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East. He believed that the shelling should last for two to three months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which scheduled the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25. During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered the artillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to “prepare for an operational order at any moment.” At this juncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter. 24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered the artillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone the bombardment and focus on making further preparations for the shelling. 25. After three weeks of "waiting and seeing,” Mao Zedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. This letter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve of the shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided to order the artillery forces concentrated on the Fujian Front to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment of Guomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Mazu) to isolate them. He suggested that after a period of shelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If this happened, it would be decided at that time if the shelling should be followed by landing operations in accordance with the actual situation. On August 21, the Central Military Commission issued the order to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particularly emphasized that the shelling should focus on the enemy's headquarters, artillery emplacements, radar facilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It also made it clear that the initial shelling would last for three days, and then the shelling would stop, so that the next action could be taken in accordance with the responses of the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.) 26. The italics are Mao's. 27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinese military planners believed that they had succeeded in cutting off Nationalist troops on the island from their supplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authorities repeatedly requested American assistance to support their forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances, Mao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 to stop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing to observe the responses of the other side. 28. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's “Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwan and the Offshore Islands under Jiang's Occupation.” The instruction emphasized that “because the struggle against Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang's occupation is a complicated international struggle, which has huge influence in various aspects, all operations and propaganda should follow the principles of concentration and unity, and no one should be allowed to act on his own." (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:376-377) 29. Lu Dingyi, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, headed the CCP's Central Propaganda Department. 30. The Baghdad Pact Organization (CENTO), established in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. The United States was related to the organization as an "observer.” The Manila Treaty Organization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States, is better known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). 31. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) was Egypt's president from 1956 to 1970. 32. The “Rightists” referred to by Mao were intellectu

als who had been criticized and purged during the
“Anti-Rightist" campaign in 1957.
33. He Yingqin (Ho Yingching, 1890-1987) was a high
ranking Nationalist officer. During China's War of
Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served as
chief of the general staff and headed the Military-
Political Department of the Military Commission of the
Nationalist Government.
34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was India's premier
from 1947 to 1964.
35. Admiral Roland Smoot was head of the Taiwan
Defense Command.
36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party,
eight “democratic parties” existed, all claiming to fol-
low the CCP's leadership.
37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam),
telegraphed to Mao Zedong: “Considering the tense
situation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S.
imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possible
for a war to break out between China and the United
States? (B) What preparations should we make here in
Vietnam?”' (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,
7:413-414.)
38. Starting on September 7, American naval ships
began escorting Guomindang transport vessels deliver-
ing supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjusted
its strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. This
becomes the background of this letter and the CMC's
order cited in the next note.
39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's
order, “On the Shelling of Jinmen," issued at 11:15
a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: "(1) If the
American ships continue their escort today and anchor
three miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries should
shell Jiang's transport ships entering the Liaoluowan
harbor to unload and the people working there. The
ships not entering the harbor, be they America's or
Jiang's, should not be shelled. In terms of the standard
for firing artillery shells, it should be set at the level
needed to sink or to expel Jiang's transport ships, while
at the same time damaging the enemy positions on
ground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and anti-
aircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal with
the air raids by Jiang's planes. The air force and anti-
aircraft units should well coordinate their operations. If
enemy planes attack our positions, our fighters may
operate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to better
handle opportunities. But our bombers should not be
sent out today. (3) In accordance with the above
principles, you may make your own decisions on spe-
cific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If the
situation changes, (you) must report immediately so
that [we) can report it to the Central Committee to make
new decisions." (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji,
6:380.)
40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCP
Politburo, was China's first vice foreign minister.
41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreign
minister; he later served as China's foreign minister in
the mid-1970s.
42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-American
ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 in
this letter, concluding that China had gained the initia-
tive at the meeting.
43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, was
then engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the Ameri-
cans in Warsaw.
44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet chargé d'affaires to
China.
45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to the

alliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to
3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing,
holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong and
other CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however,
did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans to
bombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of the
Taiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent Andrei
Gromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing's leaders told the
Soviets that they had no intention to provoke a direct
confrontation between China and the United States, let
alone one between the Soviet Union and the United
States. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relatively
well informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis.
46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed the
Indian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962.
47 Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplo-
mat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to
1961.
48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a group
established by Asian and African countries at the UN to
draft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nations
included Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Japan, and the Philippines.
49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Polit-
buro, was China's vice premier and foreign minister.
50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice presi-
dent and prime minister in Taiwan.
51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of the
PLA's Fuzhou Military District.
52. The italics are Mao's.
53. The “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” was
broadcast on the morning of 6 October and published in
all major newspapers in mainland China the same day.
The message announced that the PLA would stop
shelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalist
troops to receive supplies.
54. The italics are Mao's.
55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, Nikita
Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed to
Mao Zedong to inquire about Beijing's intentions on
handling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about the
reliability of Beijing's statistics on the results of air
battles with Guomindang air force, offering to provide
China with ground-to-air missiles.
56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had exten-
sive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, he
visited Beijing with a commercial delegation from
Singapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him,
mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD had
cooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible for
the two parties to cooperate for a third time to bring
about Taiwan's "peaceful liberation.” After returning
to Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with Zhou
Enlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao again
visited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messages
between Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Mao
mentioned Cao's name on the eve of the second “Mes-
sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” announcing that
the PLA would stopping shelling Jinmen for another
two weeks, issued during the evening of October 12.
57. At 12:30 p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent the
following report to Mao Zedong: “The broadcasts to
warn America against using its escort vessels in the
waters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. The
broadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese and
English. The texts are attached to this report. The draft
of the Defense Ministry's order has been completed. It
is also enclosed here for your consideration. Please
return it to me right after you have read and approved it.
Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades
Deng (Xiaoping], Chen [Yi), and Huang (Kecheng] for

*********

their reading and checking. Everything is ready on the KHRUSHCHEV'S NUCLEAR PROMISE year later, in the autumn of 1959. Xiamen front. Our order [for the shelling] has already

continued from page 219 been issued [to the front] separately by telephone and in writing which was signed by [Huang) Kecheng. The

Chinese leadership developing their own order limits shelling to fortifications, defense works, and beachhead boats on the Jinmen islands. No shellschool of brinkmanship that threatened to

From the CC CPSU's letter to the ing of civilian villages, garrison camps, and command draw the USSR into a conflict with the United

Central Committee of the CPC About headquarters is allowed, particularly no shelling of any States. Yet, there is no reason to believe that American ships. Our air and naval forces will make no

the USSR's Readiness to Provide Khrushchev, the real authority behind the movement at this time. The Defense Ministry's order

Assistance to the PRC in the Event of will be broadcast at 3:00 (p.m.] in Chinese and foreign Soviet letter, was dismayed by the Chinese

an Attack on It From the Side of the languages at the same time. As soon as the reading of position (though he may well have been

USA or Japan, 27 September 1958 the order is finished, [our batteries] will open fire.” miffed that Mao failed to tip him off during (Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:466

his summit in Beijing only a few weeks 467.)

... Comrade Gromyko informed us about before the PRC opened the crisis by shelling his conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai 58. The italics are Mao's. 59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast.

the offshore islands on August 23). which took place in Peking on 7 September. 60. Huan Xiang was Chinese chargé d'affaires in Khrushchev, it appears, actually supported Comrade Zhou Enlai said that in the considBritain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to the

nuclear brinkmanship as a means of achievChinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled the

eration of the situation in the Taiwan region report "Huang Xiang on the Division within the Westing China's reunification, provided that the

the Politburo of the Central Committee of ern World.” The main points of the report were as policy was fully coordinated with the Krem

the Communist Party of China proceeded follows: The two-year long British-French negotiation lin.5 He therefore took the Chinese position,

from the fact that should the USA start a war to establish a free trade zone in Western Europe had recently failed, and a trade war between imperialist reported to him in an urgent cable from

against the People's Republic of China and countries had started. The British plans to divide West Gromyko, as an indication that the Chinese

in this event uses tactical nuclear weapons, Germany and France, neutralize Belgium and Holland, leaders had begun to put their national inter

then the Soviet Union will make a stern and sabotage the European Common Market had failed. ests above the common interests of the “en- warning to the USA but will not take part in In an economic sense, this was not a big failure for

tire Socialist camp.” This effective unilatBritain. In a diplomatic sense, however, this was the eral Chinese revision of the Treaty signified States uses large yield nuclear weapons, and

the war. Only in the event that the United first serious failure Britain had suffered in its diplomacy toward West Europe. Now Britain faced two an implicit challenge to the unity of the important choices: it could take retaliatory measures communist bloc under Kremlin leadership — Soviet Union make a retaliatory strike with

in this way risks widening the war, will the and thus destroy the political and economic coopera

and was therefore anathema to Soviet leaders tions between European countries, or it could return to

nuclear weapons. negotiations, searching for the basis of a temporary

on both political and ideological grounds.
Hence the letter decries the peril of disunity decided to express to you our opinion... We

