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East. He believed that the shelling should last for two to three months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which scheduled the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25. During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered the artillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to "prepare for an operational order at any moment." At this juncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter.

24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered the artillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone the bombardment and focus on making further preparations for the shelling.

25. After three weeks of "waiting and seeing," Mao Zedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. This letter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve of the shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided to order the artillery forces concentrated on the Fujian Front to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment of Guomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Mazu) to isolate them. He suggested that after a period of shelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If this happened, it would be decided at that time if the shelling should be followed by landing operations in accordance with the actual situation. On August 21, the Central Military Commission issued the order to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particularly emphasized that the shelling should focus on the enemy's headquarters, artillery emplacements, radar facilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It also made it clear that the initial shelling would last for three days, and then the shelling would stop, so that the next action could be taken in accordance with the responses of the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizhi et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.) 26. The italics are Mao's.

27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinese military planners believed that they had succeeded in cutting off Nationalist troops on the island from their supplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authorities repeatedly requested American assistance to support their forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances, Mao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 to stop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing to observe the responses of the other side.

28. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's "Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwan and the Offshore Islands under Jiang's Occupation." The instruction emphasized that "because the struggle against Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang's occupation is a complicated international struggle, which has huge influence in various aspects, all operations and propaganda should follow the principles of concentration and unity, and no one should be allowed to act on his own." (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:376-377)

29. Lu Dingyi, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, headed the CCP's Central Propaganda Department.

30. The Baghdad Pact Organization (CENTO), established in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. The United States was related to the organization as an "observer." The Manila Treaty Organization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States, is better known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

31. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) was Egypt's president from 1956 to 1970.

32. The "Rightists" referred to by Mao were intellectu

als who had been criticized and purged during the "Anti-Rightist" campaign in 1957.

33. He Yingqin (Ho Yingching, 1890-1987) was a high ranking Nationalist officer. During China's War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served as chief of the general staff and headed the MilitaryPolitical Department of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government.

34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was India's premier from 1947 to 1964.

35. Admiral Roland Smoot was head of the Taiwan Defense Command.

36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party, eight "democratic parties" existed, all claiming to follow the CCP's leadership.

37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), telegraphed to Mao Zedong: "Considering the tense situation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S. imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possible for a war to break out between China and the United States? (B) What preparations should we make here in Vietnam?" (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:413-414.)

38. Starting on September 7, American naval ships began escorting Guomindang transport vessels delivering supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjusted its strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. This becomes the background of this letter and the CMC's order cited in the next note.

39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's order, "On the Shelling of Jinmen," issued at 11:15 a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: "(1) If the American ships continue their escort today and anchor three miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries should shell Jiang's transport ships entering the Liaoluowan harbor to unload and the people working there. The ships not entering the harbor, be they America's or Jiang's, should not be shelled. In terms of the standard for firing artillery shells, it should be set at the level needed to sink or to expel Jiang's transport ships, while at the same time damaging the enemy positions on ground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and antiaircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal with the air raids by Jiang's planes. The air force and antiaircraft units should well coordinate their operations. If enemy planes attack our positions, our fighters may operate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to better handle opportunities. But our bombers should not be sent out today. (3) In accordance with the above principles, you may make your own decisions on specific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If the situation changes, [you] must report immediately so that [we] can report it to the Central Committee to make new decisions." (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:380.)

40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, was China's first vice foreign minister. 41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreign minister; he later served as China's foreign minister in the mid-1970s.

42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-American ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 in this letter, concluding that China had gained the initiative at the meeting.

43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, was then engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the Americans in Warsaw.

44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet chargé d'affaires to China.

45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to the

alliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to 3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing, holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however, did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans to bombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of the Taiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing's leaders told the Soviets that they had no intention to provoke a direct confrontation between China and the United States, let alone one between the Soviet Union and the United States. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relatively well informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis. 46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed the Indian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962. 47 Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplomat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to 1961.

