubing. One night, Geng was reading late in a remote village house. "A ghost walks into his house with long hair and black face, and stares at the scholar. Laughing, dipping his fingers into the black ink, and painting his face black himself, Geng looked directly at the ghost with keen, sparkling eyes. The ghost felt embarrassed and ran away." Chairman Mao told us that if we were not afraid of ghosts, ghosts would be unable to do anything to us. He said that our experience in shelling Jinmen-Mazu was the experience in shelling Jinmen-Mazu was the case in point.

I can say that what Chairman Mao told us here is his summary of our management of the Jinmen-Mazu crisis of 1958.

Part II. Documents

1. Notation, Mao Zedong on Chen Geng's Report, 18 December 195722

Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji [A Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993), 6:373

Return to Comrade Peng Dehuai:

[What has been suggested in the report] is absolutely necessary. You should supervise and push the air force to go all out [to fulfill the task], so that we are sure that the invading enemy will be annihilated. Please consider the question regarding our air force's moving into Fujian in 1958.

2. Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng, 27 July 195823 Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1992), 7:326

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] Kecheng:

[I] could not sleep [last night], but thought about it again. It seems more appropriate to hold our [plans] to attack Jinmen for several days. While holding our operations, [we will] observe the situational development there. We will not attack whether or not the other side relieves a garrison. Until they launch a provocative attack, [we will] then respond with a counterattack. The solution of the problem in the Middle East takes time. Since we have time, why should we be in a big hurry? We will hold our attack plans now, but one day we will put it into implementation. If the other side invades Zhang[zhou], Shan[tou], Fuzhou, and Hangzhou, a best scenario [for us to take action] would emerge. How do you think about this idea? Could you have a discussion about this with other comrades? It is extremely beneficial [for our decision-making] with politics in command and going through repeated deliberations. To make a plan too quickly usually results in an unthoughtful consideration. I did such things quite often and sometimes had unavoidable miscalculations. What is your opinion? Even if the other side attacks us, [we still] can wait for a couple of days for a clear calculation, and then start our counterattack. Can all of the above points be accounted as working

out splendid plans here to defeat the enemy in battles a thousand miles away, and having some certainty of success that we will be ever-victorious? We must persist in the principle of fighting no battle we are not sure of winning. If you agree [with the above points], telegraph this letter to Ye Fei and ask him to think about it very carefully. Let me know his opinion.

Have a peaceful morning!

Mao Zedong

10 A.M., 27 July24

3. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, 18 August 1958, 1:00 a.m.25 Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:348

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

[We are] preparing to shell Jinmen, dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and the Americans indirectly. Therefore, do not conduct military maneuvers in Guangdong and Shengzhen, so that the British would not be scared.

Mao Zedong

1 A.M., 18 August

P.S.: Please call air force headquarters attention to the possibility that the Taiwan side might counterattack us by dispatching large groups of air force (such as dozens, or even over one hundred, airplanes) to try to take back air control over Jin[men] and Ma[zu]. If this happens, we should prepare to use large groups of air force to defeat them immediately. However, in chasing them, [our planes] should not cross the space line over Jinmen and Mazu.26

ing.

Part II

Distribute them to the Fujian Military District and all other military districts; the party committees of all provinces, metropolises, and regions; all departments of the Central Military Commission and all special forces headquarters; all members of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Lu Dingyi;29 and Wu Lengxi.

5. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 5 September 1958 (Excerpt)

Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1994), 341-348

As far as the international situation is concerned, our view has always been optimistic, which can be summarized as "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind."

At present, America commits itself to an "all-round contract" policy along our coast. It seems to me that the Americans will only feel comfortable if they take complete responsibility for Jinmen and Mazu, or even for such small islands as Dadan, Erdan, and Dongding. America gets into our noose. Thereby, America's neck is hanging in China's iron noose. Although Taiwan is [for the Americans] another noose, it is a bit farther from [the mainland]. America now moves its head closer to us, since it wants to take responsibility for Jinmen and other islands. Someday we will kick America, and it cannot run away, because it is tied up by

our noose.

I would like to present some viewpoints,

4. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Huang offering some ideas for the participants at Kecheng, 3 September 195827 Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:376

Part I

Comrade [Huang] Kecheng:

Both the instruction and the appendix28 are well written. Please send them to Comrade Peng Dehuai immediately for his reading. Then, they should be approved by the Central Military Commission's meeting and issued thereafter. Please give a detailed explanation of the reasons [for these documents] at the Military Commission's meet

this meeting. Do not treat them as a decision, or some kind of law. As law, they might not be changed; as opinions, they are alive and flexible. Let us use these points to review and analyze the current international situation.