We carefully considered this issue and compromise. It seemed that only one choice was feasible for Britain, that is, to make a continuous effort to in the strongest terms possible: “...a crime

cannot allow the illusion to be created among find ways to compromise with France and Germany,

before the world working class ... a retreat and to seek the support of the United States. This failure

our enemies that if an attack will be launched from the holy of holies of the Communists— on the part of Britain reflected the fact that Britain's

against the PRC by the USA or Japan—and position as the “second power” in the capitalist world from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.”

these are the most likely adversaries, or by had been weakened further, and that the postwar Brit- Khrushchev evidently dictated his letter ish hegemony in Western Europe had been thoroughly

any other state, that the Soviet Union will to Eisenhower immediately after he received shaken. The balance of power in continental Western

stand on the sidelines as a passive observer. Europe now tilted toward France and West Germany, the warning from Gromyko. It took him 20

Should the adversary even presume this, and against Britain. As far as the triangular relations more days to address the Chinese leadership

a very dangerous situation would be created. between Britain, France, and Germany were concerned, through party channels. It is still unclear it seemed that Britain would continue to attempt to take

It would be a great calamity for the entire what happened inside the Kremlin in the advantage of French-West German contradictions in

Socialist camp, for the Communist working order to divide the two countries, making them check interim. In effect, in turn, Mao took about the

class movement, if, when atomic bombs each other. This balance of power policy would cer- same time to respond to the CC CPSU's

have begun to fall on the Chinese People's tainly last a long time. The balance of power among letter. In a personal letter to Khrushchev, he imperialist countries in West Europe was changing,

Republic and China has begun to pay with thanked him "heartily” for his stand and and the contradictions between the imperialists over

the life of its sons and daughters, the Soviet West European problems had never been so sharp. wrote that the Chinese leadership had been

Union, possessing terrible weapons which (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:582- “deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to

could not only stop but could also devastate 5823.) the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in

our common enemy, would allow itself not ternationalism.”6

to come to your assistance. This would be a

In sum, this episode testifies to the amLi Xiaobing is Assistant Professor of History,

crime before the world working class, it biguous nature of the Soviet-Chinese relaUniversity of Central Oklahoma; Chen Jian is

would be a retreat from the holy of holies of tionship: for the majority of the leadership on the Communists—from the teaching of Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, and author of China's both sides, it continued the grim comedy of

Marxism-Leninism. Road to the Korean War: The Making of the misunderstandings; only Khrushchev began

Thank you for your nobility, that you Sino-Soviet Confrontation (New York: Colum- to suspect what was occurring in faraway are ready to absorb a strike, not involving the bia University Press, 1994); David L. Wilson is Beijing. Behind the facade of proletarian

Beijing. Behind the facade of proletarian Soviet Union. However, we believe, and are Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois internationalism the Sino-Soviet rift was

convinced, that you also agree that the main University at Carbondale,

deepening and would erupt in earnest only a thing now consists of the fact that everyone

has seen—both our friends and, especially, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 129our enemies—that we are firm and united in

142; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul

ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 our understanding of the tasks, which flow

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; from Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defend Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1959 (Kent, brother Communist parties is unshakeable,

OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and

documents translated, annotated, and introduced by that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff to

Xiao-bing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson printed in the aggressor in the event of an attack on any this issue of the Cold War International History Project Socialist state. This is necessary so that no

Bulletin. hopes will arise in our enemies that they will

2. Khrushchev Remembers, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston:

Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 469-470; Khrushchev be able to separate us, so that no cracks will

Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, ed. Jerrold L. Schecter be created which the enemy could be able to with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, use to break the connection between the and Co., 1990), 147-150; “Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Socialist countries.