48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a group established by Asian and African countries at the UN to draft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nations included Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, and the Philippines.

49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Politburo, was China's vice premier and foreign minister. 50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice president and prime minister in Taiwan.

51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of the PLA's Fuzhou Military District.

52. The italics are Mao's.

53. The "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" was broadcast on the morning of 6 October and published in all major newspapers in mainland China the same day. The message announced that the PLA would stop shelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalist troops to receive supplies. 54. The italics are Mao's.

55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed to Mao Zedong to inquire about Beijing's intentions on handling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about the reliability of Beijing's statistics on the results of air battles with Guomindang air force, offering to provide China with ground-to-air missiles.

56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had extensive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, he visited Beijing with a commercial delegation from Singapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him, mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD had cooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible for the two parties to cooperate for a third time to bring about Taiwan's "peaceful liberation." After returning to Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with Zhou Enlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao again visited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messages between Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Mao mentioned Cao's name on the eve of the second "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan," announcing that the PLA would stopping shelling Jinmen for another two weeks, issued during the evening of October 12. 57. At 12:30p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent the following report to Mao Zedong: "The broadcasts to warn America against using its escort vessels in the waters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. The broadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese and English. The texts are attached to this report. The draft of the Defense Ministry's order has been completed. It is also enclosed here for your consideration. Please return it to me right after you have read and approved it. Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Huang [Kecheng] for

their reading and checking. Everything is ready on the Xiamen front. Our order [for the shelling] has already been issued [to the front] separately by telephone and in writing which was signed by [Huang] Kecheng. The order limits shelling to fortifications, defense works, and beachhead boats on the Jinmen islands. No shelling of civilian villages, garrison camps, and command headquarters is allowed, particularly no shelling of any American ships. Our air and naval forces will make no movement at this time. The Defense Ministry's order will be broadcast at 3:00 [p.m.] in Chinese and foreign languages at the same time. As soon as the reading of the order is finished, [our batteries] will open fire." (Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:466467.)

58. The italics are Mao's.

59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast. 60. Huan Xiang was Chinese chargé d'affaires in Britain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to the Chinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled the report "Huang Xiang on the Division within the Western World." The main points of the report were as follows: The two-year long British-French negotiation to establish a free trade zone in Western Europe had

recently failed, and a trade war between imperialist countries had started. The British plans to divide West Germany and France, neutralize Belgium and Holland, and sabotage the European Common Market had failed. In an economic sense, this was not a big failure for Britain. In a diplomatic sense, however, this was the first serious failure Britain had suffered in its diplomacy toward West Europe. Now Britain faced two important choices: it could take retaliatory measures and thus destroy the political and economic cooperations between European countries, or it could return to negotiations, searching for the basis of a temporary compromise. It seemed that only one choice was feasible for Britain, that is, to make a continuous effort to find ways to compromise with France and Germany, and to seek the support of the United States. This failure on the part of Britain reflected the fact that Britain's position as the "second power" in the capitalist world had been weakened further, and that the postwar British hegemony in Western Europe had been thoroughly shaken. The balance of power in continental Western Europe now tilted toward France and West Germany, and against Britain. As far as the triangular relations between Britain, France, and Germany were concerned, it seemed that Britain would continue to attempt to take advantage of French-West German contradictions in order to divide the two countries, making them check each other. This balance of power policy would certainly last a long time. The balance of power among imperialist countries in West Europe was changing, and the contradictions between the imperialists over West European problems had never been so sharp. (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:582

5823.)