The first question is who fears whom a bit more. I believe that the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. So are we. But the question is which side actually fears the other a bit more. This is my point, as well as my observation. I would like to invite everybody here to apply this point to your observation from now on. You can observe the

situation for one, two, three, or four years by using this point. You will eventually find out whether the West fears the East a bit more, or the East fears the West a bit more. According to my opinion, it is Dulles who fears us more. Britain, America, Germany, France, and other western countries fear us a lot more. Why do they have more fears? This is an issue of strength, and an issue of popularity. Public attitude is indeed strength. There are more people on our side, and fewer on their side. Among the three doctrines [in today's world]-communism, nationalism, and imperialism, communism and nationalism are relatively closer. Nationalism dominates a large part of the world, including the three continents: Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even though the ruling groups of some countries in these continents are proWest, such as those in Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, and Iran, among the people in these countries many, probably quite a few, are pro-East. Only the monopoly-capitalists and a few people who have been totally poisoned by the monopolycapitalists want a war. Except for them, the rest of the people, or the majority of the people (not all of them) do not want a war. In northern European countries, for example, the ruling classes, though belonging to the capitalists, do not want a war. The balance of strength is like this. The truth is in the hands of the majority of the people, not in the hands of Dulles. As a result, while they feel rather diffident, we are solid and dependable inside. We depend on the people, while they support those reactionary rulers. This is what Dulles is doing right now. He specializes in such people as "Generalissimo Jiang," [South Korean leader] Syngman Rhee, and [South Vietnam leader] Ngo Dinh Diem. My viewpoint is that both sides are afraid [of each other], but they fear us a bit more. Thus, it is impossible for a war to break out.

The second question is what is the nature of the international military alliances organized by the Americans and the other imperialists, such as the North Atlantic [Treaty Organization], the Baghdad [Treaty Organization], and the Manila [Treaty Organization].30 We say that they are of an aggressive nature. It is absolutely true that these military organizations are of an aggressive nature. However, against which side do these organizations direct their spearhead? Are they attacking socialism, or nationalism? It seems to me that they are

currently attacking the nationalist countries, such as Egypt, Lebanon, and the other weak countries in the Middle East. But they will attack the socialist countries until, say, when Hungary completely has failed, Poland has collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Germany have fallen down, and even the Soviet Union and us have encountered troubles. They will attack us when we are shaking and crumbling. Why should they fail to attack you when you are falling down? Stable and strong, we are not falling down now, and they are unable to bite the hard bone. So they turn to those more bitable countries, gnawing at Indonesia, India, Burma, and Ceylon. They have attempted to overthrow [Gamal Abdul] Nasser,31 undermine Iraq, and subjugate Algeria. By now Latin America has made a significant progress. As [U.S.] vice president, [Richard] Nixon was not welcomed in eight countries, where people spat and stoned him. When the political representative of America was treated with saliva and rocks there, it means contempt for America's "dignity," and an unwillingness to treat it "politely." Because you are our enemy, we therefore treat you with saliva and rocks. Thus, we should not take the three military organizations too seriously. [We] need to analyze them. Even though aggressive, they are not steady.

The third point is about the tension in the international situation. We are calling every day for relaxing international tensions because it will benefit the people of the world. So, can we say that it must be harmful for us whenever there is a tense situation? I do not think it necessarily so. A tense situation is not necessarily harmful for us in every circumstance; it has an advantageous side. Why do I think this way? It is because besides its disadvantageous side, a tense situation can mobilize the population, can particularly mobilize the backward people, can mobilize the people in the middle, and can therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction. Afraid of fighting a nuclear war? You have to think it over. Look, we have fired a few shells on Jinmen and Mazu, and I did not expect that the entire world would be so deeply shocked, and the smoke and mist is shading the sky. This is because people are afraid of war. They are afraid that the Americans will make trouble everywhere in the world. Except for Syngman Rhee, no second country supports America among so many countries

in the world. Probably the Philippines can be added to the list, but it offers only “conditional support." It is a tense situation, for example, that caused the Iraqi revolution, is it not? The current tense situation is caused by the imperialists themselves, not by us. In the final analysis, however, the tense situathe final analysis, however, the tense situation is more harmful for the imperialists. tion is more harmful for the imperialists. Lenin once introduced this point in his discussions about war. Lenin said that a war could motivate people's spiritual condition, making it tense. Although there is no war right now, a tense situation caused by the current military confrontation can also bring every positive factor into play, while at the same time stimulating groups of backward people to think.