Khrushcheva,” Voprosi istorii [Questions of History] 2

(1993), 90-91; Andrei A. Gromyko, Memoirs (New ...It is necessary that neither our friends

York: Knopf, 1989), 251-252; see also Philip Taubman, nor our enemies have any doubts that an “Gromyko Says Mao Wanted Soviet A-Bomb Used on attack on the Chinese People's Republic is a G.I.'s," New York Times, 22 February 1988, 1, 6-7. war with the entire Socialist camp. For

3. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul

ture, 255; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the ourselves we can say that an attack on China

Eagle, 198. is an attack on the Soviet Union. We are also 4. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assisconvinced that in the event of an attack on tance Between the People's Republic of China and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 14 February 1950, the Soviet Union the Chinese People's Re

reprinted in English translation as an appendix to Sergei public would fulfill its brotherly revolution

N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncerary duty. If we in this way will build our tain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War policy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260.

5. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from depending on the unity of our goals, on the

Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Unimight of our states, on our joint efforts, the

versity Press, forthcoming, March 1996), 226-227. uniting of which is favored by the geo- 6. “We are deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to graphical disposition of our countries, then the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalthis will be an invincible shield against our

ism. In the name of all my comrades-members of the

Communist Party of China, I express to you my heartenemies....

felt gratitude." Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949

1983) (USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents (Source: Information and Documentation and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry Administration, First Far Eastern Depart

of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no.

148), 231-33. ment, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (19491983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) National Security Archive, contributes fre(Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; quently to the Bulletin. His book, Inside the internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33.

Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from The letter appears in a formerly classified Stalin to

Stalin to Khrushchev, co-authored with Soviet Foreign Ministry documentary col

Constantine Pleshakov, will be published in lection on the history of Sino-Soviet rela- March 1996 by Harvard University Press. tions, originally prepared, for internal use only, by an editorial collegium consisting of Kapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A.V.; Rogachev, 1.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P. (Deputy Chairman). During his research in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher at the National Security Archive, took notes from the collection, and provided them to CWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]

1. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972

*

MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES'S the expense of individuals. Despite these taking effect in the Soviet Union, given

“PEACEFUL EVOLUTION” drawbacks, Bo’s memoirs contain many valu- Khrushchev's fascination with peaceful coSTRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM able new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Es- existence with the capitalist West. Mao BO YIBO'S MEMOIRS pecially notable are Bo’s references to Mao's wanted to prevent that from happening in

statements unavailable elsewhere. Since Bo China. Here lie the roots of China's subseIntroduction, translation, and played a major role in Chinese economic quent exchange of polemics with the Soviet annotation by Qiang Zhai decision-making during the period, his mem- Union and Mao's decision to restructure the

oirs are especially strong on this topic. He Chinese state and society in order to prevent

sheds new light on such domestic events as a revisionist “change of color” of China, Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chi

the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, culminating in the launching of the Cultural nese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925.

the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair, the Anti- Revolution in 1966. Mao’s frantic response During the Anti-Japanese War, he was a leading member of the CCP-led resistance Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposi

Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposi- to Dulles's speeches constitutes a clear case force in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he was

tion to Rush Advance, the Great Leap For- of how international events contributed to

ward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, eco- China's domestic developments. It also elected a member of the CCP Central Com

nomic rectification in 1961-1962, and the demonstrates the effects of Dulles's stratmittee at the Party's Seventh Congress.

Socialist Education Campaign. Although egy of driving a wedge between China and During the Chinese Civil War in 1946

international relations in general does not the Soviet Union. 1949, he was First Secretary of the CCP

receive much attention, the volumes do inNorth China Bureau and Vice Chairman of

clude illuminating chapters on some key the CCP-led North China People's Government. After the establishment of the People's

foreign policy decisions.2

The translation below is taken from To Prevent “Peaceful Evolution” and Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, Chapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138

Train Successors to the Revolutionary he became Finance Minister. As a revolu1146). This section is very revealing about

Cause tionary veteran who survived the Cultural

Mao's perception of and reaction to John
Revolution, Bo Yibo is considered one of
Foster Dulles's policy toward China in 1958-

by Bo Yibo
the most powerful figures in China today.
Between 1991 and 1993, Bo published

1959. The CCP leader took seriously statetwo volumes of his memoirs, Ruogan encouraging a peaceful change of the Com

ments by the U.S. Secretary of State about According to the general law of socialzhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recol- munist system. In November 1959, accord- aproletarian political party directed by Marx

ist revolution, only through the leadership of lections of Certain Major Decisions and

ing to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao's secretary, prepared ism, reliance on the working class and other Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang

for Mao translations of three speeches by laboring masses, and waging of an armed dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The first