Li Xiaobing is Assistant Professor of History, University of Central Oklahoma; Chen Jian is Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, and author of China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-Soviet Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); David L. Wilson is Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

KHRUSHCHEV'S NUCLEAR PROMISE

continued from page 219

Chinese leadership developing their own school of brinkmanship that threatened to draw the USSR into a conflict with the United States. Yet, there is no reason to believe that Khrushchev, the real authority behind the Soviet letter, was dismayed by the Chinese position (though he may well have been miffed that Mao failed to tip him off during his summit in Beijing only a few weeks before the PRC opened the crisis by shelling the offshore islands on August 23). Khrushchev, it appears, actually supported nuclear brinkmanship as a means of achieving China's reunification, provided that the policy was fully coordinated with the Kremlin.5 He therefore took the Chinese position, reported to him in an urgent cable from Gromyko, as an indication that the Chinese leaders had begun to put their national interests above the common interests of the "entire Socialist camp." This effective unilateral Chinese revision of the Treaty signified an implicit challenge to the unity of the communist bloc under Kremlin leadership and was therefore anathema to Soviet leaders on both political and ideological grounds. Hence the letter decries the peril of disunity in the strongest terms possible: "...a crime before the world working class ... a retreat from the holy of holies of the Communistsfrom the teaching of Marxism-Leninism."

Khrushchev evidently dictated his letter to Eisenhower immediately after he received the warning from Gromyko. It took him 20 more days to address the Chinese leadership through party channels. It is still unclear what happened inside the Kremlin in the interim. In effect, in turn, Mao took about the same time to respond to the CC CPSU's letter. In a personal letter to Khrushchev, he thanked him "heartily" for his stand and wrote that the Chinese leadership had been "deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to “deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism."6

In sum, this episode testifies to the ambiguous nature of the Soviet-Chinese relationship: for the majority of the leadership on both sides, it continued the grim comedy of misunderstandings; only Khrushchev began to suspect what was occurring in faraway Beijing. Behind the facade of proletarian

internationalism the Sino-Soviet rift was

deepening and would erupt in earnest only a

year later, in the autumn of 1959.

*** ****

From the CC CPSU's letter to the Central Committee of the CPC About the USSR's Readiness to Provide Assistance to the PRC in the Event of an Attack on It From the Side of the USA or Japan, 27 September 1958

... Comrade Gromyko informed us about his conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai which took place in Peking on 7 September. Comrade Zhou Enlai said that in the consideration of the situation in the Taiwan region the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proceeded from the fact that should the USA start a war against the People's Republic of China and

in this event uses tactical nuclear weapons, then the Soviet Union will make a stern warning to the USA but will not take part in the war. Only in the event that the United States uses large yield nuclear weapons, and in this way risks widening the war, will the Soviet Union make a retaliatory strike with nuclear weapons.

We carefully considered this issue and decided to express to you our opinion... We cannot allow the illusion to be created among our enemies that if an attack will be launched against the PRC by the USA or Japan-and these are the most likely adversaries, any other state, that the Soviet Union will stand on the sidelines as a passive observer.

or by

Should the adversary even presume this, a very dangerous situation would be created. It would be a great calamity for the entire Socialist camp, for the Communist working class movement, if, when atomic bombs have begun to fall on the Chinese People's

Republic and China has begun to pay with the life of its sons and daughters, the Soviet Union, possessing terrible weapons which could not only stop but could also devastate our common enemy, would allow itself not to come to your assistance. This would be a crime before the world working class, it would be a retreat from the holy of holies of the Communists—from the teaching of

Marxism-Leninism.

Thank you for your nobility, that you are ready to absorb a strike, not involving the Soviet Union. However, we believe, and are convinced, that you also agree that the main

thing now consists of the fact that everyone

has seen both our friends and, especially, seen—both

our enemies-that we are firm and united in our understanding of the tasks, which flow from Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defend the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all brother Communist parties is unshakeable, that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff to the aggressor in the event of an attack on any Socialist state. This is necessary so that no hopes will arise in our enemies that they will be able to separate us, so that no cracks will be created which the enemy could be able to use to break the connection between the Socialist countries.

...It is necessary that neither our friends nor our enemies have any doubts that an attack on the Chinese People's Republic is a war with the entire Socialist camp. For ourselves we can say that an attack on China is an attack on the Soviet Union. We are also convinced that in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union the Chinese People's Republic would fulfill its brotherly revolutionary duty. If we in this way will build our policy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism, depending on the unity of our goals, on the might of our states, on our joint efforts, the uniting of which is favored by the geographical disposition of our countries, then this will be an invincible shield against our enemies....