The fourth point is about the issue of withdrawing armed forces from the Middle East. American and British troops of aggression must withdraw. The imperialists now refuse to withdraw and intend to stay there. This is disadvantageous for the people, but it will at the same time educate the people. In order to fight against aggressors, you need to have a target; without a target, it is difficult for you to fight against the aggressors. The imperialists now come up there themselves to become the target, and refuse to leave. This arouses the people of the entire world to fight against the American aggressors. After all, it seems to me that it is not so harmful for the people when the aggressors put off their withdrawal. Thereby the people will yell at the aggressors everyday: why do you not leave [our country]?

The fifth question is whether it is a good thing or bad thing to have [Charles] de Gaulle in power. At present, the French Communist Party and the French people should firmly oppose de Gaulle coming to power, and veto his constitution. Meanwhile, they should also be prepared for the struggle after he takes office in case they cannot stop him. Once in power, de Gaulle will oppress the French Communist Party and the French people. His taking office, however, may also have advantageous effects in both domestic and foreign affairs. Internationally, this person likes to make trouble for Britain and America. He likes to argue. He had some miserable experiences argue. He had some miserable experiences in the past. In his memoirs, de Gaulle blamed Britain and America all the time, but blamed Britain and America all the time, but said some nice words about the Soviet Union. It seems to me that he will make trouble It seems to me that he will make trouble again. It is advantageous when France has

trouble with Britain and America. Domestically, he would become a necessary teacher who can educate the French proletarians, just like "Generalissimo Jiang" in China. Without “Generalissimo Jiang," it would not be enough for the Chinese Communist Party's positive education alone to educate [China's] 600 million people. Currently, de Gaulle is still enjoying his reputation. If you defeat him now, people are still missing him as he is still alive. Let him come to power, he will run no more than five, six, seven, eight, or ten years. He will be finished sooner or later. After he is finished, no second de Gaulle will be there and his poison will be completely released. You must allow his poison to be released, just like that we did to our Rightists.32 You have to let him release the poison. If not, he always has the poison. You can eliminate the poison only after he releases it.

The sixth point is the embargo, that is, no trade with us. Is this advantageous or disadvantageous to us? I believe that the embargo benefits us a lot. We do not feel it [to be] disadvantageous at all. It will have tremendous beneficial impact on our [handling of] clothing, food, housing, and transportation, as well as on our reconstruction (including the production of steel and iron). The embargo forces us to work out all the solutions ourselves. My appreciation goes to He Yingqin33 all the time. In 1937 when our Red Army was re-organized into the Eighth Route Army under the Nationalist Revolution Army, we received 400,000 yuan of fabi every month. After we were paid the money, we became dependent on it. In 1940, however, the anti-Communist movement reached its peak, and the payment stopped. No more money was paid [to us]. We had to find out our own means [to support ourselves] from then on. What did we find out? We issued an order that as there was no more fabi, each regiment had to find out its own way of self-support. Thereafter, all [of our] base areas launched a production movement. The value yielded from the production reached not 400,000, not 4 million, even not 40 million yuan, but about 100 or possibly 200 million yuan, if we combined the production of all the base areas together. We have since relied on our own efforts. Who is today's He Yingqin? It is Dulles, a different name. Currently, they are carrying out an embargo. We are going own way. We have initiated the Great Leap Forward, throwing

away dependence and breaking down blind faith. The result is good.

The seventh is the non-recognition issue. Is [imperialist countries'] recognition [of the PRC] or non-recognition relatively more advantageous to us? Same as on the embargo issue, imperialist countries' nonrecognition of us is more advantageous to us than their recognition of us. So far there are about forty some countries which refuse to recognize us. The main reason lies in America. For instance, France intends to recognize China, but it does not dare to do it because of America's opposition. Many other countries in Central and South America, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and Canada, dare not to recognize us because of America. There are only nineteen capitalist countries which recognize us now, plus another eleven countries in the socialist camp, plus Yugoslavia, totaling thirty-one countries. It seems to me that we can live with this small number. Non-recognition [of us], in my opinion, is not a bad thing. Rather, it is relatively good. Let us produce more steel. When we can produce 600 or 700 million tons of steel, they will recognize us at last. They may still refuse to recognize us by then, but who cares?