Dulles concerning the promotion of peaceful struggle in this or that form can a revolution volume covers the period 1949-1956 and

evolution within the Communist world. Af- obtain state power. International hostile the second volume 1957-1966. In the pref

ter reading the documents, Mao commented forces to the newly born people's governace and postscript of his volumes, Bo notes that in preparing his memoirs he has con

on them before having them circulated among ment would always attempt to strangle it in

a small group of Party leaders for discussion. the cradle through armed aggression, intersulted documents in the CCP Central Archives and received the cooperation of Party

Thus Bo's memoirs not only provide fresh vention, and economic blockade. After the

texts of what Mao said, but also an important victory of the October Revolution, the Sohistory researchers. Bo’s reminiscences

window into what he read. As a result, the viet Union experienced an armed intervenrepresent the most important memoirs of a

interactive nature of Mao's activities—with tion by fourteen countries. In the wake of high-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966

his top colleagues and his secretary—is open World War II, imperialism launched a properiod.

to examination. A sense of the policy-mak- tracted “Cold War” and economic containAs a still active senior leader, Bo is not a disinterested writer. His arguments and ing process, as well as Mao's opinions, ment of socialist countries. Immediately

after the triumph of the revolution in China conclusions are completely in line with the

emerges from Bo's memoirs.

The years 1958-1959 were a crucial and the Democratic People's Republic of 1981 Resolution on Party History. Memoirs in China usually have a didactic pur

period in Mao's psychological evolution. Korea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea,

He began to show increasing concern with blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and implepose that encourages the creation of edify

the problem of succession and worried about mented an all-out embargo against China. ing stereotypes. Bo's memoirs conform to

his impending death. He feared that the All of this shows that it will take a sharp a tradition in the writing of memoirs in the PRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo's

political system that he had spent his life struggle with external hostile forces through

creating would betray his beliefs and values an armed conflict or other forms of contest memoirs are dry and wooden. There is little

and slip out of his control. His apprehension before a newly born socialist country can description of the character and personali

about the future development of China was consolidate its power. ties of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo's

closely related to his analysis of the degen- History suggests that although the armed volumes follow another memoirs-writing

eration of the Soviet system. Mao believed aggression, intervention, and economic tradition in the PRC, which tends to empha

that Dulles's idea of inducing peaceful evo- blockade launched by Western imperialists size the role of groups and societal forces at

lution within the socialist world was already against socialist countries can create enor

system that

mous problems for socialist countries, they a joint fleet with China in order to control In 1959, Sino-Soviet relations were even have great difficulty in realizing their goal of China militarily; he also openly opposed our more strained and Sino-Soviet differences overthrowing socialist states. Therefore, Party's “Three Red Flags"4 and objected to even greater. In January, the Soviet Union imperialist countries are inclined to adopt a our just action of “shelling Jinmen5.” (Chair- officially notified China that it would scrap “soft” method in addition to employing man Mao once said that whether we bom- unilaterally the agreement to help China “hard” policies. In January 1953, U.S. Sec- barded Jinmen or suspended our bombard- build nuclear industry and produce nuclear retary of States Dulles emphasized the strat- ment, our main purpose was to support the bombs. In September when the Sino-Indian egy of “peaceful evolution.” He pointed out Taiwan people and the Taiwan regime to Border Incident occurred, the Soviet Union that “the enslaved people” of socialist coun- keep Taiwan [from being] invaded and an- announced neutrality, but in actuality it suptries should be “liberated,” and become “free nexed by foreign countries.—Bo's note). ported India. It openly criticized China after people," and that “liberation can be achieved The above events alerted Chairman Mao. the incident. At the Soviet-American Camp through means other than war,” and “the In the meantime, the United States ac- David Talks during the same month, means ought to be and can be peaceful.” He tively practiced its strategy of promoting a Khrushchev sought to improve relations with displayed satisfaction with the “liberaliza- "peaceful evolution” of socialist countries. the United States on the one hand and vehetion-demanding forces” which had emerged In 1957, the Eisenhower administration in- mently attacked China's domestic and forin some socialist countries and placed his troduced the “strategy of peaceful conquest," eign policies on the other.8 All these events hope on the third and fourth generations aiming to facilitate “changes inside the So- convinced Chairman Mao that the Soviet within socialist countries, contending that if viet world,” through a “peaceful evolution.” leadership had degenerated and that the leader of a socialist regime “continues On October 24, 1958, in an interview with a Khrushchev had betrayed Marxism and the wanting to have children and these children BBC correspondent, Dulles asserted that proletarian revolutionary cause and had will produce their children, then the leader's communism “will gradually give way to a turned revisionist. At the Lushan Conferoffsprings will obtain freedom.” He also