[Source: Information and Documentation Administration, First Far Eastern Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (19491983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. The letter appears in a formerly classified Soviet Foreign Ministry documentary collection on the history of Sino-Soviet relations, originally prepared, for internal use only, by an editorial collegium consisting of Kapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A. V.; Rogachev, I.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P. (Deputy Chairman). During his research in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher at the National Security Archive, took notes from the collection, and provided them to CWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]

1. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 129142; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1959 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and documents translated, annotated, and introduced by Xiao-bing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson printed in this issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin.

2. Khrushchev Remembers, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 469-470; Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, ed. Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), 147-150; "Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," Voprosi istorii [Questions of History] 2 (1993), 90-91; Andrei A. Gromyko, Memoirs (New York: Knopf, 1989), 251-252; see also Philip Taubman, "Gromyko Says Mao Wanted Soviet A-Bomb Used on G.I.'s," New York Times, 22 February 1988, 1, 6-7. 3. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 255; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle, 198.

4. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 14 February 1950, reprinted in English translation as an appendix to Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260. 5. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming, March 1996), 226-227. 6. "We are deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. In the name of all my comrades-members of the Communist Party of China, I express to you my heartfelt gratitude." Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (19491983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33.

Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the National Security Archive, contributes frequently to the Bulletin. His book, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from

Stalin to Khrushchev, co-authored with Constantine Pleshakov, will be published in March 1996 by Harvard University Press.

MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES'S "PEACEFUL EVOLUTION" STRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM BO YIBO'S MEMOIRS

Introduction, translation, and annotation by Qiang Zhai

Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925. During the Anti-Japanese War, he was a leading member of the CCP-led resistance

force in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee at the Party's Seventh Congress. During the Chinese Civil War in 19461949, he was First Secretary of the CCP North China Bureau and Vice Chairman of the CCP-led North China People's Government. After the establishment of the People's

the expense of individuals. Despite these drawbacks, Bo's memoirs contain many valuable new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Especially notable are Bo's references to Mao's statements unavailable elsewhere. Since Bo played a major role in Chinese economic decision-making during the period, his memoirs are especially strong on this topic. He sheds new light on such domestic events as the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair, the AntiRightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposi

tion to Rush Advance, the Great Leap Forward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, economic rectification in 1961-1962, and the Socialist Education Campaign. Although international relations in general does not receive much attention, the volumes do include illuminating chapters on some key foreign policy decisions.2

The translation below is taken from

Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, Chapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138

he became Finance Minister. As a revolutionary veteran who survived the Cultural Revolution, Bo Yibo is considered one of the most powerful figures in China today.

Between 1991 and 1993, Bo published two volumes of his memoirs, Ruogan

zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollections of Certain Major Decisions and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The first volume covers the period 1949-1956 and the second volume 1957-1966. In the preface and postscript of his volumes, Bo notes that in preparing his memoirs he has consulted documents in the CCP Central Archives and received the cooperation of Party history researchers. Bo's reminiscences represent the most important memoirs of a high-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966 period.

As a still active senior leader, Bo is not a disinterested writer. His arguments and conclusions are completely in line with the 1981 Resolution on Party History.1 Memoirs in China usually have a didactic purpose that encourages the creation of edifying stereotypes. Bo's memoirs conform to a tradition in the writing of memoirs in the PRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo's memoirs are dry and wooden. There is little description of the character and personalities of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo's volumes follow another memoirs-writing

tradition in the PRC, which tends to emphasize the role of groups and societal forces at

1146). This section is very revealing about Mao's perception of and reaction to John Foster Dulles's policy toward China in 19581959. The CCP leader took seriously statements by the U.S. Secretary of State about encouraging a peaceful change of the Communist system. In November 1959, according to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao's secretary, prepared for Mao translations of three speeches by for Mao translations of three speeches by Dulles concerning the promotion of peaceful evolution within the Communist world. After reading the documents, Mao commented on them before having them circulated among a small group of Party leaders for discussion. Thus Bo's memoirs not only provide fresh texts of what Mao said, but also an important window into what he read. As a result, the interactive nature of Mao's activities-with his top colleagues and his secretary—is open to examination. A sense of the policy-making process, as well as Mao's opinions, emerges from Bo's memoirs.