The last issue is about preparations for an anti-aggression war. I said in my first point that as both sides are afraid of war, war should not break out. Everything in the world, however, needs a safety factor. Since there exists a monopoly-capitalist class in the world, I am afraid that it will make trouble recklessly and abruptly. We must therefore be prepared to fight a war. This point needs to be explained clearly to our cadres. First, we do not want a war, and we oppose any war. So does the Soviet Union. If war comes, it will be started by the other side and we will be forced to enter the fighting. Second, however, we do not fear fighting a war. We must fight it if we have to. We have only grenades and potatoes in our hands right now. A war of atomic and hydrogen bombs is of course terrible since many people will die. That is why we oppose a war. Unfortunately, the decision will not be made by us. If the imperialists decide to fight a war, we have to be prepared for everything. We must fight a war if we have to. I am saying that it is not so terrifying even if half of our population perishes. This is certainly talk in extreme terms. Thinking about the history of the entire

universe, I do not see any reason to be pessimistic about the future. I had a debate with Premier [Jawarharlal] Nehru34 over this issue. He said that [as the result of a nuclear war] no government could remain and everything would be destroyed. Even though someone might want to seek peace, no government would be there. I told him that it would never be like that. If your government would be eliminated by atomic bombs, the people would form another one which could work out a peace. If you fail to think about things in such extreme terms, how can you ever sleep? This is no more than a matter of people being killed, and [what is reflected here] is the fear of fighting a war. But if the imperialists definitely want to fight a war and attack us first, using atomic bombs, it does not matter whether you fear fighting a war or not; in any case they will attack you. If that were the case, what should be our attitude? Is it better to fear or not to fear? It is extremely dangerous [for us] to fear this and fear that every day, which will make our cadres and people feel discouraged. So I believe that [we] should be case-hardened toward fighting a war. We will fight it if we have to. We will rebuild our country after the war. Therefore, we are now mobilizing the militias. All people's communes should organize their militias. Everyone in our country is a soldier. We should arm the people. We can distribute several million guns at the beginning. Later on we will distribute several dozen million guns among the people. All provinces should be able to construct light weapons, including rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, and light mortars. Each people's commune should have a military office to supervise [combat] training. Some of our participants here today are intellectuals. You need to here today are intellectuals. You need to make a call for holding a pen in one hand and gripping a gun in the other. You cannot only have pens in your hands. You should be culturalized as well as militarized.

These eight points are my opinions. I offer them to you for your observation of the international situation.

6. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth 6. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 8 September 1958 (Excerpt)

Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 348352

I am going to discuss something we

have talked about before. About the noose issue we discussed at the last meeting, did we not? Now I want to say that we need to place nooses on Dulles, Eisenhower, and other warmongers. There are many places where the nooses can be used on the Americans. In my opinion, wherever an [American] military base is located, [America] is tied up by a noose. [This happens], for example, in the East, in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan; in the West, in West Germany, France, Italy, and Britain; in the Middle East, in Turkey and Iran; and in Africa, in Morocco and other places. In each of these countries, America has many military bases. For instance, in Turkey there are more than twenty American military bases, and it is said that in Japan there are about 800. In some other countries, although there is no [American] military base, they are occupied by the troops [of the imperialists]. For example, American troops in Lebanon and British troops in Jordan.

Here I am focusing on two of these nooses: one is Lebanon, the other is Taiwan. Taiwan is an old noose since America has occupied it for several years. Who ties America there? The People's Republic of China ties it there. 600 million Chinese have a noose in their hands. This is a steel noose and it ties America's neck. Who tied America? The noose was made by America itself and tied by itself, and it throws the other end of the noose to mainland China, letting us grasp it. [America] was tied in Lebanon only recently, but the noose was also made by America itself, tied by itself, and the other end of the noose was thrown into the hands of Arab nations. Not only so, America also throws the [other end of the] noose into the hands of the majority of the people in the world. Everyone condemns America, and no one gives it any sympathy. The noose is held by the people and governments in many countries. In the Middle East, for example, the UN held meetings [on the Lebanon issue], but [America's] main problem is that it has been tied by the Arab people and cannot escape. At present, America is caught in a dilemma-is it better to withdraw earlier or later? If an early withdrawal, why did it come in the first place? If a late withdrawal, [the noose] will be getting tighter and tighter, and will become an encased knot. How can this be handled? Lebanon is different from Taiwan with which America has signed a treaty. The

situation in Lebanon is more flexible as no treaty is involved there. It is said that one issued the invitation, and the other came, and [the noose] is hitched up. As far as Taiwan is concerned, this is an encased knot since a treaty was signed. There is no difference between the Democrats and Republicans in this case. Eisenhower agreed on the treaty and [Harry] Truman sent the Seventh Fleet there. Truman could come and go at will since there was no treaty during his time. Eisenhower signed the treaty. America is tied up [in Taiwan] because of the Guomindang's panic and request, and also because America was willing [to be tied up there].