pays more attention to the wel- ence held during July-August that year, when claimed that “Chinese communism is in fare of the state and people,” and that at the Peng Dehuaio criticized the “Three Red fatal danger,” and “represents a fading phe- moment, “Russian and Chinese Commu- Flags,” Chairman Mao erroneously believed nomena,” and that the obligation of the United nists are not working for the welfare of their that this reflected the combined attack on the States and its allies was “to make every people,” and “this kind of communism will Party by internal and external enemies. Faceffort to facilitate the disappearance of that change.”

ing such a complex situation, Chairman Mao phenomena,” and “to bring about freedom in Considering the situation in both the felt deeply the danger of a “peaceful evoluall of China by all peaceful means."3 Soviet Union and at home, Chairman Mao tion.” Accordingly, he unequivocally raised

Chairman Mao paid full attention to took very seriously Dulles's remarks. In a the issue at the end of that year. these statements by Dulles and watched care- speech to the directors of the cooperation In November 1959, Chairman Mao confully the changes in strategies and tactics regions on November 30, 1958, Chairman vened a small-scale meeting in Hangzhou used by imperialists against socialist coun- Mao noted that Dulles was a man of schemes attended by Premier Zhou [Enlai], Peng tries. That was the time when the War to Aid and that he controlled the helm in the United Zhen, 10 Wang Jiaxiang, 11 Hu Qiaomu, 12 Korea and Resist America had just achieved States. Dulles was very thoughtful. One had among others, to discuss and examine the victory, when the United States was con- to read his speeches word by word with the international situation at the time. Before the tinuing its blockade of the Taiwan Straits help of an English dictionary. Dulles was opening of the meeting, Chairman Mao asked and its embargo, and when our domestic really taking the helm. Provincial Party his secretary, Lin Ke, to find Dulles's situation was stable, “the First Five-Year Committees should assign special cadres to speeches concerning “peaceful evolution” Plan” was fully under way, economic con- read Cankao ziliao.7 Chairman Mao has for him to read. Comrade Lin Ke selected struction was developing rapidly, and ev- always insisted that Party leaders at all lev- three such speeches: Dulles's address titled erywhere was the picture of prosperity and els, especially high-ranking cadres, should “Policy for the Far East” delivered before vitality. At that moment, Chairman Mao did closely follow international events and the the California Chamber of Commerce on not immediately bring up the issue of pre- development of social contradictions on the December 4, 1958, Dulles's testimony made venting a “peaceful evolution.” The reason world scene in order to be well informed and before the House Foreign Affairs Commitfor his later raising the question has to do prepared for sudden incidents. It is very tee on January 28, 1959, and Dulles's speech with developments in international and do- necessary for Mao to make that demand. titled “The Role of Law in Peace” made mestic situations.

Chairman Mao read Cankao ziliao every before the New York State Bar Association In 1956, at the 20th Congress of the day. For us leading cadres, we should con- on January 31, 1959. Chairman Mao had Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev at- sider not only the whole picture of domestic read these three speeches before. After retacked Stalin, causing an anti-Communist politics but also the whole situation of inter- reading them, he told Comrade Lin Ke of his and anti-Socialist wave in the world and national politics. Thus we can keep clear- opinions about them and asked him to write triggering incidents in Poland and Hungary. headed, deal with any challenges confidently, commentaries based on his views and insert In 1957, a tiny minority of bourgeois Right- and “sit tight in the fishing boat despite the them at the beginning of each of Dulles's ists seized the opportunity of Party reform to rising winds and waves.” This is a very statements. After Comrade Lin Ke had attack the Party. In 1958, Khrushchev pro- important political lesson and a leadership completed the commentaries, Mao instructed posed to create a long-wave radio station and style.

him to distribute Dulles's speeches, along

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