The years 1958-1959 were a crucial period in Mao's psychological evolution. He began to show increasing concern with the problem of succession and worried about his impending death. He feared that the political system that he had spent his life creating would betray his beliefs and values and slip out of his control. His apprehension about the future development of China was

closely related to his analysis of the degeneration of the Soviet system. Mao believed that Dulles's idea of inducing peaceful evolution within the socialist world was already

taking effect in the Soviet Union, given Khrushchev's fascination with peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Mao wanted to prevent that from happening in China. Here lie the roots of China's subsequent exchange of polemics with the Soviet Union and Mao's decision to restructure the Chinese state and society in order to prevent a revisionist "change of color" of China, culminating in the launching of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Mao's frantic response to Dulles's speeches constitutes a clear case of how international events contributed to China's domestic developments. It also demonstrates the effects of Dulles's strategy of driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.

*

To Prevent "Peaceful Evolution" and Train Successors to the Revolutionary Cause

by Bo Yibo

According to the general law of socialist revolution, only through the leadership of a proletarian political party directed by Marxism, reliance on the working class and other laboring masses, and waging of an armed struggle in this or that form can a revolution obtain state power. International hostile forces to the newly born people's government would always attempt to strangle it in the cradle through armed aggression, intervention, and economic blockade. After the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet Union experienced an armed intervention by fourteen countries. In the wake of World War II, imperialism launched a protracted "Cold War" and economic containment of socialist countries. Immediately after the triumph of the revolution in China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea, blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and implemented an all-out embargo against China. All of this shows that it will take a sharp struggle with external hostile forces through an armed conflict or other forms of contest before a newly born socialist country can consolidate its power.

History suggests that although the armed aggression, intervention, and economic blockade launched by Western imperialists against socialist countries can create enor

mous problems for socialist countries, they have great difficulty in realizing their goal of overthrowing socialist states. Therefore, imperialist countries are inclined to adopt a "soft" method in addition to employing "hard" policies. In January 1953, U.S. Secretary of States Dulles emphasized the strategy of "peaceful evolution." He pointed out that "the enslaved people" of socialist countries should be "liberated," and become "free people," and that "liberation can be achieved through means other than war," and "the means ought to be and can be peaceful." He displayed satisfaction with the "liberalization-demanding forces" which had emerged in some socialist countries and placed his hope on the third and fourth generations within socialist countries, contending that if the leader of a socialist regime "continues wanting to have children and these children will produce their children, then the leader's offsprings will obtain freedom." He also claimed that "Chinese communism is in fatal danger," and "represents a fading phenomena," and that the obligation of the United States and its allies was "to make every effort to facilitate the disappearance of that phenomena," and "to bring about freedom in all of China by all peaceful means. "3

Chairman Mao paid full attention to these statements by Dulles and watched carefully the changes in strategies and tactics used by imperialists against socialist countries. That was the time when the War to Aid Korea and Resist America had just achieved victory, when the United States was continuing its blockade of the Taiwan Straits and its embargo, and when our domestic situation was stable, "the First Five-Year Plan" was fully under way, economic construction was developing rapidly, and everywhere was the picture of prosperity and vitality. At that moment, Chairman Mao did not immediately bring up the issue of preventing a "peaceful evolution." The reason for his later raising the question has to do with developments in international and domestic situations.