Is it [America] tied up at Jinmen and Mazu? I think that it has also been tied up at Jinmen and Mazu. Why do I think so? Did not the Americans say that they had not made any decision yet, and that they would

Khrushchev's Nuclear Promise To Beijing During the 1958 Crisis introduction by Vladislav M. Zubok

The history of the "second" Taiwan Straits crisis (August-October 1958) has gotten a second wind lately, due to the emergence of new Chinese evidence.1 While this research has greatly illuminated Chinese decision-making, scholars still have been unable to ascertain precisely what transpired between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships after the outbreak of the crisis. The document printed below, a previously secret 27 September 1958 communication from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC CPC), an internally circulated version of which is now declassified and available to researchers at the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, adds one more piece of evidence to this puzzling story.

Two episodes relating to Soviet-Chinese interactions during the 1958 crisis have attracted particular attention: the secret visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Beijing and his talks with Chinese leaders on September 6-7; and the letter of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 warning that an attack on the People's Republic

make the decision in accordance with the situation after the Communists landed there? The problem lies in the 110,000 Guomindang troops, 95,000 men on Jinmen and 15,000 on Mazu. America has to pay attention to them as long as these two large garrisons are on the islands. This concerns the interest and the islands. This concerns the interest and feelings of their class. Why do the British and Americans treat the governments in some countries so nicely? They cannot fold their hands and see these governments collapse. Today the Americans and Jiang are having a joint military exercise under the command of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.] command of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.] Beakley, commander of the Seventh Fleet. Also is there is [Roland] Smoot,35 the person who ordered the firing, which made the [U.S.] State Department and Defense Department unhappy. He is there, together with Beakley, to take the command.

To make a long story short, you [Ameri

of China (PRC) would result in Soviet nuclear retaliation. Researchers have assumed for some time that Soviet leaders were unhappy with the new Sino-American confrontation and considered the Chinese brinkmanship as a dangerous development that interfered with Kremlin plans for "detente" with the West. In their memoirs, Khrushchev and, more recently, Gromyko both described how puzzled and alarmed they were by Mao's seemingly reckless attitude toward nuclear war as not only possible, but actually desirable for the communist camp.2 However, Khrushchev's September 7 public declaration to Eisenhower-stating that "An attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union"3_ seems to contradict this general thesis.

The secret letter from the CC CPSU to the CC CPC printed below links the two puzzling events noted above, and helps point toward possible answers to the questions they raise. It attests to the fact that, in spite of the genuine tension between the two communist giants, the Khrushchev leadership at that time still was determined to stand with Beijing at a moment of crisis, and took additional steps to prove that it remained loyal to the spirit and letter of the SinoSoviet Treaty of February 1950.

The first article of that treaty, concluded at the end of Mao Zedong's summit meetings in Moscow with Stalin after the estab

cans] are noosed here. You may be able to get away if you take the initiative to leave slowly and quietly. Is there not a policy for getting away? In my view, you had a policy for getting away from Korea, and now a policy for getting away from Jinmen-Mazu is being shaped. As a matter of fact, those in your group really want to get away, and the public opinion also asks you to do so. To get away is to extricate yourself from the noose. How can this be done? That is, the 110,000 troops should leave. Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs. The dealing between us and you [the Americans] is an international issue. These are two different issues. Although you Americans have been associated with Jiang Jieshi, it is possible to dissolve this chemical combination. This is just like electrolytic aluminum or electrolytic copper, the combination will be dis

lishment of the PRC the previous fall, stated that, "in the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.”4 (The United States was not mentioned by name in the text, but the implication was clear enough.)

What emerged from the Gromyko-Chinese talks in early September 1958 and what appeared to have worried the Kremlin leadership was not that the Chinese might provoke a general war with the United States. Rather, as the text of the Soviet letter below implies, it was the general assumption of the Chinese Politburo that if the United States "should start a war against the People's Republic of China" and used tactical nuclear weapons against the PRC (in response to Chinese attacks against the offshore islands or Taiwan), the Soviet Union should remain passively on the sidelines, as a strategic reserve in case the Americans decided to broaden the war by using high-yield (e.g., thermonuclear) weapons. This interpretation of the Soviet commitments diverged significantly from Article I of the Treaty signed in Moscow eight years earlier.

In a forthcoming book, Constantine Pleshakov and I argue that many in the Soviet leadership were unhappy to see the

continued on page 226

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