In 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev attacked Stalin, causing an anti-Communist and anti-Socialist wave in the world and triggering incidents in Poland and Hungary. In 1957, a tiny minority of bourgeois Rightists seized the opportunity of Party reform to attack the Party. In 1958, Khrushchev proposed to create a long-wave radio station and

a joint fleet with China in order to control China militarily; he also openly opposed our Party's "Three Red Flags"4 and objected to our just action of "shelling Jinmen5." (Chairour just action of "shelling Jinmen5." (Chairman Mao once said that whether we bombarded Jinmen or suspended our bombardment, our main purpose was to support the Taiwan people and the Taiwan regime to keep Taiwan [from being] invaded and annexed by foreign countries.-Bo's note). The above events alerted Chairman Mao.

In the meantime, the United States actively practiced its strategy of promoting a "peaceful evolution" of socialist countries. In 1957, the Eisenhower administration introduced the "strategy of peaceful conquest," aiming to facilitate "changes inside the Soviet world," through a "peaceful evolution." On October 24, 1958, in an interview with a BBC correspondent, Dulles asserted that communism "will gradually give way to a system that pays more attention to the welfare of the state and people," and that at the moment, "Russian and Chinese Communists are not working for the welfare of their people," and "this kind of communism will change."

Considering the situation in both the Soviet Union and at home, Chairman Mao took very seriously Dulles's remarks. In a speech to the directors of the cooperation regions on November 30, 1958, Chairman Mao noted that Dulles was a man of schemes and that he controlled the helm in the United States. Dulles was very thoughtful. One had to read his speeches word by word with the help of an English dictionary. Dulles was really taking the helm. Provincial Party Committees should assign special cadres to read Cankao ziliao.7 Chairman Mao has always insisted that Party leaders at all levels, especially high-ranking cadres, should closely follow international events and the development of social contradictions on the world scene in order to be well informed and prepared for sudden incidents. It is very necessary for Mao to make that demand. Chairman Mao read Cankao ziliao every day. For us leading cadres, we should consider not only the whole picture of domestic politics but also the whole situation of international politics. Thus we can keep clearheaded, deal with any challenges confidently, and "sit tight in the fishing boat despite the rising winds and waves." This is a very important political lesson and a leadership style.

In 1959, Sino-Soviet relations were even more strained and Sino-Soviet differences even greater. In January, the Soviet Union officially notified China that it would scrap unilaterally the agreement to help China build nuclear industry and produce nuclear bombs. In September when the Sino-Indian Border Incident occurred, the Soviet Union announced neutrality, but in actuality it supported India. It openly criticized China after the incident. At the Soviet-American Camp David Talks during the same month, Khrushchev sought to improve relations with the United States on the one hand and vehemently attacked China's domestic and foreign policies on the other.8 All these events convinced Chairman Mao that the Soviet leadership had degenerated and that Khrushchev had betrayed Marxism and the proletarian revolutionary cause and had turned revisionist. At the Lushan Conference held during July-August that year, when Peng Dehuai9 criticized the "Three Red Flags," Chairman Mao erroneously believed that this reflected the combined attack on the Party by internal and external enemies. Facing such a complex situation, Chairman Mao felt deeply the danger of a "peaceful evolution." Accordingly, he unequivocally raised the issue at the end of that year.

In November 1959, Chairman Mao convened a small-scale meeting in Hangzhou attended by Premier Zhou [Enlai], Peng Zhen, 10 Wang Jiaxiang,11 Hu Qiaomu,12 among others, to discuss and examine the international situation at the time. Before the opening of the meeting, Chairman Mao asked his secretary, Lin Ke, to find Dulles's speeches concerning "peaceful evolution" for him to read. Comrade Lin Ke selected three such speeches: Dulles's address titled "Policy for the Far East" delivered before the California Chamber of Commerce on December 4, 1958, Dulles's testimony made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 28, 1959, and Dulles's speech titled "The Role of Law in Peace" made before the New York State Bar Association on January 31, 1959. Chairman Mao had read these three speeches before. After rereading them, he told Comrade Lin Ke of his opinions about them and asked him to write commentaries based on his views and insert them at the beginning of each of Dulles's statements. After Comrade Lin Ke had completed the commentaries, Mao instructed him to distribute Dulles's speeches, along

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